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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The present study analyses the impact of social assistance programs on poverty, broadly 
construed as economic disadvantage, in eight Central and East European countries during the 
mid-2000s. It does that by examining cross-national & cross-temporal variation program features 
and specificities to identify patterns of association with outcomes of interest such as poverty 
levels, individual long-term income, earnings and assets. The main data source used throughout 
the study is the 2007 longitudinal component of the European Union-Survey of Income and 
Living Condition (EU-SILC). 
Social assistance programs in CEE are a marginal component of the social protection 
system in all eight countries. They serve small populations, spend relatively little compared to 
needs and the benefits they award are largely a top-up for their clients. Both the ability of the 
programs to reach the poor and, the ability to provide them with sufficient resources to bring 
them above the relative poverty threshold are found lacking. However, the more extensive and 
liberal programs achieved higher effectiveness in reducing poverty, and directed a greater share 
of their resources to the very poor. Contrary to theoretical expectations, no link was found 
between generosity and efficiency. Discretion has been linked to very poor targeting 
performance, suggesting arbitrariness in entitlement and spending decisions. 
No conclusive evidence of a work disincentive effect of social assistance programs could 
be discerned. Most importantly, any work disincentives that the programs might create could not 
be linked to the benefits they provide. Instead, lower future incomes appear to be related to 
program participation as such rather than disbursed benefits. 
Finally, social assistance programs could not be shown to impede asset accumulation 
among low-income households. With the exception of debt management, there are no 
indications that the income floor implicit in the programs represents a disincentive to saving.  
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INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE 
 
 
Addressing poverty has long been a core function assumed by the modern Western state. 
After the post-war “golden years”, slower growth, rising and persistent unemployment especially 
in continental Europe, migration, and more conspicuous inequality of income distribution have 
given a new impetus to debates about economic disadvantage and public efforts to reduce and 
control it1. Among the many types of public intervention that may be relevant in this context, 
this study is focused on only one namely, means-tested (cash) transfers directed to households in 
demonstrable need. Throughout the thesis, the same public policy may be referred to using other 
terms such as social assistance, minimum income, income support or public assistance. All are 
used interchangeably. 
The present study analyzes the impact of social assistance programs on poverty, broadly 
construed as economic disadvantage, in eight Central and East European countries during the 
mid 2000s. The interest in the role of means-tested benefits in mitigating poverty stems primarily 
from two sources. On the one hand, this type of program usually endorses poverty prevention/ 
alleviation as an explicit policy goal. On the other hand, means-tested benefits are ultimately the 
last barrier Western democratic capitalist societies have erected between their members and 
material destitution. As such, the capacity of the above mentioned policies to effectively fight 
back against economic deprivation is of particular concern.  
The concept of poverty figures prominently in the argument of the thesis. Despite its 
apparent straightforwardness, there are many uncertainties about its conceptualization, especially 
when moving from the general to the concrete. The main points of contention in the poverty 
literature are reviewed in the next section, along with a more thorough discussion of the way the 
notion is employed for purposes of making the thesis‟s argument. For the moment suffice it to 
say that poverty is meant to describe a state of economic disadvantage resulting from lack of 
material resources. 
Policy analysis is carried out by comparing social assistance programs existent in Central 
and Easter European (CEE) countries, between 2004 and 2007. Albeit now clearly heading 
towards emulating West European models, the region has had its own distinctive history and 
particularities. Shortly before the fall of the communist regime, an important Hungarian 
sociologist, Ivan Szelenyi, was speculating about a possible Third Road developing in the CEE 
satellites of the USSR, as a possible modernization alternative to both Western capitalism and 
Eastern communism (1988). While the Third Road has not materialized, the recent history of the 
region has been quite extraordinary. After World War II, the region has experienced 
unprecedented upheaval as the implementation of a radically different type of society was 
attempted under foreign pressure. Not only political institutions, but also economic and social 
                                                          
1 Before industrialization, material destitution had long been a prominent feature of all European societies. 
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ones have been dramatically transformed. Bureaucratic allocation has replaced market forces as 
the main economic co-ordination mechanisms, and redistributive concerns were subsumed and 
incorporated into economic policy. 
After nearly half a century of straying from the capitalist-democratic path, the same 
region has again underwent radical, social and political changes as the socialist, command 
economy template has been abandoned in favour of liberal democratic capitalism. A new period 
of institutional restructuring and rebuilding has followed in which liberal blueprints have meshed 
with more conservative traditions to build a new institutional order. Moreover, the institutional 
re-making has taken place in a period of acute economic crisis and social turmoil. In this context, 
both the outlook and the consequences of the new institutions are of special interest. 
The institution this work is focused on is the most general type of social assistance, i.e. 
minimum guaranteed income programs targeted at the general population2. On the one hand, 
due to their relative novelty, relatively little is known about the characteristics and the 
functioning of such programs in Central and East European countries. Virtually inexistent two 
decades ago, modern means-tested benefits have been established almost ex-nihilo3. Conversely, 
the “transition” period4 has been marred by formidable social and economic problems, among 
them an increase in poverty and inequality. It is thus of interest to see the extent to which new 
institutions set up in the post-communist era have been successful in addressing an old problem 
of capitalist societies.  
On the other hand, since the design of social assistance programs in CEE countries has 
been largely modelled based on Western blueprints, an opportunity is created to investigate the 
role of context. Although sharing the general outlines of a capitalist democratic system, CEE 
states differ from the developed Western world both in the level of their economic development 
and in the specificities of their bureaucratic-administrative culture. In addition, the peculiar 
make-up of CEE societies may be of relevance. On the one hand, CEE countries have not 
experienced the strains posed by a large influx of immigrants. On the other hands, many of the 
CEE countries are far from homogeneous, as one or several minority ethnic groups inhabit their 
territories. Economic development, migration, ethnic composition, and demographic trends are 
important factors shaping the distribution of resources in a society, and hence also poverty‟s 
profile and characteristics. Administrative capacity is paramount for program implementation, 
and thus program performance, especially in the case of such a complex program as means-
tested social assistance. All of the abovementioned factors make for a policy setting that is quite 
different from that found in more economically developed West European countries. Comparing 
                                                          
2
 I thus do not consider categorical means-tested benefits (such as for example benefits for the elderly or for families 
with children) nor in-kind benefits aimed at the poor. 
3 The next chapter will qualify this assertion to some extent; although poverty was not officially recognized in most 
countries of the Eastern bloc, some very limited benefits to assist the poor have been put into place in late 
communism, especially in the more liberal regimes. 
4 By “transition” it is usually meant to describe the first decade after the fall of the communist regime, i.e. the 1990s. 
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the impacts of similar programs in different settings may yield valuable insights on the 
significance of the latter.  
While some of the discussions concern the entire region, analyses have been carried out 
using only eight countries, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. The choice is based largely on data availability5 
grounds. 
In connecting poverty and policy, I focus on design. More specifically, in treating policy 
as an instrument through which public authorities “wield their power” to effect social change 
(Vedung 1997), I consider whether certain policy features are more likely than others to bring 
about the desired change. To make my case, I go beyond wholesale program evaluation and 
deconstruct one type of policy instrument to a much finer level of detail. In doing so, I eschew 
general regime typology6 discussions in favour of an approach that allows me to examine 
potential policy effects of each program component separately. The underlying motivation is 
both theoretical and practical. On the one hand, by disentangling program elements I am better 
able to draw on and test microeconomic theories of labour supply and saving. On the other 
hand, by analyzing program characteristics individually, I am better positioned to evaluate which 
measures work and which do not in poverty prevention. A serious effort is made to address both 
first and second order effects, so as to gain a more accurate picture of total effects. Second order 
effects originate in behavioural changes that individuals and/or families are inclined to make in 
view of the program‟s existence. A word of caution is warranted at this point. Evidently, the 
various features of a program may have effects individually but also taken together. In other 
words, there may be interactions between the different program components. While I do 
consider such possible effects, my research design and, especially, the small number of different 
policies in my sample preclude me from reaching more than (very) tentative conclusions.  
So far, the term “program/policy effects/performance” has been mentioned, but not 
explained. Broadly speaking, the terms are used as a reference to the impact of social assistance 
programs on economic well-being. First, in all the analysis, social assistance, public assistance, 
means-tested income support and minimum guaranteed income are used interchangeably to refer 
to minimum guaranteed income programs (with the addition of means-tested housing benefits in 
some cases). Thus, means-tested categorical benefits such as those for the elderly or those for 
                                                          
5 All of the analyses are based on the European Union- Survey of Income and Living Condition, and so are limited 
to countries contained in the dataset. Initially the analyses were set to also include Romania and Bulgaria. 
Unfortunately, delays in data release and the smaller number of waves have ultimately precluded their inclusion.  
6
 Several studies have looked into the issue of whether Central European Welfare states/ policies are „different‟. i.e. a 
type of their own (Bahle, T. (2005). Family policy in the enlarged European Union: persistent diversity in 'old' and 
transition to the periphery in the 'new Europe'? Social Conditions in an Enlarged Europe, WZB, Berlin, Cerami, A. 
(2009). "Változó Közép-Európa: a jólét és a szociális segélyezés kialakuló modellyei [ Central Europe in Transition: 
Emerging Models of Welfare and Social Assistance]." ESÉLY(1): 28-50.) . I want to stress that I do not follow this 
approach. Instead, I try to go a to a finer level of detail to look at more general relationships between program 
design and program outcomes. 
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families with children are not considered. The term social assistance is used in a broader meaning 
to denote benefits for the poor in general in the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Second, since the main explicit goal of social assistance transfers is to provide a modicum 
of resources meant to prevent extreme hardship, program effects are first discussed in terms of 
impact on poverty. Subsequently, to keep the analysis simple and straightforward, program 
effects are gauged directly in terms of economic resources rather than poverty. Two types of 
resources that are most probable to affect the economic standing of a majority of households, 
namely income and assets, are considered. Finally, in view of the possible second-order effects of 
means-tested benefits on labour income, I briefly examine program effects on earnings and 
labour supply. The structure of the argument is made explicit in the following section. 
  
 
1.1 STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to the introduction of an important theoretical 
concept, i.e. poverty, as well as to an in-depth discussion of the links between public policy and 
material well-being. As a background to the main question underlying this thesis, I first review 
some of the most important arguments that have been made on both the rationale and limits of 
public intervention to address poverty and inequality. Next, a short general description of the 
most important existing policy framework for addressing poverty and inequality in the 
Developed World, namely the welfare state, follows. Last, the final section of the chapter deals 
with social assistance design and its relationship with poverty.  
The first introductory chapter is followed by two descriptive ones that constitute the 
background for the subsequent analyses. Chapter two reviews the main trends and characteristics 
of poverty in Central and Eastern Europe. The starting point is the communist period. Because 
specific data on poverty during communism is scarce, I build instead on information on income 
distributions, consumption patterns, social mobility, educational outcomes and inequalities in 
political power to show which groups were most likely to find themselves in a disadvantaged 
position. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the post-communist period. It provides 
an overview of levels and trends in both absolute and relative poverty indices, as well as an 
outline of poverty profiles, i.e. individual and household characteristics associated with a higher 
risk of poverty. The chapter ends with a discussion of the length of poverty spells. 
In Chapter 3, the features and specificities of social assistance programs in CEE are 
described in detail. Before examining the current program characteristics, a brief account is given 
of the public measures directed to the poor under the communist regime in various CEE 
countries. Subsequently, characteristics and impact on income inequality of social assistance 
programs during the 1990‟s are discussed. Lastly, the bulk of the chapter is taken up by a detailed 
description of social assistance programs between 2004 and 2007. In all, five separate program 
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dimensions are reviewed, namely expenditure, means-tests and work tests, benefit levels, 
centralization, and the provision of complementary services (health and housing).  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 contain the actual analyses of program effects. Following a summary 
of the main findings related to social assistance programs in Western Europe, Chapter 4 uses 
EU-SILC data to perform a classic pre-post transfer analyses of poverty levels and characteristics 
for eight CEE countries between 2004 and 2007. It shows not only traditional measures of 
poverty reduction, such as the difference in poverty rates and poverty gaps before and after 
transfers, but also measures of targeting performance, program extensiveness (number of clients 
and expenditure), relative benefit levels and distributional effects on the client population. The 
main indicators are presented first for the general population, and subsequently separately for six 
family types. 
Drawing on microeconomic theories of labour supply, Chapter 5 uses econometric 
modelling and the panel nature of the EU-SILC to have a closer look at the impact of program 
participation on future income, earnings and labour supply. Similarly, Chapter 6 looks into the 
potential effects of programs on asset accumulation not only on program clients, but on the low-
income population in general. Finally, Chapter 7 brings together the results from the various 
analyses and puts forward several conclusions.  
 
 
1.2 POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
 
 What is poverty? While the concept has much intuitive appeal, pinning it down involves 
answering a series of difficult questions. As mentioned before, poverty is taken here to represent 
economic disadvantage. But what constitutes disadvantage? And which are the dimensions of 
wellbeing “economic” refers to? In principle, two issues need to be grappled with when defining 
poverty, namely the economic variables the definition relies on and the threshold separating the 
poor from the non-poor. Let us address each of them starting with the latter7.  
 In the nineteenth century tradition, poverty was equated to threatened physical survival 
and pauperism (Miller, Rein et al. 1967). It represented a “condition of individual scarcity taking 
extreme forms” (Andreß 1998), such that satisfaction of the most basic needs was imperilled. 
The threshold which delimited the poor from the rest was therefore “absolute” in the sense of 
being invariant to context. In particular, it did not depend on the material situation of the non-
poor members of society. More recently, as industrialized societies grew more affluent, poverty 
began increasingly to be defined in “relative” terms, as an ”inability to live in a way customary to 
the environment” (Kangas and Ritakallio 1998). In this latter view, poverty cannot be defined 
universally. It comes to be inextricably linked to the average affluence level of society. Thus, 
                                                          
7 For a thorough discussion of definitional and measurement issues related to the concept of poverty see 
Tomaszewski, W. (2009). Multidimensional poverty and social exclusion in Europe: a cross-national perspective. 
Social and Political Sciences. Florence, European University Institute. PhD Thesis. 
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although historically, poverty and inequality have been treated as qualitatively different concepts, 
more recently, they have converged somewhat. In effect, substantial controversies remain about 
whether poverty in the economically developed world should be defined using absolute or 
relative approaches and about the ways the actual poverty threshold may be derived or 
established. Both absolute are relative definitions of poverty start from the general assumption 
that poverty arises in a context in which at least some human needs go unsatisfied. Whereas this 
assumption is relatively uncontroversial, it is much less straightforward to establish which 
unsatisfied needs are to be considered as worthy of public concern. In particular, if basic human 
needs are taken to involve not only physical necessities but also relational and social ones, the 
original, absolute definition of poverty can no longer be seen as adequate. Poverty, in fact, 
becomes a question if inequality. 
Beyond the absolute vs. relative controversy, many issues remain when moving from 
theoretical discussions to empirical research on poverty. First and foremost is operationalization 
of economic well-being. Several strategies are possible, each having both advantages and 
drawbacks. The simplest one is to circumvent all evaluative issues and rely on the direct 
subjective assessment of the respondent herself. Obviously, such a measure would no longer 
reflect an objective depiction but would rather capture individual dissatisfaction with one‟s own 
standard of living (Gallie and Paugam 2002). Because of their striking subjective nature, poverty 
estimates based on assessments carried out by subjects themselves are harder to interpret for 
comparative purposes. Furthermore, the same subjectivity renders impossible their use when 
policy decision making about who receives what benefits is to be made (Kangas and Ritakallio 
1998). Nevertheless, they constitute a valuable source of information that is not to be overlooked 
when examining quality of life and personal wellbeing.  
If poverty is to be defined and measured in an objective way, two options remain. Need 
satisfaction may be measured directly, as quality of life, living standard, or functioning sets (Sen 
1997). Alternatively, an indirect strategy would focus on the availability of resources for need 
satisfaction. The latter has been, by far, the widest used approach in empirical poverty research. 
In principle, many types of resources are consequential for individual well-being and so should 
be taken into account when measuring poverty. In practice, however, it has become customary 
to use post-tax, post-transfer annual income to approximate the reserve that may be employed to 
acquire goods and services needed to satisfy needs. Using lack of income as a measure of poverty 
has the definite advantages of relative easiness in collecting data, as well as the facilitation of 
pooling and comparison by using only one measurement unit, namely money.  
 Despite these practical benefits, focusing narrowly on income alone has noticeable 
shortcomings. First, income is clearly just one type of resource, among many others. Financial 
assets, housing, health, education, access to quality basic services, political power, social 
networks, time etc. all constitute valuable resources that influence current well-being, as well as 
opportunities for the future (Miller, Rein et al. 1967; Andreß 1998; Smeeding 2000; Johansson 
2002). Not only are all these forms of “capital” instrumental to well-being, they are also, to a 
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large extent, interrelated. One form may be transformed or converted into another. Yet, despite 
these considerations, it is inherently very difficult to construct more encompassing but workable 
measures of available resources. The multidimensionality aspect quickly becomes a thorny 
problem once aggregation or interpersonal comparisons are needed. Consequently, 
notwithstanding the substantial progress to be made by taking a multidimensional perspective, 
income-based measures of poverty continue to dominate in empirical research.  
Despite its apparent promise of tractability, using income alone to measure and examine 
poverty is not without problems. For example, being a flow measure, income may vary, 
sometimes substantially over time. As such, cross-sectional pictures of household income at any 
given moment may greatly over- or underestimate average income in the longer run8. In addition, 
income from certain sources, such as home production, the grey economy, 
traditional/subsistence agriculture or the monetary value of in-kind transfers is notoriously 
difficult to quantify. 
A more general critique may be levelled not only against income based measures of 
deprivation but against all attempts to assess poverty by relying on the indirect measurement of 
available resources. Ultimately, the substantive interest is in actual individual well-being and the 
various types of resources are simply means to achieving other ends. In focusing exclusively on 
means, the resource based approach ignores the fact that heterogeneity in individual, 
environmental, social etc. factors yields different “conversion rates” of resources into well-being 
(Sen 1997). A possible alternative is then to take a direct approach, and study well-being and 
achieved functioning in society. However, beyond a few uncontroversial aspects such as health, 
education or longevity, translating well-being into actual observable indicators quickly becomes 
intractable. First, if participation in society is purported to necessitate adequate consumption, a 
major difficulty resides in pinning down deficient consumption, i.e. in establishing a list of items 
the consumption of which is necessary to share the community‟s life style (Andreß 1998; Kangas 
and Ritakallio 1998). Second, both achieved functioning and actual consumption behaviour are 
largely the result of individual choices. Thus, not all deficiencies in consumption, achieved 
functioning or well-being may be qualified as deprivation.  A millionaire drug user may 
experience poor health as a result of her habits, but could hardly be considered as deprived as a 
result. Establishing the degree to which a shortfall in consumption is attributable to personal 
choice or to factors outside the control of the individual is not clear-cut. Third, acquiring precise 
expenditure data is much more demanding than obtaining the same type of data on income. 
Household bookkeeping may be the best alternative but, due to the effort involved, it cannot be 
carried out over long stretches of time (Kangas and Ritakallio 1998).  
Partly in response to the many shortcomings of the income-based poverty concept, a 
series of closely linked concepts, intended to broaden the perspective have been forged, among 
them social exclusion, underclass, or precarity. While the relative aspect of deprivation conceived 
                                                          
8 Stability and predictability of income may itself be valuable for well-being; 
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as “exclusion from ordinary living patterns through lack of resources” (Whelan and Maître 2005) 
figures prominently in all of them, they each focus on slightly different aspects. For example, 
proponents of social exclusion tend to emphasize the dynamic processes through which one 
becomes excluded, rather than the exclusion state itself (Whelan and Maître 2005). The term 
underclass on the other hand denotes an enduring state on deprivation, the continuation of 
which gradually erases any hope for improvement and thus, generates perverse adaptations 
(Kronauer 1998). Lastly, precarity is concerned with instability of living standards and 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks, especially but not only, due to joblessness and marginal 
employment. 
 For the purposes of this study, poverty is defined using a relative rather than absolute 
framework. In addition, an indirect approach is taken, in that the focus is on economic resources 
(mainly income and assets) rather than on consumption, functionings or satisfaction with one‟s 
own economic situation. The choices are grounded both in the comparative nature of the study 
and in its primary focus, namely of linking public policy design and poverty outcomes. On the 
one hand, the adoption of a relative definition of poverty greatly simplifies cross-national 
comparisons. First, it avoids the necessity of actually having to construct a list of basic necessities 
to be covered in the absence of poverty. Second, it circumvents the careful calibration of 
absolute poverty lines so as to take into consideration local factors (such as climate for example). 
Finally, given that the affluence level of Central East European countries is more akin to 
Western developed countries than to the Third World, a relative poverty threshold that includes 
not only physical but also social needs is more appropriate.  
On the other hand, the preference for a relative definition of poverty is justified also by 
the focus on the evaluation of social assistance design. Although, in principle, social assistance 
may be used to reduce both absolute and relative poverty, it is essentially a redistributive policy. 
Consequently, it is primarily a means to alter the distribution of a society‟s existing resources (i.e. 
inequality) rather than their level (i.e. the average living standard)9. It is the capacity of social 
assistance programs to reduce inequality at the bottom, rather than to ensure physical survival 
that is the focal point of this study. 
Lastly, the resource based approach is the most suitable one for policy appraisal 
purposes. The stated explicit objective of social assistance programs is to provide a modicum of 
resources when other options have been exhausted. The goal of the programs is thus to alter an 
objective situation rather than a subjective one. Since perception and reality may diverge 
considerably, subjective poverty assessments are unhelpful in this case10. Similarly, while policy 
may occasionally take a paternalistic stance11, the aim is usually to provide an additional 
                                                          
9 Historically, the reduction of absolute poverty has been achieve through economic growth rather than through 
redistribution. 
10 Consider for example a program that keeps the poor in poverty but makes them more accepting and content with 
their situation. 
11 For example, by encouraging certain types of consumption through the provision of in-kind rather than cash 
benefits. 
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opportunity rather than to directly determine individual choices and life-styles. As such, a focus 
on resources is preferable to one on consumption and living standards. Finally, while capabilities 
and functionings represent a promising new avenue, their operationalization and measurement 
beyond health and human capital indicators is often problematic. Moreover, functionings are the 
final result of many intertwined causal processes, biological, environmental, social, economic, 
psychological etc. Disentangling the role of one policy in this context may be unfeasible. And 
having economic resources may ultimately be considered one capability among many.  
 
 
1.3 PUBLIC POLICY AND POVERTY 
 
Poverty, especially in its absolute (but also in its relative) form, has long been the target 
of collective action, initially by private actors such as the Church and later by the State. The first 
systematic attempts at tackling the poverty problem, the English Poor Laws, date back to the 
XVII-th century (Nelson 2004), practically constituting the oldest form of national social policy 
in the modern world. To some extent, the early beginnings of social assistance are also due to the 
recognition of the many harmful social outcomes poverty brings along. The rationales for public 
policy to limit/eliminate poverty are examined next. 
 
1.3.1 A CASE FOR PUBLIC INTERVENTION? 
 
Regardless of which precise definition or measurement is adopted, poverty, and some 
forms of inequality more generally, pose deep ethical questions. First of all, the existence of deep 
material deprivation is at odds with our intuition that all human beings have intrinsic value and 
are worthy of respect. Financial poverty seems to be the single strongest determinant of personal 
wellbeing (Gallie and Paugam 2002). It is not only material comfort that is at stake, but the 
normal psychological and social functioning of the person. On the psychological level, living in 
poverty entails higher levels of stress due to continuous facing of financial shortages, frustration 
due to the failure to realize one‟s life plans, reduced moral, feelings of humiliation and social 
devaluation, low self-esteem and a sense of being stigmatised (Walker 1998; Gallie and Paugam 
2002). The impact of being deprived is all the more noxious in affluent societies, as the contrast 
with the rich brings one‟s poverty in sharper focus  (Whelan and Maître 2005). 
Lack of sufficient material resources, especially in its extreme forms, impedes a person‟s 
full personal development. Thus, a strong case can be made that a modicum of resources should 
be made available to everyone, as a precondition to enabling individuals to seek self-realization. 
The argument becomes even more compelling if viewed from an intergenerational perspective. If 
parental resources are decisively consequential for their children‟s life chances, fairness towards 
the younger generation presupposes absence of excessive material hardship in the parental 
cohort, so as to ensure equality of opportunity (Sefton 2006). Finally, if one accepts diminishing 
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marginal utility of income and/or other valuable resources, very large differences in the 
distribution of resources are problematic to justify on normative grounds. 
 On the social level, integrative institutions tend to malfunction in the case of the poor. 
Low incomes put strain on family relations, triggering lower satisfaction levels with family life, 
bringing about conflict and ultimately family break-up (Gallie and Paugam 2002). Inability to 
participate in the customary life-style risks engendering social isolation. Research evidence points 
to the fact that the lowest income groups have the scarcest social contact and that they feel the 
most isolated (Böhnke 2008). Even when the range of their social network is not markedly 
smaller, the poor are more likely to be dissatisfied with their social relationships, indicating a 
qualitative deficit in their social bonds(Gallie and Paugam 2002; Böhnke 2008).  
 From a political point of view, deficit of material resources, especially in the long run, is 
prone to prompt a handicap in terms of power (Laski 1974; Kronauer 1998; Sefton 2006). 
Groups that are barred from participating in the power-sharing process risk becoming politically 
alienated and detached from the political institutions of the society they live in. Disappointed 
with the democratic game, they are in peril of becoming supporters of various forms of 
extremism. 
 On a more general note, one should bear in mind the deleterious effects of material 
scarcity on social integration. Continuous long-standing poverty brings about not only 
dissatisfaction with the political system but also with the societal one. The poorest strata often 
display less solidaristic attitudes, are more intolerant and less trustful (Whelan and Maître 2005). 
Ultimately, marginalization of a significant share of the population threatens to muster conflict 
and to endanger social cohesion. Feelings of resentfulness, frustration and powerlessness are 
conducive to social polarization, tensions and conflict and risk undermining the very fabric 
society is built upon. 
To sum up, normative consideration regarding both the individual and the society 
militate in favour of public intervention to reduce relative deprivation resulting from large 
inequalities. A parallel argument can be made on efficiency grounds. Aside from the intrinsic 
value we might place, as moral beings, on individual self-fulfilment, material deprivation is 
counterproductive as it results in loss of human capital, both through lack of investment and 
through psychological strain. Therefore, from a micro perspective, relative deprivation is 
unambiguously negative as it causes valuable productive resources to be wasted. Much more 
controversy surrounds the relationship between inequality and efficiency, at the macro level. A 
straightforward and intuitive argument states that inequality, by encouraging risk-taking, 
entrepreneurship etc., is conducive to economic growth. Yet, the empirical evidence behind this 
assertion is rather thin. On the contrary, high inequality seems to be associated with wasteful 
management and lower growth (Lipton and Ravallion 1995). In addition, redistributive public 
intervention may reduce economic insecurity and hence induce risk-averse individuals to 
innovate, take risks and adapt to take advantage of existing opportunities (Sefton 2006).  
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 Given the ethical quandaries, as well as the negative externalities brought about by the 
existence of economic deprivation, there is a strong case to be made for public intervention to 
prevent, combat or otherwise alleviate the phenomenon. If the goal of public action in this 
context is relatively clear, the precise means through which the goal may be achieved are subject 
to much more controversy. Since Western liberal societies have accepted market mechanisms as 
the principal allocators of resources, altering the existing distribution entails either changing the 
rules by which the market operate so as to achieve more equality or redistributing “outside” the 
market12. The distributive impacts of government economic regulations and institutions 
undoubtedly represent a crucial public policy topic that has received relatively little attention13. 
Instead, mainstream research on public redistribution has focused on the tax-benefit system, as 
the main tool through which governments may alter distributional outcomes in their societies. 
Indeed, unlike other types of policies, the tax-benefit system has redistribution as one of its 
explicit goals. The case for redistribution “outside” the market through progressive taxation and 
benefit transfers is reviewed in the following section. 
 
1.3.2 SHOULD (AND CAN) WE REDISTRIBUTE? 
  
Is public policy in general and redistribution in particular, desirable as a way to reduce 
relative poverty and inequality? Even admitting that deprivation is best avoided or counteracted, 
it is not clear that public action can or should make a difference. Standard neoclassical 
economics posits and equity-efficiency trade-off (Atkinson 1989; Stiglitz 2000; Blank 2002; Barr 
2004). The inverse relationship arises because, in a static framework at least, redistribution in 
itself is a costly activity. Taxation14 not only consumes resources directly (through administrative 
costs for example), but it lowers the relative benefit of working and saving relative to leisure and 
consumption. Clearly, the equity-efficiency trade-off has consequences for public efforts to 
address poverty and inequality. Its relevance however depends crucially on what the mechanisms 
behind poverty and extreme inequality are. Thus, for public intervention to play a beneficial role, 
a clearer account of the causes and origins of poverty and inequality is needed. Unfortunately, 
social theory can provide us only with “weak” and inconclusive causal accounts of poverty (Rein 
and Winship 1999).  
Three broad types of explanations have been put forward to account for the existence of 
deprivation. The first one emphasizes poverty‟s idiosyncratic character. It posits that becoming 
                                                          
12 Redistribution cannot be fully outside the market as, whatever its peculiarities, it is bound to have effects that feed 
back into market allocation. 
13 On the role that institutions play in structuring and enabling economic activity see North, D. (1990). Institutions, 
institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.; for an argument against 
state intervention in economic activities see Hayek, F. A. (1939). Freedom and the Economic System. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, Hayek, F. A. (1976). Law, legislation and liberty. Vol. 2 The Mirage of Social Justice. 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.; for an opposite view, see Danziger, S. and R. D. Plotnick (1986). "Poverty 
and Policy: Lessons of the Last Two Decades." The Social Service Review 60(1): 34-51. 
14 Taxation may be explicit or implicit by benefit withdrawal. 
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poor is the outcome of a series of personal free, unconstrained choices. In this sense, poverty is 
“voluntary”, the result of specific individual preferences (for working less, saving and investing 
less etc.)15. If this is the case, redistributive antipoverty efforts by the state are neither required 
(since the poor themselves are solely responsible for their own plight), nor desirable since they 
exacerbate instead of solving the problem16. To be sure, if the experiencing of poverty is due to a 
personal distaste for productive activity, public redistribution only encourages the poor to evade 
integration through work and to organize their lives around public transfers. Since these transfers 
are financed through levies on others‟ productive work, public transfers become problematic 
both from a moral perspective (since they support “undeserving” poor) and from an efficiency 
one (since they discourage work and saving). If poverty is the result of the poor‟s own human 
failings, public policy should try to address those failings rather than redistribute17. Redistribution 
will only create a “welfare trap” and thereby perpetuate poverty18. The first historical attempts to 
tackle poverty have, in fact, been based on such a view19. More recently, these ideas have 
resurged in the context of persistent high joblessness rates, especially in Europe. In both cases, 
social control rather than redistribution becomes the focus of public policy. 
 The remaining two causal accounts of poverty emphasize less the individual choices of 
the poor and more factors outside their control, such as institutional patterns, economic cycles, 
social stratification and mobility patterns, specific life stages etc. Institutions, in particular, play a 
special role structuring the opportunities and barriers for resource acquisition in a society. 
Therefore, they have the potential to systematically disadvantage some groups relative to others. 
The most simple and compelling example is that of racial, ethnic, gender etc. discrimination 
which has served to keep some groups permanently in a lower socio-economic position. Another 
institutional mechanism that has been pointed out as closely linked with poverty and inequality is 
the institution of the family. Growing up in a poor family is associated with multiple adversities 
such a socialization deficit, exposure to deviant attitudes and behavioural models, lack of social 
control, spatial segregation and isolation, all of which combine to create particular adaptations 
that have the ultimate effect of transmitting poverty to the next generation. In this account, 
poverty is due to personal characteristics, albeit not ones that the poor themselves have freely 
chosen. Children simply “inherit” the disadvantaged state of their parents (Gallie and Paugam 
2002; Gallie and Paugam 2004). Finally, due to the fact that income from work has become the 
main source of income in modern societies, labour market institutions are especially salient to the 
                                                          
15 A similar argument is made by Milton Friedman with respect to inequality,  Friedman, M. (1953). "Choice, 
Chance, and the Personal Distribution of Income." Journal of Political Economy 61(4): 277-290. 
16 They are also paternalistic in that they do not respect the poor‟s “choice” of lifestyle. 
17 To a large extent this has been the approach of liberal economists that have emphasized human capital 
development and job creation as better ways to tackle poverty than redistribution Brady, D. (2005). "The Welfare 
State and Relative Poverty in Rich Western Democracies, 1967-1997." Social Forces 88(4): 1329-1364. 
18 A more thorough discussion of these arguments is found in Chapter 5. 
19 The English Poor Law was clearly concerned with public support destroying the “moral” incentives for the poor, 
and so imposed the very harsh test of the workhouse Barr, N. (2004). Economics of the Welfare State. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.  
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form of the income distribution. Some authors have went so far as to identify lack of a job or 
too low earnings as the main culprits behind poverty and deprivation (Johansson 2002). Some 
categories of workers, such as the low skilled, older workers or new entrants are known to face 
more hurdles in achieving labour market integration. In the long run, inability to gain access to 
employment or weak attachment to the labour market is likely to entail marginalization and 
confinement to survival strategies (Kronauer 1998). It should be kept in mind though that 
exclusion from the labour market does not automatically trigger poverty (for example, 
housewives or early retirees seldom belong to the ranks of the poor). On the other hand, 
employment per se does not guarantee well-being. Low paying jobs are often insufficient to 
provide enough resources to escape poverty. Moreover, low paying jobs are also more insecure 
and provide few opportunities for promotion and advancement. Consequently, individuals 
holding low quality jobs are more likely to be permanently trapped in a stratum of working poor.  
 The life-course perspective shares with the previous theories the emphasis on structural 
factors, but diverges in that it recognizes that poverty is often transitory rather than permanent. 
Accordingly, it adopts a dynamic rather than static point of view, focusing on the critical 
moments during lifetime when vulnerability to experiencing poverty increases (Andreß and 
Schulte 1998). Special attention is paid to mediating processes and triggering events (such as 
finishing education, retirement, becoming divorced, ill health etc.) that are likely to prompt a 
poverty spell. 
 If the explanation for poverty is at least partly structural, as the last two explanations 
assert, there is a larger role for public redistribution to play. Yet, is redistribution with the aim of 
eliminating or at least reducing poverty possible? Since all reshuffling of market income carries 
behavioural incentives, it is not clear that the tax-benefit system though designed to be 
redistributive will ultimately be so. Firstly, depending on their exact design and starting 
conditions, tax-benefit systems that are theoretically designed to redistribute towards the bottom 
may eventually determine regressive outcomes. For example, given a particular set of conditions, 
taxation of inheritances can be shown to increase rather than decrease income inequality (Davies 
1986). Similarly,  taxation may increase pre-tax inequality both by lowering effort and by 
reducing risk aversion20 (Sinn 1995). This class of arguments goes back to the original conflict 
between redistribution and efficiency, via negative effects on economic incentives. Though a 
classic supposition in classical economic theory, the counterproductive nature of redistribution 
remains to be verified empirically.   
 In fact, despite this argument‟s theoretical plausibility, the empirical evidence to support 
it remains thin (Atkinson 1995; Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001; 
Moffitt 2002). Even when empirical evidence does seem to confirm theoretically derived 
                                                          
20 The same paper makes the case that the insurance aspect of redistribution, if taken to extreme may lower 
efficiency as moral hazard with regard to risk taking sets in Sinn, H.-W. (1995). "A Theory of the Welfare State." 
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97(4): 495-526. The  insurance aspect of redistribution is discussed in the 
next section. 
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predictions, interpretation is not clear-cut and contradictory findings have to be reconciled21. 
Conflicting results are obtained depending on the specifics of the research design. Generally, 
macro level studies that analyze the impact of welfare state spending on economic indicators 
such as growth, unemployment, GDP/capita and so on, in rich Western democracies fail to find 
any negative effects22 (Atkinson 1995; Aghion, Caroli et al. 1999; Headey, Goodin et al. 2000; 
Brady 2005; Wilensky 2006).  
Notwithstanding their usefulness in testing prima facie predictions derived from theory, 
macro level studies cannot provide an ultimate answer on the efficiency-redistribution trade off. 
Since an observed macro-level pattern is compatible with several explanations, macro level 
studies cannot resolve issues of interpretation. Instead, microeconomic theory on mechanisms 
and corresponding microeconomic empirical testing are required. Albeit not in short supply, 
microeconomic models have usually suffered from oversimplification and a lack of focus on the 
institutional forms in which redistribution is embedded (Atkinson 1989; Atkinson 1995). Most 
importantly, they continue to assume perfectly competitive and perfectly informed markets 
where clear cases of market failure have been documented. The existence of market failures 
often mutes or attenuates the redistribution- efficiency conflict (Atkinson 1989; Barr 2004). 
Extending the classical theoretical model of saving and investment to incorporate the case of 
imperfect capital markets, Aghion et al. make the case that redistribution may be growth 
enhancing by providing more opportunities for investment, improving borrower incentives and 
reducing macroeconomic volatility (Aghion, Caroli et al. 1999). Likewise, accounting for the fact 
that involuntary unemployment is an uninsurable risk23 that cannot be organised on actuarial 
bases makes subsidization of unemployment (in effect redistribution) desirable on efficiency 
grounds (Barr 2004).  
 Issues of market failure aside, the equity efficiency trade-off is rooted in another 
questionable assumption. In its basic formulation, welfare economics is based on the utilitarian 
desire to maximize the abstract concept of total utility, not material welfare. To arrive at testable 
empirical formulations, it is further assumed that individual utility depends solely on one‟s own 
level of material possessions. This is however a very stringent assumption. In particular, 
individual utility may partially depend on others‟ level of material resources24 (Barr 2004; 
                                                          
21 Most studies have focused on the effect of replacement rates implicit in unemployment and means-tested income 
support benefit on hours worked; although these two programs are generally found to have some negative effects 
on labour supply, findings indicate that it not replacement rates but rather other program features such as duration 
or the enforcement of the job search requirement that matter most Atkinson, A. B. (1995). "The Welfare State and 
Economic Performance." National Tax Journal 48(2): 171-198. 
22 In fact, macro level studies are more likely to find positive than negative effects of welfare state on economic 
performance. 
23 Obviously, the biggest problem in insuring unemployment is moral hazard. That however is not all. 
Unemployment risk is not entirely individual, as during recession involuntary unemployment increases over the 
board. 
24 The most prominent example is that of positional goods or status markers Hansson, S. O. (2004). "Welfare, 
Justice, and Pareto Efficiency." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7(4): 361-380. 
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Hansson 2004). Taking into account such externalities modifies efficiency equilibriums and 
consequently, affects the relationship with equality and redistribution. 
The efficiency-equality conundrum has been the most discussed rationale against public 
redistribution. There are however other types of counterarguments that may be put forward. 
One line of reasoning asserts that even if efficient, redistribution through taxes and benefit 
intrudes too much into individual freedom and autonomy, and as such should be avoided (Hayek 
1939; Hayek 1976; Barr 2004). The point is no longer a conflict between equality and efficiency 
but one between equality and freedom25. Unlike the case of efficiency, the incompatibility is 
established on normative grounds and, as such, cannot be refuted empirically. Nevertheless, the 
argument does not stop here. The conflict between equality and freedom hinges on whether 
freedom is framed negatively, as absence of coercion or positively, as an ability to act (Laski 
1974; Barr 2004). If the second position is taken, liberty actually necessitates a modicum of 
security and equality26.  
Thirdly, even if redistribution can be shown in theory to be technically possible and 
normatively desirable, its implementation is much trickier. Since redistribution is to be carried 
out by a state apparatus and its leaders who have their own interests and agenda, transfers that 
were originally designed for the poor are at risk of being hijacked by other more politically 
powerful vested or rent-seeking interests27 (Hayek 1976; Lipton and Ravallion 1995; Stiglitz 
2000). A study of developing and middle-income democracies found that neutral and effective 
bureaucratic institutions is instrumental in poverty alleviation28 (Henderson, Hulme et al. 2007). 
Finally, even supposing that redistribution is feasible, normatively desirable and a 
dependable state apparatus to implement it exists, it may still fail due to political economy 
reasons. Since Western states are also representative democracies, taxes and benefits that reduce 
inequality and benefit the poor must enjoy popular support in order to be adopted and 
subsequently survive. Seemingly, in a society in which collective decisions are taken through 
universal vote, public demand for redstribution should increase in the face of higher inequalities. 
However, a more thorough analysis shows that the actual public support redistributive programs 
enjoy depends on additional factors such as whether they are directed solely to the poor or 
                                                          
25 This is the libertarian position. 
26 For an argument refuting the normative contradiction between equality and efficiency see Wilkinson, T. M. 
(2010). Deontic Efficiency and Equality. Essays on Philosophy, Politics and Economics. C. Favor, G. Gaus and J. 
Lamont. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press: 159-172. 
27 This has actually been shown to occur in developing countries Lipton, M. and M. Ravallion (1995). Poverty and 
Policy. Handbook of Development Economics. J. Behrman and T. N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam, Elsevier. IIIB: 2551-
2657. 
28 The role of effective bureaucracies in fostering economic growth has long been documented. See for example,  
Rauch, J. E. (1995). "Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Cities during the 
Progressive Era." The American Economic Review 85(4): 968-979, Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1997). "Why Don't 
Poor Countries Catch Up: A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation." Economic Inquiry 35(3): 590-
602, Stark, D. and L. Bruszt (1998). Postsocialist Pathways. Transforming Politics and Property in East Central 
Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Evans, P. and J. E. Rauch (1999). "Bureaucracy and Growth: A 
Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of the "Weberian" State Structures and Economic Growth." American 
Sociological Review 64(5): 748-765. 
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encompass middle class families as well (Sen 1995; Cantillon, Marx et al. 2003; Nelson 2004), on 
whether they are viewed primarily as redistributive or insurance devices (Moene and Wallerstein 
2001) and on the phase of the economic cycle (Danziger and Plotnick 1986).  
 To sum up, redistribution carries its own problems and risks. Yet, despite the substantial 
controversies that surround it, redistribution through the tax-benefit system remains a 
centrepiece of modern government. While tax financed cash transfers are present in virtually all 
developed capitalist economies, the exact content, design and therefore outcomes vary 
substantively. A more in depth discussion of the distinctive attributes and outputs of transfer 
programs, generally termed social protection or the welfare state, is presented in the next section.  
 
 
1.4 THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE WELFARE STATE 
 
The arguments put forward thus far should have made it clear that achieving poverty 
reduction through public intervention is an inherently complex matter, fraught with unforeseen 
setbacks and shifting dilemmas. Nevertheless, public intervention aimed at poverty prevention/ 
reduction does take place, under a variety of programs and policies.  
Established during the latter half of the XIX-th century, the modern welfare state has 
become a ubiquitous presence in capitalist economies. It nowadays accounts for a large share of 
public outlays in virtually all rich Western nations. Its exceptional expansion in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, and subsequent retrenchment during the „80s and the „90s have been the 
subject of much controversy (Pierson 1996; Myles and Quadagno 2002; Wilensky 2006). One 
aspect that has received a great deal of attention is the redistributive side of the welfare state. On 
the one hand redistribution might be attacked as excessive. On the other hand, it is claimed that 
the ultimate purpose of the welfare state is to prevent poverty and destitution, and redistribution 
is its main tool in achieving such goals (Behrendt 2002; Nelson 2004; Sefton 2006; Wilensky 
2006). Yet, despite the visible progressive nature of both cash transfers and provision of basic 
social services such as health-care or education, it is worth remembering that the origins of 
welfare state are to be found not so much in a desire to redistribute as to insure. 
The origin of the welfare state has been ascribed to the new needs created by capitalism 
and industrialism. In modern economic parlance, the welfare state is a response to the inability of 
markets to allocate resources efficiently in some areas of the economy, i.e. market failure (Barr 
1992; Stiglitz 2000; Barr 2004; Kleiman and Teles 2006). In particular, informational barriers 
create specific pitfalls29 in insurance and capital markets that render certain types of income loss 
uninsurable on private markets. As such, public provision is warranted on efficiency grounds. In 
fact, current social security programs continue to be broadly based on the insurance principle, 
and may be viewed as “collective action to protect individuals against income deficiencies” (Hill 
                                                          
29 Moral hazard and adverse selection are the most important informational problems discussed in the economic 
literature on insurance. 
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2006). Furthermore, public provision of income loss insurance does not have to be 
redistributive. In principle, its parameters may be set in such a way that primary market allocation 
inequality is maintained or even increased30 (Hill 2006) 31. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
redistributive effects of a program may be different, depending on the time frame considered, as 
much of the redistribution taking place at any given moment may be cancelled out over the 
lifetime (Sefton 2006). 
Thus, failures in the insurance and credit markets are by themselves enough to justify the 
existence of publicly provided social insurance programs that constitute the core of the modern 
welfare state. On the other hand, the existence of market failures would not seem to justify the 
current form of most welfare states. Notably, neither the progressive bias in contributory programs, 
nor the presence of non-contributory ones should be required based on inefficiencies in the 
insurance and credit markets. Before discussing this argument at length, let us note that 
redistributive arrangements are in principle possible only within a public, compulsory program. 
Private, actuarial insurance arrangements preclude any vertical cross-subsidization between 
different risks. Therefore, the welfare state has the advantage of being able to combine insurance 
with redistribution (albeit it does not have to), whereas purely private, market-based insurance 
cannot (Barr 1992). 
While the efficiency enhancing role of contributory social transfers in providing 
insurance against catastrophic income loss are well established, universal and means-tested 
programs are often presumed to serve exclusively redistributive purposes. In effect, the insurance 
and redistributive functions of the welfare state are assumed to be separate and embodied in 
separate types of programs, i.e. contributory and non-contributory. The result of this 
separateness is a two-tracked system, with (marked) differences in the generosity and political 
acceptance of the two types of programs32.  
While the association of contributory benefits with insurance and non-contributory ones 
with redistribution might appear intuitive, the distinction is, in essence, illusory. Both 
contributory and non-contributory benefits simultaneously serve both insurance and 
                                                          
30 A special case of course is unemployment insurance that tends to be redistributive in a cross-sectional  income 
centered analysis; however, earnings related unemployment insurance may be regressive in the long  run if higher 
and lower earners have the same propensity of becoming unemployed; moreover, an unemployment insurance 
system may be regressive is assets and non-labour income are considered alongside earnings. 
31 This actually was the case in the Soviet welfare state where wage differentials were supplemented by transfer 
differentials as a way to increase the efficiency of labour allocation; see Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion of 
this point. 
32 Despite their constituting a relatively small share of public expenditure, many reform efforts have been targeted at 
means-tested cash benefits and other programs targeted towards the poor; while sometimes cuts affected core 
contributory programs as well, these tended to be small and inconsequential for the general structure and outlook of 
the programs; as such, contributory programs proved to be politically much more resilient to retrenchment Sen, A. 
(1995). The Political Economy of Targeting. Public Spending and the Poor. Theory and Evidence. D. Van de Walle 
and K. Nead. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press: 11-24, Skocpol, T. (1995). Social Policy in the United 
States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, Myles, J. and 
J. Quadagno (2002). "Political Theories of the Welfare State." The Social Service Review 76(1): 34-57, Wilensky, H. 
L. (2006). Social Policy: Is There a Crisis of the Welfare State? Handbook of Public Policy. B. G. Peters and J. 
Pierre. London, Sage Publications: 201-217. 
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redistribution purposes. On the one hand, contributory programs may be designed so as to 
increase the benefit-contribution ratio for low-wage earners, thereby redistributing vertically 
from the better-off to the poor. On the other hand, by providing benefits in case of income loss 
or other contingencies (such as for example, having children), non-contributory benefits do serve 
an insurance purpose, in the sense of providing some sort of security in case of adverse 
economic circumstances. Absent a secure and stable attachment to the labour market, the 
contributory logic breaks down and insurance may be achieved only through non-contributory 
transfers. Universal and conditional benefits may be particularly adapted to provide insurance for 
the vulnerable categories such as low-wage workers, carers and other categories whose link to the 
labour market is tenuous. Since these groups face larger risks of experiencing income shocks and 
larger probable losses, as well as higher transaction costs when attempting to insure on the 
market (Dercon, Bold et al. 2008), providing them with insurance may potentially bring 
efficiency gains. More generally, the poor have little resources to cushion the impact of an 
adverse event, and therefore may be forced to resort to practices that while tackling the 
emergency, are counterproductive in the long term such as postponing health-care, failing to 
invest in education, selling income generating assets, engaging in crime etc. (Emory Burton 1992; 
Barrett and Carter 2005; Ladány and Szelenyi 2006; Stricker 2007). Consequently, non-
contributory benefits that benefit the poor are efficiency enhancing to the extent that they 
prevent or minimize behaviour that is harmful both for the recipients themselves and for society 
at large. Ultimately, all welfare state programs may be conceptualized as an insurance contract 
entered in behind a veil of ignorance (Barr 1992). 
To summarize, the insurance and redistributive function of the welfare state are 
analytically distinct. In practice though, the distinction becomes blurred. Traditional contributory 
social insurance programs incorporate redistributive features whereas non-contributory, universal 
or means-tested ones may be also conceptualized as insurance tools33. Obviously, both insurance 
and redistribution are consequential to addressing poverty concerns. Essentially, both insurance 
and redistribution are put into practice by providing resources to individuals or families afflicted 
by an unfavourable economic condition, be it sickness, unemployment, low wage, lone 
parenthood, old-age, disability etc. The conventional wisdom treats contributory transfers as 
primarily aimed at consumption smoothening while non-contributory ones as directly geared 
towards poverty prevention and/or alleviation. Nonetheless, in principle, all transfer programs 
have distributional consequences and thus, may mitigate or, on the contrary, advance relative 
poverty. Indeed, programs that have been designed with consumption smoothening in mind may 
                                                          
33 The double functionality of the welfare state is also apparent in political theories regarding its emergence and 
subsequent development. Theories that have related the origin of the welfare state to the needs imposed by 
capitalism and industrialism have in fact emphasized its insurance functions. Conversely, explanations based on the 
political actors and political institutions have highlighted its redistribution outcomes.  
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be more effective at poverty reduction than transfer programs explicitly designed as anti-poverty 
tools (Nelson 2004; de Neubourg, Castonguay et al. 2007). 
On a different level, the rationale behind the welfare state construction is not only 
economic or distributional, but also social and political. By pooling risks across income, 
occupation, education, age and class, the welfare state represents a powerful integrative 
institution (Myles and Quadagno 2002; Ferrera 2005). By fostering social cohesion and national 
solidarity, the welfare state has in effect become an important pillar and identity symbol of the 
modern nation state. The same integrative function though may be interpreted from a different 
perspective. Marxist critics of the welfare state have asserted that by providing for the most basic 
needs of its workforce, the state has created a powerful instrument of social control that allows 
for the peaceful survival of the capitalist economic system (Barr 2004). Control and cohesion 
ultimately are different aspects of the same basic mechanism. 
 
 
1.5 POLICY DESIGN AND THE ANTI-POVERTY ROLE OF THE WELFARE STATE 
 
The modern welfare state is a complex institution that does not easily fit in the classical 
efficiency-equity trade-off. Rather than being a simple drain on economic resources, it addressed 
and bridges important gaps left over by the functioning of the markets. At the same time, it 
redistributes resources both horizontally and vertically, while serving as an integration tool. 
Finally, public transfers have a key role to play in public efforts to deal with poverty and material 
hardship. 
The anti-poverty role of the welfare state in various types of settings has received special 
scrutiny (Rodgers 1988; Emory Burton 1992; Kolberg and Ferge 1992; van de Walle and Nead 
1995; Tóth 1999; Grinspun 2001; Behrendt 2002; Cantillon, Marx et al. 2003; Nelson 2004; 
Brady 2005; de Neubourg, Castonguay et al. 2007; Handler and Hasenfeld 2007; Barrientos and 
Hulme 2008; Noelke 2008; Ziliak 2009). At this point, it should be noted that transfer programs 
within the welfare state are not the only anti-poverty tool available for public action. On the 
contrary, some economists have argued that the best way to address poverty is not through 
direct social transfers but by growth inducing macroeconomic policies and free markets34 (van de 
Walle and Nead 1995; Subbarao, Bonnerjee et al. 1997; Grinspun 2001; Hagerty, Vogel et al. 
2002; Barrientos and Hulme 2008; Schmidt 2009). These would bring about a “rising tide for all 
boats”, i.e. an overall increase in incomes across the board that would “trickle down” to the 
poorest members of society. Apart from the fact that the validity of the relationship between 
economic growth and poverty in all contexts (the “trickle down” theory) is disputed (Aghion, 
Caroli et al. 1999), the argument only stands if poverty is defined in absolute terms. On the 
                                                          
34 This has also been the approach adopted by the World Bank in relation to anti-poverty strategies in developing 
and transition countries. See the Poverty Assessment Reports of the Word Bank. 
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contrary, if poverty is viewed as primarily a distributional issue, economic growth alone cannot 
address it unless it is shown that it also brings about an equalization of resources. 
Thus, tackling relative poverty, in principle, requires explicit redistribution. There are 
however many channels through which the state may redistribute. Rather than providing the 
poor with money, it can provide them with services that may alter their position in the labour 
market such as health, education, work experience, child-care, or training. Ultimately, it may 
directly provide them with a job that pays an above poverty level wage or it may subsidize their 
employment in the private sector. In effect, these types of interventions aim at addressing the 
root cause of poverty (for example, unemployment, low-skills, ill-health, or caring 
responsibilities) rather than the symptoms (lack of income). In a certain sense, they may be 
deemed „investment‟, as public authorities attempt to make the poor self-sufficient and able to 
exit poverty without public benefits35. A reliance on services and support for the poor rather 
than transfers is an indirect, two-step approach to addressing poverty motivated by the belief 
that paid work is the best source of individual and family welfare. It is also, to some extent, a 
paternalist strategy that assumes that the poor are best provided with certain types of 
consumption rather than simply resources. Lastly, it is based on the conviction that material 
deprivation may be best „solved‟ by a one-time energetic intervention rather than through on-
going public action.  
Albeit appealing in its emphasis on self-sufficiency and autonomy, the “investment” 
strategy critically hinges on several implicit assumptions. First, it identifies the proximate causes 
of poverty in some deficient characteristics of the poor themselves (such as, for example, lack of 
education). By focusing on addressing these individual shortcomings, it tends to overlook the 
role of structural or institutional factors in the generation of poverty (for example, the role of 
labour market institutions, economic cycles, family patterns etc.). It ignores the fact that 
inequality may be embedded in a society‟s structure and thus not addressable by individual level 
measures. Second, since it is an indirect strategy, it presupposes both the correct identification of 
poverty‟s sources and the power of altering the underlying causes. To illustrate, if a person is 
presumed poor due to its poor skills, public programs must be able to both pinpoint why the 
existing skills are poor and to provide the person with “better” ones. Obviously, both steps 
involve considerable complexity and may be problematic. For example, what should be done if a 
person is poor because she is a lone parent? Third, the “investment” approach assumes that 
relative poverty and inequality may be dealt with “once and for all”, by providing the current 
generation of poor with extra specific resources. However, if inequality at the bottom is due to 
structural factors, rather than individual differences, addressing it requires continuous rather than 
one-time efforts. 
Finally, poverty may be addressed directly by providing income resources to the poor. 
This is what the welfare state does. It avoids the complexities of the two-step strategy by aiming 
                                                          
35 Probably the most notorious example of an “investment” approach being used to “solve” poverty is president 
Lyndon Johnson‟s “War on Poverty” program carried out in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
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not at the root causes, but at the „symptoms‟ or effects on poverty36. As mentioned, public 
transfers of monetary resources may take a variety of forms. Broadly speaking, public cash 
transfers may be grouped into universal, contributory and means-tested. Whereas the first two 
are usually justified in terms not related to poverty, means-tested benefits have poverty reduction 
as an explicit objective.  
Whereas means tested programs vary greatly in their precise details, they all share one 
characteristic, namely the fact that they attempt to separate the poor from the non-poor and to 
award public resources only to the former37. This is usually achieved by imposing some sort of 
resource conditionality, as a prerequisite for receiving the transfer. The stated goal is to 
redistribute more efficiently, by directing public resources only at individuals or families deemed 
poor and hence, minimizing the taxation level required for the financing of the benefit program 
(Akerlof 1978). The means-test itself may take a variety of forms, including income, asset, 
demographic, work-based tests, or a combination of them. Obviously, each type of test has its 
particular advantages and weaknesses38. Which of them is most successful in identifying the poor 
remains a matter of controversy (Barr 1992; Atkinson 1995; Ravallion and Datt 1995; Van de 
Walle 1995; Subbarao, Bonnerjee et al. 1997).  
Despite their differences, all these targeting mechanisms share the same underlying 
purpose, namely distinguishing between the poor and the rest. Albeit prima facie desirable both 
on efficiency (less taxation required to finance it) and equity grounds (as all the available 
resources go in theory to the poor), the principle of targeting poses itself a series of problems, 
regardless of which concrete test is used to implement it (Sen 1995; Boadway, Marceau et al. 
1999; Offe 2005; Sefton 2006; Bougheas, Dasgupta et al. 2007). Firstly, as long as the 
characteristic on which the test is performed is controlled by the recipient39, there are always 
behavioural effects. Put differently, potential recipients are incentivised to alter their own 
characteristics so as to qualify for the receipt of the conditional benefit. This may lead to 
undesirable behaviour such as limiting one‟s labour supply, shifting from saving towards 
consumption, family break-up and so on. Secondly, the implementation of the test itself requires 
administrative resources and is, thus, costly. Moreover, perfect implementation is infeasible, both 
due to principal-agent problems regarding front line administrators and social workers and to the 
                                                          
36 That is not to say that it may not affect the root causes as well.  
37 The term used for this separation is targeting. 
38 For example, income is the probably most difficult to measure, while demographic characteristics are more easily 
observable; work tests have been advocated based on the idea that they impose an extra non-monetary cost, that the 
poor are more likely to pay than the non-poor; on the other hand, they are relatively expensive is jobs are provided 
directly and available evidence points towards them advantaging not so much poor, labour constrained families, but 
rather non-poor, non constrained ones Ravallion, M. and G. Datt (1995). Is Targeting through a Work Requirement 
Efficient? Some Evidence for Rural India. Public Spending and the Poor. Theory and Evidence. D. Van de Walle 
and K. Nead. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press: 413-444. 
39 This is of course the case of many resource related household traits such as income, assets, labour market status, 
number of children etc. 
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impracticality40 of filtering out all fraudulent claims. As a result, there will always be some poor 
applicants misclassified as non-poor and vice versa, resulting in decreased program efficiency. 
Thirdly, since being poor is usually an undesirable trait and receipt of means-tested benefits is 
closely associated with poverty, participation in the program may create in itself disutility in the 
form of stigma. In turn, stigma not only imposes an additional cost on recipients but creates 
serious problems of non-take-up, and consequently, diminishes the effectiveness of the program 
in addressing poverty. Specific program features such as hassle and very intrusive procedures in 
verifying entitlement, workfare requirements etc. may exacerbate the stigma problem. Finally, 
programs that benefit a narrow section of the population generally lack political support. If 
dealing with poverty requires on-going redistribution, relying on politically unpopular programs 
to achieve poverty reduction may be self-defeating in the long-term. Given all these issues, what 
role do means-tested cash transfers play in addressing poverty? This is the main question that 
this thesis will try to answer.  
 Clearly, the volume leaves unanswered questions about many aspects of individual well-
being that might be impacted by the presence of means-tested benefits41. By focusing narrowly 
on income and assets, extensiveness is traded for depth. Even so, the complexities and 
difficulties inherent in appraising means-tested benefits remain formidable. Barring a pure 
experimental design, the task of evaluating policies is bound to come up against the conundrum 
of constructing a counterfactual from observational data (Bergh 2005). The difficulties are many 
and the proposed solutions not always fully satisfactory. Validity threats, self-selection, regression 
to the mean, confounding factors at the country level, non-random missingness and panel 
attrition to name just a few, cannot always be ruled out. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, it 
is the aim of the present study to make a significant contribution to the scholarly and policy 
debates on means-tested public transfers and their role in shaping inequality and poverty in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The reader will judge whether it has succeeded or not.  
                                                          
40 The basic problem lies in the asymmetry of information. The applicant knows more about herself and program 
rules and thus may manipulate information so as to appear eligible. 
41 For example, the effects on family formation and break-up, on the educational and behavioural outcomes of 
children, on labour skills, on health outcomes etc. Some of these issues have been taken up in the American 
literature on AFDC/TANF. See Garfinkel, I., S. McLanahan, et al. (1988). Child Support and Dependency. Beyond 
Welfare. New Approaches to the Problem of Poverty in America. H. R. J. Rodgers. Armonk, M.E. Sharpe: 66-85, 
Knab, J., I. Garfinkel, et al. (2009). The Effects of Welfare and Child Support Policies on the Incidence of Marriage 
Following a Nonmarital Birth. Welfare Reform and Its Long-Term Consequences for America's Poor. J. P. Ziliak. 
New York, Cambridge University Press: 290-307, Morris, P., L. A. Gennetian, et al. (2009). How Welfare Policies 
Affect Child and Adolescent School Performance. Welfare Reform and Its Long-Term Consequences for America's 
Poor. J. P. Ziliak. New York, Cambridge University Press: 255-289.  
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2 POVERTY DURING SOCIALISM AND TRANSITION: TRENDS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF VULNERABLE GROUPS  
 
 
2.1 INEQUALITY AND POVERTY UNDER SOCIALISM 
 
Socialist societies have often been regarded as the closest embodiment of egalitarian 
ideals, at least when material well-being is considered. The egalitarianism permeating Marxist and 
official Soviet ideology, the lack of private property and the effort made by communist states to 
make available jobs, subsidized goods, and quasi-free services were all reasons to expect a 
relatively equal distribution of material goods. Yet, precious little empirical information is 
available on the extent, depth and profile of poverty during the communist era. Two factors have 
played a role in relegating poverty issues to a minor research topic. 
On the one hand, the official ideological stance was that the socialist society has been 
successful in ensuring opportunities for self-realization for every individual. Moreover, Marxism 
claimed that all class-based inequalities, as well as scarcity will disappear under communism42. 
Both the proclaimed equalitarianism and the absence of deprivation were difficult to reconcile 
with the existence of poverty, whether defined in absolute or relative terms. Hence, for a long 
time, poverty has not been deemed an “appropriate” research field. Little data was collected to 
get a picture of consumption patterns or life-styles (although there is considerable variation both 
across time and across countries). Moreover, not only was poverty research deemed ideologically 
inappropriate, the official interest in consumption patterns or shortages was low. Rapid 
industrialization and economic growth far outweighed consumption as prioritized official 
objectives43 (McAuley 1979). 
On the other hand, researchers outside the socialist block tended to base their appraisal 
of socialist social stratification both on the official socialist ideological position and a few raw 
facts such as wage scales, “full” employment, wide-spread subsidization of goods and a 
purported universal availability of social services. For example, Jan Adam posits: 
Despite the shortcomings, the comprehensive social programmes [existent during 
socialism] introduced certainties: people knew that, when they reached old age or 
became disabled, they would receive a pension and if they became ill, they would 
                                                          
42 One qualification must be added though, equality of results or rewarding  “according to one‟s need” was 
considered to be achieved in communism; however, the transitional phase of socialism was to derogate from this 
requirement by underlining the “performance principle” embodied in the expression “to each according to his 
work”; For a more detailed discussion see Connor, W. D. (1977). Socialism, Work and Equality. Equity, Income, 
and Policy Comparative Studies in Three Worlds of Development. I. L. Horowitz. New York, Praeger Publishers: 
146-175.;Yanowitch, M. (1977). Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union. Six Studies. New York, M.E. 
Sharpe, McAuley, A. (1979). Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union. Poverty, Living Standards and Inequality. 
Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, Yanowitch, M., Ed. (1986). The Social Structure of the USSR. Recent 
Soviet Studies. New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 
43 Data on consumption patterns was not even collected until the mid 50‟s and official bodies that were assigned the 
task of inquiring and reporting on consumption issues were relatively of minor importance;  
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have access to health care without having to be concerned about payment. They 
also knew that if their children were capable, they would be able without great 
obstacles to get a university education and later a job.(Adam 1999) 
 Consequently, little has been done to investigate the actual empirical reality. Overall, a 
picture of homogeneity emerged in which similarities among social groups vastly outnumbered 
the differences. Except for a tiny elite, the rest of the population constituted an amorphous mass 
(Fuller 2000). As such, poverty was seen as a marginal phenomenon both by insiders and 
outsiders of the socialist regime (of course, the much lower living standards prevalent in the 
communist bloc, as well as the widespread shortages have been pointed out by Western analysts). 
Yet, the homogeneity paradigm may be misleading. The socialist societies were not nearly 
as equalitarian as sometimes portrayed. Firstly, the emphasis put on the work ethic often 
contradicted equalitarian ideals. In effect, periodical anti-egalitarian movements (of which the 
Stalinist one is perhaps the strongest) in the official discourse attacked „equality mongering‟ and 
re-affirmed the justice and necessity of ensuring unequal material rewards for unequal work 
(Lane 1971; Yanowitch 1977; Ovsiannikov 1986).  Secondly, the success of the socialist plans for 
industrialization in economically backward countries hinged on the success in attracting workers 
in particular industrial sectors selected for rapid expansion as well as on encouraging acquisition 
of skills. Consequently, some wage differentiation to reward scarce skills and abilities seemed 
unavoidable in order to provide for an efficient allocation of labour. Thirdly, subsidization of 
goods was counteracted by huge shortages and preferential access to desired goods for some 
categories (for example, through enterprise based shops, access to special retail networks, priority 
in access to housing etc.). Fourthly, the availability and especially the quality of services such as 
health-care and education that were supposed to be universal, was largely dependent on one‟s 
own connections and on under-the-table payments.  
Albeit poverty as such has rarely been touched upon, more data is available on inequality, 
stratification and mobility, as a result of research undertaken mostly in the USSR, Hungary and 
Poland, especially after the end of the Stalinist era. The official Marxist ideology posited that 
socialist societies contained two non-antagonistic classes, the working class and the peasantry 
and one stratum, the intelligentsia. Obviously, such an approach could not shed much light on 
existing economic and political inequalities. While this official stance was almost never 
challenged, Soviet and East European researchers have generally the occupation as the main 
stratification dimension44 (Wesołowski 1966; Rutkevitch, Wesołowski et al. 1974; Wesołowski 
and Słomczyński 1977; Domański and Sawiński 1986; Gordon and Nazimova 1986). It was 
considered that one‟s position in the social division of labour is the most salient criterion for 
stratification in a socialist society. As a result, income, consumption, asset, power etc. 
distributions generally refer to differences between occupational categories. Another salient 
                                                          
44 The quality and quantity of work performed was considered to be the most relevant differentiation criterion in a 
socialist society; 
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dimension of inequality that has been looked into, albeit to a lesser, is gender. Overall, both 
economic and, to a lesser extent, political inequality have been investigated. 
 
 
2.2 DIMENSIONS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
 
2.2.1  INCOME 
 
 Although there is plenty of controversy over which indicator best reflects material well-
being, income amounts to the most widely used proxy. Albeit often not representative and 
gathered for different purposes45, data on the distribution of earnings and wages together with 
agricultural production income can be used to gain a fairly accurate picture of income inequality. 
In an analysis of the Soviet income distribution in the 1970‟s, Bergson found that 
inequality in terms of the 90/10 ratio was remarkably similar between the USSR and Western 
countries (Bergson 1984). This finding held whether income was equated to wages or household 
income per capita46. Inequality was at least as great as or greater than in Sweden, only somewhat 
less than in Norway and Great Britain, and considerably less than in the US or in France 
although not by such a large a margin as previously thought. Wage inequality is explained by 
Bergson in terms of three factors, i.e. scarcity of specific skills, political-ideological imperatives 
and planning distortions favouring certain industrial branches(Bergson 1984). While the second 
factor pressed for wage compression, the first and the third one acted in the opposite direction. 
Analyzing the income distribution of six socialist countries, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, Walter Connor states that common measures such as 
Gini Coefficients, Lorenz curves, and inter-quartile ranges show that income distribution seems 
indeed to have been more egalitarian in the East than in the West but the difference was far from 
massive on the one hand, and the relative ranking of various groups in the income hierarchy 
resembled strikingly the pre-socialist order on the other hand (Connor 1977). The main 
difference between capitalism and socialism in terms of income stratification seemed to be the 
fact that  
“capitalism does produce some very rich people with great wealth while socialism does 
not; for those located through the rest of the distribution, whether in a socialist or in a 
capitalist economy, the difference is only quite moderate”(Connor 1977). 
                                                          
45 Usually, wage and earnings data was collected in order to help in establishing „appropriate‟ wage scales, so as to 
stimulate the accumulation of scarce skills and to reward the performance of demanding tasks Yanowitch, M. 
(1977). Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union. Six Studies. New York, M.E. Sharpe, McAuley, A. 
(1979). Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union. Poverty, Living Standards and Inequality. Madison, The University 
of Wisconsin Press, Yanowitch, M., Ed. (1986). The Social Structure of the USSR. Recent Soviet Studies. New York, 
M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 
46  In a study of inequality in Hungary and Poland, Lidia Beskid and Támas Kolosi found that household per capita 
income was more unequally distributed than earnings; Beskid, L. and T. Kolosi (1983). Differences in Welfare. 
Equality and Inequality under Socialism: Poland and Hungary Compared. T. Kolosi and E. Wnuk-Lipiński. London, 
Sage Publications: 106-145. 
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In an extensive study of Soviet inequality and poverty, Lane (1971) approximated that the 
ration between the best and worst paid employee in an enterprise could be on the order of 1347, 
or  25-30  when all the bonuses and perks were counted. In 1940, the highest to lowest pay ratio 
in the USSR was 28:1 (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987). Večernik examined the earnings 
inequality in Czechoslovakia, one of the lowest in Europe (Večernik 1991). Despite smaller wage 
differentials among socio-occupational groups, considerable inequality in earnings was 
maintained along other dimensions such as gender, education, economic sector, age and finally 
political engagement. Even on the occupational dimension, substantial pay differentials existed 
according to the economic sector. During the 1960s, skilled workers in heavy industry typically 
earned about five time as much as skilled workers in services (Machonin 1996).  
While there is some disagreement on the precise magnitude of inequality, there is 
remarkable consensus over the ranking of the various occupational categories (McAuley 1979; 
Kolosi and Wnuk-Lipiński 1983; Bokor 1984; Kolosi 1984; Domański and Sawiński 1986; Kolosi 
1988). Invariably, professionals but also the administrative cadres were placed in a favourable 
position while unskilled workers and farmhands were placed at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy. Even in the most egalitarian country, Czechoslovakia, although returns to education 
were smaller than in the West, university-educated were still better off by the age of 50 compared 
to their less educated peers. Additionally, higher educational advantage materialized less in higher 
earnings than in better working conditions and a better quality of life (Večernik 1991). 
Among the occupational strata, the collective farm peasantry found itself in the most 
disadvantaged position, reflecting a development strategy of financing industrialization by 
squeezing the agricultural sector, as well as the secondary status awarded to the peasantry by the 
official ideology. The initial lack of a pension system for collective farmers, the permit system for 
acquiring a job or a house, enforced low agricultural prices all discriminated against collective 
farmers48 (Lane 1971; Yanowitch 1977; Kemény 1979; McAuley 1979; Lane 1982; Hamilton and 
Hirszowicz 1987). As a result, incomes were lowest in the agricultural sector and rural poverty 
was usually widespread. The income of Soviet collective farmers was on average only 70% that 
of state employees in 1960 and 80% in 1965.  
In spite of often being treated as one category, blue-collar workers were far from 
constituting a homogeneous group. The industrialization policy favoured heavy over light 
industry (Yanowitch 1977). For example, awarded bonuses (as a percentage of the basic wage 
rate) for hazardous or arduous working conditions were higher (in the USSR twice as high) in the 
                                                          
47
 Estimating inequality measures is made more difficult by the fact that usually no raw data was available; instead 
measures were computed based on published tables and histograms which tended to group data in large and 
heterogeneous, for example including highest level officials and enterprise managers in the same category as 
foremen; the resultant inequality measures tended to underestimate the true extent of inequality; 
48 Starting with the early 60‟s a series of measures such as the introduction of a pension system for collective farmers 
in the USSR and private farmers later on in Poland, improved pay and working conditions on state and collective 
farms, as well as higher prices for agricultural products considerably narrowed the gap between collective farmers 
and state employees; however, the measures reflected the need to increase agricultural productivity as much as 
concerns about inequality and deprivation; 
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heavy compared to the light industry (McAuley 1979). Furthermore, as a rule, bonuses were 
completely lacking in service and other „non-productive‟ sectors (Lane 1971). Even within the 
same branch substantial earnings differentials could arise. Enterprise managers often used the 
bonus and extra perk system to bypass existing wage rate scales and attract workers to their 
enterprise. The leeway they enjoyed in using this recruitment strategy different from enterprise to 
enterprise. In many cases, actual pay was linked to enterprise performance and, as such, inter-
enterprise performance were accepted and legitimated. In some cases, directors and managers of 
strategic enterprises or research centres were paid personal wage rates which were well in excess 
of what the amounts that would have corresponded to them using the official pay scale (Lane 
1971). 
Socialist inequality was well entrenched along gender-lines. Despite their high labour 
force participation and despite their considerable advancement in education, women never 
ceased to be seen as more than secondary-earners. On average, women earned around two thirds 
of male wages49 (Lane 1971; Heitlinger 1979; McAuley 1979; Gruzdeva and Chertikhina 1986; 
Łobodzińska 1995). The resulting gender pay gap stemmed from at least three sources. First, 
women tended to be employed in low-paying economic sectors, such as services, trade and 
agriculture (Connor 1977; Echols III 1981; Szelényi 1992)50. On the one hand, women were 
disproportionally employed manual, low productivity jobs. For example, 73% of the manual 
jobs, requiring no special training and only short on the job experience in the USSR were held by 
women (Gruzdeva and Chertikhina 1986). Higher educational qualifications did not 
automatically translate into better and higher paying jobs. In fact, women were often 
overqualified for the jobs they held (Heitlinger 1979). On the other hand, higher skill feminized 
occupations, such as education or health services, were often considered to be less productive 
than predominantly male ones, such as those in the heavy industry. Moreover, to have their 
reproductive health protected, women were forbidden to enter particular (usually hazardous but 
well-paying) occupations. Second, women were much less likely to be employed in high paying 
managerial positions, even in feminized sectors. For example, in the USSR, women represented 
approximately 60% of the agricultural workforce but only 4% of collective farm chairpersons 
and state farm managers (Heitlinger 1979). Third, even when holding a similar job and having 
similar educational qualifications, women were consistently paid less than men (Heitlinger 1979).  
High income differentials have been found to exist not only between men and women 
but also between the majority and ethnic minorities and among various regions (Echols III 
1981). In the USSR, despite some attempt at equalization, considerable income differences 
                                                          
49 In fact, the size of the gender pay gap was very similar in East and in the West; 
50 Connor found very high (between 0.7-0.9) correlations between the average pay in an occupational sector and the 
percentage of its female labour force in Bulgaria, Hungary and USSR (1973-figures); He concludes that to the extent 
that white-collar non-manual routine occupations have been equalized (as income) to the skilled manual work , this 
has been done though the heavy feminization of the former sector;  See Connor, W. D. (1977). Socialism, Work and 
Equality. Equity, Income, and Policy Comparative Studies in Three Worlds of Development. I. L. Horowitz. New 
York, Praeger Publishers: 146-175. 
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remained between the constituent republics. Average income in the most prosperous one was 1.8 
times higher than in the poorest one (McAuley 1979).  
Official policy and legislative measures did periodically reduce income inequality. 
Although, the declared primary purpose of official wage rate scales of an efficient labour 
allocation implied appropriate wage differentiation, periodically, measures were taken to 
eliminate „unnecessary‟ income differentials, especially in the post-Stalinist era  (McAuley 1979). 
Nonetheless, the chosen equalization strategy proved to be unsustainable in the long run. 
Income equalization relied mainly on increasing incomes at the bottom (for example, by 
increasing the minimum wage, establishing a pension system for collective farmers, increasing 
the pay for agricultural products etc.) faster than incomes at the top. In practice, this translated 
into accelerated consumption growth relative to the GNP. The low initial share of consumption 
in the Gross National Product allowed some leeway for substantial consumption increases. Yet, 
as the growth in consumption outpaced the GNP growth, such an equalization strategy 
threatened investment and future economic growth (McAuley 1979). As such, attempts at 
„equalization‟ were periodically interrupted by periods of increased earnings differentials 
(McAuley 1979; Machonin 1996).  
 
2.2.2 CONSUMPTION 
 
It has often been claimed that income is not an adequate indicator of consumption in 
socialist economies, mainly due to the substitution of distribution through market prices with 
distribution based on rationing and direct administrative allocation. In particular, chronic 
consumer goods shortages meant that direct access to scarce goods was often more important 
than income (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987). As a result, income equalization often failed to 
translate into an equalization of consumption and living standards51 (Machonin 1970). 
Several studies have focused on inequality patterns deriving from differentiated access to 
housing, subsidized goods and education. Perhaps the most well-known is the research work 
done on the distribution of housing in Hungary by Ivan Szelenyi (Szelenyi 1978; Szelenyi 1983; 
Szelenyi and Manchin 1987). Examining the housing conditions of various social strata and the 
way these obtained their housing, Szelenyi reaches the conclusion that inequalities after housing 
are greater than inequalities before considering housing costs. Higher income-groups were much 
better positioned to receive quality new housing from the state at a very low price (as rents were 
heavily subsidized). In contrast, lower-income groups were forced to build their house on their 
own or to buy it on the market. As a result, not only did they have to live in worse housing 
conditions, but usually they paid more for their housing than did higher income groups. Similar 
                                                          
51 Unlike Western Europe, cash transfers were only very mildly progressive; in fact, counting pensions as transfers, 
Milanovic asserts that transfers were largely the same in size across income groups Milanovic, B. (1993). Cash Social 
Transfers, Direct Taxes and Income Distribution in Late Socialism. Policy Research Working Papers. Washington 
D.C., The World Bank. 
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housing inequalities have been found to exist in the USSR and Poland (Rutkevitch, Wesołowski 
et al. 1974; Yanowitch 1977; McAuley 1979; Lane 1982; Ovsiannikov 1986). Professionals and 
skilled workers lived in larger housing units, equipped with more amenities, compared to 
unskilled workers and collective farmers. 
An analogous point is made by Ladany about price subsidies  (see Szelenyi 1978). 
Examining the effect of administrative price distortions he finds a slight regressive effect 
resulting from the fact that goods consumed by higher income groups were subsidized in a 
higher proportion than goods consumed by lower income groups. In some countries (for 
example, in the USSR or Romania), consumer goods were effectively rationed. Allocated rations 
could vary dramatically, depending on the job held. For instance, the highest category of 
employees in the USSR was entitled to 14 kilos of meet per month, while the lowest category 
was allowed only 2.2 kilos per month (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987). Enterprise based shops, 
as well as the existence of separate, better supplied retail networks for some privileged categories 
further magnified inequalities in consumption. 
 Professionals and managerial groups have been found to be (two to three times) more 
likely to own a variety of consumer durables, especially devices relieving or aiding domestic 
work, compared to skilled and unskilled workers and collective farmers (Yanowitch 1977; 
Heitlinger 1979; Gruzdeva and Chertikhina 1986). The latter were the least probable to own such 
items. Correspondingly, rural residents were much less likely to own consumer durables than the 
urban population.  
To sum up, socialist societies continued to be strongly stratified in terms of income and 
even more so in terms of access to public goods such as housing and education. Whereas official 
wage scales were comparatively compressed by Western standards, additional bonuses, perks, 
personal wages and pensions considerably widened income differentials. The widespread practice 
of researchers based in socialist countries to use large and heterogeneous categories when 
making comparisons often obscures the real extent of income inequality. Additionally, the 
existence of administrative allocation mechanisms for housing, holiday homes, even retail goods 
(though the existence of separate retail networks) signified that consumption disparities were 
often larger than income inequalities. 
 
2.2.3 SOCIAL MOBILITY 
 
 The existence of economic disparities becomes less of a concern and politically more 
acceptable if access to privileged positions is relatively open. A fluid stratification, with many 
upward as well as downward intra-generational and intergenerational trajectories would be 
indicative of a high level of openness. On the contrary, the stability of access to privileged social 
positions would signify social closure.  
 The rapid social change characteristic of the early communist period created the 
conditions for substantial occupational mobility to occur. Industrialization, urbanization and 
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rapid economic growth have altered the occupational structure by increasing the positions at the 
top and diminishing those at the bottom. Consequently, many top positions had to be filled by 
recruiting from the bottom (Sarapata 1966; Zagórski 1974; Yanowitch 1977; Pohoski 1986; 
Strmiska 1987; Machonin 1996). This situation allowed for impressive upward mobility. 
However, substantial movement towards the top was not accompanied by corresponding 
downward paths, suggesting that the relatively high levels of total mobility were the result 
primarily of structural and not relative mobility. Therefore, a slowing down of economic growth, 
industrialization and urbanization translated into an intensified competition for top positions and 
declining mobility. The exceptional upward mobility experienced by the peasantry and the 
working class during the late 1940‟s and 1950‟s remained a onetime occurrence.  
  Children of professionals and managers were much more likely to enter professional and 
higher level jobs compared to children of working class and peasant background. To illustrate, in 
the USSR, around 70% of intelligentsia parents could expect to pass down their position to their 
children, whereas only 30% of working class children acceded to intelligentsia status (Yanowitch 
1977). Even when holding similar qualifications, children of non-manual employees- more likely 
to obtain better entry level jobs than children of working class parents (Yanowitch 1977). 
Unskilled workers and peasantry were much less socially mobile compared to other 
categories, both intra- and inter- generationally (Aksentievics 1983). Especially after the first 
period of industrialization when  the transformation of the occupational structure started to slow 
down, social mobility became much less prevalent among the lower classes (Ferge 1984; Kolosi 
1988). In 1963, in Hungary, 69% of the children of professionals, but only 4% of the children of 
agricultural workers found themselves in a non-manual occupation (Lane 1971). Early poverty 
became a significant hindrance of the advancement in the social hierarchy (Ferge 1984).  
 Mobility patterns were not only occupationally dependent, but residential based. Children 
residing in an urban environment, were, irrespective of the parents‟ occupation, more likely to 
experience upward mobility compared to children living in the countryside (Yanowitch 1977; 
Yanowitch 1986). 
 Even when it did occur, upward mobility was most often short ranged (Yanowitch 1977; 
Shkaratan 1986). Children of non-manual employees were most likely to move upward to 
intelligentsia status. Upward trajectories for children of collective farmers usually translated into 
access to a skilled worker position.  
 Not only did the deceleration of economic growth reduce mobility opportunities, but 
some of the early achievements were beset by setbacks. As higher educational qualifications 
became widespread, some individuals who initially have experienced upward mobility were later 
demoted (Shkaratan 1986). Apparently, the lack of appropriate formal qualifications eventually 
proved an insurmountable barrier for some individuals. In addition, whereas in the early 50‟s the 
career of many individuals in leading positions started with a short experience as a skilled or 
(more rarely) unskilled worker, followed by further education, later on the personnel for top 
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positions tended to be recruited directly from among higher education graduates (Shkaratan 
1986). 
The educational system is probably the most important institutional mechanism shaping 
mobility opportunities. Access to top positions, especially after the initial shortage of skills was 
overcome, was generally restricted to individuals undergoing longer and higher quality education. 
Therefore, existing educational inequalities have the potential to shape future mobility patterns. 
Initially, the rapid expansion of mass education allowed many with a worker or peasant 
background to advance their qualifications and thus be socially mobile (Yanowitch 1986; Shavit 
and Blossfeld 1993). Furthermore, early on, the introduction of the quota system which granted 
preferential access to higher education to children of worker and peasant background 
contributed to ensuring upward educational mobility. However, once the growth of the system 
slowed down as it reached a saturation point, cadre administrators and professionals were able to 
use their social and cultural capital to ensure the reproduction of their positions through the 
acquiring of educational credentials. The realization that is was much more efficient to educate 
children of intelligentsia background led to the gradual abandonment of the quota system. 
Furthermore, even as the expansion of the educational system and the introduction of quotas in 
higher education acted to promote upward educational mobility, the children of professionals 
and administrative cadres were consistently better able to acquire educational credentials both at 
the higher secondary level and especially at the tertiary level (Gazsó 1984; Hanley and McKeever 
1997). On the one hand, early family socialization played an important role in shaping school 
achievement. Children of professionals consistently outperformed children of working class 
background and especially of collective farm background (Yanowitch 1977). More educated 
parents were better able to support their children‟s school work, to provide for adequate housing 
and material resources, and to instil higher career aspirations into their children.  
On the other hand, even when attaining a similar level of school achievement, children of 
collective farmers and unskilled workers were less likely to decide on continuing their education 
and less likely to enter higher education establishments. For instance, in the USSR , only 46% of 
working class children with a score of 3.5 or better continued to the 9-th grade, whereas 77% of 
the intelligentsia children with a score of 3.5 or lower did so (Yanowitch 1977). In fact, among 
children of university educated parents, previous academic performance had virtually no 
influence on the likelihood of continuing education (Yanowitch 1977). 
The impact of parental and occupational background increases as the child moves up the 
educational ladder. The underrepresentation of the lower strata youth is even more striking in 
higher education. Children of intelligentsia background are three times more likely to enter 
higher education than children of blue-collar workers (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987). In the 
USSR, only 6.5% of students in tertiary education were of collective farm origin in 1979/80 
(down from 9.9% in 1971) (Yanowitch 1977). 
Even when children of lower class background do continue education, they often end up 
in lower quality establishments, undergoing shorter term programs. Lower quality, lower level 
32 
 
professional schools were overwhelmingly working class establishments (Yanowitch 1977). After 
finishing eighth grade, around 25-50% of worker and non-specialised employees children began 
work or entered a vocational school, whereas only 3% of the intelligentsia children did so. 
Within the most prestigious Soviet higher education institutions, only 1 to 4% of students were 
of collective farm background and only 25-30% of a working class background (corresponding 
representation in the population is 15.2% and 60% respectively) (Yanowitch 1977).  
Despite some early successes, the Soviet educational system never escaped the strains 
imposed by the contradictions between democratization and the efficient production of scarce 
skills. Whenever the strains became too intolerable, the practical demands of economic 
production tended to outweigh any ideological commitments to equality of opportunity. As a 
result, access to educational resources remained unevenly distributed. 
 
2.2.4 POLITICAL INEQUALITY 
 
The working class occupied a central position in Marxist thinking. Its special leading role 
in history was to bring about the conditions necessary for the establishment of a fully developed 
communist society. However, the classic Leninist interpretation of Marxism stated that the 
working class carried out its leading role through the communist party. As such, the party was of 
paramount political importance. Party membership and especially access to party leading 
positions, together with holding of state offices, may be regarded as the primordial levers 
shaping political inequality. 
Unlike economic inequality, political inequality in socialism has been examined early on. 
Trotskyite and other new class critics52 have pinpointed new cleavages that were not the 
remnants of the previous bourgeois society but were generated by the new socialist order (Sawer 
1978; Szelenyi 1978; Szelenyi 1978; Lane 1982). More specifically, the party was seen to be 
gradually transforming from a revolutionary vanguard force to a rigidified bureaucracy, which, by 
virtue of its monopoly over vital decision-making regarding production and redistribution of 
society‟s resources, enjoyed a privileged position. Most importantly, its interests ran against those 
of the working class. The new class relied on accumulated expertise, education and training to 
maintain its elite position and financed this capital accumulation by extracting surplus value from 
the primary producers (Sawer 1978). It used its stated monopoly over teleological knowledge, i.e. 
the best and fastest way of bringing about a communist society, to reject all forms of control 
from below (Bauman 1974; Szelenyi 1978). 
While agreeing to the existence of an elite group‟s monopoly over production and 
redistribution, various authors disagree when it comes to delineating the actual members of the 
group. Ivan Szelenyi (1978) diverges from mainstream views in suggesting that not only the core 
bureaucracy and officialdom but the entire intelligentsia constitute an elite ruling group. His 
                                                          
52 For a discussion of „new class‟ theories see Sawer, M., Ed. (1978). Socialism and the New Class: Towards the 
Analysis of Structural Inequality within Socialist Societies. Sydney, Australasian Political Studies Association. 
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argument rests on the constant interchanges and circulation taking place between bureaucrats 
and intellectuals, on the similarity of material conditions and lifestyles of the techno-bureaucracy 
and the intelligentsia, and on the structural economic conflict between intellectuals and the 
working class.  
On a more empirical level, high official and managerial positions tended to be occupied 
by educated professionals, not by working class members (Szelenyi 1978). Except for a short 
period, when lack of skills allowed for the rapid advancement of some individuals with a working 
class and collective farm background, such high level positions were deemed to require a higher 
education, as well as an appropriate political attitude. As a result, managers and professionals 
were much more likely to be members and to hold higher level party positions compared to 
workers and especially collective farmers. In Hungary, professionals and technocrats were twice 
as likely as workers and 14 times more likely than those outside socialized production to be 
members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers‟ Party (Szelényi 1987). Moreover, professionals 
were better able to use their political engagement to obtain higher earnings and, more generally,  
higher living standards (Beskid and Kolosi 1983).  
Power disparities manifested themselves within the enterprise as well. The early years of 
planning have consecrated an authoritarian style of management centred around controlling and 
supervising (Yanowitch 1977). Whilst later on a more humanizing and participatory style was 
promoted, the actual exclusion of workers from decision making was kept intact. The extremely 
hierarchical nature of the system meant that responsibility was always construed upwards and not 
downwards. Decentralization and decision-making at the bottom was often rejected and 
opposed, as it threatened the power of managers and bureaucrats. Among existing categories of 
workers, not all were equally powerless.  The  core (mostly skilled) workers were better able to 
advance their interests both at the enterprise level and at the national level through company-
management (Yanowitch 1977; Kolosi 1988).  
Not only were workers not involved in decisions regarding enterprise production, but the 
official view forbade any adversarial relationships with management. As a result, trade unions53 
which in capitalism act as a counterweight to management, in socialism acted as mechanisms 
enabling the party and the enterprise management to better control its workers. The close links 
between management and the local political elite not only prevented the party acting as a 
counterweight to management in upholding the workers‟ interest, but they enabled management 
to use political power against recalcitrant workers (Benson 1974). 
The only example of a socialist country attempting to implement direct workers‟ 
decision-making at the enterprise level, Yugoslavia, did not make for a success story (Benson 
1974). Despite the existence of formal workers decision-making bodies and the veto power they 
held in several important areas, in practice, management was the most important decision-
making actor, successfully bypassing or controlling workers‟ councils. The latter‟s authority 
                                                          
53 Such organizations acted as a conveying belt, carrying the party‟s orders and demands to ordinary citizens; 
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usually was confined to issues of minor importance. The practical demands imposed by co-
ordinating, supervising and leading, the critical role of management as a supplier of information,  
as well as the different discipline rules applying to management and workers, prevented any 
substantive form of self-management from materializing. In effect, workers had no effective 
channel to sanction management. Attesting to the pure formal role of self-management 
mechanisms, workers themselves deemed striking as a more effective tool of having their wishes 
heard than workers‟ councils (Benson 1974).   
The occupational dimension has undoubtedly been the most widely reviewed aspect of 
political inequality. Yet, other dimensions, such as ethnicity, gender etc., were just as salient. For 
instance, Russian ethnics tended to dominate the highest level of Party leadership in the USSR 
(McAuley 1979). In 1970 Czechoslovakia,  out of 115 members of the Central Committee only 8 
were women (Heitlinger 1979). 
To sum up, a person‟s political power was largely determined by the persokn‟s position 
in the organization it belonged to, as well as the organization‟s position in the larger institutional 
hierarchy (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987). In fact, no independent channel to exercise 
authority, such as democratic elections, existed. All organizations were very hierarchical and 
decisions were taken in a top-down manner. Despite the official discourse, in effect, ordinary 
blue-collar workers possessed very little leeway to influence decision-making both at the 
enterprise and at the societal level. Overall, the political influence of the working class had 
changed little under socialism (Wesolowski and Mach 1986). 
 
2.2.5 POVERTY 
 
Despite the official discourse that claimed that poverty has been completely eradicated in 
the socialist society, deprivation continued to exist. It is difficult to obtain reliable quantitative 
estimations of the prevalence of material need in the various countries of the communist bloc. 
Nonetheless, some attempts have been made to arrive at such estimations, especially in Hungary. 
For example, based on a seven-dimensional index54, Tamás Kolosi approximated the 
share of the deprived, in Hungary, to be around 9% (Kolosi 1984). His results indicated that 
consumption, housing facilities, consumer durables, cars and holiday homes discriminated better 
between the deprived and the non-deprived than per capita household income. In a similar 
research endeavour, Ágnes Bokor investigated the prevalence and characteristics of deprivation 
in six dimensions, i.e. work, interest upholding, residence-housing, material assets, lifestyle, and 
health status (Bokor 1984). She finds that only 4% are deprived in four or more dimensions, but 
29% are deprived in at least 2 dimensions. Her results pointed out that material living conditions 
and settlement-housing conditions had the greatest impact in determining a person‟s probability 
                                                          
54 The index includes settlement, housing, financial and cultural characteristics, consumption, position in the division 
of labour and the ability to uphold ones interest; see Kolosi, T. (1984). Status and stratification. Stratification and 
Inequality. R. Andorka and T. Kolosi. Budapest, Institute of Social Sciences: 51-103. 
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of being deprived55. Building on the 1969 definition on the minimal monthly subsistence wage 
put forward by the Hungarian Central Bureau of Statistics, Kemény puts at 32% the share of 
families living below this subsistence level on 1968 (Kemény 1979).  
Building on an array of various but disparate sources, Alastair McAuley estimated the 
Soviet share of individuals living in households with a per capita income below the official 
“working” poverty line (about 25-30 roubles/ month) to range between 2-2.5% for state non-
agricultural employees to 36.56% for collective farmers in the late 50‟s (McAuley 1979). In 1965, 
around 35-40% of the population was estimated to have an income below the official poverty 
level (around 50 roubles per capita per month). 
Despite direct public provision of some goods and services, low and very low incomes 
went together with very low living standards. For example, during the early 1970s, three quarters 
of the very poor in Hungary loved in houses that had at most a room and a kitchen (Kemény 
1979). They spent more of their income on basic necessities such as food or heating but still 
occasionally suffered from malnourishment, lacked basic amenities such as running water and in 
some cases electricity (Kemény 1979). In fact, public provision of goods and services was often 
regressive as desirable goods were not only linked to employment but reserved to “valuable” 
workers.  
Who was likely to be in a disadvantaged position? Because of the emphasis on the 
productive role of the individual, some authors maintain that vulnerability remained strongest 
among those not integrated in the work-eligibility system, such as the disabled, the elderly, 
children or the Roma (Castle-Kanerova 1992; Millard 1992; Deacon 2000). For those integrated 
into mainstream employment, demographic characteristics such as the earner/dependents ratio 
bear the strongest risk of low per capita income (McAuley 1979; Večernik 1991). 
The shallowness of the protection offered to those not able to enter gainful employment 
is nowhere more evident that in the case of the disabled. Both in the Soviet Union and in the 
Central-East European satellites, disability benefits were markedly less generous than old-age 
pensions, guaranteeing only a very meagre income level (Minkoff and Turgeon 1977). Indeed, 
the replacement rate for a disability pensioner with 3 dependents was generally lower (sometimes 
much lower) than the replacement rate awarded to a single old-age pensioner. Survivorship 
pensions conferred even lower benefits than disability pensions. It should not be concluded 
however that pensioners enjoyed a relatively high standard of living. Indeed, in Hungary, persons 
over 60 had a relative risk of being deprived56 2.44 times higher compared to the average in the 
population (Bokor 1984).  
Another group at high risk of experiencing inadequate income were families with 
children and especially families with many children. In Hungary, despite a very generous family 
                                                          
55 Defined as deprivation in at least 3 of the 6 areas; 12.2% of the population fell within this category; Bokor, Á. 
Ibid.Deprivation: Dimensions and Indices: 105-135. 
56
 Deprivation is defined as being below mean-1 standard deviation in 3 dimensions out of six: work, interest 
upholding, residence-housing, material assets, lifestyle, and health; Ibid. 
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benefits system, large families containing three or more children were 1.27 times more likely to 
experience deprivation57 than the average population (See Table 2.1 below). A third of the 
families with three children and two thirds of the families with four or more children were very 
poor (in the bottom decile) in 1973 (Kemény 1979). In the Soviet Union, minimum wages were 
high enough to maintain a person above the official poverty level in the 50‟s and the 60‟s but 
families with children were about four times as likely as childless couples to have inadequate (per 
capita) income. Single-parent (“incomplete”) families and families which contained other 
dependent relatives (“complex families”) were also more likely than single-persons and childless 
couples to find themselves below the official poverty line (McAuley 1979). 
 
 Table 2.1Relative risk* of deprivation in Hungary in early 1980‟s 
Social 
category 
Share of all 
deprived 
Relative 
Risk 
Social category 
(within non-active 
earners) 
Share of 
non-active  
deprived  
Relative Risk 
Women  63.9 1.21 Old-age pensioners 53.7 1.003 
Over 60**  56.2 2.44 Widow pensioners 12.7 1.67 
3 + children 5.2 1.27 Other non-active 
earners 
33.8 2.25 
Rural 
resident 
73 1.52    
Retired*** 
semi-skilled 
worker 
22.9 2.54    
Retired*** 
unskilled 
worker 
11.4 2.60    
Non-active 
earner 
77.1 1.92    
Note: deprivation is defined as being below mean-1 standard deviation in at least 3 dimensions 
out of six: work, interest upholding, residence-housing, material assets, lifestyle, and health; the 
six dimensions are composite scales based on 95 original items; the work and the interest indexes 
were computed only for active earners; 
*The relative risk is defined as the ratio between the percentage of the respective social category 
among the deprived and the percentage among the total population;  
**Active and non-active earners are pooled together; further analysis showed that actually the 
relative risk of deprivation was higher for active earners over 60- 1.62 than for non-active earners 
over 60 -1.04; 
*** In total seven categories of retirees were analysed; the remaining five categories had relative 
risks of being deprived lower than 1; 
Source: (Bokor 1984). 
                                                          
57 As defined by Bokor; see above; 
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Among those gainfully employed, the worst material situation was encountered among 
collective farmers. This category has to contend with the lowest incomes, scant access to 
qualitatively inadequate services, less prevalent ownership of consumer durables, lower quality 
housing and, at least during some periods, with overt institutional discrimination (see the 
sections on inequality above). It is no surprise then that collective farmers often experienced 
poverty. In 1965, in the USSR, 75% of collective farmers had a personal income (cash payments 
from the collective farm together with the income derived from in-kind production on personal 
plots) smaller than the (low) official poverty line and 50% had an income lower than half of the 
poverty line (McAuley 1979). In Hungary, fourth fifths of households in the bottom income 
decile were unskilled, semi-skilled or farm labourers living in rural areas (Kemény 1979). Aside 
from low income, this group also suffered from volatile employment histories, often supplanting 
or supplementing regular official wages with income from day-labouring and agricultural 
seasonal work. Such insecure employment, albeit sometimes yielding a higher pay, often meant 
unrecognized work histories and lower or no access to services and benefits that were tightly 
linked to employment (Kemény 1979).  
The economic position of the Roma during socialism is another telling example of 
deprivation. In a comprehensive analysis of a Gypsy settlement in Hungary, Szelény and Ladány 
conclude that although socialist policies helped to integrate the Gypsy, at least economically, they 
also laid the foundation of extreme segregation and poverty during post-socialism (Ladány and 
Szelenyi 2006). Although Gypsy children did complete eight years of primary schooling they 
rarely underwent the apprenticeship training needed to gain access to a skilled job. As a result, 
the bulk of the Roma population earned its living through (easily accessible) unskilled 
employment. Moreover, paternalistic economic and social policies destroyed the pre-socialist 
economic skills of the Roma (as artisans, middlemen, musicians etc.) and made them entirely 
dependent on the state. The decay of the rural settlements partly exacerbated by the socialist 
industrialization and urbanization policies left the Roma in a deplorable state of almost complete 
spatial segregation58. Even during socialism, the Roma were likely to experience very low 
incomes. For example, Kemeny estimates that 62% of the Roma families in Hungary were in the 
bottom 10% of the income distribution during 1968-1971 (Kemény 1979). To sum up, although 
socialist policies did go some distance in the economic integration of the Roma, they never 
succeeded in lifting them above the bottom of the social hierarchy while at the same time 
increasing their vulnerabilities in the post-socialist competitive system. 
To conclude, the impression that socialism had transformed Central and East European 
societies into unstructured and homogeneous masses is highly misleading. Bureaucratic allocation 
                                                          
58 The authors draw an interesting parallel to the ghettoization of the black urban underclass through the 
outmigration of the white and the better-off black families taking place in American cities Ladány, J. and I. Szelenyi 
(2006). Patterns of Exclusion: Constructing Gypsy Ethnicity and the Making of an Underclass in Transitional 
Societies of Europe. New York, Columbia University Press.;  
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of goods did generate an unequal distribution of valuable goods in Eastern socialist countries just 
as market allocation mechanisms have in capitalist societies (Szelenyi 1978; Szelenyi and Manchin 
1987). Although some authors maintain that the extent of inequality was smaller under socialism 
(Szelenyi 1978; Ferge 1984; Szelenyi and Manchin 1987), this assertion is quite controversial, 
mainly due to the fact that Western countries themselves have highly divergent levels of 
inequality (see Bergson 1984). Even if the wage scale was considerably more compressed 
compared to the West, living standards were much more unequal than the income distribution 
would indicate (Szelenyi 1978; Szelenyi and Manchin 1987; Kolosi 1988). Indeed, direct 
allocation mechanisms most often worked to heighten not lessen income inequalities, thereby 
playing the role of wage supplements. Notwithstanding the official discourse that blamed 
individual failures and pathologies for the inability to integrate in the work-centred protection 
mechanisms and thus avoid material hardship(Sipos 1994; Atal 1999; Ringold and Andrews 
1999), some social categories were much more likely to be pushed to the fringes of society. The 
system persistently disadvantaged women, larger families and unskilled workers and agricultural 
workers (especially after they retired). These categories continued to remain vulnerable in the 
newly emerging market economies. 
 
 
2.3 POVERTY IN TRANSITION 
 
There has been little contention about the negative consequences that the transformation 
of a planned economy into a market one will have in the social sphere, poverty among them. 
Some authors reasoned that the double transition would bring about both more efficiency and 
more equity, i.e. going from planned to market economy would entail more efficiency while 
going from dictatorship to democracy would convey more equity (Rupp 1992). Despite such 
arguments, opinion surveys pointed out that Central and East European citizens were much 
more concerned with their material situation than with more opportunities for political 
participation or more freedom of speech (Andorka 1999).  
The underlying causes for the spread of poverty are linked both to the economic 
recession and to the solutions to address it put forward by the neoliberal strategy, i.e. a highly 
restrictive fiscal and monetary policy that constrained both employment and wages growth on 
the one hand and demanded a restriction of public outlays in the forms of various social benefits 
and services on the other hand. Thus, the real value of wages, pensions and other social benefits 
quickly eroded, savings were largely wiped out by bouts of inflation and negative interest rates, 
unemployment ensued and the decline in agricultural subsidies seriously hurt peasants (Adam 
1999). Obviously, structural reforms such as privatization or enterprise restructuring contributed 
their share by generating a sizeable number of unemployed, especially during the mid 90‟s (Yet, it 
should be remembered that, at least initially, the vast majority of the poor were working (Alam, 
Murthi et al. 2005)). Among these phenomena, two deserve further attention as being closely 
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linked to poverty. The first one is a general fall in the standard of living. The second one is an 
increase in inequality. 
 
 
2.3.1 STANDARD OF LIVING AND INEQUALITY 
 
Compared to West European countries, the standard of living throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe was low. The economic downturn in the first half of the 90‟s brought a further 
deterioration. Household real income decreased substantially both through employment 
contraction and through inflation reducing the purchasing power of earnings and of social 
benefits59.  
Table 2.2 presents an overview of the drop in income and consumption based on data 
compiled from various sources60. Generally speaking, figures show a smaller decline in 
consumption compared to income. To a considerable extent, this finding is to be expected. On 
the one hand, an inaccurate measurement of income overestimates the decline by not capturing 
resources generated in the informal economy, and on the other hand, households resort to 
coping strategies such as accumulated savings, sale of assets or loans in order to maintain their 
consumption level in a period of declining income. Hence, a focus on real income trends appears 
to exaggerate the losses in household welfare. Yet, it should be remembered that the structure of 
household consumption has also been altered61. Households are now forced to commit much 
larger shares of their budgets to items such as housing, education or health-care which previously 
were available on a quasi-free basis. Hence, the same real income cannot buy the same quantity 
of goods and services (Adam 1999).  
 
Table 2.2 Drop in real income and real consumption in the transition period (in %) 
 Milanovic (Per capita real 
income estimated at HH level) 
Adam (Average Real Income and 
Average Consumption) 
  Income Consumption 
Bulgaria  -45 (1989-1993) - - 
Czech Republic -12 (1988-1993) -22.1 (1989-1993)- -12.8 (1989-1993) 
                                                          
59 One might argue that as long as shortages were widespread and the consumers had a narrow range of choices 
when acquiring goods and services, real income is not a good measure of the standard of living; the situation is 
worsened by the fact that some goods such as housing or services like health-care were so heavily subsidized that 
they were virtually free; while acknowledging that real income/ real wages have significant shortcomings in gauging 
the standard of living, they are only given as a rough measure that need to be complemented by other indicators; 
60 For further information on the fall in GDP/capita, employment and real wages see also Garner, T. I. and K. 
Terrell (1998). "A Gini Decomposition Analysis of Inequality in the Czech and Slovak Republics during the 
transition." Economics of Transition 6(1): 23-46. 
61 Actual consumption during communism might have been higher than expenditure figures indicate as some 
services were quasi-free and thus not included in expenditure data;  
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 Milanovic (Per capita real 
income estimated at HH level) 
Adam (Average Real Income and 
Average Consumption) 
-8.6 (1989-1996) +0.2(1989-1996) 
Hungary -23 (1989-1993) -11.3 (1989-1993) 
-13.9 (1989-1996) 
-7.5 (1989-1993) 
-16.3(1989-1996) 
Poland -27 (1987-1993) -14.5 (1989-1993) 
-2.4 (1989-1996) 
-3.1 (1989-1993) 
+13.8(1989-1996) 
Romania -31(1989-1994) - - 
Slovak Republic -34 (1988-1993) - - 
Slovenia -7 (1987-1993) - - 
Source: (Milanovic 1996; Adam 1999) 
 
A fall in real income is not the only sign indicating a worsening of household welfare in 
Central and Eastern Europe during the 90‟s. As Cornia et al. point out (Cornia, Fajth et al. 1996), 
the region has also experienced a surge in mortality and morbidity rates, a drop in life-
expectancy, particularly for young and middle-aged males, a substantial drop in enrolment rates 
at kindergarten and secondary school levels, as well as a sizeable expansion of crime rates. All of 
these phenomena indicate that early transition has been associated with a general worsening of 
the quality of life. 
As noted in the previous section, inequality was not uncommon under socialism. Yet, at 
least in income terms, its magnitude was under tight direct administrative, and implicitly political, 
control. As market forces and private ownership were gradually introduced, inequalities began to 
widen (see Table 2.3). Although research done on the topic confirms that indeed there has been 
an increase, detailed figures are not always consistent62.  
 
Table 2.3 Gini coefficients of income distribution in Central and Eastern Europe from 1987-
2004 
 Equivalence 
scale 
1987-
1989 
1990-
1992 
1993-
1995 
1996-
1998 
1999-
2001 
2002-
2004 
BULGARIA        
Milanovic 
GVG 
Per capita  
Per capita 
21.7 30 34.2 
27.1 
 
31.4 
 
29.5 
 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
Vecernik HH level 29 32 - 33   
Per capita 20 23  26   
Garner 
&Terrel 
HH level 16.2  17.4    
WDI Per capita 19  27    
                                                          
62 For an in-depth analysis of this problem see Heyns, B. (2005). "Emerging Inequalities in Central and Eastern 
Europe." Annual Review of Sociology 31: 163-197. 
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 Equivalence 
scale 
1987-
1989 
1990-
1992 
1993-
1995 
1996-
1998 
1999-
2001 
2002-
2004 
ESTONIA        
GVG Per capita    38 38  
HUNGARY        
Kattuman 
&Redmond 
Original 
OECD scale 
20.7 19.5 23.4 24.2   
Milanovic Per capita 20.7  22.9    
GVG OECD scale   30 30 30 30 
WDI Per capita 21  23    
LATVIA        
Milanovic Per capita 22.6 23.5 32.6    
POLAND        
WDI Per capita 25  30    
ROMANIA        
GVG Per capita 21.0 23.0 31.0 30   
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
Garner & 
Terrel 
HH disposable 
income 
15.7  16.8    
SLOVENIA        
Milanovic Per capita 22.9 25.7 27.2    
Note: Where data are available for more than one year of each 3-year period, the highest figure is 
presented; 
Sources: (Garner and Terrell 1998; Milanovic 1998; Kattuman and Redmond 2001; (GVG) 2003; 
(GVG) 2003), World Development Indicators (WDI) produced by the Word Bank see 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Section2.htm;  
 
Several factors were behind the rising inequality trend (Milanovic 1998). First of all, 
wages tend to be more unequal in the private sector. As the public sector shrinks being 
progressively replaced by the private one, earnings dispersion also increases. Second, while in a 
planned economy income generation channels were constituted almost exclusively of wages 
(except for social transfers), a greater diversification of income is to be found in market 
economies. However, these new income sources, such as self-employment and capital income 
are much more unequally distributed than wages. Hence, their increase in the total share of 
aggregate household income usually comes along with wider income inequality. Finally, as 
unemployment spread, larger numbers of people were forced to rely on unemployment benefits 
or social assistance which provided them only with a meagre cash amount, thereby augmenting 
income differentiation between them and individuals in employment or on pensions.  
While a general trend of increasing inequality manifested itself throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe, its precise characteristics varied across countries. For example, in an analysis of 
inequality trends in Hungary in the first half of the 90‟s, Kattuman and Redmond maintain that 
inequality slightly declined between 1987 and 1991, only to increase sharply between 1991-1993 
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and more moderately between 1993 and 1996 (Kattuman and Redmond 2001)63. The factors 
behind the inequality increase are a diversification of income resources, less progressive taxation 
and a polarization of cash transfers between pension and non-pension benefits. Analyzing the 
distribution of household income in the Czech Republic, Jiři Večernik finds a stronger increase 
in the Gini coefficient of per capita income as compared to the Gini of total household income 
(Večernik 1999). To explain this finding he points to a weakening impact that demographic 
factors such as the number of wage-earners, the age, and the number of children have on a 
household‟s income position and to a simultaneous strengthening of the effect of personal 
earnings. Garner and Terrel also find that inequality increased in the Czech and in the Slovak 
Republics between 1989 and 1993, mainly due to a larger dispersion of earnings and a greater 
role played by self-employment (Garner and Terrell 1998). Examining the evolution of inequality 
in five CEE countries and Russia, Milanovic concludes that increased inequality could be 
explained mainly through a more unequal distribution of wages and possibly a higher 
concentration of pensions (Milanovic 1998). 
From a poverty point of view, it is worth noting that much of the changes taking place in 
the income distribution have been concentrated in the lower and upper tails, i.e. the income 
shares of the lowest/ upper quintiles have witnessed a substantial decline/ increase (Rutkowski 
1998; Kattuman and Redmond 2001).  
 
2.3.2 POVERTY TRENDS 
 
The drop in household welfare but especially its unequal distribution64 meant 
impoverishment, especially to certain segments of the population (see section on poverty 
profile). While all evidence indicates that poverty has undeniably increased in the first half of the 
1990‟s (see Fig. 1 and Table 2.4), the exact magnitude of the increase depends on the chosen 
poverty line, as well as on the data source on which calculations are based. Table 3 below 
presents a comparison of poverty trends in ten Central and East European countries using 
various poverty lines and equivalence scales. 
Notably, some of the poverty thresholds are set a very low level, i.e. between a quarter 
and a fifth of the national average wage, so the figures can be taken to indicate extreme poverty. 
The absolute poverty line set at 120$ per capita per month is also fairly low by OECD standards. 
Interestingly enough, due to the general fall in household real income, poverty expansion may be 
higher when an absolute measure is used rather than a relative one. This is true not only for the 
                                                          
63
 The authors experiment with various definitions of income and various inequality measures; their findings are 
generally consistent; 
64 For example, between 1993 and 1998, purchasing power in the Czech Republic dropped by 32.4% in the first 
decile and by only 6.7% in the highest one; See Adam, J. (1999). Social Costs of Transformation to a Market 
Economy in Post-Socialist Countries. The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. London, Macmillan 
Press Ltd. 
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poorer Baltic and South-East European states but also for their relatively wealthier neighbours in 
Central Europe65. 
 
Figure 2.1 Growth in incidence of absolute poverty ( % headcount index) 
 
Note: poverty line= 4.40 PPP$/per capita/per day;  
Source: See Annex 1; 
 
 
Table 2.4 Poverty levels in Central and Eastern Europe through the 90‟s 
  BG CZ EE HU  LV LT PL RO SI 
PL=0.21AW 
EQ SCALE= 
0.8 additional 
adult; 0.5 
child; 0.7 
elder 
1989 - 0.2 1 1.1 1.3 1.5 5.8 7.0 - 
1990 2.0 0.2 - - - - 9.7 3.5 4.5 
1991 12.7 0.2 - 2.3 - - 8.4 8.6 - 
1992 21.8 1.4 21.4 - - - 10.9 16.4 - 
1993 25.3 - 30.0 4.0 - - - 25.3 6.2 
1994 32.7 - 27.0 - 33.5 39.1 - - - 
PL= 120$ per 
capita per 
month at 
1990 
international 
prices 
1987-
1988 
2 0 - <1 - - 6 6 0 
1993 33 <1 - 3 - - 26 24 0 
PL=24- 1989 - - - 1.1 - - - 7.0 - 
                                                          
65 For figures concerning Hungary see also Spéder, Z. (1998). "Poverty Dynamics in Hungary during the 
Transformation." Economics of Transition 6(1): 1-21. 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2004 
BG 
CZ 
EE 
HU 
LV 
LT 
PL 
RO 
SK 
SI 
44 
 
  BG CZ EE HU  LV LT PL RO SI 
27%AW 1990 2.0 - - - - - - 3.5 - 
1991 12.7 - - 2.3 - - - 8.6 - 
1992 21.8       16.4  
1993 25.3   4.5    25.3  
PL=50% 
average 
equivalized 
consumption 
EQ Scale= 
Original 
OECD scale/  
1996    18.3* 15.1 18.0 14.0   
1997    17.8* 16.4 16.6    
1998 15**   12.8* 18.2 16.0   13.9** 
1999 14**   13.8* 18.6 15.8 16.5   
2000 14**   14.6* 20.3 16.0 17.1   
2001 15**   14.4*  16.4    
Notes: **60% median income; *Per capita 
Sources: (Cornia, Fajth et al. 1996; Milanovic 1996; Atal 1999; (GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003; 
(GVG) 2003). 
 
Despite being based on a variety of data sources and computed according to diverging 
methodologies, figures in Table 2.4 present rather similar stories66. First of all, it must be noted 
that the incidence of poverty in Central and Eastern Europe varies substantially across countries, 
irrespective of using absolute or relative measures. Two patterns become apparent. On the one 
hand, countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia started with low 
poverty levels and were largely successful in containing massive surges. On the other hand, the 
expansion of poverty has been much more extreme in Bulgaria, the Baltic states, Poland and 
Romania, although initial poverty levels are much more heterogeneous in this group.  
It seems that countries that have a higher standard of living are also characterized by 
lower levels of inequality. This finding seems to confirm the traditional theories linking inequality 
stabilization/ diminution and economic growth (For an extended discussion of these theories see 
(Heyns 2005)). Yet, there might be another explanation. Results of inequality decomposition 
studies indicate that social transfers did play a rather important role in mitigating market-
inequality income in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and to a lesser degree in Hungary and 
Poland (Garner and Terrell 1998; Rutkowski 1998; Tóth 1999; Kattuman and Redmond 2001). 
Thus, wealthier countries may have made use of the larger resources they had at their disposal to 
mitigate possible income polarization. 
Secondly, after the spikes witnessed in the mid 1990‟s, absolute poverty rates have 
retrenched (see Fig. 1), lending some support to the argument that as economic growth resumes, 
households are able to take advantage of the new economic opportunities and pull themselves 
out of poverty. Yet, despite their declining trend are still at worrisomely high levels, indicating 
that the trickle-down effect does not work for everybody. The effect sustained gains in real 
                                                          
66 See also Appendix 1; 
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average earnings might have had on poverty have been seriously undermined by persisting 
unemployment and widening inequality of pay. 
 
2.3.3   WHO IS POOR? 
 
Although the extent and depth of poverty varied region-wide, the profiles of the poor 
were remarkably similar (Atal 1999; Braithwaite, Grootaert et al. 2000; Fox 2003; Alam, Murthi 
et al. 2005; Lelkes 2006) (see also Table 2.5). Unsurprisingly, unemployment notably increased 
the risk of becoming poor. Unemployed and irregularly employed workers tended to have higher 
poverty incidence rates and above average poverty gaps (Milanovic 1996; Braithwaite, Grootaert 
et al. 2000). Unemployment became all the more a painful experience as in a large number of 
cases it proved to be rather intractable. With the exception of the Czech Republic, outflows from 
the unemployment pool were low. Thus, an appreciable share (between 40% and 60%) of the 
unemployed remained so for a longer time period (Kramer 1997; Fox 2003; Alam, Murthi et al. 
2005). Long unemployment spells quickly eroded any savings that might have been available and 
further reduced the chances of re-employment. Thus, very soon, unemployment came to have a 
large marginalizing potential. 
 
Table 2.5 Groups at a higher risk of poverty in comparative perspective (1996-1999*)  
Risk BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
Unemployment 
Risk of poverty - - - - - - - - - - 
Rel. poverty risk 2.24 16.29 4.51 4.33 2.65 1.38 4.56 2.51 3.47 3.55 
Share of poor % 19.3 26.2 15.4 30.4 16.1 4.0 7.4 11.9 - 9.6 
Low Pay (In-work poverty) 
Risk of poverty 9.1 5.0 17.4 7.6 16.8 9.0 10.5 28 9 4.1 
Relative poverty 
risk when in (self) 
employment 
0.8 1.78 1.79 1.24 1.51 0.9 0.97 3.68 0.82 0.63 
Share of poor-
(self) employed-% 
25.1 43.7 45.2 43.9 43.8 73.9 75.6 55.5 - 42.5 
Educational Disadvantage (Having only primary education or less) 
Risk of poverty 15.2 3.3 NA 9.4 15.3 14 33.2 37.1 NA 50.8 
Rel. poverty risk 1.33 1.17 NA 1.54 1.37 1.4 3.07 4.88 1.41 7.81 
Share of poor-% 58.3 24.4 NA 52.7 33.9 17.3 33.2 43.5 - 51.2 
Family and children 
Poverty risk- lone 
parents 
11.5 21.1 NA 10.5 13.2 21 21.3 15.3 NA 7.4 
Rel. poverty risk – 1.01 7.53 NA 1.72 1.18 2.10 1.97 2.01 2.75 1.13 
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Risk BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
lone parents 
Poverty risk-other 
hh with children 
12.1 2.1 NA 9.2 13.7 11.9 14 10.1 NA 6.2 
Rel. poverty risk-
other hh.  with 
children 
1.06 0.75 NA 1.5 1.23 1.2 1.29 1.32 1.75 0.95 
Share of poor 
(families with 
children)-% 
44 95.5 NA 68.1 59 68.4 84.4 72.1 66.6 48.4 
Elderly (65+) 
Risk of poverty 14.7 0.3 11.3 3.5 9.1 9.9 6.2 5.9 9.4 10.8 
Rel. poverty risk 1.29 0.11 1.16 0.57 0.82 0.99 0.57 0.78 - 0.66 
Share of poor 22.9 1.4 36.3 8.1 13.7 13.8 6.3 9.9 4.4 21.5 
Living in a rural area 
Risk of poverty 14.6 2.5 NA 9.1 16.2 17.2 17.3 11.1 NA NA 
Rel. poverty risk 1.28 0.89 NA 1.49 1.46 1.72 1.6 1.47 NA NA 
Share of poor-% 42.6 30.4 NA 57 41.9 55.3 62 66.8 NA NA 
NA-not available; 
* The figures are for different years in the interval depending on the country; 
Note: The relative risk for a given category is defined as the ratio between the probability of 
experiencing the risk for the respective category and for the entire population; for example to 
compute the relative risk of being unemployed in the case of young people, the youth 
unemployment rate divided by the total unemployment rate; the poverty risk represents simply 
the poverty rate for the respective group; 
Source: (Evans 2003); poverty line=50% of median per capita consumption; equivalence scale- 1 
adult; 0.75-child; 
 
Yet, the vast majority of the poor in the region continued to be linked to the formal 
labour market (Alam, Murthi et al. 2005). In their case, poverty sprang simply from the very low 
earnings levels. Historically, wages have been low as the state largely compensated through the 
provision of free services and massive price subsidies. Yet, the early price liberalization generated 
enormous inflation which quickly outpaced wage indexation. As labour productivity was low, 
enterprises tackled the problem with a mixture of labour shedding and low salaries. Furthermore, 
in an attempt to fight unemployment, policy makers kept wages low in the expectation that this 
measure will increase labour demand. Later on, as growth resumed and economic performance 
greatly improved, wages increased substantially in real terms but they also decompressed. As 
post-communist economies became more and more integrated into international circuits and as 
the private sector expanded and the public one shrunk, returns to education increased 
substantially (Braithwaite, Grootaert et al. 2000; Alam, Murthi et al. 2005). Well-paid industrial, 
low-skilled employment requiring only secondary school education is retrenching while a number 
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of domains heavily relying on human capital experience labour shortages, a fact that pushes up 
the wages of some of the high-skilled workers. Direct comparison of education and poverty 
levels also confirms that low-educated, low-skilled workers are at much higher risk of material 
deprivation than national averages, while the university-educated have a correspondingly lower 
risk (Milanovic 1996). 
When looking at pensions, the most important type of social transfer, the situation is 
more mixed. A heated controversy governed the question of pensioner protection, especially in 
comparison with large families, with many children. Some authors (Milanovic 1996; Atal 1999; 
Fox 2003; Lelkes 2006) have contended that pensioners have not been particularly vulnerable to 
poverty during the economic recession years. Three arguments were brought in favour of this 
view (Fox 2003). Firstly, pensions seemed to have enjoyed better protection against inflation 
compared to wages. Secondly, as retirement ages were low, pensioners could afford to continue 
working after retirement, most likely in the underground economy (Lelkes 2006). Thirdly, 
middle-aged adults and pensioners were the main beneficiaries of housing and land repatriation 
policies. More generally, due to their size as a group and their voting behaviour, pensioners were 
considered to have been a rather vocal category that was largely successful in having its interests 
protected during the transition. Poverty statistics seemed to support this viewpoint, as 
pensioners tended to have both below average poverty gaps and below average poverty 
headcounts. Yet, Lanjow et al. (1998) have shown that the finding is highly sensitive to the 
preferred equivalence scale. In particular, if poverty measures are computed using per capita 
income or expenditure, then, indeed, pensioners do not seem to have been particularly 
vulnerable to poverty. Nonetheless, such findings may be biased by the fact that they assume no 
economies of scale. Resorting to equivalence scales that allow for larger, yet not implausible, 
economies of scale points to a much more precarious position of the pensioners.  
Instead of using the presence of pensioners or children to predict poverty, Lanjow and 
his colleagues suggest to resort to dependency ratios67. As expected, higher dependency ratios are 
associated with an increased risk of poverty as the same amount of resources is split among a 
larger number of persons. In particular, poverty is widespread among families with three or more 
children. This situation is all the more worrisome as it points to the fact that poverty among 
children tends to be higher than the national averages (Milanovic 1996; Adam 1999; Tóth 1999; 
Förster and Tóth 2001).  
Rural residence constituted another characteristic associated with poverty. The 
agricultural sector suffered a downturn as state subsidies were removed and trade was liberalized, 
forcing farmers to face competition from more efficient producers abroad (Adam 1999; Fox 
2003). On average, incomes of farmers have declined more than those of workers (Milanovic 
1996). Agriculture has been transformed, especially in South-Eastern Europe, in a strategy for 
survival, as many have turned to home farming as a way of making ends meet. What resulted was 
                                                          
67 Dependency ratios refer to the ratio between (wage) earners and dependents (non-earners) within a household; 
dependents include both children and the non-working elderly; 
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a type of subsistence crop growing that, although allowed for survival, could only provide with 
minimal living standards. The underdeveloped nature of the agricultural sector was made even 
worse by bad infrastructure and reduced access to public services such as health-care or 
education (Fox 2003). All these factors, together with the fragmented land ownership, hampered 
agricultural productivity and kept growth in the sector much below national averages (Alam, 
Murthi et al. 2005). In turn, low productivity and slow growth account for the higher poverty 
levels that can be found among rural dwellers. 
In some countries (for example, Poland or Romania), poverty rates have also varied 
markedly by region, as mono-industrial and declining industry areas have been much more 
vulnerable than the rest. Furthermore, large disparities in infrastructure stimulated further 
concentration of economic activity and employment68. Building on the Luxembourg Income 
Study, Förster, Jesuit and Smeeding take a closer look at the distribution of  inequality and 
poverty between and within regions in four countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Russia (Förster, Jesuit et al. 2003). Their results point towards an increase in 
inequality within and between regions taking place in the first half of the 1990‟s. Interestingly 
enough, rises in inequality have been more prominent in countries were initial inter-regional 
inequality was higher at the outset of the economic transformation. Similarly, there is 
considerable interregional variation in poverty levels among regions, with the Czech Republic 
reporting lower dispersion compared to Hungary and Poland. 
Beside variation in poverty levels among geographical regions, numerous studies have 
found a negative correlation between the size of the locality and the poverty rate suggesting that 
large cities are at an advantage in terms of poverty incidence (Milanovic 1996; Förster, Jesuit et 
al. 2003). Especially capital cities have low poverty rates when using a national relative poverty 
line, although using local poverty lines, which probably capture specific local costs of living 
better than national measures, yields higher figures69 
Last but not least, poverty has also been prevalent among the rather large Roma minority 
that lives in the region (Milanovic 1996; Adam 1999; Tóth 1999; Emigh and Szelenyi 2001). 
Roma communities have continuously suffered from a very weak attachment to the labour 
market, lacked sometimes even primary education and their families traditionally had a large 
number of children. All three traits are associated with increased poverty risks. It is an 
accumulation of risks and disadvantages that pushes the Roma towards the margins of society. 
Arguably though, discrimination might have also played a role in the perpetuation of poverty 
among the Roma ethnics.  
Finally, demographic characteristics such as age, gender and family composition are also 
of relevance when it comes to poverty risks (Milanovic 1996; Braithwaite, Grootaert et al. 2000). 
                                                          
68 An increasing concentration of both GDP and employment in CEE is confirmed by  a series of OECD reports; 
concentration levels are found to be similar or even higher to OECD countries; See Förster, M. F., D. Jesuit, et al. 
(2003). Regional Poverty and Income Inequality in Central and Eastern Europe. Helsinki, UNU-WIDER. 
69
 For an analysis of the impact of using local rather than national lines in measuring poverty levels, see Ibid.; 
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Female headed households (be they widows living alone or single mothers with their children) 
display systematically higher poverty incidence and poverty gap figures. Young single persons or 
young couples with children also experience an increased poverty risk.  
 
2.3.4 TRANSITORY OR PERMANENT POVERTY? 
 
Although poverty has unquestionably gained in occurrence, many studies have claimed 
that, by and large, it was a transient phenomenon (Milanovic 1996; Fox 2003; Alam, Murthi et al. 
2005). Most of the poor households were located relatively close to the poverty line. Since the 
gap to be closed was relatively small, economic recovery was expected to lift them out of 
poverty. Given that the first economic shocks took place in a context of lack of liquid assets and 
inflation devalued savings, which prevented consumption smoothening in the short term, the 
shallowness of the new poverty seems a plausible hypothesis. Indeed, ownership of consumer 
durables was found to be largely independent of being poor (Milanovic 1996). Panel studies 
carried out in Poland and Hungary have confirmed that only a minority of the poor are 
unsuccessful in escaping poverty during four consecutive years (Spéder 1998; Fox 2003), while 
substantial mobility in and out of poverty did occur. Furthermore, in early transition, those who 
succeeded in escaping poverty often managed to climb substantially above the poverty line, while 
inflows into poverty contained significant numbers of individuals previously located in the 
middle and higher deciles of the income distribution (Spéder 1998). However, there is evidence 
that fluidity has diminished considerably starting with the second half of the 1990‟s as both 
inflow and outflow rates as well as distances travelled shrank (Spéder 1998). It might be the case 
that as economic recovery helps many to overcome their (temporary) material deprivation, a 
stratum of permanently poor begins to crystallize. As poverty becomes a more seldom 
encountered phenomenon, its severity increases as long-term neediness sets off a cycle of 
cumulative disadvantages. Those unable to take advantage of the new economic boom become 
trapped in a marginalized situation, with few prospects of improvement. An analysis of 
Hungarian data, shows that children, elderly living alone, widow and disability pensioners as well 
as inactive adults are at much higher risk of experiencing prolonged poverty spells (Spéder 1998; 
Tóth 1999). Factors such as low education as well as residence in a rural or economically 
underdeveloped area reduce the chances of finding regular employment and thus add to the 
prospects of long-term poverty. Facing an accumulation of risk-factors, the Roma are also much 
more likely to belong to the permanently poor. The very high incidence of extreme poverty in 
this groups is confirmed by the fact that their share among the poor gradually increases as the 
poverty line is made more restrictive(Tóth 1999). 
50 
 
51 
 
3 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: 
FEATURES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Going back to the English Poor Law of 1601, means-tested public assistance programs 
constitute probably the oldest type of state social intervention in the modern era. Their initial 
objectives though consisted much more in establishing efficient methods of social control rather 
than in preventing the harshest forms of material destitution. Built on the principles of local 
administration, local financing, lay discretion and partial loss of citizenship (Lodemel and Schulte 
1992; Nelson 2004), and implementing the infamous workhouse test (Guibentif and Bouget 
1997; Ditch 1999), Poor Law assistance severely disenfranchised and stigmatised those whom it 
was supposed to help. The nature, principles and functioning of the Poor Law made it into a 
very controversial tool of state intervention.  
The pioneering and gradual expansion of social insurance programs started in the second 
half of the 19th century gradually diminished the need for a means-tested state-run public 
assistance scheme. Yet, even as social insurance became the prevalent form of ensuring income 
protection and security, some individuals were unable to comply with the required eligibility 
conditions and fell through the cracks. For them, needs-based social assistance constituted an 
entitlement of the last resort (Lodemel and Schulte 1992). Starting with the 1970‟s, concern grew 
in Western Europe about the inadequacy of social insurance to deal with mounting and resilient 
unemployment as well as new family forms (Ditch 1999). Even earlier than that, some countries 
(the United Kingdom in 1948, and Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands in the 1960‟s) 
introduced minimum income guarantees as a supplemental layer in their welfare state setup 
(Lodemel and Schulte 1992; Ditch 1999; Heikkilä and Keskitalo 2001; Nelson 2004). Others 
soon followed (Belgium in the 1970‟s, Luxembourg, France and Spain in the 1980‟s). Partly 
reflecting an expansion of state responsibility and involvement during the Great Depression era, 
the United States established Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the federal means-tested 
public assistance program in 1935. 
As the shift from an industrial to a service economy progressed, and as the traditional 
male breadwinner family model started to break up, tensions on the insurance system 
accumulated. Not only did insurance programs seem unable to protect the new poor, but they 
also entailed significant public expenses which started to look increasingly unsustainable in a 
context of slow growth, significant unemployment and aging. As a result, two tendencies may be 
observed after 1980 (Ditch 1999). On the one hand, eligibility conditions for some insurance 
programs, in particular unemployment insurance have been tightened, thus shifting recipients to 
means-tested programs. On the other hand, within social assistance, a renewed emphasis on 
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control and removing work disincentives gained ground. The number of social assistance 
recipients expanded substantially between 1980 and 1996 in all West European countries (Ditch 
1999; Aust and Arriba 2005; van Berkel 2007), albeit in some countries it has dropped since (for 
example, in Sweden (Brännström and Stenberg 2007)).  
Unlike insurance based security, social assistance constitutes a unilateral not a reciprocal 
type of transfer. In most countries, it is considered a „subjective‟ right, with no legal entitlement 
to the benefit and with stringent, often stigmatizing and intrusive conditionality attached. Since 
the direct tie with employment is severed and since it is, as a rule, made available only to those 
individuals and families with insufficient resources, potential disincentives to take up paid 
employment represent a major concern.  
Means-tested cash benefits were relatively unknown in the Eastern and Central parts of 
Europe until the last few decades. Being part of the German and Habsburg sphere of influence, 
Central Europe developed a strong tradition of state social insurance schemes built on the classic 
Bismarckian model. Social insurance traditions were much weaker in Eastern Europe, but both 
regions experienced an implementation of Soviet welfare state variants after the Second World 
War. Poor relief initiatives were not unknown in either region. A well-established tradition of 
providing for the poor had developed in Central and Eastern Europe already in the latter half of 
the XIX-th /early XX-th century (Hering 2006; Schulte 2006). Originally born out of the private 
initiatives of religious and ethnic communities which sought to use social work as a tool to 
reaffirm their identities (Hering 2006), social work gradually became the province of local and 
central public authorities. As in Western Europe, poor relief aimed not only at providing support 
for the destitute but also to correct and control behaviour (Waaldijk 2006). Eligibility was often 
conditional on “deservingness” criteria such as willingness to work, “moral” behaviour, or 
membership in politically favoured groups such as veterans of national independence struggles.  
Unlike social insurance programs, the advent of state socialism spelled major changes for 
relief. In fact, the basic principles of social insurance remained largely unaltered as the Soviet 
welfare state model was built around the link between employment and benefits. Conversely, 
social assistance did not fit very well into an employment based security model. 
 
 
3.2 SAFETY NETS AND POLICIES TO ADDRESS POVERTY UNDER COMMUNISM 
 
Understanding the content and role of social assistance programs under communism is 
impossible without a thorough consideration of the peculiar way the entire socialist social 
protection system was organized. As Michael Mandelbaum has put it, the communist welfare 
state did not have safety nets as it constituted itself one huge safety net (Mandelbaum 1997). 
More generally, the socialist ideological obsession with the productive process brought about a 
unique vision on ensuring protection. Briefly put, the entire social protection realm was 
incorporated into the larger economic one. Social protection was to be achieved by integrating 
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workers into the productive process, i.e. through the economy and not outside it (Manning 1992; 
Offe 1993). In practice this meant that social benefits were tightly linked to the workplace, 
thereby excluding those who did not hold a formal job. However, full employment, quasi-free 
public provision of services and heavy subsidization of basic goods were deemed to be sufficient 
to ensure that everybody‟s needs were satisfied. Additionally, under the pressure of a strong 
equalitarian ideology, more visible aspects of stratification, such as income or wealth were 
levelled off somewhat [For a detailed description of the communist welfare setup see (Deacon 
1992; Barr 1994; Standing 1996; Connor 1997; Mandelbaum 1997; Hutton and Redmond 2000)].  
In fact, in the USSR, early attempts to deal with material deprivation were largely 
confined to tampering with the wage policy (McAuley 1979). It was considered that raising the 
minimum wage would constitute the best way to deal with insufficient resources. Only later on, 
after it became obvious that family circumstances played a greater role in shaping economic need 
than actual wages, and that repeated increases of the minimum wage did not constitute an 
effective way of dealing with poverty, did the system of social transfers and benefits expand. 
Ingrained beliefs about the disincentive effects of decoupling work and material rewards partly 
explain the reluctance in going outside the productivist logic to ensure need satisfaction. 
Despite the official discourse claiming poverty had been completely eradicated in the 
socialist society, vulnerability remained among those not integrated in the work-eligibility system, 
such as the elderly, the Roma or large families (Castle-Kanerova 1992; Millard 1992; Deacon 
2000). The emphasis on the productive role of the individual refused public support to those 
members of society who were not able to fit into the work-centred protection mechanisms. 
Outside work, support was extended only to citizens who could not integrate due to accepted 
reasons, not to everyone in demonstrable need (McAuley 1979). Poverty was associated with a 
personal failure to integrate into the productivist logic and therefore it was viewed as stemming 
from an individual pathology rather than from a malfunctioning of the system (Sipos 1994; Atal 
1999; Ringold and Andrews 1999).  
In this context, a residualised and heavily social work oriented form of social assistance 
developed to deal with such “personal failures”. In most countries, pre-World War II charities 
and poor relief organizations were dismantled (Schulte 2006) and their functions transferred to 
local or enterprise authorities. In some cases, the heavy emphasis on dealing with “deviant” 
behaviour led to the system becoming medicalised (see the case of Hungary, (Schulte 2006)). 
In some rare instances, special “needs” justified public support outside the employment 
system, such as in the case of the disabled that were entitled to non-contributory pensions (Sipos 
and Ringold 2005). When no special “needs” were present, social assistance was largely equated 
with social work aimed at correcting “deviant” behaviour. As a consequence, assistance 
provisions were exceedingly fragmented, offered on a highly discretionary basis and stigmatizing 
for the recipients (Sipos 1994; Ringold and Andrews 1999; Sipos and Ringold 2005). Social 
assistance was far from constituting a right. On the contrary, there was no enforceability of 
claims (Offe 1993) as, in the majority of situations, decisions made by social workers could not 
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be contested. Moreover, political discrimination often governed the allocation of benefits70 
(Castle-Kanerova 1992; Offe 1993; Schulte 2006).  
The discretionary and ad-hoc features present in the administration and delivery of social 
assistance were mirrored by the arbitrariness and paternalism ingrained in the design of the 
benefits. In fact, the actual needs of welfare clients rarely constituted a concern. No systematic 
investigation of the clients‟ needs or of the utility they derived from receiving the benefits was 
envisioned (Standing 1996; Sipos and Ringold 2005). Conversely, no mechanisms were put in 
place to allow recipients themselves to articulate needs from below (Deacon 2000).  
From a more technical point of view, there was precious little administrative experience 
with targeting. Practically, there were no procedures in place to take into account variation in 
individual circumstances. Not only social assistance, but the entire social security system was 
largely based on categorical benefits (Barr 1996; Ringold and Andrews 1999), which meant that 
transfers were targeted at groups rather than individuals. This group based approached entailed 
two main disadvantages, at least when social assistance is concerned. On the one hand, a 
complex and fragmented array of benefits meant overlapping and duplication were relatively 
frequent, making administration extremely cumbersome and non-transparent (Ringold and 
Andrews 1999). On the other hand, some of these categorical benefits were actual privileges 
awarded to groups that were not necessarily more threatened by poverty, for instance war 
veterans (Ringold and Andrews 1999). Both features hindered the capacity of the existing social 
assistance provisions to play a significant role in tackling economic vulnerability. 
Among the programs that were put in place, two deserve perhaps further consideration. 
Some authors maintain that family benefits acted, de facto, as an effective safety net due to their 
high relative value combined with a flat wage distribution and a low level of individual earnings 
(Sipos 1994). The strong negative correlation between the number of children in a household 
and its income also made family allowances pro-poor (Milanovic 1993). However, family benefits 
were more often than not part of the social insurance system, i.e. access to benefits was obtained 
through employment. Benefits were sometimes available only starting with the second child and 
were offered for relatively short periods. To illustrate, in the USSR, child allowances were 
normally extended only until the child‟s fifth birthday or until the child‟s twelfth birthday in the 
case of single mothers (McAuley 1979).   
Starting with the latter half of the 1960‟s, pro-natalist concerns prompted the availability 
of special benefits to families with three or more children. In some cases (for instance, in the 
USSR), these transfers were made available on a means-test basis (McAuley 1979). Such benefits 
were relatively well targeted71 since large families were also more likely to have a precarious 
                                                          
70
 A well known example is the one in which benefits were not always available to orphans who had “suspect” 
parentage Castle-Kanerova, M. (1992). Social Policy in Czechoslovakia. The New Eastern Europe. Social Policy 
Past, Present and Future. B. Deacon. London, Sage Publications: 91-117.; 
71 It should be noted that such targeting was implicit; that is to the extent that the demographic characteristics of the 
beneficiary group were associated with low income, the transfer was redistributive; it did not aim though initially at 
vertical redistribution. 
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economic position. Birth grants constituted additional benefits that disproportionally profited 
large families in a vulnerable economic position. Czechoslovakia offered rent rebates and low 
interest loans that were linked to the number of children in the family (Heitlinger 1979). 
A growing awareness of the conflicting demands imposed on women by their productive 
and reproductive roles led to a development of legislation to address the issue. Originally, 
Marxism asserted that the liberation of women entailed the complete socialization of housework. 
However, as little progress was made on this front, and as quality child-care was very expensive72, 
a gradual shift occurred favouring the support of women‟s domestic and reproductive role in the 
home rather than their socialization. The most common answer to this problem consisted of (up 
to three years) paid maternity and parental leaves. Initially put forward only for employed 
women, some countries such as Hungary or Czechoslovakia eventually extended the scheme to 
housewives, albeit on less generous terms (Heitlinger 1979; Haney 2002). In effect, this benefit 
amounted to a carer‟s wage and most often benefited poorly educated, low skilled, deprived 
women. However, this arrangement was not present throughout the entire Eastern bloc. In fact, 
countries like Poland or the USSR lacked a system of paid parental leave altogether73. Mothers 
having a large number of children could be entitled to special pensions or a reduced contribution 
record such as in Czechoslovakia or the USSR (Yanowitch 1977; Heitlinger 1979; Machonin 
1996).  
The other peculiarity of the communist social protection net was its over-reliance on 
residential care for various categories of vulnerable people, such as the elderly, the disabled  and 
orphans (Sipos and Ringold 2005). This type of service tended both to lack quality and to be 
relatively expensive. Apart from being forced to endure poor living conditions, residents of this 
type of institutions were also cut-off from the rest of society. Practically, they were isolated with 
dim perspectives of long-term community integration (Ringold and Andrews 1999). 
 Although the above observations are generally valid for the entire East-European 
communist bloc, considerable variation existed among countries both in registered poverty levels 
and in the institutional mechanisms put in place to address poverty related issues. During the 
peak of the industrialization era, consumption issues were hardly given attention. However, as 
economic growth slowed down and living conditions stabilized at a low level, poverty became 
more visible. The timing and depth of this phenomenon varied across countries. While in 
Czechoslovakia “pauperization has been a fact since the late 60s” (Castle-Kanerova 1992), in  
Poland the increase in poverty became apparent especially after the 80‟s following the onset of 
the economic crisis (Millard 1992)74.  
                                                          
72 In Czechoslovakia, where relatively high-quality child care existed, it was estimated that each nursery place cost 
around 30% of average earnings Heitlinger, A. (1979). Women and State Socialism. Sex Inequality in the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia. London, Macmillan Press Ltd. 
73 The USSR did introduce in 1974 a means-tested family supplement that was awarded to qualifying families until 
the child turned eight; 
74 An official estimate put the poverty incidence in 1980 at 19% of families; however this figure might well be an 
underestimation  Millard, F. (1992). Social Policy in Poland. The New Eastern Europe. Social Policy Past, Present 
and Future. B. Deacon. London, Sage Publications: 118-143. 
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Answers to the phenomenon of rising poverty were equally variegated. For example, 
Bulgaria provided special assistance to pregnant women who had not received higher education 
or who had not been in employment in the last six months  (Deacon and Vidinova 1992). The 
aid consisted of the maternity benefit at the minimum wage rate being payable for longer 
periods. In-kind provision (food, clothes etc.) was often preferred over cash. Administration lay 
with the local authorities. Decisions could be contested by appealing to a higher administrative 
authority but not to an independent tribunal.  
 In Poland, not only the local councils had responsibilities in providing for the less well-
off but also the enterprises. The latter were to play a role especially in providing for their needy 
employees (Millard 1992). Social workers enjoyed a large discretion margin in providing benefits 
both for the “needy” and for the disabled. 
In Hungary, the system underwent far-reaching transformations after the 60‟s (Szalai and 
Orosz 1992). A shift occurred in the composition of social policy that favoured cash transfers 
over social services. As a result, cash benefits acquired a bigger share in overall household 
consumption but access and quality of important social services visibly deteriorated.  
Although fairly developed by present day standards, socialist welfare states lacked an 
institutionalized mechanism to effectively tackle poverty.  As a matter of fact, the poverty issue 
was given little prominence as the socialist strategy focused on ex-ante solutions that were 
supposed to prevent all households from falling into a state of economic precariousness. Put 
differently, risk coping strategies were largely absent as the focus rested with risk reduction and 
risk mitigation (Ringold and Andrews 1999). Existing benefits and transfers while often 
representing a substantial portion of a household‟s budget75, were, as a rule, not designed to 
equalize incomes or to prevent material destitution. On the contrary, especially cash benefits 
were strongly and positively correlated with income, acting as wage supplements rather than 
redistributive elements. Some universal benefits, such a family allowances, care grants, free access 
to social services such as health-care and education, by virtue of their implicit targeting towards 
lower income groups, did act as a last resort safety net in supporting individuals in vulnerable 
economic positions. Yet, no social program was deliberately aimed at mitigating material need. 
Still, although officially not recognized as such, poverty emerged, in most CEE countries, as a 
growingly worrisome issue during the economic crisis which preceded the collapse of the regime 
(Atal 1999).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75
 McAuley estimated that in the USSR, between 1960 and 1970, social consumption, i.e. cash and in-kind transfers 
represented, on average, 25-28% of the total income of a family McAuley, A. (1979). Economic Welfare in the 
Soviet Union. Poverty, Living Standards and Inequality. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press.;  
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3.3 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SCHEMES DURING THE 1990S 
 
 The complex transition processes that have taken place in the post-communist space 
have been much debated. Yet, the bulk of the discussions have concentrated on economic 
transformations and policies. Much less attention has been devoted to social issues. Policy 
makers themselves tended to prioritize economic reforms over their social counterparts. Social 
sector issues were seldom touched upon in the initial macrostabilization and structural reform 
packages (Nelson 2001). To a certain extent, this situation was to be expected. Social policy 
issues are much more sensitive from a political point of view, as “in contrast to macroeconomic 
stabilization, institutional reforms are likely to mean permanent losses to specific groups, which 
may prompt tenacious resistance”(Nelson 2001). Additionally, the institutional building process 
needed in the social sector was considerably more demanding as it presupposed the existence of 
a well-developed and capable administration, the cooperation and support of various agencies 
both inside and outside the central government, as well as a longer time available for 
implementation and consolidation.  
 It is precisely this institutional building process that proved to be a real Gordian knot.  
Social measures taken so far have broadly fallen into two categories. On the one hand, 
“emergency” measures were taken to tackle the emergence of new social problems (such as 
unemployment) or the acutization of older ones (such as low living standards and poverty). Yet,  
addressing these social problems was seen  more “as a political necessity rather than an aspect of 
good government” (Millard 1992). More specifically, the role of social policy measures resided 
primarily in garnering popular support for the “painful” economic restructuring (Deacon 1992; 
Offe 1993; Kramer 1997; Mandelbaum 1997; Scholz and Tomann 1999), and less in settling 
distributional issues. 
  As a result, adopted decisions were largely ad-hoc, erratic and many times contradictory 
(Offe 1993; Inglot 2007). On the other hand, major institutional reforms (the most telling 
example is that of pension reform) were pushed through mainly on fiscal grounds, designed and 
backed by Ministries of Finance rather than by Ministries of Welfare (Hausner 2001; Nelson 
2001).  
 Despite the general low prioritization of social issues, there is considerable heterogeneity 
among post-communist countries in the extent they were able to prevent the emergence and 
subsequently to cope with such problems.  
Research on Central and East European safety nets is rather piecemeal and inconclusive. 
Indeed, up to the moment, there have been few attempts to build up a comprehensive cross-
country comparative compilation of social assistance program features. Equally, very little is 
known about the effectiveness of implemented schemes in alleviating poverty. Much of the 
literature concerning social assistance was rather preoccupied with recommending its reform 
rather than rigorously analyzing what the existing provisions actually accomplished [one notable 
exception is (Milanovic 2000)]. On the one hand, drawing on neo-liberal arguments relating to 
58 
 
expenditure containment and work disincentives, one strand of studies emphasised (one might 
say excessively) targeting as the main dimension of social assistance at which improvement 
efforts should be directed (Sipos 1994; Barr 2002; Fox 2003; Sipos and Ringold 2005; Ringold, 
Kasek et al. 2007). On the other hand, in opposition to the neoliberal camp, another type of 
research focused on social rights rather than on cost reduction. As a result, it stressed the 
negative outcomes that might stem from the tightening of eligibility rules and the use of inflation 
to implicitly reduce benefits (Standing 1996; Atal 1999). While providing useful insights both 
into the demands faced by social assistance systems and into some of their possible 
shortcomings, these studies fell short of actually gauging the impact of social transfers on living 
standards. Nor did they succeed in comparing systematically schemes in a cross-country or cross-
temporal perspective. Arguments were either based on a normative discourse or derived 
primarily from economic theory. Little empirical evidence was mustered to support the claims 
put forward (one notable exception will be discussed further on). 
Yet, a review of scholarly work dedicated to the topic of social security in the post-
communist area yields several interesting findings regarding the main stages in the construction 
and development of social assistance schemes in Central and Eastern Europe. Much like the 
entire social protection system, social assistance programs have experienced considerable flux. 
Since being introduced for the first time, they have undergone substantial modifications in 
almost every important aspect. In the following section, I provide a brief overview of the 
knowledge gathered so far. 
 
3.3.1 CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Early social assistance schemes in Central and Eastern Europe differed from their 
Western counterparts in several important respects. The differentiation supposedly was due to 
the much smaller financial and administrative resources that post-communist countries had at 
their disposal. Essentially, three distinguishing features have been identified in the literature 
(Sipos 1994; Milanovic 1995; Barr 2002). Firstly, the aim of benefits is not to eliminate poverty 
but rather to relieve it, i.e. not the entire poverty gap is filled. Secondly, benefits in kind form a 
much bigger part of the package on offer. Thirdly, low income by itself is not enough to ensure 
eligibility. Due to difficulties and unreliability of means-testing, indicator targeting becomes an 
important substitute. By now however, all Central and East European countries have introduced 
minimum guaranteed income schemes, following West European practices. The process of 
becoming a member of the European Union may have also played a homogenization role 
(Sissenich 2007). While no European hard law on social programs exists, the Council‟s 
recommendation from 1992 encourages the introduction of universal minimum guaranteed 
income schemes that top up resources when income falls below a threshold deemed necessary 
for leading a decent and dignified life (Guibentif and Bouget 1997; Heikkilä and Keskitalo 2001). 
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 By and large, social assistance schemes have not formed an important pillar of the 
broader social protection system. These programs have generally reached small shares of the 
population and have constituted only a tiny fraction in overall social expenditure (Fox 2003). 
Together with unemployment insurance, social assistance constituted 10% of social expenditure 
in Poland in the mid-1990s (Rutkowski 1998), while social assistance payments in 1996 in 
Hungary totalled 3.3% of cash transfers (Lelkes 2000). Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide an overview of 
spending on minimum income guarantee programs, as well as of percent of the population 
covered, in several CEE countries from 1999 to 2004.  
 
Table 3.1 Spending on minimum guaranteed income programs (as % of GDP) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Czech Republic 0.38 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.46 
Estonia 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.17 
Latvia 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Lithuania 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.11 
Poland 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.44 0.41 0.19 
Slovakia 1.13 1.11 1.13 1.04 0.75 0.48 
Slovenia 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.31 0.44 0.48 
Source: (Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007) 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Receipt of minimum income guarantee programs (% of population receiving benefits) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Czech Republic -- -- -- -- 4.0 3.6 
Estonia 5.9 4.8 5.2 5.1 3.8 2.5 
Hungary 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.4 -- 
Latvia 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.2 
Lithuania 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.4 
Poland 4.2 4.2 3.6 1.7 1.5 -- 
Slovakia 5.5 5.9 6.0 6.0 5.2 3.3 
Slovenia 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.7 
(Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007) 
 
 It must be said at this point that the need for social assistance programs might be 
decreased by the existence of “functional equivalents”, i.e. mechanisms of providing income to 
those unable to access the formal labour market. Some of these equivalents are of economic 
nature. For example, the sizeable unofficial economy developed during late socialism and early 
transition has often been claimed to provide an alternative to unemployment (Greskovits 1998). 
Alternatively, economic migration to the West of one or more of its member may offer a family 
another strategy to secure an income flow. Aside undocumented labour or migration, needy 
individuals may be channelled towards other social programs. Instead of relying on a general 
means-tested scheme, a redistributive system may resort to an array of programs designed to 
serve well-defined categories ranging from disabled, older people, care-takers, parents or 
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unemployed. Establishment of such categorical transfers in principle diminishes the need for 
targeted social assistance, as materially deprived individuals are eligible for other types of 
benefits.  
On the one hand, use of a categorical instead of a general system may have carried the 
advantage of better targeting. As accurate income data has been notoriously difficult to obtain, 
social categories more likely to find themselves in a precarious material situation, such as single 
parents, large families or the disabled were more easily identifiable. On the other hand, such 
fragmentation of the system may breed “holes” and inequities between various social groups. 
Materially deprived individuals, who do not fit either of the categories, fall through the safety net. 
Moreover, a segmented system, where various categories are separated into distinct programs 
may contribute to the idea that some groups are more “deserving” than others and thus generate 
stigmatization. 
Indeed, judging by the extent of social assistance both as financial effort and as 
proportion of the population covered, this type of scheme played a minor role in redistribution 
in Central and Eastern Europe. More often, the benefit system was designed to serve various 
social groups through distinct programs. However, often, part or all of the benefits targeted at a 
given category, were subjected to income-tests (for example child benefits in the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary, maternity benefit in Hungary, unemployment allowances in various 
countries, minimum social pensions etc.). Therefore, income testing, although not asset testing, 
has been combined with a group membership as a principle of entitlement. To a significant 
degree, the categorical system has been maintained alongside the general system, once the 
minimum guaranteed income schemes have been introduced (see Table 3.7 in the next section). 
Residential care, a major element of the communist social assistance setup, gained in 
frequency of use during the first transition years especially in the case of the disabled and that of 
children (Ringold and Andrews 1999). The expansion in the utilization of residential care 
occurred despite previous chronic problems of poor quality and high expenditure. Furthermore, 
living conditions for residents worsened even more due to the tightened budgets and rising 
operating costs experienced in early transition. Countries in the region have moved towards 
foster care and community based services, but some have done it sooner (Slovakia) rather than 
later (Romania). 
In their early years, social assistance schemes faced also numerous problems in 
implementation, such as missing data, missing benefits, gaps in coverage and non-receipt of 
entitlement, a shortage of qualified and motivated social workers etc., making “poverty relief 
patchy throughout the region” (Barr 1996). In particular, monitoring procedures needed for the 
evaluation and improvement of existing programs were largely missing (Ringold and Andrews 
1999). Consequently, precious little was known about the characteristics, needs and evolution of 
welfare clients. Since then, significant improvements have been made in terms of modernizing 
information systems, including financial and property assets in eligibility rules, increasing the role 
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of social workers to provide outreach services and reforming administrative procedures (Fox 
2003; Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007). 
Despite these general trends, safety nets in Central and Eastern Europe have by no 
means followed a unique design pattern. Substantial country variation exists in several aspects 
such as the importance that is to be given to means-testing as opposed to universal or 
contributory benefits, share of the population that is covered, generosity and complementary 
measures associated to the income support. First of all, some countries decided to submit 
previously universal benefits (such as child allowances or maternity benefits) to income-tests (as 
in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). Secondly, inflation has often been used 
by governments to adjust various benefit levels, social assistance included. Whereas initially 
generous, benefit amounts declined dramatically as governments failed to price-index them. For 
example, from 1991 to 1997, the official subsistence minimum declined in real terms by 88% in 
Lithuania and 69% in Bulgaria (Ringold and Andrews 1999). Indeed, as a general trend, social 
assistance benefits were more often set according to budgetary concerns rather than on the basis 
of a subsistence basket. Nonetheless, average benefits were markedly higher in some countries 
compared to others (See Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 Average yearly social assistance benefits (in $ PPP) 
  Poland 2004 584 
Estonia-2003 421 Latvia 2002 50 
Estonia-2004 467 Latvia 2004 47 
Hungary-2000 317 Lithuania 2000 324 
Hungary-2004 426 Lithuania 2004 214 
Poland 2000 472 Slovenia 2003 690 
Source: (Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007) 
 
Thirdly, the importance given to in-kind benefits in the larger assistance package varied. 
Some countries made part of these benefits available to larger sections of the population by 
administering them separately and by allowing higher income thresholds than in the case of 
social assistance support (for example, Romania and Bulgaria). The bulk of in-kind benefits 
consisted of subsidies to cover rising housing and utilities costs, especially during the winter76. 
Other in-kind provision consisted of free school meals, free or subsidized public transportation, 
free medical services etc. (Ringold and Andrews 1999).  
 Finally, two issues merit further discussion as they have been the centre of heated 
controversies, not only in the context of the post-communist transition but also in the 
framework of research on the West European welfare states. The two contentious topics that I 
                                                          
76 Bulgaria introduced in 1995 a targeted winter benefit, while Romania adopted a lifeline tariff so as to protect the 
economically vulnerable Ringold, D. and E. S. Andrews (1999). Safety Nets in Transition Economies: Toward a 
Reform Strategy. Social Protection Discussion Papers. Washington D.C., World Bank.; 
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would like to refer to are decentralization and work incentives. In the case of the former, two 
opposing views have been formulated. The first one argued in favour of decentralization on the 
account that local authorities have better information at their disposal to identify the “truly” 
poor. The other view singled out two negative externalities in the form of “welfare migration” 
(recipients migrating where benefits are higher) and cost-explosion if funding remains essentially 
at the central level(Sipos 1994; Barr 2002). Note that although pointing to different directions, 
both positions assigned cost containment and “efficiency” as a primary goal. 
Central and East European countries opted for different levels of decentralization of 
their social assistance schemes. The issue of decentralization regards several dimensions, namely 
administration and delivery, financing and decision-making about rules governing eligibility and 
minimum amounts to be awarded. As far as the first two aspects are concerned, local authorities 
are generally the ones charged with the task.  On the other hand, financing and decision-making 
have been less likely to become solely the responsibility of local authorities. Hungary is the only 
state that has chosen to initially completely decentralize both financial and decision-making 
responsibilities. While national guidelines do exist, Hungarian local authorities are free to set 
both the amount and the duration of the benefit, while at the same time bearing the entire 
burden for its financing (Lelkes 2000). In-between, the majority of countries preferred to set 
national mandatory regulations regarding minimum levels, leaving local authorities the possibility 
to discretionally augment them. Simultaneously, some central budget financial support is 
provided.  
Decentralization of poor-relief has often proceeded in an ad-hoc manner as both the 
central government and enterprises attempted to pass some of their previous social 
responsibilities onto unprepared local governments (Ringold and Andrews 1999; Deacon 2000; 
Reuterswärd 2003). The result has been that social assistance programs have been left unfunded 
in the poorest municipalities, while in the richer ones, benefits have been available to a wider 
segment of the population. Lack of funds and low institutional capacity at the local level 
translated into use of ad-hoc eligibility criteria as a way of rationing scarce resources (Ringold, 
Kasek et al. 2007). Geographical inequalities have led some countries to partly recentralize their 
schemes (for example, Romania, Bulgaria and Latvia) (Ringold and Andrews 1999; Ringold, 
Kasek et al. 2007). Moreover, evidence so far suggests that decentralization is far from improving 
targeting77. 
 The second theme that has been a central concern to many studies of social assistance 
schemes is the issue of work incentives and the so called “welfare dependency” culture. In 
particular, too generous benefits were seen as deterring clients from entering formal 
employment. A number of remedies have been proposed to address this danger (Ringold and 
Andrews 1999; Barr 2002; Sipos and Ringold 2005; Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007). First, keeping 
                                                          
77 Despite having the most decentralized social assistance scheme among the Baltics, Latvia experience leakage levels 
of over 80% Ringold, D., L. Kasek, et al. (2007). Social Assistance in Central Europe and the Baltic States. 
Washington D.C, World Bank. 
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benefits low and limiting entitlement duration had the role of making paid work financially more 
attractive. Generally, benefits offered through social assistance programs have been low 
compared to minimum wages throughout Central and Eastern Europe (See Table 3.4). This 
however has not proved to be the answer for long-term unemployment. Furthermore, there is a 
huge problem with adequacy as minimum wages tended to be low as well.  
 
Table 3.4. Social Assistance Benefits and Minimum Wages 
 EE HU LV LT PL SI 
Average received SA benefit as % of 
minimum wage-2003/4 
15 10 2 7 14 10 
Source: (Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007) 
 
 Second, as a way to prevent misuse, an increased policing of the willingness to work 
was recommended. Again, this recommendation has been put into practice. Presently, all social 
assistance schemes in CEE link benefit receipt by a formal connection with the employment 
office. In most cases, recipients are required to accept job offers or training programs that have 
been presented to them78. Third, the taxes and social security contributions have been seen as 
detrimental to employment take-up. Together with relative low wage-benefit differentials, high 
taxation increases the marginal effective tax rate of labour earnings, creating a so-called 
unemployment trap (Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007). This phenomenon is typical in countries with 
wide wage distributions and low minimum wages. As, in the last decade, Central and East 
European countries experienced both a significant widening of the wage distribution and the 
persistence of relatively low minimum wages, in-work benefits have been advocated as a way to 
tackle possible emerging poverty traps and, more generally, the problem of the working poor 
(Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007). In fact, some countries have already followed this advice. Estonia 
has introduced in-work benefits, while Slovenia and Hungary have benefits that taper of 
gradually as income from employment increases. 
 The interest in work (dis)incentives incorporated in social assistance schemes in Central 
and East European countries was partly motivated by their increased role in providing resources 
for the unemployed. For example, a study based on Hungarian data from 2006 revealed that 
more unemployed people received social assistance than unemployment insurance (Lelkes 2006). 
Similar patterns were and continue to be common throughout the region. Two factors have 
contributed to the high number of unemployed on social assistance rolls, namely a persistence of 
long-term unemployment and a tightening of the eligibility and duration rules of unemployment 
insurance programs (Boeri and Edwards 1998; Boeri and Terrell 2002). Rapid exhaustion of 
unemployment insurance benefits has meant that the burden of income support has quickly been 
taken over by social assistance. Although social (or unemployment) assistance was often 
                                                          
78 In Slovenia, recipients must prove that they have actively been seeking work or participated in an active labour 
market program before they qualify for benefits while in Estonia unemployed members that are not registered at the 
employment office are not counted when calculating the benefits Ibid.;  
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preferred on financial and incentive grounds, moving from unemployment insurance to means-
tested benefits has actually increased replacement rates in some countries79 for households that 
had many children and a non-working spouse (Boeri and Edwards 1998). As a consequence, the 
early shift from unemployment compensation to social assistance not only failed to economize 
on spending but brought in a plethora of administrative problems, ranging from expensive and 
inaccurate targeting to distortions stemming from decentralized social spending (Boeri and 
Edwards 1998). 
 
3.3.2  IMPACT ON INEQUALITY 
 
 There is plenty of controversy regarding the extent to which Central and East European 
Countries have been able to put in place an effective safety net during their political and 
economic transition. Some have argued that the “social safety net has helped to mitigate the 
negative effects of transition on income inequality, especially for the most vulnerable portions of 
the population” (Roland 2002). On the contrary, others have claimed that insufficient social 
reform left behind a too complex mix of benefits, “neither fish nor fowl”, which failed to reach 
those most in need (Ringold and Andrews 1999). Heavy reliance on categorical benefits together 
with weak institutional coordination, unclear division of tasks between agencies and ministries, 
lack of flexibility and over-bureaucratic institutions were maintained to be the factors responsible 
for the establishment of a system that duplicated benefits for some groups while leaving others 
completely unprotected. Instead, a new system in which social assistance programs, especially 
guaranteed minimum income schemes, would be given significantly more weight was claimed to 
be much more effective in providing a basic but unswerving safety net. The recommendation 
draws on empirical evidence showing that in Central and Eastern Europe, unemployment and 
social assistance benefits are much more likely to go to the bottom quintile (Table 3.5), while 
pensions (which form the biggest expenditure item) are much more likely to go to the better off 
(Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007). In part, this situation is to be expected as pensions are income-
related transfers and serve primarily consumption smoothening purposes and not poverty 
alleviation ones. However, an interesting finding has been that pensions not only do not 
diminish inequality but actually substantially add to it.  For example, in Poland, pensions were 
the second largest inequality generator, their contribution amounting to almost a third of the 
total Gini value (See Table 3.6).  
 
                                                          
79 In Romania and Slovakia, the shift from unemployment benefits to social assistance increased the benefits 
received by couples with a non-working spouse (especially if the couple also had many) after six months after the 
loss of the previous job Boeri, T. and S. Edwards (1998). "Long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment 
benefits: The changing nature of non-employment subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe." Empirical Economics 
23(1-2): 31-54. 
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Table 3.5. Concentration coefficients80 of social assistance transfers and proportion of transfers 
going to the bottom quintile 
 BG EE HU LV LT PL RO SK 
Concentration 
coefficient-1993-95 
-3 -16 -25 +10 -10 -13 +9 -53 
% of SA transfers 
received by bottom 
quintile (1992-95) 
36 36 35 -- -- 29 23 52 
Source: (Milanovic 1998) 
  
 
 
Table 3.6 Components of inequality in Poland 
 Concentration 
coefficient-1995 
Concentration 
coefficient-1989 
Contribution to 
Gini81-1995 
Labour(wage) income 31.7  45.5% 
Self-employment +farm 
income 
41.0  22.4% 
Total market income 34.3 34.5 67.9% 
Pensions 35.9 -2.6 29.1% 
Family allowance -18.2 -11.9 -1.2% 
Unemployment benefits -19.1 Not applicable -1.4% 
Cash social transfers 26.5 -4.5 26.6% 
Source:(Rutkowski 1998) 
 
 In one of his studies, Milanovic (Milanovic 2000) compared the basic governing rules of 
social assistance schemes and their impact on poverty (defined in terms of the national poverty 
line) in four countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Estonia and Poland. Drawing on variation in poverty 
level, coverage and relative benefit importance for poor households, Milanovic established a 
three-class typology. It distinguishes between concentrated (reduced coverage, high relative 
benefit), dispersed (high coverage, small relative value of the benefit) and irrelevant (reduced 
coverage and small benefit) systems. However, using effectiveness (poverty gap closed for the 
lowest decile), efficiency (share of transfers disbursed to the lowest decile) and relative 
effectiveness (effectiveness divided by spending on social assistance as % of social protection) as 
evaluating criteria failed to yield any consistent pattern linking program type to achieved results. 
Other attempts to determine the effects of social assistance schemes on the region‟s poverty 
levels and intensity resulted in small impact estimates (Fox 2003; Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007). 
                                                          
80 The concentration coefficient measures the correlation between the distribution of an income source S and the 
distribution of total income; it ranges between -1 and 1 (however, here numbers have been multiplied by 100); 
negative numbers indicate an inverse relationship between the income source S and total income; in the case of 
transfers this denotes progressivity, i.e. larger sums go to those with a smaller total income; similarly, positive 
numbers denote regressive transfers, i.e. those who receive more also have more;  
81 The figures are derived from a Gini decomposition procedure which allows to pinpoint what the marginal change 
in overall inequality would be, given that a given income source would increase/decrease, become more/less 
unequal; it is based on the relative size of the respective income source in the overall income, on its inequality of 
distribution and the correlation with the distribution of overall income;  
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Interestingly enough, with the exception of Slovenia, means-tested benefits are more 
common in the EU15 and in the OECD countries than in the New Member States82 (Fox 2003; 
Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007). Conversely, social insurance contributory benefits, especially 
pensions, weigh much more heavily within social transfers. Unlike other benefits that were 
subjected to passive downward revisions, pensions have been much better protected against 
inflation (Rutkowski 1998; Lelkes 2000; Fox 2003). Early retirement has also had a wider reach in 
terms of coverage compared to unemployment insurance and social assistance schemes. As a 
result, pensions were the biggest expenditure item in the social expenditure budget. To be able to 
finance growing pension entitlements, governments often cut spending in other areas, poverty 
relief among them. “The growth in pension spending has overshadowed what was assumed to be 
the major focus of the social welfare budget during the transition, namely a social safety net to 
protect vulnerable groups from emerging risks” (Rutkowski 1998). 
 Although the socialist system has often been criticised as unable to tackle problems of 
poverty as its role was to give everyone a stake and harness political support for the regime 
rather than redistribute (Barr 1996; Rutkowski 1998), its main features have been preserved with 
little alteration during the 1990‟s. This has come as a surprise to many students of post-89 public 
policy in Eastern Europe, especially given the dominance of the neo-liberal discourse within 
domestic and international (IMF, World Bank) policy circles. Especially economists, but also 
sociologists argued that targeting is preferable on two grounds83. First, it reduces public 
expenditure and hence fosters economic growth and second it is more equitable since a larger 
share of resources goes to the neediest. Despite the popularity of these arguments, targeting has 
been used on a startlingly small scale. Several reasons have been put forward in an attempt to 
justify this finding. Firstly, the previous residual nature of social assistance programs and the 
stigma generally associated with poverty relief has been deemed to lower political support for 
this type of means-tested and generally, targeted, schemes (Ringold and Andrews 1999). 
However, means-tested benefits are rarely benefiting from wide popular support, irrespective of 
the communist experience. More generally, there is a targeting-taxability trade-off in which tax 
payers are less reticent to pay for universal benefits (Deacon 2000). Hence, this is a problem that 
social assistance schemes in all democratic societies must confront.  
 Secondly, some authors have noted that in a context of overall declining living 
standards, targeting becomes more difficult to implement (Ringold and Andrews 1999; Fox 
2003). As economic reforms were gradually implemented, the large majority of the population 
suffered real income losses and felt entitled to claim some sort of compensation. As a result, 
attention was focused on transition shock, while concerns with the welfare of the poorest 
stratum were less prominent.  
                                                          
82 Based on 2003 figures; 
83 For a broader discussion, see Haney, L. (2002). Inventing the Needy. Gender and the Politics of Welfare in 
Hungary. Berkeley University of California Press. 
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 Thirdly, despite being hailed as very egalitarian, the socialist social protection system 
contained numerous privileges, not just for the nomenklatura but also for various social 
categories that were considered particularly “valuable” for the regime. Some occupational groups 
benefited from advantageous conditions regarding pay, sickness insurance and retirement. Such 
categorical privileges proved to be very resilient to reform (Ringold and Andrews 1999). Usually, 
groups benefiting from special terms were also more able to organize politically to defend their 
interests. Re-channelling resources from these groups towards social assistance clients has been 
politically unattractive.  
 Finally, technical issues might also be responsible for the marginal role of social 
assistance schemes in Central and East European Countries (Ringold and Andrews 1999; Fox 
2003). In particular, targeting is known to require substantial administrative capabilities that were 
largely absent in the early years of transition. High informalization and lack of indicators strongly 
correlated with poverty further compounded the difficulty of targeting (Fox 2003). Instead of 
experimenting with new programs, countries largely preferred to rely on the already tested 
institution of social insurance.  
 
 
3.4  CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SCHEMES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE BETWEEN 2004-2007 
 
 The preceding section has cast a bird‟s eye on the main findings in the literature on social 
assistance in Central and Eastern Europe. The following subchapter is dedicated to an in-depth 
and comparative examination of program characteristics. It will attempt to accurately answer 
both the question of who gets how much under what conditions and that of how much 
resources are devoted to how many recipients. 
 Much of the scholarly research on social programs has taken the financial point of view 
as its main focus. Country comparisons of social spending have probably been much more 
frequent and detailed than investigations of other constitutive elements of the social protection 
setup. Following this tradition, although not resuming to it, I start by presenting data on social 
assistance expenditure, based on data released by Eurostat. 
 Expenditure and number of clients are only one side of the coin. They reveal the size of 
a program but expose little about its inner mechanisms. Who and under what conditions gets a 
share of the redistributed pie is just as important as how much and how many. Put differently, 
social assistance programs like all redistributive mechanisms work with certain rules. In the 
following, I take a closer look at key characteristics of the social assistance setup and their cross-
country variation in eight Central and East European states that comprise the core of this study. 
In doing so I draw heavily on information relating to social assistance programs made available 
via the Mutual Information System on Social Protection on EU Member States and the EEA 
(MISSOC). To supplement gaps in MISSOC, I also use the information provided in the country 
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chapters of the OECD‟s 2007 Benefits and Wages (OECD 2007), as well as in the Social 
Protection in the Candidate Countries series ((GVG) 2003).  
 First of all, some general data regarding the programs is presented. This includes 
information on the timing of introduction and of major changes, as well as on additional benefits 
offered alongside the main benefit to social assistance recipients. Secondly, I use EUROSTAT 
provided macro data to build a picture of the amounts of resources devoted to social assistance. 
Thirdly, I discuss the tests on which eligibility is based, namely the means test and the work test. 
Fourthly, the generosity of the system is examined. Last but not least, I take a closer look at the 
(de)centralization of the programs. 
 
3.4.1  GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
 By the end of the 1990‟s, all countries in the Central and East European bloc have 
established minimum income guarantee schemes for their residents. The introduction of this 
form of public assistance took place as early as 1990 in countries such as Poland or Lithuania 
and as late as 1995 in Romania and Latvia or Estonia (See Table 3.7 on the year of the 
introduction of social assistance in each country, as well as on the year of major reforms of the 
system). All of them share a number of common characteristics, largely replicating the basic 
model of minimum guaranteed income programs found in Western Europe (Lodemel and 
Schulte 1992). First, they represent a last resort type of public aid, meaning that all other personal 
resources, entitlement to other types of benefits and sometimes even family support have to be 
exhausted before accessing the benefit. Second, individual resources are assessed usually both in 
terms of income and in terms of assets. The exact assessment procedure however varies (a more 
thorough discussion of income and asset test is found in subsection IV.3 below). Third, in 
addition to a means-test, claimants have to undergo a so called work test. All able bodied adults 
(some exemptions are granted for single parents with very young children) must be working, or 
searching for work and available to take up the first employment opportunity. Fourth, benefits 
are normally available for an unlimited time period as long as the qualifying conditions are 
satisfied. Fifth, the entitlement is not individual, but family or household based. If other family 
or household members have enough resources to pull a claimant above the poverty line, the 
granting of the benefit is not warranted. Finally, benefits are normally financed from general 
taxation, although the exact central-local mix may differ from one country to another.  
 To be sure the introduction of social assistance was mainly linked to the alarming 
spread of a new phenomenon, namely long-term unemployment. Jobseekers that exhausted their 
entitlement to unemployment compensation were left without any kind of income replacement. 
Yet, some countries chose to ignore this problem until the mid 90‟s. Furthermore, social 
assistance was often not introduced as a wide-casted net. That is, instead of having a general 
scheme to cover all cases where income fell below a certain threshold, many countries chose to 
introduce an array of income-tested or means-tested transfers that incorporated also categorical 
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features in their entitlement conditions. The elderly, single parents, care-takers, disabled persons 
and the unemployed often had separate schemes run for them. Thus, fragmentation of the 
income support system ensued.  
 
 
Table 3.7 Overview of Social Assistance Schemes in CEE 
 Year SA first 
introduced 
Major changes Additional benefits 
CZ 1991 (1988) 2006- change to 
two tier system; 
rules for setting the 
benefit amount 
changed 
Housing support. 
EE 1995 Benefits adjusted in 
2005 and 2007 
Housing expenses deducted before 
establishing entitlement.  
2002-local municipalities must provide 
emergency SA= food, clothes, shelter. 
Municipalities required to provide social 
housing 
HU 1992 (1979) 1997-regular social 
benefit for 
unemployed (UA) 
introduced; 
previously SA-only 
local; 2006-reform 
changing the way 
the benefit is 
computed; 
temporary work no 
longer barred (but 
income included in 
income test) 
Home maintenance support provided by 
the local authorities; higher income 
threshold than SA, but income and asset 
test. 
LV 1995 2003-minimum 
amount set 
nationally; local 
authorities may 
grant additional 
benefits 
Rent and utility allowance (national 
amount very low but municipality may 
top it up). 
Free school meals. 
Allowance for care and for upbringing of 
children. 
Allowance for single pensioners. 
LT 1990 1993-radical 
reduction of the 
value of the basket 
of goods; food 
expenditure 
increased from 46% 
to 70% of basket‟s 
value 
Compensation for heating, hot and cold 
water- funded by the local budget. 
Free school meals. 
Free school transportation. 
Maternity benefit for non-insured female 
students- paid from the central budget. 
PL 1990 (1973) 1996-introduction Housing allowance- paid by the local 
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 Year SA first 
introduced 
Major changes Additional benefits 
of price-indexation government 
SK 1993 1998-new fully 
fledged law on SA 
Housing benefit. 
Benefits for the disabled. 
 
SI 1992 2001- important 
increase in the level 
of SA; benefit 
reaches 60% of AW 
for 2 adults and 2 
children; 2007-
stricter work search 
requirements 
Rent allowance (up to 25% basic amount 
of min income). 
Attendance supplement for the disabled. 
Source: ((GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003); MISSCEECII Tables and MISSCEEO 
Tables; 
 
In addition to the main benefit, additional assistance was available to recipients, mainly in 
the form of support with housing and with the payment of utilities. Six out of eight countries 
have implemented a separate transfer aimed to help those on low-income to pay for their 
housing (See Table 3.7). Usually, this benefit is not strictly linked to the receipt of social 
assistance. Instead, it is available to larger strata of the population as the income thresholds 
determining entitlement are often higher than those for the regular monthly benefit. 
Nevertheless, the amount of the benefit is usually low, well below average rent levels. In some 
cases, local authorities are required to provide social housing. However, this requirement is 
seldom fulfilled as the demand for social housing vastly exceeds the supply.  
As part of the liberalization process, governments gradually reduced or eliminated energy 
subsidies. The withdrawal seriously impacted on general household welfare, especially in the cold 
season when the heating bill could absorb a large share of the household income. To partly 
offset the losses, one country (See Table 3.7) has introduced energy/utility benefits targeted at 
the lower-income households. Just as with housing support, the benefit was generally made 
available on a larger scale than the basic social assistance monthly benefit.  
 
3.4.2  EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
 
One angle from which one can analyze a social policy consists of the public resources 
devoted to it.  This subpart presents expenditure data on social assistance programs in the eight 
Central and East European Countries. Ideally, precise figures on minimum income support, as 
well as related benefits, expenditure would be presented. The figures represent expenditure on 
means-tested84 benefits under the social exclusion function of social protection. Two kinds of 
                                                          
84 Only direct cash or near-cash payments (ex: housing allowances) are counted; other benefits as access to public 
services such as health-care or education is not included. 
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statistics are presented, social assistance expenditure as percentage of the GDP and as percentage 
of the total social expenditure bill (See Table 3.8). The underlying rationale for the use of two 
measures instead of one is that each of them reflects a different aspect of social assistance 
expenditure. While assessing it in terms of a GDP percentage sheds light on how much 
resources a social assistance system enjoys, expressing it in terms of a percentage of social 
expenditure points out the importance of the social assistance component within the overall 
social protection architecture.  
 
Table 3.8 Expenditure on total means-tested benefits in Central and Eastern Europe 
 Expenditure means-tested 
benefits as  % GDP 
Expenditure on means-tested 
benefits as  % social 
protection benefits 
Expenditure on means-
tested benefits as PPP/ 
inhabitant 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 
CZ 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 2.18 2.06 2.04 0.60 66.2 64.9 67.3 21.6 
EE 0.1 0.1 0.1 <0.1 0.93 0.79 0.49 0.40 14.8 13.6 9.2 8.5 
HU 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.34 0.38 0.37 0.35 9.4 11.7 12.2 11.9 
LV 0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.43 0.37 0.25 0.18 5.1 4.8 3.7 2.7 
LT 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 2.14 1.32 1.11 0.92 30 20.1 18.7 19.2 
PL 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.75 1.81 0.89 0.87 16.1 40.2 20.9 20.8 
SK 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.80 2.99 3.22 2.94 57.2 64.4 75.9 75.7 
SI 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 2.25 2.23 1.85 1.65 96 99 84.9 76.6 
Source: Eurostat ESSPROS Database (Eurostat 2008); 
 
All eight countries spend relatively little on means-tested benefits designed to prevent 
exclusion, both in absolute and in relative terms. The highest spenders are the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic, where around 0-4-0.5% of GDP is spent on this type of 
transfer. Lithuania and Poland are in a somewhat intermediary position, while the remaining 
countries, especially Latvia and Estonia spend very little resources, on average less than 1% of 
GDP. In a similar vein, reliance on public assistance within the wider welfare setup is very low. 
Sometimes less than 0.5% of the social expenditure budget goes towards financing means-tested 
assistance. The highest spenders devote around 2-3% of their social protection budget to finance 
this type of residual benefit. Not surprisingly, countries that are willing to spend more on social 
assistance programs are also keen on making these programs into important items within the 
overall social protection system85.  
In addition to the low level of expenditure, another striking finding emerging from Table 
3.8 is the (sometimes very sharp) downward trend in spending. With the exception of Slovakia, 
all countries have reduced the amounts they spend on social assistance, both as a percentage of 
their GDP and as a share of the overall social expenditure. The drop is particularly steep in the 
                                                          
85 Another explanation might be that various social programs compete for the same resources (although social 
assistance is financed through general taxation while insurance-based benefits are financed through contributions 
which are collected into a separate and independent fund). Thus, expenditure on one type of program squeezes 
resources for the remaining schemes;  
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Czech Republic, after the 2007 reform. While this result may reflect a declining need for this type 
of benefit as the economy grows and living standards rise, it could just as well be the result of 
social expenditure cuts, either explicitly, or implicitly, by failing to adjust upwards benefits and 
eligibility thresholds.  
Finally, to illustrate the fact that varying country wealth levels allow for very different 
amounts of resources, the last column of Table 3.8 present social assistance expenditure as 
Purchasing Power Parities per inhabitant. Obviously, richer states dispose of significantly more 
financial sources to tap on, in order to finance social assistance schemes. What is indeed rather 
startling, there are huge discrepancies between some countries pointing out the very unequal 
levels of economic development present in Central and Eastern Europe, despite the shared 
communist experience. 
 
Table 3.9. Break-down of expenditure on means-tested transfers in CEE (in PPP Euros per 
inhabitant) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SK SI 
Means-tested cash benefits 
2004 65.6 14.8 5.2 5 13.1 7.1 57.2 94.8 
2005 64.3 13.6 6.5 4.4 10 29.7 64.4 99 
2006 66.8 9.2 7 3.4 10.9 8.4 75.9 84.9 
2007 21.3 8.5 5.3 2.4 10.6 8.5 75.7 76.6 
Income support (means-tested)86 
2004 53.2 14.8 2.3 4.8 12.1 5.6 57.2 94.5 
2005 50.2 13.6 3.5 4.2 8.7 6.1 64.4 98.6 
2006 46.2 9.2 4.10 3.2 7.3 6.5 75.9 84.4 
2007 19.6 8.5 2.8 2.3 8.1 6.9 75.7 76.1 
Benefits in kind (means-tested) 
2004 0.6 NA 4.2 0.2 16.8 8.9 NA 1.2 
2005 0.6 NA 5.2 0.4 10.1 10.5 NA NA 
2006 0.6 NA 5.3 0.3 7.8 12.5 NA NA 
2007 0.2 NA 6.6 0.3 8.6 12.3 NA NA 
Accommodation (means-tested) 
2004 NA NA NA NA NA 0.2 NA 1.2 
2005 NA NA NA NA NA 0.2 NA NA 
2006 NA NA NA NA NA 0.2 NA NA 
2007 NA NA NA NA NA 0.2 NA NA 
Note:  NA-data not available. 
Source:  Eurostat ESSPROSS Database (Eurostat 2008) 
 
 Because many types of benefits may be lumped together under the heading of social 
exclusion not elsewhere classified, Table 3.9 displays expenditure figures on some of the four 
subcategories, i.e. means tested-cash benefits, means-tested income support, means-tested 
                                                          
86 Income support encompassed periodic cash payments to households with insufficient resources; means-tested 
cash benefits are a slightly wider category. In addition to income support, they include lump-sum, emergency and 
other forms of irregular cash support; see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-11-
014/EN/KS-RA-11-014-EN.PDF. 
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benefits in kind and means-tested expenditure on accommodation. Unfortunately, for the latter 
two categories data is very scant, as figures are missing for most countries. In any case, 
comparing figures in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, it is easily observable that generally, means-tested 
assistance designed to combat social exclusion is awarded in cash, and that income support is its 
most important element. This is a pattern that holds for all countries, albeit noticeable variations 
exist. For example, means-tested income support is the only component of means-tested cash 
assistance in Estonia, while it amounts to only half on means-tested cash benefits expenditure in 
Hungary. In the latter case, the expenditure patterns suggest the existence of important 
categorical or tied means-tested support (for further evidence on this, see section IV.4 on 
benefits). 
 
3.4.3 ENTITLEMENT: MEANS TESTS AND WORK TESTS 
 
By definition, social assistance is awarded subsequent to a means test. The means test 
may consist of an income test, an asset test or both. All of the eight CEE countries have an 
income test as part of the process of determining entitlement. However, the types of revenue 
that are taken into consideration may differ. In effect, only two countries, namely Latvia and 
Poland do not disregard any type of income when establishing eligibility. All six remaining 
countries have some type of income exemptions. Generally speaking, incidental income, as well 
as some types of social transfers, notably those connected to disability and to children tends not 
be included in the income test (see Table 3.10). The Czech and Slovak Republic go farthest, by 
disregarding some portion of earnings, as well as several types of cash transfers together with 
non-regular income.  
 
Table 3.10 Determining eligibility: means tests and work tests (2004-2008) 
 Income test Asset test Work test Unit of testing 
CZ Income from gainful 
activities and from 
capital; social security 
benefits and all 
recurrent income; 
non-regular income 
exempted; since 
2005, 50% of the 
care benefit 
exempted; since 2007 
30% of earnings and 
20% of sickness/ 
unemployment 
benefits disregarded 
Not until 2007; 
after 2007 
property 
considered in 
establishing 
eligibility 
Registration with the 
labour office and 
willingness to work; 
should actively 
search for work; 
since 2005-different 
definition of 
„suitable‟ work 
applicable to those 
unemployed for 12+ 
months; since 2007-
benefit reduced to 
subsistence benefit 
if not enough work 
effort 
Household/ 
Single person 
EE Taxable income, 
pensions, social 
No Registration with the 
labour office. 
Household; 
parents, 
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 Income test Asset test Work test Unit of testing 
security benefits; Not 
included in the test: 
lump sum payment, 
benefits for the 
disabled + child 
allowances and 
supplementary 
benefit (since 2003), 
housing allowances 
within limits, 
allowances for 
families with 3+ 
children; since 2006-
student loans, 
transportation benefit 
& accommodation 
benefit for the 
unemployed also 
exempted 
Did not refuse 
repeatedly a job 
offer. 
Did not refuse to 
participate in a 
rehabilitation 
program. 
Sanctions at the 
discretion of the 
local authority. 
Since 2005-case 
management. 
grandparents 
and other 
persons living in 
the same 
household may 
be required to 
extend payments 
before public 
support kicks in 
HU Array of categorical 
benefits, many 
established locally; 
some allowances 
connected to 
disability are usually 
disregarded; housing 
allowance 
disregarded (until 
2006) benefit is only 
cummulable with up 
to 90 days of 
temporary work; no 
benefit payable for 
the days worked; 
since 2006- after 
taking up work, 
benefit paid for an 
additional 3 months 
at 50% rate and 
another 3 months at 
25% rate. 
Usually, yes but 
eligibility 
conditions vary 
with the local 
government 
From 1999-income 
replacement for the 
unemployed linked 
to participation in 
public work 
programs (workfare) 
Usually 
household (more 
discretionary) 
LV All types of income 
considered. Partial 
payment of a benefit 
for 3 months after 
taking up work (at 
75%, 50% and 25% 
rate) 
Yes, but savings 
up to 200LV and 
property up to 
3000LV allowed. 
Registration with the 
labour office. 
Must accept suitable 
work or training. 
Must co-operate and 
give full information 
and accept 
rehabilitation 
Immediate 
family/ 
household 
members; must 
claim alimony or 
support from the 
absent parent; 
resources of the 
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 Income test Asset test Work test Unit of testing 
In case of refusal, 
household benefit is 
reduced by the part 
of the person who 
has refused; since 
2005-benefit may 
not be received for 
more than 9 
months/ year 
extended family 
may be taken 
into 
consideration 
LT All income. 
Exception: 
extraordinary grants, 
special allowances 
and alimonies 
Must not have a 
farm larger than 
3.5 ha. Must not 
own an 
establishment;  
Registration with the 
labour office.  
Must accept job 
offers, participation 
in training or public 
works. 
Refusal may lead to 
suspension or 
withdrawal of the 
benefit; Work test 
does not apply if 
taking care of a 
child<3 or three 
children<16 or of 
nursing a disabled 
person 
Individual or 
Family 
PL All income 
considered.  
No explicit test 
but wide 
discretion of local 
authorities to 
establish whether 
a person is „needy‟ 
Registration with the 
labour office. 
Availability for  
work, training or 
socio-professional 
integration 
Did not refuse job 
unjustifiably 
No work-test for 
care-giver of a 
handicapped child 
Family/ single 
person 
SK All income. 
Exception: birth 
grants and death 
grants; in 2004-25% 
of earnings and 25% 
of old age benefit, 
(since 2005)-25% of 
maternity benefit, 
child benefits, 
scholarships, some 
benefits for the 
unemployed & 
incidental income up 
No Registration at the 
labour office and 
willingness to work, 
train, retrain and 
accept community 
work to receive the 
higher amount (SA 
for objective 
reasons/ activation 
allowance)m 
Household=appl
icant+ spouse + 
dependent 
children 
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 Income test Asset test Work test Unit of testing 
to 2* subsistence 
minimum, 
community help 
disregarded 
SI Earnings, 
inheritances, gifts; 6 
exceptions: child 
benefits, 
scholarships, 
alimony, benefits for 
the disabled and 
benefits for 
assistance and care-
giving;  
Yes, but assets 
valued at 
maximum 24 
minimum wages 
allowed. Benefit 
may be reduced if 
social worker 
considers assets 
are enough for 
maintaining 
minimum living 
standards 
Must sign and 
observe a contract 
with the Centre for 
Social Work. 
No entitlement if 
voluntarily 
unemployed.  
Must accept 
activation before 
receiving benefit. 
2006-Tightening of 
job search 
requirements 
Family 
(spouse/cohabit
ant children and 
parents and 
grandchildren if 
in the care of the 
applicant); 
obligations 
extend to 
children, 
stepparents and 
parents 
Source: ((GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003); MISSCEECII Tables, MISSOC Tables and 
MISSCEEO Tables; 
 
Until very recently, no CEE country allowed for earnings disregards either when 
establishing the initial eligibility status or when maintaining it. However, following developments 
taking place both in Western Europe (Ditch 1999; Heikkilä and Keskitalo 2001) and especially in 
the US, earnings disregards have been introduced in the Czech and Slovak Republics whereas 
gradual benefit tapers are present in the Hungarian and the Latvian schemes. Such measures 
have been used extensively in the American context, but also in large European countries such as 
Germany or France as a way to diminish the financial disincentives associated with moving from 
benefit receipt into employment. Both earnings disregards and benefit taper-off zones have the 
advantage of temporarily lowering the withdrawal rate when earnings increase. However, the 
latter do discriminate between low-income working households who have not entered the 
program and those who have. As a result of their earnings disregards, the Czech and Slovak 
Republics have an effective marginal tax rate of 70% and 75% respectively. In the other two 
countries, the effective marginal tax rate is lowered only temporarily-for three months in Latvia 
and for six in Hungary. After the grace period, the effective marginal tax rate reaches 100%, 
irrespective of actual earnings. In the remaining four countries, the immediate withdrawal of one 
euro of benefit for each euro of earnings, translates into an effective marginal tax rate of 100% 
immediately after taking up employment.  
In addition to the income test, another way of gauging a household‟s resources is the use 
of an asset test. Carrying out asset tests may bring two advantages. On the one hand, income is 
much more fluctuating than wealth. As a result, an asset test is better suited to capture the long-
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term material well-being of a household87. On the other hand, in economies where a large share 
of the activity takes place underground, asset tests may be a much more reliable tool than income 
tests. Despite their enhanced stability and reliability, asset test also incorporate a major drawback. 
They require future recipients to “spend away into poverty” in order to become eligible for 
benefits. Put differently, they require persons with low incomes to first consume their wealth 
before becoming eligible for state support. This prerequisite may have negative consequences as 
it entails a deterioration of the individual‟s material situation before state intervention is allowed 
for. More generally, the presence of asset test has the potential to discourage saving among the 
low income household88. Furthermore, wealth constitutes a resource in more ways than just 
financially. For example, selling a house and moving out of a neighbourhood may disrupt a 
person‟s social network as well as undermine her self-esteem and sense of efficacy. It follows 
that despite its higher accuracy in evaluating resources, asset testing may entail exclusionary 
processes.  
Before discussing country asset tests in more detail, a caveat is in order. Unlike income 
tests, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding asset tests. This is partly due to inaccurate and 
fuzzy data and partly due to the fact that asset tests may be ill-defined in the national legislation 
itself. Certainly, asset-tests seem to be more amenable to discretionary assessment, partly due to 
the difficulty in specifying the treatment of many types of different assets that may serve 
different purposes. This is a case in point particularly for the CEE region, where experience with 
administrative targeting is lacking and where instruments for assigning value to assets are 
underdeveloped. Thus, all asset-test related data should be interpreted with caution. 
Of the eight CEE countries present in the study, only two (Estonia and the Slovak 
Republic) do not clearly define the existence of an asset testing as part of their means test (See 
Table 3.10). Additionally, an asset test has been explicitly introduced in the Czech Republic only 
in 2007. Of the remaining five countries, only Slovenia has very clear asset disregards. Latvia and 
Lithuania also exempt some possessions, although it is less clear how the implementation of the 
asset test is carried out in practice how the definition of the asset test changed in time. Finally, 
Hungary and Poland do not explicitly stipulate any asset disregards, although in practice, it is 
likely that consumer durables or homes are not entirely subject to the asset test. 
The murky nature of asset test is not stemming from vague legislation only. Even when 
asset-tests are explicitly called for in legislation, their enforcement cannot be taken for granted. 
For example, in a study of European minimum income schemes, Guibentif and Bouget (1997) 
conclude that the application of asset tests is seldom consistent within a country. 
                                                          
87 On the advantages of using wealth instead of income to assess poverty, see Shapiro, T. M. (2001). The 
Importance of Assets. Assets for the Poor: The Benefits of Spreading Asset Ownership. T. M. Shapiro and E. N. 
Wolff. New York, Russell Sage Foundation: 11-33, Sherraden, M. (2001). Asset-Building Policy and Programs for 
the Poor. Assets for the Poor: The Benefits of Spreading Asset Ownership. T. M. Shapiro and E. N. Wolff. New 
York, Russell Sage Foundation: 302-333, Carter, M. R. and C. B. Barrett (2006). "The Economics of Poverty Traps 
and Persistent Poverty: An Asset-Based Approach." Journal of Development Studies 42(2): 178-199. 
88
 See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion and analysis of this topic. 
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On top of passing a means test, potential clients may also have to demonstrate that their 
material deprivation is not due to a personal choice. In practice, this amounts to passing a work 
test. Albeit not new as a policy instrument, work tests accompanied by significant sanctions have 
gained increasing attention. In Western Europe, they have figured prominently in the activation 
discourse and in initiatives aimed at reforming unemployment insurance and/ or social 
assistance, so as to “make work pay”. There is very little empirical evidence showing the work 
disincentives of social assistance in Central and Eastern Europe. Early studies have focused on 
calculating replacement rates relative to the average or the minimum wage (Boeri and Edwards 
1998; Ham, Svejnar et al. 1998). Yet, comprehensive longitudinal studies of unemployment 
duration of recipients and non-recipients are lacking. Still, Western arguments about program 
driven unemployment traps have often been taken over, especially in light of high replacement 
rates relative to minimum wages. As a result, work tests seem to have gradually gained in 
importance and visibility89 (MISSOC 2006; MISSOC 2007; MISSOC 2008). Unlike in Western 
Europe, this development has not taken place in a context of rising welfare rolls and mounting 
expenditure. On the contrary, work-tests have gained prominence in an era of sustained 
economic growth and falling unemployment rates90. 
 Each of the eight social assistance programs includes a work test for the able bodied, 
albeit some exceptions are be made for parents of small children or for single parents lacking 
child-rearing support91. In its lightest form, the work test consists of registration with the 
employment office. Indeed, this prerequisite is present as an eligibility condition in all eight 
schemes. In addition to formal registration as an unemployed, recipient able-bodied adults may 
have to submit to several “activation” measures. These may either emphasize increasing 
employability and opportunity, such as taking up training and requalification, undergoing therapy 
or addressing health and personal issues or they may take the form of increased pressure and 
control, for instance, the obligation to take up any available job offer, providing evidence of job 
search or even the compulsion to participate in public or community works. This last condition, 
willingness to participate in public works, may be considered the most stringent and the possibly 
the most stigmatizing (workfare). Two countries, Hungary and Lithuania, link eligibility for social 
assistance benefits to availability to participate in public works (See Table 3.10). Sanctions in case 
of failure to satisfy work/job search conditions also vary. At one extreme, the entire household 
benefit may be suspended or withdrawn in case one member‟s job search efforts are deemed 
unsatisfactory in Lithuania, Estonia or Hungary. At the other end, a minimum benefit is awarded 
                                                          
89 This development may have been aided by policy reports of the EU that emphasized work disincentives see 
REPORTS; 
90 Indeed, during early transition when budget considerations were looming large, spending reduction has usually 
been achieved by reducing benefits or by making benefit receipt conditional of budgetary conditions, rather than by 
using work tests. 
91 It should be noted that some countries, while not exempting certain categories for work-tests in social assistance 
programs, actually make available categorical benefits (such as  care-giver benefits) that do not have work or job 
search requirements. 
79 
 
to needy households irrespective of the work-test in the Czech and Slovak Republics92. In 
between, Latvia only suspends the part of the benefit that is awarded to the person deemed as 
failing the work test. Finally, Slovenia does not make social assistance available to the voluntarily 
unemployed. 
Just as in the case of asset tests, the application of the work test may be highly variable 
and dependent on the social worker‟s discretion. For example, even if refusal of a job is 
stipulated to trigger cuts or suspension of the benefit, such a rule may be ignored by the social 
workers charged with its application93. 
Lastly, generally speaking, all eight countries base the means-test and hence the 
entitlement on the resources of the household or the nuclear family. In Latvia, carers must claim 
alimony from the absent parent before becoming eligible to receive the benefit. Resources of the 
extended family may be considered in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. However, maintenance 
obligations are not clearly defined, and it is unclear to what extent these claims are actually 
enforced or even enforceable94.  
To summarize, three differentiation criteria may be observed when analysing entitlement 
rules in Central and Eastern Europe. While differences in the application of the income test are 
more straightforward, asset and work tests are usually only vaguely defined and, in all likelihood, 
inconsistently applied. Vague, imprecise or contradictory eligibility criteria are not unique to 
CEE countries. On the contrary, such features have emerged in the study of Western social 
assistance schemes, where they have been blamed for high leakage rates (Guibentif and Bouget 
1997).  
 
3.4.4  BENEFITS 
  
The amount of the benefit encompasses the quantity of resources that the state is willing 
to provide to those who cannot support themselves. The principle on which the determination 
of this amount rests and the indexation mechanism incorporated in the scheme play an 
important role in determining the size of available aid. More specifically, countries that determine 
the benefit level in a purely administrative way, instead of basing it on a minimum basket of 
goods and services, tend to have lower benefit levels. Similarly, social assistance programs that 
lack a clear indexation mechanism have lower benefit levels as well. Administrative discretion 
tends to be heavily influenced by budgetary considerations. Both lack of indexation and 
discretionary setting of the benefits are used as savings generator devices. As a result, fewer 
                                                          
92 If the test is passed, a higher amount is awarded. 
93 Disregard or lax enforcement of this rule has been found in a study of the German social assistance Guibentif, P. 
and D. Bouget (1997). Minimum Income Policies in the European Union. Lisbon, União das Mutualidades 
Portuguesas. 
94 Such obligations exist in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Germany, although it is not always clear to what 
extent they are actually implemented Lodemel, I. and B. Schulte (1992). Social Assistance: A Part of Social Security 
or the Poor Law in New Disguise? Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Beveridge 50 years after. Y. E. I. o. S. 
Security. Leuven, Acco Leuven/ Amersfoort: 515-543. 
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resources are redistributed through this type of programs (for a description of indexation, 
principles of determination and benefit levels see Table 3.11).  
 
Table 3.11Benefit level and determination in social assistance programs in the early 2000s 
Country Determination of 
minimum amount 
Indexation Monthly benefit 
amounts for 
single person 
Relation between 
amounts (equivalence 
scales) 
CZ Minimum basket of 
goods 
Regular 
indexation, as 
soon as the cost 
of living increases 
by 5% 
4100 CZK 
(160,23 EUR) 
27,3%AW 
Single adult=1 
Child<6= 0.73 
Child 6-10=0.81 
Child 10-15=0.96 
Child 15-26=1.06 
Household amounts: 1 
person=1 
2 persons=1,3 
3/4 persons=1,6 
5+ persons=1,8 
Since 2007-new rules: 
Single adult=1.09 
First adult=1 
Other adult=0.9 
Child <6=0.55 
 Child 6-15=0.68 
Child 15-26=0.78 
+ housing costs 
EE Set by Parliament No regular 
indexation; at the 
discretion of the 
government 
500 EEK 
(32 EUR) 
8,1%AW 
First person=1 
Every subsequent=0.8 
HU Set by the local 
authority/  min 
pension 
Regular social 
benefit-linked to 
the min pension 
which is indexed 
annually 
Other benefits- 
indexation at the 
discretion of local 
authorities 
Regular social 
benefit: 14070 
HUF 
(57,5 EUR) 
11,5%AW 
Other benefits: 
determined by 
local authorities 
Regular social benefit: 
per capita (until 2006) 
Since 2006: 
First person=1 
Every subsequent 
adult=0.9 
Child (first 2)=0.8 
Child (3rd +)=0.7 
Single parent 
bonus=0.2 
Disability bonus=0.2 
 
LV Set by local 
authority until 2003; 
2003-set by central 
government 
No regular 
indexation; at the 
discretion of the 
government 
21 LVL 
(37,5 EUR) 
13%AW 
Per capita 
LT Minimum basket of 
goods 
No regular 
indexation; at the 
discretion of the 
government 
121,5 Litas 
(38 EUR) 
11,9%AW 
Per capita 
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Country Determination of 
minimum amount 
Indexation Monthly benefit 
amounts for 
single person 
Relation between 
amounts (equivalence 
scales) 
PL % of min pension Price indexed 
since 1996 
447 PLN 
(126,27 EUR) 
21,3% 
First person= 1(1,1-
single person) 
Subsequent adult=0.7 
Child (<15)=0.5 
SK Set by the 
Parliament, but 
based on minimum 
basket of goods 
Regular price 
indexation at least 
once a year/ as 
soon as cost of 
living increases by 
10% 
3490 SKK (1895 
SKK if 
subjective 
reasons) 
(83 EUR) 
25,8%AW 
First adult=1 
Subsequent adult= 0.7 
Child= 0.5 
SI Set by the 
government 
Regular price 
indexation- 1 per 
year 
37934 SIT 
(175 EUR) 
16,1%AW 
First person=1 
Subsequent adult= 0.7 
Child=0.3 
Note: AW=average wage; taken from ILO Laborstat database; figures for 2002; 
Source:((GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003); MISSCEECII Tables and MISSCEEO 
Tables; 
 
Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia establish the basic benefit rates administratively. The 
remaining countries, at least theoretically, rely on calculations of a minimum basket of goods 
when setting the basic rate. The Baltic States are the only ones not to have implemented to date a 
regular mechanism of updating benefits with inflation. Local, discretionary benefits are also 
raised in an ad-hoc manner. In fact, inflation erosion constitutes a significant way of cutting 
benefits. For example, in Estonia, the basic rate has not been raised at all between 1996 and 
2006, resulting in one of the most meagre benefits in the region, before being slightly raised in 
2006. 
Just by taking a quick look it is easy to realize that social assistance benefits are very small 
in 2002, insignificant in some cases. Although amounts in purchasing power parities would have 
been somewhat higher than those in Euro, it is clear that transfers are meagre by any standard. 
Looking at benefits for single persons, the most generous are by far Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic (see Table 3.11). Poland and Slovakia also disburse somewhat higher benefits. The rest 
of the countries offer only very limited resources through their social assistance schemes, usually 
around or below 50 Euros for a single person. Benefits may become more generous as the family 
includes a higher number of children. Yet, the amounts of the benefit are obviously well below 
subsistence level. More recent data (for the 2004-2007 period) on benefit levels point towards 
similar results (Table 3.12). The largest transfers are registered in Slovenia, the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, whereas benefit levels are lowest in the three Baltic states.  
 Social assistance transfers rose in all eight countries between 2004 and 2007. However, 
the growth pattern has been unequal. Whereas countries with regular indexation in place (and 
larger benefits, as a rule) experience slow but steady growth, benefit increases have been much 
more erratic, but also more abrupt in the Baltic States and, to a lesser extent in Poland. 
82 
 
 Finally, it is worth noting that despite the fact that broad country clusters on benefit 
generosity hold regardless of which type of household is concerned, finer grained comparisons 
of countries in the same group are not robust to a change in household characteristics. This is 
due to the fact that very different equivalence scales may be used (see Table 3.11 and Table 3.12). 
In fact, the country with the most generous single person benefit, namely Slovenia, also has the 
most conservative equivalence scales. Pre-2006 Hungary, as well as Lithuania and Latvia, all 
operate per capita rules in determining the household benefit, thus giving all household members 
the same weight.  Such a system disregards any economies of scale resulting from living in the 
same household and advantages large families over single persons. The Czech Republic, Hungary 
after 2006, Estonia and the Slovak Republic all give children consumption weights very similar to 
those of the adults, thereby making their social assistance programs relatively more attractive to 
families with many children. On the other hand, three countries, i.e. Latvia, Poland and Hungary 
since 2007 operate family caps. Poland is relatively unique in operating a very low cap that 
applies to small and large families alike.  
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Table 3.12: Monthly benefit amounts in CEE between 2004 and 2007(in Euros)* 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
CZ Single/first person-71+ 55 
Other adults-71+71(2 persons) 
Child-58-75 depending on 
age+ 88/91 (3-4 hh members) 
Single parent-child part of 
benefit increased to 61-79 
Social allowance paid to care-
givers 
Single/first  person-78+64 
Other adult-78+83(2 persons) 
Child-57-82 depending on age 
+83-116 (3 to 5 persons) 
Single parent-child part of 
benefit increased to 60-86; 
special care allowance if 
child<4(7 if handicapped)  
Social allowance paid to care-
givers 
Single/first person-83+70 
Other adult-83+91(2 persons) 
Child-60-87 depending on age 
+112-121 (3-5 persons) 
Single parent-child part of 
benefit increased 63-90 
Social allowance paid to low-
income care-takers 
Single person-114 
First adult-104 
Other adult-94 
Child-58-92 depending on age 
Subsistence min-73 
Social allowance paid to low-
income families with children 
Single parent-social allowance 
for care purposes increased 
1.17 times 
EE First/Single adult-32 
Other adults-26 
Child-26 
Discretionary additional 
benefits granted by the 
municipalities 
Firs/single adult-48 
Other adult-38 
Child-38 
Special benefit for survivors of 
a non-contributory benefit 
recipient 
Discretionary allowances 
granted by municipalities 
First/single adult-48 
Other adult-38 
Child-38 
Single parent bonus-13 
Special benefit for survivors of 
a non-contributory benefit 
recipients 
Discretionary allowances 
granted by municipalities 
First/single adult-58 
Other adult-46 
Child-46 
Single parent bonus-13  
Special benefit for survivors of 
a non-contributory benefit 
recipients 
Discretionary allowances 
granted by municipalities 
HU Single person-71 
Other adult-71 
Child-71 
Additional benefits: child-care 
allowance, benefit for families 
raising 3+ children; 
discretionary benefits granted 
by the municipalities 
Single person-80 
Other adult-80 
Child-80 
Single parent-special care 
benefit, child care allowance + 
benefit for 3+ children 
Additional benefits: child 
protection benefit & irregular 
child benefit 
Single person-82 
Other adult-82 
Child-82 
Single parent-child-care 
allowance and extra benefit if 
3+ children 
Single person=91 
Other adult=82 
Child-64-73, depending on 
birth order 
Single parent bonus-16 
Disability bonus-16 
Maximum family benefit-212 
Single parent-special care 
allowance + extra benefit if 3+ 
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 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Many specific benefits: 
temporary, debt-management, 
transportation, funeral, home 
renting, + other emergency 
and support schemes organised 
by municipalities 
children 
LV First/single adult-28 
Other adults-28 
Child-28 
Max. Benefit=161 
Discretionary additional 
benefits granted by the 
municipalities 
First/single person-30 
Other adult-30 
Child-30 
Max. Benefit= 151 
Discretionary benefits granted 
by the municipalities 
First/single adult-34 
Other adult-34 
Child-34 
Max. Benefit-194 
Discretionary benefits granted 
by municipalities 
First/single person-39 
Other adult-39 
Child-39 
Max benefit-193 
Extra benefit for raising a 
child<1 or more children<2 
Discretionary benefits granted 
by municipalities 
LT First/Single adult-35 
Other adult-35 
Child- 35 
First/single adult-39 
Other adult-39 
Child-39 
First/single adult-40 
Other adult-40 
Child-40 
First/single person-53 
Other adult-53 
Child-53 
PL Single person-66 
Max. Family Benefit-87 
Emergency one-time benefits 
awarded regardless of income 
Single person-78 
Max family benefit-103 
Special Needs Allowance for 
one-off purchases if 
demonstrable need 
Single person-108 
Max family benefit-108 
Special Needs Allowance for 
one-off purchases if 
demonstrable need 
Single person-109 
Max family  benefit-109 
Special Needs Allowance for 
one-off purchases if 
demonstrable need 
SK First/single person-104 
Other adult-73  
Child-47 
Special benefits for the 
disabled 
Single/first adult-118 
Other adult-83 
Child-54 
Subsistence minimum-40 (for 
single person) 
Additional benefits: lump sum 
for certain types of expenses 
up to 3*subsistence min 
Health-care allowance, housing 
Single/first adult-125 
Other adult-87 
Child-57 
Subsistence minimum-41 (for 
singles) 
Single parent-extra allowance if 
child<31 weeks, subsidies for 
employment & care allowance 
Additional benefits: for 
Single/first adult-145 
Other adult-101 
Child- 66 
Subsistence min-48 (for 
singles) 
Single parent-higher wage 
subsidies if hiring single parent 
with child<10 or 3+ children 
Additional benefit-for pregnant 
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 2004 2005 2006 2007 
allowance, disability/care-giver 
allowance  
pregnant women, lump sum 
for certain expenses up to 
3*subsistence min, health-care, 
commuting to work, housing 
allowance, motivational 
allowance for children of low-
income families, care allowance 
if child <3 (6 if chronically ill) 
women, for disabled persons, 
health-care allowance, housing 
allowance, transport to work, 
care allowance if caring for 
child<31 weeks; extra benefit if 
raising child<1 
SI First/single adult-191 
Other adult-134 
Child-57E 
Single parent bonus-57 
Extra benefits for the disabled 
 
First/single adult- 196 
Other adult-137 
Child-59E 
Single parent bonus-59 
Extra benefits for the disabled 
First/single adult-196 
Other adult- 137 
Child-59 
Single parent bonus-59 
Extra benefits for the disabled 
 
First/single adult-205.57 
Other adult-143.90 
Child- 61.67 
Single parent bonus-61.67 
Extra benefits for the disabled 
Note: Euro conversions are approximate; they use the exchange rate of the year for which the benefit amount is shown; benefit amounts relate to 
May 2004; January 2005; January 2006 and January 2007; 
Source: MISSOC Database (Mutual Information System on Social Protection on EU Member States and the EEA (MISSOC) 2004; European 
Commission 2005; European Commission 2006; European Commission 2007; European Commission 2010), OECD (OECD 2007; OECD 2007; 
OECD 2007; OECD 2007; OECD 2007; OECD 2007; OECD 2007; OECD 2007) 
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Of the eight countries, only Hungary imposed a so-called wage rule 95 in 2007. Its social 
assistance scheme effectively limits the maximum amount a household might receive to the 
existing minimum wage. In the remaining countries however, in some cases, large families may 
expect to receive a benefit larger than the minimum wage. Such a possibility is all the more likely 
if the minimum wage is low, as is the case in the Baltic States. Basic rates may be supplemented 
by additional one-time or regular transfers. These payments are however usually made on a 
discretionary basis and, as such, are difficult to include in a cross-national study. 
In addition to the standard benefits, many social assistance programs include a large array 
of “special” benefits that may be awarded to certain categories that are viewed as particularly 
deserving or particularly in need, such as the disabled (when benefits are awarded to them under 
the social assistance program) or single parents. The case of single parents is particularly 
interesting. This type of household is much more vulnerable to poverty due to the difficulties it 
has with simultaneously handling work and care responsibilities. As a result, more generous 
benefits for single parents may be justified on this ground. On the other hand, increasing out-of-
work benefits for single parents may simply encourage then to exit the labour force, thereby 
reinforcing the precariousness of their situation. With the exception of Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland, social assistance schemes award a single parent “bonus”. The benefit increase is 
relatively small (compared to what the received amount would have been in its absence) in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, but substantial (in relative terms) in Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia. 
Finally, only the Slovak Republic has a provision aiming to help single parents return to wage 
employment. 
 Another type of “extra” benefits present in public assistance, are disbursements tied to 
particular expenditures (such as transport, health-care, special purchases etc.)96. Hungary and the 
Slovak Republic possess the largest number of such additional benefits relating to specific types 
of consumption. Lastly, benefits may be topped up entirely discretionarily by local or 
“emergency” payments. Arguably, such discretionary payments may be of great importance to 
the household receiving them. Regrettably however, their discretionary nature also makes them 
hardly amenable to study. Estonia, Latvia and Hungary all explicitly allow local municipalities to 
set up their own support systems to top up nationally defined minimum income payments. 
Yet, despite the relative generosity of the equivalence scales, of the presence of 
indexation and, in some cases, of the delineation of the benefit based on a basket of goods, the 
most striking feature of CEE social assistance transfers remains the very low amount of the basic 
rates.  
                                                          
95 Wage rules have been introduced as a result of concerns with making work pay; in practice, they mean that a 
minimum gap should be maintained between the disbursed benefit and the wage a low-skilled worker can expect to 
earn; an example of such a rule being introduced is Germany Ditch, J., J. Bradshaw, et al. (1997). Comparative Social 
Assistance. Localisation and Discretion. Aldershot, Ashgate. 
96 A special type of tied benefit is represented by housing allowances; they will be analyzed in more detailed in 
section VI.6. 
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3.4.5 CENTRAL VERSUS. LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
 The organization of social assistance programs can be located on a central-local 
continuum.  
The exact mix of central and local responsibilities can vary enormously. The division of 
responsibilities between central and local authorities concerns at least three axes, namely 
implementation, financing and decision-making. In principle, these three areas are independent 
of each other. In practice, usually they are linked.  
On a very general level, Ditch et al. distinguish between three general models of 
devolving responsibilities to the lower levels of government, namely federalism, de-
concentration97 and decentralization (Ditch, Bradshaw et al. 1997). Each of the three models 
involves a different organization of delivery, financing and decision-making. Since all of the eight 
CEE countries included in the analysis are national unitary states, the federal archetype is not 
relevant in this context. De-concentration and decentralization based models are best 
distinguished on the implementation axis.  On the grounds that local governments are better able 
to establish who the needy are, a majority of CEE countries have devolved the responsibility for 
the daily running of the program to municipalities, thus opting for decentralization. In fact, CEE 
countries have largely followed a wider penchant for decentralization promoted both by 
international organizations and by experts, as well as by  trends in on-going reforms in Western 
Europe (Guibentif and Bouget 1997). Only three countries, i.e. the Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia, have retained a system where the local branches of the central administration are 
responsible for delivering benefits (see Table 3.13). The implementation system in Czech 
Republic, while theoretically relying on municipalities, in practice resembles the de-concentrated 
model. 
 
Table 3.13 Centralization of social assistance programs in CEE countries 
Country Implementation Financing Decision making 
CZ District labour offices & 
Designated local 
municipalities  on behalf 
of the state; one-off 
benefit administered by 
municipalities 
Central budget Central 
EE Local government Central budget for the 
basic amount; local 
budget for 
supplementary benefits 
Minimum amount set 
nationally; local 
authorities may grant 
additional benefits of 
relax eligibility 
conditions 
HU Local government Until 2004- 75% central Regular social benefit-
                                                          
97 Deconcentration is a weaker form of decentralization whereby administration is carried out by the local branches 
of a central institution; it thus involves a fair amount of centralization. 
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Country Implementation Financing Decision making 
25% local 
Since 2004- 90% central 
and 10% local (100% 
central for the homeless) 
amount set nationally 
Other SA benefits-
usually set locally 
LV Local government Mainly the local budget Since 2003, the basic 
amount is set nationally; 
local authorities may 
grant additional benefits 
at their discretion 
LT Local government Central/state budget Central. Municipalities 
grant additional services. 
PL Local and regional offices 
of the Ministry of 
Economy, Labour and 
Social Policy & local 
government 
State budget 20%; local 
budget- 80% 
Central. However, social 
workers have wide 
discretion in establishing 
eligibility. 
SK Local branches of central 
administration (Ministry 
of Interior) 
Until 2004- Central 
budget; Since 2004 –
Central budget for the 
first 24 months of receipt 
and municipalities 
thereafter 
Central 
SI Local branches of central 
agency (Centre for Social 
Work) 
Central budget Central 
Note: When not indicated otherwise, information refers to the 2004-2007 period. 
Source: ((GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003); MISSCEECII Tables and MISSCEEO 
Tables;(OECD 2007; European Commission 2010); (Levy and Morawski 2008). 
 
More important than implementation are, however, financing and decision-making. 
Decentralization of these two functions tends to create strong regional imbalances in the 
treatment the clients get. More often than not, decentralization of financing and decision-making 
is regressive, from a redistributive point of view, as better-off clients living in richer districts 
receive more comprehensive support than the neediest living in poor municipalities.  
In practice, no country assigns local authorities total discretion in establishing the basic 
amount of the benefit. National level regulations regarding the minimum benefit amount have 
been established in all eight countries98 (see Table 3.13). Regional variations may be introduced 
though through the granting of supplemental benefits. The three Baltic States explicitly provide 
leeway for local authorities to grant additional transfers on condition they are entirely financed 
from local budgets. Consequently, richer municipalities are often in a position of providing more 
generous benefits to their residents than poorer ones, where, theoretically, such additional 
benefits would be more necessary. Similarly, a plethora of locally set benefits for the needy is 
                                                          
98 This has not always been the case; Hungary until 1997 and Latvia until 2003 did not have a nationally set 
minimum income guarantee that encompassed the unemployed. 
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present in Hungary. Local authorities have complete authority over shaping both entitlement and 
the support awarded under these programs, although some of are partially funded from the state 
budget. Finally, local public assistance support is also noteworthy in the Slovak Republic. 
Finally, a very important aspect of the central-local balance of responsibilities is the issue 
of financing. Central governments often opt for decentralization in an attempt to transfer some 
of the fiscal responsibility from the centre towards the municipalities. Yet, in the absence of an 
equalization mechanism co-ordinated from the centre, both equity and practical concerns arise. 
In the most extreme case, poorer localities may find themselves unable to pay out the mandated 
basic rates. Given these drawbacks, it is not surprising to find that a majority of countries 
finances the basic rate of the social assistance benefit from the state budget99. Of the eight 
countries, only Latvia and Poland rely mainly on local budget financing to pay for public 
assistance benefits. However, local finances are also strongly consequential for the functioning of 
the program in the remaining two Baltic States, and Hungary. Hungary in particularly has a large 
part of its support system for the needy run on a local basis and using local funds. The Slovak 
Republic is peculiar in that it funds centrally only the first 24 months of benefits, passing on the 
funding responsibility to municipalities thereafter. In practice, this means that funding for. long-
term recipients and the (very) long-term unemployed, is made dependent on local financial 
circumstances. These recipients are often the most vulnerable (unemployable, with social 
problems such as addiction, homelessness etc.), and the most in need of support. Smaller and 
poorer municipalities may lack the resources to effectively help them. 
To sum up, most countries in the region administer their public assistance in a relatively 
centralized way. Still, clear differences emerge between countries such as Slovenia that rely 
almost exclusively on a central apparatus and Latvia or Hungary who put greater emphasis on 
the role of local authorities. At this point, it should be noted that some type of convergence in 
centralization patterns does seem to emerge, possibly reflecting a consensus for a middle ground. 
Thus, the countries that have had the most decentralized systems, i.e. Latvia and Hungary took 
steps to introduce centralizing features. Conversely, some countries that have started out with 
very centralized systems, namely the Czech and Slovak Republics, have given municipalities 
greater leeway in administering public assistance benefits. 
 
3.4.6 ADDITIONAL SERVICES: HOUSING AND HEALTH-CARE 
 
 In addition to cash transfers, social assistance recipients are often entitled to additional 
support relating to particular types of expenses. Two, namely housing and health-care are 
reviewed in greater detail in this subsection. Aside from being areas of particular importance to 
                                                          
99 In fact, there earlier on, local budgets were much more relied on to pay for benefits (for example in Hungary or 
Poland); this is still the case in other countries in the region such as Romania; the central government always 
performed some kind of equalization; however, since funds were not earmarked but block-granted, municipalities 
themselves established funding priorities; social assistance programs rarely find themselves on the top of the list. 
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human welfare, the two are worthy of special attention due to the large amount of resources a 
household consumes to satisfy its health and shelter needs. Paying for accommodation is often 
the single largest expenditure in a household‟s budget. Thus, housing benefits (or lack of thereof) 
play a crucial role in providing subsistence resources. Similarly, health-care services are usually 
expensive. Although existing legislation makes access to health-services relatively unproblematic 
for the majority of the population in all eight countries, social assistance recipients may face 
special barriers. In particular, where the health system is organized on insurance (rather than 
residency) principles, unemployed social assistance recipients do not pay health insurance 
contributions. Thus, unless special arrangements are made, they are excluded from health-care 
coverage.  
 
Table 3.14 Social assistance associated rights: housing and health-care 
Country Housing Health-care 
CZ Housing allowance: income test only; 
threshold higher than for SA 
(1.6*min income for the family); 
differential amount depending on the 
family income and on the subsistence 
minimum; actual housing costs 
irrelevant 
Health care is free of charge at the 
point of delivery for all residents. 
EE No special housing benefit; some 
housing expenses deductible from 
assessable income before establishing 
eligibility 
Only emergency care for uninsured 
persons is covered from the central 
budget. For other services, providers 
may require a letter of guarantee 
from the municipality. 
HU Home maintenance allowance: local 
benefit paid by municipalities; limit 
on the size and quality of the home + 
no income must be derived from it; 
guidelines on entitlement: if housing 
costs >20% household income/ 
income per family member<150% 
old age pension; local municipalities 
set the amount of the benefit, but it 
cannot e lower then a certain limit 
(2500HUF in 2004; non-SA 
recipients may qualify 
Health care contributions are paid by 
the state on behalf of SA recipients. 
LV Separate municipality benefit; it is not 
mandatory for local authorities to 
establish/pay this benefit; financing 
entirely local, so benefit depends on 
available resources 
Tax financed health-care system; 
access based on residency, not 
contributions 
LT No housing benefit, but special 
benefit reimbursing the costs of 
heating and water. Income test + size 
of housing test to qualify; non SA 
recipients may qualify 
Health care contributions are paid by 
the state on behalf of SA recipients. 
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Country Housing Health-care 
PL No special support. Local 
municipalities are charged with 
running shelters for the homeless 
Health care contributions are by the 
state on behalf of SA recipients. 
SK Housing allowance: fix sum payable 
only to social assistance recipients 
Health care services are normally free 
of charge. Small health-care 
allowance granted for SA recipients. 
SI Housing allowance: maximum 25% 
of the basic SA rate if the recipient is 
paying rent; benefit cannot exceed 
the cost of rental in social housing 
units; only for SA recipients 
Health-care contributions are paid for 
by the state on behalf of SA 
recipients. 
Note: Information refers to the 2004-2007 period 
Source: (European Commission 2005; European Commission 2006; European Commission 
2007; European Commission 2010) 
 
A detailed outline of both housing and health-care benefits applicable to social assistance 
recipients are presented in Table 3.14. Of the eight countries, only Estonia fails to cover in some 
way health-care services for social assistance recipients. The other seven CEE states make 
provisions to insure public assistance clients have access to health-care, either based on their 
residence or based on contributions paid on their behalf by the state. In fact, even in Estonia, 
social assistance recipients are not excluded outright but face extra barriers that put them at risk 
of going without needed health care services. In any case, there is precious little variation in 
health-care access100, perhaps reflecting a norm that nobody should have to live with unmet 
medical needs101. 
Providing for housing needs is much less uniform in the region. Poland, Estonia, and 
Lithuania have no special provisions to provide social assistance clients with accommodation. 
Latvia relies entirely on locally defined, managed and financed provision, which is likely to mean 
that many of the needy go without help in this area. Even among the four countries that did 
implement housing benefit, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, 
adequacy in relation to housing costs is often deficient. Most strikingly, no country has made 
provisions to cover real housing costs102. In fact, in all four countries however, benefits are 
relatively low, varying between 10-60 Euros per month. Thus, existing housing benefits cannot 
be said to solve the housing problems of the poor. They might however help alleviate them. In 
the Czech Republic and in Hungary, housing benefits are available to a larger section of the 
population compared to minimum income support. On the contrary, in the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia benefits are meant entirely for public assistance clients.  
In short, health-care needs are provided for in all countries except Estonia, whereas 
housing provision is much scantier. Yet, housing terms may amount to a substantial amount 
                                                          
100 Health care costs of social assistance recipients are not included in social assistance expenditure data. 
101 The actual operation of the health systems, and whether in practice they actually deliver quality care is an entirely 
different issue. 
102 This is the case for example in Sweden or in Germany. 
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compared to the basic benefit rate, thus potentially making an important contribution to the 
recipient households‟ welfare. Generally, countries with low levels of income support do not 
provide for special housing benefits. This is the case of the three Baltic States, as well as Poland. 
On the contrary, countries with more generous minimum income transfers, such as Slovenia, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, and to a lesser extent Hungary, also make available extra support 
for housing needs. Therefore, housing benefits do not compensate for any basic benefit 
inadequacies, on the contrary. The cross-country difference in benefit generosity is larger once 
housing benefits are taken into account. 
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Means-tested public assistance schemes have been put in place throughout Central and 
East European countries in the first half of the 1990‟s. Following their inauguration, they have 
been subject to numerous changes and adaptations until finally stabilizing around the minimum 
guaranteed income model. The lack of a well-established and developed means-tested program 
under socialism probably both encouraged policy experimentation and fluidity and relegated this 
type of benefit to a minor position within the wider social protection setup. In all eight countries, 
expenditure on social assistance benefits is very low while benefit amounts are often tiny in 
comparison with needs.  
Means-test implementation is generally a demanding administrative task, all the more so 
when it falls upon a bureaucratic apparatus unaccustomed to such a procedure. A fairly complex 
three pronged entitlement test relying on income, assets and availability for work governs 
eligibility determination in all eight countries. Initially simple in design, programs have gradually 
incorporated more complex features, such as earnings disregards or a prolongation of benefit 
payments after benefit take-up. While mostly crude, such measures have been adopted in 
response to concerns about possible work disincentives created by the schemes103. Other, more 
complex measures, such in-work benefits or detailed accounting of assets and customized 
activation trajectories characteristic of Western schemes, are often lacking. Ensuring that “work 
pays” is achieved in a majority of countries by providing social assistance recipients with very 
low benefits and linking them to public works.  
Beyond the general commonalities, the eight social assistance programs display substantial 
divergence, especially in the size and generosity of the basic rates as well as in the mix of central 
and local responsibilities. Analyzing the differentiation among West European minimum income 
schemes, Lødemel and Shulte (1992) advance three possible explanations, namely culture, the 
extent of poverty and the historic development of social insurance. Similar factors may account 
for Central and East European variation. Firstly, a strong tradition of charity and local 
                                                          
103 It is also likely that CEE countries have emulated some of the innovations developed in the West. 
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involvement in dealing with the poor is likely to bring about a more localized program. The 
tradition of big urban centres of setting up special programs to deal with poor women (Haney 
2002) may have played a role in the establishment of the most decentralized social assistance 
scheme in the CEE region. Secondly, countries experiencing lower poverty levels, in principle, 
benefited from more time and resources in developing their public assistance safety nets. Indeed, 
the wealthiest countries, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have both the most generous transfers 
and the most sophisticated programs. On the contrary, countries where poverty is relatively 
widespread such as Poland or the Baltics may have had to contend with meagre, more 
rudimentary schemes. Finally, despite of shrinking resources and escalating poverty rates, no 
country has made any decisive attempt to replace an insurance based welfare state with one 
heavily relying in targeting. Quite the opposite, new poverty problems have first and foremost 
been addressed through the existing social insurance programs. The size of the social assistance 
program can be hypothesized to have been influenced by the form of the social protection 
system under socialism. Countries that have developed systems orientated toward universalism 
and inclusion, such as Czechoslovakia and Slovenia (Inglot 2008) also tend to spend relatively 
more on means-tested cash assistance. Conversely, states such as Poland or the Baltic States that 
have had a relatively fragmented, unequal and hierarchical system in place tend to assign lower 
importance to public aid. The existence of well-entrenched privileged categories might 
discourage the setup of a relatively universalistic program such as social assistance, favouring 
instead separate channels of aid for these categories, such as for example, severance payments. 
Obviously, this proposition remains a hypothesis to be confirmed or disproved by empirical 
research.  
If in Western Europe minimum guaranteed income programs have been transformed 
into a support system for the casual, low-paid worker for whom traditional unemployment 
insurance does not provide protection (Guibentif and Bouget 1997), in Central and Eastern 
Europe they play an even more residual role. Since benefits cannot alone guarantee subsistence, 
they probably supplement agricultural, family and grey economy incomes and child and large 
family benefits. No reliable estimate of the take-up rate has been put forward so far. 
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4 OUTCOMES OF SOCIAL ASSITANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE: A PRE-TRANSFER POST-TRANSFER COMPARISON 
 
 
 
This chapter sets out to explore in a comparative setting just how successful the 
established social assistance schemes in Central Europe104 have been in reaching their goal, 
namely alleviating and diminishing poverty. Extensive use is made of a three wave panel, the 
European Union-Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) to carry out the analyses. 
The arguments are organized in four parts. 
 First, some of the previous research and findings relating to social assistance policies and 
poverty, mostly derived based on Western European examples, are presented. Second, a short 
presentation of the dataset that is used follows and the advantages and disadvantages of pre-post 
comparisons are spelled out. Third, social assistance performance in the eight Central and East 
European countries  is examined through twenty-six indicators relating to the programs‟ 
generosity, effectiveness and efficiency. Finally, a discussion follows and conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
4.1 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND POVERTY IN EUROPE: CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS 
 
Research on European means-tested programs has largely been limited to describing, 
comparing and finally classifying programs based on their features, as well as constructing a few 
gross outcome indicators. The following section reviews the main findings leaving a more 
thorough discussion on the economic mechanisms and the potential effects of social assistance 
to be take up in chapter 5. Chapter 6 will take up the potential effect of participation in a means-
tested program on asset ownership. 
Largely following the regime typology developed by Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen 
1990) based on variation in insurance programs, Lødemel and Schulte (1992) distinguish between 
four types of social assistance: a well-developed, universal and undivided “institutionalized 
poverty regime”, a “differentiated poverty regime” in which some categories are better protected 
than others, a “residual poverty regime” in which means-tested benefits are largely marginalized 
by extensive and generous social insurance and a strong emphasis on social work and control 
exists and an “incomplete differentiated regime” where universal programs are basically lacking. 
The four clusters may be viewed as the social assistance counterparts to the liberal, corporatist, 
Nordic, and South European insurance regimes respectively.  
Arguably, the most well known study of social assistance was carried out by Eardley et al 
(Eardley, Bradshaw et al. 1996; Gough, Bradshaw et al. 1997). It surveyed experts from 23 
                                                          
104 Eight CEE countries are analyzed Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia; Romania and Bulgaria have been excluded due to current unavailability of data in the EU-SILC; 
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OECD countries in an attempt to put together comparable detailed information about social 
assistance design. The authors used three criteria, namely extent defined by expenditure and size 
of the client population, an exclusion index, and benefit generosity to derive seven types of social 
assistance schemes. The classification was derived theoretically. Later on, Gough used the same 
three criteria in a cluster analysis that largely confirmed the existence of the seven groupings 
(Gough 2001).  
In a follow up of the study, Ditch and Oldfield (1999) reviewed legislative changes 
concerning social assistance in 18 of the 23 countries and found three main trajectories. The 
majority of the countries retained the core features of their programs and made only minor 
modifications and updating. Two Southern countries made important extensions of their existing 
means-tested benefits, substantially increasing coverage and possibly also benefits. Finally, a third 
group of countries, mainly English-speaking nations have attempted important innovations and 
alterations by bringing in elements that emphasize work incentives and self-sufficiency. One 
common trend though seems to be taking place in every country, namely the expansion105 of 
social assistance both in the allocated budget and in the size of the population served (Ditch 
1999; Hanesch 1999).  
Reviewing social assistance in seven West European countries, Heikkila et al (2001) 
conclude that program variation largely corresponds to the welfare regime typology. Thus, high 
benefits, clear rights, unlimited duration, the presence of supplementary benefits, and a strong 
emphasis on employment facilitating measures characterize means-tested assistance in Nordic 
countries.  In the Conservative cluster, social assistance is a clear right but a responsibility exists 
to support members of the extended family. Lastly, in the Latin Rim region, benefits are low, 
effective payments are dependent on budgetary considerations and their awarding is strongly 
discretionary and the responsibility is heavily placed on the family to support its members.  
In addition to typology construction, another strand of research has attempted to 
establish potential links between regime types on the one hand, and poverty and inequality 
outcomes on the other hand by using pre-transfer post-transfer comparisons. In a Luxembourg 
Income Study based study, Sainsbury and Morissens (2002) found that, despite their being 
classified as residual and relatively stringent, means-tested benefits in Nordic countries were the 
most effective in bringing their clients above the poverty line. Nordic social assistance schemes 
were also the most effective in reducing poverty for most vulnerable groups. On the contrary, 
conservative and South European countries had, with the exception of Germany, the least 
effective means-tested programs. While they were somewhat successful in protecting the elderly, 
they failed to prevent poverty among the unemployed and families with children. 
                                                          
105 The increase appears to be fuelled both by demographic and labour market changes and by policy shifts in as 
much as access to social insurance is restricted and benefits cut back in an attempt to control expenditure; 
consequently, some individuals and families are pushed from insurance into means-tested assistance Hanesch, W. 
(1999). The Debate on Reforms of Social Assistance in Western Europe. Linking Welfare and Work. Dublin, 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions: 71-85. 
97 
 
A similar study (Kuivalainen 2005) used three program characteristics, namely extent 
(measured as expenditure), entitlement (based on the income, asset and work test) and generosity 
(measured as the standard benefit amount for two types of families) together with outcomes 
(measures as poverty reduction among the recipients) to check the validity of existing typologies, 
as well as to link program characteristics to outcomes. The results suggested that countries that 
had less extensive schemes tended to also disburse higher benefits and ultimately to more 
effectively reduce poverty within the client population. A companion paper (Kuivalainen 2005) 
compared the adequacy and poverty reduction effectiveness of social assistance transfers among 
various family types, based both on the family method and on the Luxembourg Income Study 
databank. The findings revealed that, irrespective of the program characteristics, the elderly 
benefited from better protection than the young. Only the Nordic countries had in place social 
assistance programs that were capable of markedly reducing poverty across the board, and 
especially among single parents. 
Utilizing the same dataset, Hölsch and Kraus (Hölsch and Kraus 2006) examined the 
potential links between redistributive outcomes of means-tested transfers and their level and 
statutory setting on the one hand and their (de)centralization, on the other hand. They concluded 
that programs serving a larger population tend to be correlated with better redistributive 
outcomes whereas higher benefits or higher expenditure are not. Extensive programs were also 
found to be associated with more inefficient redistribution. While no link between centralization 
and redistributive impact could be discerned in this study, previous research (Hölsch and Kraus 
2004) has shown extremely centralized programs to be both more effective and more efficient in 
guarding against poverty compared to extremely decentralized systems. However, the evidence 
did not support a straightforward, linear relation between effectiveness in reducing relative 
poverty and inequality and centralization. Rather it pointed to moderately centralized schemes 
performing better than either very centralized, or strongly decentralized ones. 
Using Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom as examples of three different 
modalities of organizing and providing protection, Behrendt (1999; 2000) suggested that both 
the Swedish and the British social assistance schemes achieve superior results in preventing 
poverty compared to the German program. In particular, the extensive and well institutionalized 
British means-tested benefit is very successful in virtually eliminating the harshest forms of 
poverty, whereas Swedish social assistance tends to channel benefits towards the moderately 
poor. 
Reviewing the role of the various social transfers in preventing poverty, de Neubourg et 
al(2007) concluded that, relatively speaking, means-tested benefits play a minor role in 
preventing poverty throughout Europe. Conversely, social insurance transfers play a crucial role 
in preventing poverty among large strata of the population. Social insurance may play another, 
more indirect, role in combating poverty. By effectively offering support to the vulnerable, it 
reduces demand for means-tested public assistance. In turn, social assistance programs seem to 
offer larger benefits and to be more effective in reducing poverty when they deal with relatively 
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small caseloads (Ditch 1999; de Neubourg, Castonguay et al. 2007). Larger benefits also seem to 
be correlated with strict enforcement of eligibility rules, relatively tough income and asset tests, 
as well as a strong emphasis on returning to work (Hanesch 1999; de Neubourg, Castonguay et 
al. 2007). However, this association largely rests on the presence of Nordic countries. 
In a study of social assistance recipients in several European cities, Saraceno et al (2002) 
point out that very stringent targeting has a series of negative effects that tend to undermine the 
capacity of social assistance to relieve or eliminate poverty. First, the existence of very harsh 
eligibility rules automatically selects in only the population with very severe integration problems, 
and thus likely to receive the benefit for extended periods of time. Both long-term receipt and 
the composition of the recipient population are likely to accentuate the stigma and de-moralizing 
effect associated with participation in the program. Second, by limiting intervention to only a 
very few cases, the opportunity of an early intervention, before all resources are exhausted is 
missed. Similarly, very low benefits tend to stigmatize recipients, as well as force them to rely on 
a combination of informal earnings and means-tested benefits for survival. Once this situation is 
established, it tends to be resistant to change. Finally, the enforcement of strict duration limits 
fosters a re-cycling of recipients as leaving the scheme is not equated with establishing self-
sufficiency. 
  In addition to cross-national comparisons, a few in-depth reviews of the national public 
assistance framework have been carried out. In Germany, social assistance has morphed from a 
benefit catering to the elderly, the disabled and other individuals in special conditions to a 
transfer designed to support the unemployed (Adema, Gray et al. 2003). The overlap of 
responsibilities and cost shifting between the various administrative levels, the high stigma 
resulting from the consideration of the children‟s and parents‟ resources in the means-test, 
relatively high replacement rates especially for families with children and single parents are 
identified as the main attributes of German social assistance. The strong stigma attached to 
benefit receipt is thought to trigger high non-take up rates, in the range of 35-63%. Analyzing 
German data from the beginning of the 1990‟s, Riphahn (2000) estimates that non-take up has 
been increasing in the 1990‟s relative to earlier periods, reaching approximately 60%. Higher 
benefits, longer expected duration of receipt and lower stigma, all are found to lessen the 
likelihood of non-take-up.  
 Similar high non-take up rates have been found in the Nordic countries (Gustafsson 
2002; Bargain, Immervoll et al. 2007), ranging between 40% and 80%. Akin to the German 
results, the expected size of the benefit and duration of receipt, the existing and expected 
income, age, the presence of children and the strength of stigma brought about by claiming 
influence the probability of benefit take-up. When transfer receipt becomes more widespread, 
the associated stigma normally decreases. The relatively low take-up rate in the Nordic countries 
is somewhat in contradiction with their means-tested programs‟ ability to reduce poverty found 
in previous studies.  
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Evidence of the link between stigma and take-up has also been ascertained on Swiss data 
(Obinger 1999). In the same context, very discretionary means-tested programs, administered by 
non-professional, part-time workers recruited from the local community are especially 
stigmatizing, and hence have very low take-up rates. However, the strong targeting is considered 
to be enabling the provision of relatively high benefits (Obinger 1999), whereas decentralization 
brings fragmentation and possibly confusion about entitlement and benefits. 
 Australia and New Zealand constitute an interesting case for public assistance research 
due to their heavy reliance on income and means tested benefits in lieu of Bismarckian social 
insurance. As a consequence of this particular feature, they have been designated as selective 
welfare states (Eardley, Bradshaw et al. 1996; Mood 2006). Research on Australian data (Mood 
2006) has largely confirmed findings derived from the study of European social assistance. In a 
system where large sections of the population receive means-tested benefits, take up rates are 
comparatively high, around 80 to 85%. The positive relationship with expected benefit amounts 
and social acceptability of receipt, as well as the negative link with current income and non-
income resources has been confirmed.  
 To a large extent, research on European social assistance schemes has attempted to 
imitate the regime typology tradition developed based on more prominent social insurance 
programs. In fact, some studies (Lodemel and Schulte 1992; Guibentif and Bouget 1997; 
Behrendt 2000; Heikkilä and Keskitalo 2001) have implicitly or explicitly replicated the welfare 
state country groupings using social assistance characteristics. Scandinavian countries have been 
found to host the most generous and comprehensive transfer programs, whereas South 
European states offered only very stingy, unreliable and short-term benefits. Others however 
(Eardley, Bradshaw et al. 1996; Gough, Bradshaw et al. 1997; Sainsbury and Morissens 2002) 
have failed to find the same one to one correspondence.  
 When it comes to outcomes, two issues have primarily received attention. First, keeping 
in mind that to have any effect on poverty, means-tested transfers have to reach the vulnerable 
and the destitute, some authors have focused on the issue of benefit take-up (Obinger 1999; 
Riphahn 2000; Gustafsson 2002; Adema, Gray et al. 2003; Mood 2006; Bargain, Immervoll et al. 
2007). Generally, the take up of means-tested benefits is relatively low in Nordic and Continental 
countries whereas it is somewhat higher in the countries of the liberal cluster, such as UK. Most 
consistently, these studies have indicated that the extent of non-take-up is negatively related to 
the extent of program participation within the population. Second, poverty reduction 
effectiveness has been gauged by simulating pre-transfer poverty rates and other poverty 
indicators and comparing them with the post-transfer situation. The results of this endeavour are 
less clear-cut than those concerning non-take-up. Generally though, means-tested social 
assistance best protects against poverty in the Nordic countries, a finding which is somewhat 
inconsistent with the low take-up rate characterizing these schemes. Depending on the chosen 
indicators, the British social assistance may perform very or only moderately well, while 
assistance in Continental and Mediterranean nations provides inadequate protection.  
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 Albeit the country clustering and comparisons are occasionally used to draw inferences 
on the interconnection between program features and outcomes, research on European social 
assistance is largely limited to a descriptive and classificatory exercise. To a large extent, a 
thorough discussion of which program characteristics are the most important in triggering 
poverty reduction, as well as of the manner in which various program traits complement and 
interact with each other is lacking. The issue of how to design means-tested benefits so as to 
facilitate the reintegration and long-term well-being of the poor has been addressed much more 
vigorously in the American context. The topic will be taken up in the next chapter. 
 
 
4.2 DATA AND METHODS 
 
 All of the analyses carried out are based on the four consecutive waves (2005-2008106) of 
the European Union-Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The database is 
particularly suited for the endeavour since it offers detailed information at the micro level about 
household income levels and sources, social assistance included. Moreover, it is the first cross-
national study to collect such information in a large number of former socialist countries in a 
framework that emphasizes comparability. The availability of SILC allows for pre-transfer post-
transfer comparisons to be carried out on actual household populations rather than on 
hypothetical examples (such as for example in the case of work using model families)107. In 
addition to basing the analysis on „actual‟ households, this approach has the important advantage 
that it recovers not only central measures but also distributions around it. In the second part of 
this chapter, some of the analysis is repeated separately for several demographic groups. Even in 
this case, I am able to consider the entire distribution of households with a given characteristic 
(for example, single parenthood) rather than just a „model‟ example. Last but not least, some 
issues such as for example the ability of the program to reach the poor can only be answered 
using micro-data. 
With the exception of Slovenia which resorts to register data, the other countries use 
survey information to establish the types and corresponding amounts of income a household 
relies on. Hence, the quality of the data is vulnerable to intentional or accidental reporting errors. 
In particular, since receipt of means-tested benefits is often associated with stigma, information 
on this type of income is particularly susceptible to underreporting. Given the size of the 
informal economy throughout the former communist bloc, total net disposable income may also 
be underestimated. Nevertheless, keeping these shortcomings in mind, the EU-SILC still 
                                                          
106 At the time of writing, only three waves (2005-2007) have been integrated in a longitudinal dataset; consequently, 
the cross-sectional database is used to compute figures for 2008; 
107 An example where the model family approach is used extensively to compare social assistance programmes is the 
CSB-MIPI project- Van Mechelen, N., S. Marchal, et al. (2011). The CSB-Minimum Income Protection Indicators 
dataset (CSB-MIPI). CSB Working papers. Antwerp, CSB, University of Antwerp. No 11/05. 
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constitutes the best data source for a comparative study of means-tested benefits in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
Information about social assistance payments is provided through a variable termed 
social exclusion, elsewhere not classified. It incorporates two components, namely on income 
support (periodic payments to people with insufficient resources) and other cash benefits108 
(support for destitute and vulnerable persons to help alleviate poverty or assists in difficult 
situations). In addition, data is also available on means-tested housing allowances (either as a rent 
benefit or any other form of payment that is disbursed to compensate for housing costs). The 
social assistance variable used throughout the remainder off the paper is constituted by adding 
the two components, i.e. social exclusion not elsewhere classified and means-tested housing 
allowance. The choice of including the latter rests both on its substantive importance and on an 
attempt to improve comparability. Some countries treat housing allowances as part of the general 
package offered to those who prove to be unable to satisfy their own needs by passing a means 
test. Others make the benefit more widely available, that is to say they have less stringent 
qualifying conditions for the housing allowance compared to the social assistance means test. On 
the one hand, housing constitutes one of the most important components of household 
consumption and therefore, one of the strongest influencing factors of its living standards. As a 
result, housing provision represent a major channel through which the state can intervene to lift 
a family out of poverty. On the other hand, since in some cases the housing allowance is 
integrated and cannot be separated from the overall social assistance benefit, inclusion of income 
or means-tested housing allowance in the analysis is necessary for reasons of comparability. 
Numerous controversies surround the definition of poverty. Arguments in favour and 
against have been formulated regarding both absolute and relative measures. Official poverty 
lines are almost without exception absolute, although relative approaches might be used to set 
them (such as, for example, investigating the consumption patterns of the lower-income 
households). Furthermore, absolute poverty lines have the upside of not being influence by the 
income distribution. However, in this paper, a choice has been made to use a relative line, for 
two reasons. First, since the countries included in the analyses exhibit wide disparities in their 
wealth and living standard, the use of a single absolute line would be obviously inappropriate. A 
relative approach avoids the need to establish eight equivalent poverty lines. Second, since 
poverty is not only an economic but also a social phenomenon, a relative approach better 
underlines this latter dimension. In keeping with the Eurostat definition of the at-poverty-risk, 
the first poverty threshold is defined as having a household equivalised income below 60% of 
the median (equivalised income). Since this is considered to be a relatively high poverty line, a 
second, more conservative one, i.e. 50% of median income is also included. 
                                                          
108 The latter component may include payments or services offered by private NGOs; unfortunately, there is no way 
to disentangle the public provision (direct or only publicly financed) from the private one; however, it is unlikely that 
this shortcoming will significantly influence the results;  
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The poverty reduction potential of general social assistance in the eight Central and East 
European countries is assessed by calculating pre-transfer and post-transfer poverty indicators. 
In addition to enabling a first rough estimation of program performance, this approach carries a 
few advantages. First, it is relatively simple and straightforward. Second, and more importantly, 
any poverty reduction thus detected can be attributed relatively unambiguously to program 
participation. However, the method also implies a major drawback in that it completely ignores 
potential behavioural effects. More specifically, the counterfactual construction in this case 
assumes that the presence or absence of the program does not otherwise influence the behaviour 
of potential recipients. Such an assumption obviously does not hold. Still, a pre / post transfer 
comparison can be considered a useful first step in examining the performance of social 
transfers. 
Since eligibility conditions, as well as benefit generosity are often differentiated across 
household types (through equivalence scales, extra amounts for single parents, and large families 
etc.), the pre- post-transfer indicators are computed both for the general population and 
separately, for six family types, namely couple with two children, single person aged under 65, 
single person aged 65 and over, couple with 3 or more children, single parent living alone, single 
parent living with other adults. Together these family types constitute between 40% and 52% of 
the sample. Of the two poverty lines proposed above, the higher one is seen as indicating risk of 
rather than actual deprivation/poverty, and as such, is likely to be well above eligibility 
thresholds present in mean-tested programs. As a result, only indicators based on the 50% 
median equivalised disposable income are shown for the six family types. It should be kept in 
mind though that this disaggregation drastically reduces the number of cases in some instances. 
Consequently, depending on the family category, the computed parameters show significant 
instability for some country-years. 
Before continuing with the analysis, a few technical remarks are in order. First, since 
some inconsistencies have been found in the equivalised household income variable provided in 
the dataset, a new variable has been constructed by multiplying the total net disposable income 
with the intra-household non-response inflation factor and dividing it by the household‟s 
equivalised size109. Accordingly, a new poverty status indicator has been computed based on the 
new equivalised disposable income variable. Second, for each of the two components forming 
social assistance, two variants are available, i.e. gross and net. Some countries have recorded only 
gross sums and some countries have recorded only net sums. Since social assistance benefits are 
usually non-taxable, gross figures have been used for countries where the net sum was missing. 
Third, all figures have been computed based on personal and, in some cases, household 
weights110. Fourth, in all eight countries, the income reference period refers to the year previous 
                                                          
109 The EU-SILC variable is used in this case; in turn, this amounts to the modified OECD equivalence scale of 1, 
0.5 for additional adults and 0.3 for children; 
110 Longitudinal weights have been used for 2005, 2006 and 2007, whereas the analysis for 2008 relies on cross-
sectional weights; 
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to the survey. Thus, income is collected for the following years: 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. As 
such, all information currently available in the dataset relates to program performance during 
periods of positive economic growth. Although it would undoubtedly be of great interest to 
gauge the performance of means-tested last-resort income support in the face of economic 
recession, this will only be possible once the 2009 wave is released.  
 
 
4.3 RELATIVE POVERTY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 
Table 4.1 presents the value of the 60% of median equivalent income and of half the 
median equivalent income respectively. Despite their common communist past and transition 
period, countries in Central and Eastern Europe display wide disparities in living standards. The 
relative poverty lines are around four times higher in the richest country (Slovenia) compared to 
the poorest (Latvia and Lithuania). Thus, it should be kept in mind that the material situation of 
those considered to be poor can be dramatically different depending on the country they reside 
in. 
 
Table 4.1. Annual poverty lines in Central and Eastern Europe (Euros)  
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Poverty line-60% of median household equivalised income 
2003  1499       
2004 2539 1775 2102 1319 1278 1503 5293 1707 
2005 2880 2161 2304 1553 1537 1784 5560 2002 
2006 3252 2638 2341 2094 1960 2101 5934 2394 
2007 3638 3328 2639 2502 2899 2493 6667 2875 
Poverty line-50% of median household equivalised income 
2003  1249       
2004 2116 1479 1752 1099 1065 1253 4411 1422 
2005 2400 1800 1920 1294 1281 1487 4633 1668 
2006 2710 2199 1951 1745 1633 1751 4945 1995 
2007 3032 2774 2199 2085 2416 2077 5556 2396 
Note: Poverty thresholds are computed at the individual level, using household weights; the 
figures refer to the year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007; 
Source: Own calculation based on EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-SICL 
2008 cross-sectional database;  
 
All countries in the region experienced strong economic growth during the 2003-2007 
period. Reflecting this trend, both relative poverty lines have increased, sometimes substantially, 
throughout the region. Poorer countries have grown proportionally more, sometime overtaking 
richer ones (for example, at the outset of the four year period the income lines are much lower in 
Estonia and the Slovak Republic compared to Hungary, but at the end of the period the reverse 
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is true). Poverty lines in the eight countries are somewhat closer to one another in 2007 
compared to 2004. The increases however are not proportional, as income raises have benefitted 
differently the various sections of the low-income population. Thus, the increase in the incomes 
of the poorest has been very strong in Estonia between 2004 and 2007, whereas Hungary 
experienced strong growth in income for the near-poor but a much weaker expansion in the 
incomes of the very poor between 2005 and 2006. Nevertheless, gains in the lower poverty 
threshold indicate steady and substantial income boosts for the poorest in every country. 
Notably, no consistent cross-national or cross-temporal pattern of pro-poor growth becomes 
apparent.  
Based on the two poverty lines, Table 4.2 displays the poverty rate (headcount index) and 
poverty gap respectively for each country and wave of the dataset. Both poverty definitions 
indicate that poverty is most widespread in Poland and the Baltic States (around 10 to 18% 
according to the more conservative definition of poverty and 17-25% according to the more 
liberal one) and least present in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic 
(around 5-7% based on the 50% median equivalised income line and 9-12% according to the 
60% median equivalised income threshold).  
 
Table 4.2 Poverty rates and size of poverty gap in Central and Eastern Europe 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Poverty rate- at 60% of median household  equivalised income 
2003  19,35       
2004 10,36 18,09 12,57 18,13 21,32 20,10 12,07 12,97 
2005 9,83 18,53 14,91 22,05 18,95 18,48 11,68 11,81 
2006 9,68 18,69 12,52 22,20 19,03 17,24 11,52 9,68 
2007 9,06 19,46 12,39 25,58 19,99 16,88 11,61 10,87 
Poverty rate- at 50% of median household  equivalised income 
2003  12,11       
2004 5,46 11,12 7,31 11,48 14,54 13,88 7,00 8,32 
2005 4,94 11,00 9,06 15,33 11,92 11,71 6,56 6,85 
2006 5,00 10,35 7,46 15,10 12,33 10,99 6,19 5,00 
2007 4,71 11,49 6,41 18,58 13,74 10,25 6,26 5,74 
Poverty gap (as % national poverty line)-at 60% of median household equivalised income 
2003  34,53       
2004 23,26 31,27 22,88 32,67 32,64 34,52 23,52 30,08 
2005 21,24 29,02 28,64 32,56 31,62 28,95 23,72 25,02 
2006 22,64 26,59 24,10 31,22 30,53 28,58 22,52 23,87 
2007 22,92 26,84 22,05 32,08 31,04 27,21 22,90 26,33 
Poverty gap (as % national poverty line)-at 50% of median household equivalised income 
2003  40,36       
2004 23,84 35,15 20,09 36,62 33,06 35,37 22,09 31,28 
2005 21,18 32,21 31,10 31,65 34,88 29,15 22,97 24,84 
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2006 23,55 29,66 21,54 30,56 31,24 27,95 22,11 26,70 
2007 24,69 27,27 22,86 29,12 29,59 27,50 22,94 31,91 
Note: Figures are constructed on the individual level, using household weights; figures refer to 
the year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007; 
Source: Own calculation based on EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and the EU-SILC 2008 
cross-sectional database; 
 
Despite the strong increase in the poverty line, poverty rates remained relatively stable 
during the three years included in the analysis. Only Poland experienced consistent yearly 
declines of its poverty rate during the entire period, irrespective of which line is used to construct 
the poverty rate. Between 2004 and 2007, its poverty rate dropped approximately 3.5 percentage 
points, not an unremarkable achievement for a period of four year. The contrary pattern may be 
observed in Latvia, where the poverty rate consistently increased during the entire observed 
period by roughly seven percentage points, a very large increase. In the remaining countries, 
stability prevails. Albeit minor fluctuations are registered, poverty rates in 2007 are remarkably 
similar to those registered in 2004. With the exception of Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, all countries experienced a rise in poverty levels in 2007 compared to the previous year. 
The lower half of Table 4.2 contains information relating to the average poverty gap, 
measured as a percentage of the relevant national poverty line. Although in this case cross-
national variation is not as striking as in the case of poverty rates, two country clusters are easily 
distinguishable. The first one contains the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic, all countries in which the average poverty gap is about a fifth of the national poverty 
line. The second group, comprising the three Baltic States together with Poland, exhibits a 
pattern of deeper poverty. Mean poverty gaps in this cluster reach about a third of the national 
poverty line. Quite interestingly, the depth of poverty appears of similar magnitude whether it is 
based on the more stringent poverty line or on the more liberal one. The exception is the Slovak 
Republic in 2006 and 2007 where poverty is deeper when measured using the lower threshold. A 
significant reduction in the depth of poverty occurred in Poland. Quite remarkably, the gap 
irrespective of how it is measured, decreased by approximately 7 percentage points. Estonia was 
also successful in diminishing the severity of poverty, especially when measured at the lower line. 
The gap diminished by almost 13 percentage points, albeit from a very high base. In the other six 
countries, despite yearly fluctuations, poverty gaps remained relatively stable, as gains tend to be 
offset by weaker performance in subsequent years. 
Despite the advances made by Poland, and in some cases by Estonia, as well as by 
adverse trends in the Slovak Republic, the broad division between the four low-poverty countries 
and the four high poverty ones is maintained throughout the four year period. Notably, the high 
poverty countries (the three Baltic States and Poland) contain both the highest poverty rates and 
the largest poverty gaps. On the contrary, poverty in countries with low or moderate shares of 
the population vulnerable economically (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and the Slovak 
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Republic) is shallower, suggesting a positive correlation between spread and severity of poverty. 
Similarly, temporal trends in the poverty rates have broadly mirrored those in the average 
poverty gap, although the correspondence is far from perfect (for example, using the stricter 
50% median equivalised income definition of poverty, rates have declined in the Slovak 
Republic, whereas the gap has increased). Overall, at the country-year level, there is a 0.65 
correlation between the headcount index and the mean gap, when poverty is defined based on 
equivalised income below 50% of the median. The correlation increases to 0.85 when the 
alternative specification, i.e. equivalised net disposable income under 60% of the median, is used 
instead.  
 
 
 
 
4.4 PERFORMANCE OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SCHEMES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE 
 
While poverty levels are the result of multiple factors affecting the level and distribution 
of income, means-tested transfers explicitly aim at dealing with poverty. Thus, since they are 
above all a poverty fighting instrument, social assistance programs should be primarily evaluated 
on how successful they are in reducing the extent and severity of poverty, a dimension termed 
henceforth effectiveness. Yet, there are other angles from which means-tested programs may be 
viewed. Social programs have to operate in a context of limited budgets and tight spending. 
Therefore, the cost of achieving poverty reduction amounts to a second evaluative criterion. 
Finally, similarly to the welfare regime research tradition, means-tested programs have been 
compared in terms of their size and generosity. While not directly addressing outcomes, these 
types of indicators provide relevant intermediary information on how the program operates, as 
well as on potential effects. The next three sub-sections, each deal with one of the three broad 
assessment criteria outlined above. 
In assessing the relationship between poverty characteristics and social assistance 
transfers, poverty is taken to be a household concept. This approach implicitly assumes that 
members of the same household equally share resources among themselves. While this 
assumption may not always be justified, intra-household allocation issues are beyond the scope 
of this analysis. Having said that, social assistance schemes may not necessarily defined their unit 
of assessment as the household. Indeed, social assistance programs in three out of the eight 
countries-namely the Czech Republic, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic assess eligibility and 
establish amounts using a unit smaller than the household. This may affect the results of the 
subsequent analyses as well as the comparability between countries. Unfortunately, SILC collects 
information about social assistance receipt at the household level rather than the individual level 
so it is impossible to tell in a multiunit household which one(s) of the units received the transfer. 
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This prevents an analysis strictly using the unit of social assistance receipt. However, a sensitivity 
check may be performed by looking at results derived using only single unit households (i.e. 
ignoring multi-unit households). A comparison of results using all households to those using 
single unit households only is shown in Appendix 2 for the three countries where this issue is 
relevant. While some differences do exist, they are small and do not affect the substantive 
conclusions emerging from the main analysis. In the following sections, both poverty and social 
assistance receipt are construed at the household level. 
 
4.4.1  EXTENSIVENESS\ GENEROSITY 
 
One angle from which social assistance programs can be looked at is extensiveness/ 
generosity. This dimension is concerned with how much resources a country devotes to the 
program and its clients. Since social assistance schemes are only one component in a much larger 
welfare setup, the size of a social assistance program may be interpreted in two ways. Previous 
research has pointed out that most countries in Continental and Northern Europe spend 
relatively little on their social assistance programs because other national programs usually kick in 
to provide resources for the needy, before social assistance does. Thus, there is little need for an 
extensive social assistance net. Therefore, a large social assistance budget may be indicative either 
of a more generous program, or of a stronger reliance on this type of program to meet various 
social needs. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 summarize five extensiveness/ generosity measures, namely 
percent of the population receiving benefits, the average disbursed benefit in Euros, spending 
per poor person, spending111 relative to the total poverty gap, and benefit amounts as a share of 
poor recipients‟ total disposable income. Each of the latter three indicators is presented in two 
variants, namely one based on the 60% median equivalised household income and the other on 
the 50% median equivalised household income. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Extensiveness/ generosity of social assistance transfers in Central and Eastern 
Europe-I 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
% of the population receiving SA  
2003   4,78       
2004  12,14 3,84 15,34 10,22 6,36 10,93 17,36 13,64 
2005  11,88 2,67 12,46 7,01 5,20 11,30 15,86 8,16 
2006  9,75 1,94 11,81 7,72 5,59 9,88 15,59 6,54 
2007  5,21 2,91 18,04 9,26 5,92 8,14 12,02 5,18 
Average disbursed benefit per person (adjusted based on the equivalence scale) 
                                                          
111 The two spending indicators are better interpreted as measures of generosity as they refer to persons who are 
poor after all social transfers, except social assistance;  
108 
 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2003   248,33       
2004  401,79 175,42 253,37 93,18 156,21 119,08 716,34 326,58 
2005  464,74 207,57 121,97 103,69 105,98 169,34 740,68 416,91 
2006  588,37 211,93 118,60 116,23 148,27 214,99 720,44 390,32 
2007  551,88 283,07 168,56 200,36 166,13 222,92 725,37 521,23 
Spending per poor person (poor defined on the 60% median equivalised income) 
2003   45,13       
2004  268,26 24,66 190,02 34,90 28,95 40,61 571,27 202,11 
2005  301,96 22,34 60,65 21,64 19,09 61,35 551,71 174,52 
2006  328,46 15,07 64,50 25,68 28,34 72,96 534,79 155,33 
2007  200,81 30,13 143,17 52,46 29,00 67,80 443,11 146,93 
Spending per poor person (poor defined on the 50% median equivalised income) 
2003   71,73       
2004  423,01 39,77 325,32 56,06 41,59 58,70 937,78 287,51 
2005  526,18 37,34 98,51 30,71 30,04 94,22 954,67 289,45 
2006  528,54 27,21 106,13 37,63 43,18 111,03 904,31 271,64 
2007  349,55 50,24 260,58 71,52 41,32 108,69 736,87 265,62 
Note: Figures are computed at the individual level, using household weights; figures refer to the 
year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC longitudinal database and the EU-SILC 2008 
cross-sectional database; 
 
 The highest proportion of recipients is registered in Slovenia during 2004, where around 
17% of respondents live in a household that has reported receiving social assistance payments112. 
Receipt of the transfer is also relatively widespread in Hungary throughout the entire period, in 
the Slovak Republic in 2004, and the Czech Republic in 2004 and 2005 where the client 
population is in excess of 10%. At the opposite end, Estonia runs a very restricted scheme, 
making benefits available to between 2 and 5% of the population, depending on year. 
Extensiveness is also reduced in Lithuania, and in Slovakia starting with 2006, as benefit receipt 
is largely reduced to around 5% of the population. In between, in Poland and Latvia means-
tested benefits reach around 7-9% of the adult population. Benefit receipt fell strikingly in the 
Slovak Republic between 2004 and 2007 from around 13% to 5%. It is not cleared whether this 
decline occurred due to decreased need or whether it can be attributed to stricter entry screening 
and/or faster exit. It should be noted though that in 2004, the Slovak Republic enacted a social 
assistance reform, effectively capping guaranteed payment of benefit to two consecutive years113. 
This change of rules may be partially driving the declining receipt levels.  Declines in benefit 
                                                          
112 It is important to remember that the social assistance variable encompassed means-tested or income-tested 
support for housing costs, which may be available on a wider scale than the minimum income guarantee benefit 
alone; however, no separate housing allowance exists in Slovenia in 2004; 
113 After 24 months, municipalities step in and cover the benefit; see European Commission, D. E., Social Affaires 
and Equal Opportunities (2010). Mutual Information System on Social Protection Database, European 
Commission; http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do?lang=en. 
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receipt, albeit less marked, are also noticeable in Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Both 
countries (the Czech Republic in 2007 and Slovenia in 2006) have taken measures to reduce 
outlays by toughening eligibility, especially enforcing more strictly the work availability as a 
condition of entitlement. 
 The second indicator in Table 4.3 presents the average disbursed benefit per person, 
adjusted to reflect the proportionally smaller amounts normally awarded when several individuals 
belong to the same family. The divergence is indeed striking. As the richest country in the 
sample, Slovenia disburses the highest benefits. The Czech and Slovak Republics also have 
relatively high average disbursed benefits, approximately two thirds of the Slovenian mean 
transfer. Among the Baltic States, Estonia makes available markedly more generous benefits in 
comparison to Latvia and Lithuania. Hungary and Poland have relatively similar, moderately 
generous average disbursed benefits, albeit the trends in the two countries are opposed. Thus, 
benefits are declining in Hungary while rising in Poland. Notably, most countries have 
consistently raised average benefits disbursed by their social assistance programs. It should be 
remembered though that the poverty line also increases yearly in every country from 2004 to 
2007. In fact, poverty lines rise much more spectacularly than the average disbursed benefit, a 
sign that, in times of economic growth, social assistance might be ill suited to equalize incomes at 
the bottom. The increases are proportionally highest in countries where benefits were initially 
lowest. Thus, as cross-national differences gradually diminish in time, a mild convergence trend 
is noticeable.  
The next two indicators in Table 4.3 offer information on spending patterns in relation 
to existing needs. They illustrate the average amounts spent in each country in relation to the 
poor population, defined first using a higher and then a lower poverty line. Care must be taken 
when interpreting these two indexes, as richer countries obviously need to spend more to bring a 
person above the poverty line. Even so, it is plainly apparent that all three Baltic countries, 
together with Poland and to a lesser extent Hungary spend very little relative to the size of their 
poverty stricken population. The contrast with the highest spenders, i.e. the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic could not be stronger. For example, in 2004, Slovenia spent 19 
times more per poor person114 than Lithuania, a difference that cannot be justified in terms of 
economic wealth alone. It is interesting to note that with the partial exception of Hungary, 
countries that spend little relative to the size of the poor population are characterized by soaring 
poverty rates. Moreover, despite the fact that the relative poverty line increased in the three year 
period under study, spending per poor person shrunk substantially in many countries, regardless 
of whether poverty is construed using the higher or the stricter definitions. In effect, only Latvia 
and Poland spend more per poor person in 2007 compared to 2004. Since average benefits have 
remained constant or have been growing, the fluctuations in the amount spent per poor person 
are presumably due to diminishing ability of the programs to reach the poor. 
                                                          
114 Defined using the 60% median poverty line; 
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Perhaps a better indicator of spending relative to need is expenditure as a share of the 
total poverty gap (see Table 4.4). The indicator has been constructed by dividing total spending115 
by the amount that would be needed to bring all the poor above the poverty line (assuming of 
course no identification errors). When poverty is measured as having a household equivalised 
income below 60% of the median, spending is grossly inadequate in all countries. Only Hungary 
and Slovenia in 2004, as well as the Czech Republic in 2004 and 2005 disburse enough transfers 
to fill more than half of the total poverty gap. The Czech Republic and Slovenia in the remaining 
years, as well as the Slovak Republic together with Hungary in 2007 also spent relatively high 
amounts in comparison to their needs, covering between 25 and 49% of their respective national 
poverty gaps. In the remaining countries and years however, spending is far too low to make a 
meaningful contribution. For instance, the sum of all disbursed benefits in Estonia would have 
sufficed to fill between 5 and 12% of the total poverty gap, depending on year. Likewise, Latvia 
and Lithuania spend below 10% of what is needed to fill their total poverty gaps.  
 
Table 4.4 Extensiveness and generosity of social assistance in Central and Eastern Europe- II 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Total SA spending† as % of the national poverty gap-60% line 
2003   11,73       
2004  50,54 6,20 57,61 11,42 9,82 12,13 51,53 45,51 
2005  54,60 4,90 14,49 6,37 5,82 18,83 49,99 43,31 
2006  49,42 2,96 17,27 5,76 6,92 19,27 46,85 35,02 
2007  28,74 4,29 33,93 7,57 5,20 15,01 33,86 26,74 
Total SA spending† as % of the national poverty gap-50% line 
2003   18,51       
2004  86,18 10,58 124,62 19,15 16,58 19,94 94,72 68,32 
2005  96,73 8,84 25,88 11,42 10,11 33,75 92,78 73,75 
2006  81,88 5,79 36,27 10,43 12,50 35,42 88,27 62,88 
2007  51,94 8,61 67,52 13,52 9,39 28,06 65,23 46,15 
Average benefit size-as % of poor households‟ budget (poor based on 60% median equivalised 
income) 
2003   34,41       
2004  27,87 27,39 12,44 17,81 26,80 15,49 26,91 48,13 
2005  28,30 26,97 8,16 12,69 15,44 16,60 27,78 38,31 
2006  32,19 22,42 6,86 9,34 15,95 16,83 26,43 34,35 
2007  28,49 15,26 12,91 8,83 11,79 15,39 25,05 33,59 
Average benefit size-as % of poor households‟ budget- (poor based on 50% median equivalised 
income) 
2003   37,00       
2004  33,90 30,66 15,53 24,44 30,74 18,23 34,12 53,24 
2005  36,60 32,18 9,65 15,14 20,08 19,83 35,82 41,78 
                                                          
115 Again, only spending on  cash benefits is counted due to the information available in the dataset; administrative 
costs, as well as in-kind benefits (other than those related to housing) are disregarded;  
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2006  39,07 28,79 7,52 10,38 21,09 19,71 33,23 37,22 
2007  33,89 17,66 17,30 9,81 14,72 18,46 30,22 39,26 
Note1: Total SA spending is computed by summing total household benefit payments at the 
country-year level 
Note2: Indicators are computed at the household level, using household weights; figures refer to 
the year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-
SILC 2008 cross-sectional database; 
 
 In light of the results above, social assistance transfers could be considered largely trivial. 
However, if the total poverty gap is constructed based on the stricter 50% median equivalised 
line, the performance of the programs improves, sometimes considerably. Thus, during 2004 in 
Hungary, if no identification errors occurred, social assistance benefits would have successfully 
compensated for the entire shortfall in disposable income for every poor household. The Czech 
Republic and Slovenia (with the exception of 2007) would have also come very close to filling 
their respective total national gaps. Large spending levels relative to need are also registered in 
the Slovak Republic before 2007 and in Hungary and Slovenia during 2007 as total benefit 
outlays would have sufficed to bridge around two thirds of the poor‟s total income shortfall.  At 
the opposite end, spending levels remain inadequate in the Baltic States and to a lesser extent in 
Poland and Hungary between 2005 and 2006, where the sums of all disbursed benefits cover 
only 6 to 35% of the respective total poverty gap. 
 Noticeably, the best performers during the 2004, the first year for which information is 
available, lost significant ground by the end of 2007, the last year observed. All four countries 
underwent drastic reductions in spending relative to need, as reductions range from 20 to 30 
percentage points. Albeit far from conclusive, this pattern may be an indication that high social 
assistance disbursements may be unsustainable in the long run. 
 Examining the importance of the transfers in the budget of poor recipients, the case of 
the Slovak Republic stands out. Slovak social assistance payments make up about half of the 
disposable budget of the poor households that receive them. Means-tested transfers represent an 
important component of household resources for Czech, Slovenian poor households, as well as 
Estonian ones in 2003 and 2004, as benefits make up to 30% of the poor‟s disposable income. 
The lowest benefit importance for the client population is found in Hungary, where means-
tested payments account for only 7-17% of the poor recipient households‟ budget.  
Overall, social assistance schemes are a relatively small component of the larger welfare 
setup. Generally, they serve a small population, spend fairly little relative to existent needs and do 
not have a major impact on their clients‟ finances (see Table 4.4). Nevertheless, some divergence 
is clearly visible. Notably, the eight countries may be divided in two groups. The first group 
comprises Czech and Slovak Republics together with Slovenia. These countries have relatively 
extensive social assistance programs, serving a tenth or more of the population, with relatively 
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generous benefits. Total spending is high enough to theoretically be able to fill the larger part of 
their respective poverty gaps, while actually disbursed benefits are relatively important to those 
who receive them, constituting between a quarter and a half of their net disposable income. A 
wholly contrasting pattern is observable in Estonia, Lithuania, and to a lesser extent in Latvia, 
the countries forming the second group. All three Baltic States run small scale social assistance 
programs that reach only 2 to 10% of the population. Benefits are much stingier, while 
comprising less than 30% of the poor recipient households‟ budget. Spending levels are well 
below what would be needed to fill the total poverty gap. In between the two country clusters 
are Hungary and Poland. In both countries, extent/generosity indicators exhibit significant year 
to year fluctuation. The Hungarian social assistance is moving from a more generous and 
extensive scheme towards a more restricted and stringent, whereas the opposite development 
emerges in Poland. Depending on the indicator and year, each county is closer to one of the two 
country clusters described above.  
Clearly, the distinction between the two groups of countries is much clearer in 2004 than 
in 2007, largely due to falling extensiveness/generosity occurring in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, as well as Slovenia. In all three countries, receipt rates and total spending levels have 
declined precipitously. The less steep decline in benefit levels (both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of household income suggests that reduction in total spending have been achieved 
mainly by moving people off benefit or refusing entry, rather than through less generous 
disbursements. The same declining pattern in number of client and total outlays is noticeable in 
Estonia. In the Estonian case however, relative benefit levels have declined as well.  
Up to a certain point, the extent and generosity of the means test appears to be positively 
correlated to the general economic affluence. Thus, poorer countries such as the three Baltic 
States seriously under-spend when it comes to their social assistance, despite their high poverty 
rates and relatively deep poverty. Conversely, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, the richest 
countries in the sample, also operate the most extensive and generous schemes. However, the 
association is not unambiguous. Whereas the Slovak Republic and Hungary have similar GDP 
per capita levels116, the former undoubtedly offers more and higher payments though its means-
tested transfer framework (at least before 2007).  
 
4.4.2 EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 The next dimension to look at is how successful social assistance schemes are in 
accomplishing their mission, i.e. how effective they are in reducing poverty. A total of eight 
indicators have been computed, each describing a different facet of effectiveness. The first task 
of a social assistance scheme is to identify who the needy are. Consequently, the first indicator of 
                                                          
116 Measured in Purchasing Power Parities; based EUROSTAT figures 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb010;  
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effectiveness, termed coverage, looks at the share of the poor population117 that receives social 
assistance transfers. Table 4.5 shows that the Central and East European performance in this 
respect is disappointing. Defining the poor population based on the higher at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold, only the Czech Republic is successful in handing out benefits to half or more of its 
needy population, and only prior to its 2007 reform. Again, the Baltic States have the most 
dismal record offering benefits through their social assistance schemes to less than a fifth of the 
poor. The remaining four countries reach between 25% and 46% of their poor population 
though means-tested transfers.  
If the boundary of the poor population is pushed downwards by adopting a stricter 
definition of poverty, social assistance coverage improves in every country, although most 
substantially in the Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia. Between half and two thirds of the 
poor receive some social assistance payment in these countries. Coverage is low, averaging 15 to 
20% in the three Baltic States and hovers around 30% in Poland and Hungary. Mirroring trends 
in benefit receipt and total spending, coverage levels drop significantly during 2007 in the Czech 
and Slovak Republics, Slovenia and Estonia, although in the latter case from a much lower base. 
The decline is especially visible when the poor are counted using the higher poverty line, 
suggesting that the withdrawal of support affected the near-poor to a greater extent than the very 
poor. Only Hungary experienced sustained and noteworthy yearly increases in its coverage rate, 
irrespective of how the target poor population is defined. In the remaining three countries, 
coverage levels have been fairly stagnant. 
 
Table 4.5 Effectiveness of social assistance transfers in Central and Eastern Europe –I 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Coverage=% poor receiving SA benefits- (poor based on the 60% median equivalised income 
line) 
2003   16,23       
2004  56,81 13,33 29,34 17,84 13,36 27,67 46,64 45,75 
2005 59,22 9,60 32,67 11,71 14,89 32,26 42,01 36,72 
2006  55,36 6,81 33,88 13,38 14,99 31,24 43,99 32,16 
2007 34,32 7,60 45,61 16,28 20,46 25,81 36,51 28,17 
Coverage=% poor receiving SA benefits-(poor based on the 50% median equivalised income 
line) 
2003   23,09       
2004  68,02 18,46 31,18 17,41 15,86 29,60 51,27 56,86 
2005 71,28 12,82 38,26 12,19 15,80 36,06 48,34 53,25 
2006  68,97 9,13 37,80 15,06 15,99 34,71 53,07 48,38 
2007 47,33 9,56 50,98 17,75 22,37 29,94 45,79 40,11 
Total well-targeted SA† spending as % of the national poverty gap-based on the 60% median 
                                                          
117 The share of the poor population receiving transfers is computed relative to those poor before social assistance 
payments; 
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
equivalent income line 
2003   6,34       
2004  35,47 4,69 9,87 3,84 6,33 6,32 24,92 32,46 
2005 38,42 3,93 5,53 2,27 3,63 10,59 24,48 25,98 
2006  38,05 2,02 6,01 2,40 4,06 11,18 24,84 23,67 
2007 22,56 1,87 15,76 2,99 3,42 9,08 19,75 18,93 
Total well-targeted SA† spending as % of the national poverty gap--based on the 50% median 
equivalent income line 
2003   9,08       
2004  49,79 6,58 15,10 4,44 8,80 8,04 35,48 43,89 
2005 54,27 6,26 6,90 2,58 4,13 14,59 35,57 39,76 
2006  54,45 3,43 8,58 3,17 5,93 15,35 36,70 34,49 
2007 34,74 2,92 22,53 4,32 4,99 13,01 29,17 26,59 
Note: Coverage has been computed at the individual level, using personal weights; targeted SA 
spending relative to total gap has been computed using household data and weights; figures refer 
to the year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-
SILC 2008 cross-sectional dataset; 
 
The previous section has presented data on expenditure amounts relative to needs. Yet, 
some of the sums spent unavoidably leak to the non-poor (a more thorough analysis on leakage 
follows in the next section). As a result, not all the resources of the program reach those who 
truly need them. To illustrate how much resources are actually made available to the poor, the 
well-targeted amounts of spending per poor person, and as a share of the poverty gap have been 
computed (figures are shown in Table 4.5). Targeted amounts are obtained by subtracting from 
overall payments the disbursements made to the non-poor as well as payments made to the poor 
that are in excess of bringing them above the poverty line.  
As expected, correctly targeted social assistance spending constitutes a much smaller 
share of the total poverty gap compared to total spending. When the poverty gap is constructed 
based on the 60% median equivalised income threshold, five of the eight countries actually fill 
less than 10% (or in some years a little over 10%) of their overall poverty gap through social 
assistance transfers.  Only in three countries, namely in Slovenia together with the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, do social assistance disbursements make a noteworthy contribution to filling 
the poverty gap.  
 Using the second, lower poverty line, the percentage of the poverty gap actually filled by 
means-tested social transfers increases somewhat. The best performance in this case is achieved 
by the Czech Republic, as between a third and a half of the initial total gap is closed by social 
assistance disbursements. Slovenia and the Slovak Republic also score relatively high on this 
indicator. Their social assistance schemes eliminate around 25 to 40% of the initial total poverty 
gap. The picture is much bleaker in the remaining countries. Figures indicate that the direst 
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situation is to be found in the three Baltic States throughout the entire period and Poland in 
2004. Virtually no meaningful contribution to poverty reduction through means-tested transfers 
can be detected in these case, since less than 10% (and sometimes as little as 3 %) of the initial 
poverty gap is closed by well targeted social assistance spending. Although not as low, correctly 
channelled spending is woefully inadequate in Hungary and Poland during 2005 and 2006, as 
well. In addition, despite above average performance, the ability of social assistance programs to 
close the total national poverty gap has weakened in the top three performing countries, between 
2004 and 2007. 
 
Table 4.6: Effectiveness of social assistance in Central and Eastern Europe-II 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Average % reduction in the poverty rate-total population- (poor defined on the 60% median 
equivalised income line) 
2003   1,35       
2004  11,44 1,20 5,76 2,72 1,31 3,11 12,73 5,73 
2005 14,97 0,77 3,35 1,28 2,14 4,09 12,69 5,15 
2006  10,20 0,34 3,45 1,53 0,67 4,92 10,29 6,76 
2007 4,56 0,56 7,28 1,18 1,05 3,75 7,27 5,73 
Average % reduction in the poverty rate-total population-(poor defined on the 50% median 
equivalised income line) 
2003   1,90       
2004  26,35 2,05 6,21 1,06 3,29 3,25 16,95 13,95 
2005 25,62 1,53 4,65 2,60 3,17 6,63 15,11 8,74 
2006  25,39 0,31 5,31 1,86 1,93 7,76 18,52 15,78 
2007 13,55 2,15 12,72 2,16 3,08 6,33 16,84 9,94 
Average % reduction in the poverty rate-SA recipients- (poor defined on the 60% median 
equivalised income line) 
2003   8,31       
2004  20,13 8,99 19,64 15,26 9,83 11,24 27,30 12,52 
2005 25,28 8,06 10,25 10,93 14,37 12,68 30,20 14,03 
2006  18,42 4,96 10,18 11,43 4,47 15,76 23,38 21,04 
2007 13,29 7,37 15,95 7,24 5,15 14,53 19,90 20,34 
Average % reduction in the poverty rate-SA recipients- (poor defined on the 50% median 
equivalised income line) 
2003   8,22       
2004  38,74 11,12 19,92 6,10 20,73 10,98 33,07 24,54 
2005 35,94 11,94 12,16 21,34 20,07 18,40 31,26 16,41 
2006  36,81 3,40 14,04 12,37 12,06 22,37 34,90 32,61 
2007 28,62 22,50 24,95 12,17 13,76 21,15 36,77 24,78 
Average % reduction in the poverty gap- total population- (poor defined on the 60% median 
equivalised income line) 
2003   4,90       
2004  31,44 4,30 12,60 6,50 6,02 8,21 28,05 23,64 
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2005 33,43 2,95 9,43 3,48 5,30 11,44 25,61 17,62 
2006  31,42 1,75 10,14 3,71 10,14 12,55 24,65 17,40 
2007 16,03 2,31 19,57 3,99 4,37 9,99 19,82 14,67 
Average % reduction in the poverty gap- total population- (poor defined on the 50% median 
equivalised income line) 
2003   30,19       
2004  55,35 32,25 42,93 36,42 45,08 29,65 60,14 51,68 
2005 56,44 30,69 28,87 29,74 35,61 35,45 60,96 47,97 
2006  56,75 25,65 29,93 27,71 28,45 40,16 56,04 54,12 
2007 46,69 30,39 42,92 24,53 21,38 38,72 54,29 52,09 
Average % reduction in the poverty gap- SA recipients- (poor defined on the 60% median 
equivalised income line) 
2003   8,73       
2004  48,82 6,75 15,20 4,84 8,32 9,71 35,38 35,17 
2005 49,90 5,14 12,92 5,09 6,43 15,60 32,57 29,37 
2006  49,77 2,46 16,35 4,86 6,93 16,81 36,06 54,12 
2007 28,51 3,98 27,51 5,70 7,21 15,06 30,72 31,40 
Average % reduction in the poverty gap- SA recipients- (poor defined on the 50% median 
equivalised income line) 
2003   37,83       
2004  71,78 36,58 48,76 27,82 52,47 32,80 69,01 61,86 
2005 70,00 40,10 33,78 41,72 40,69 43,26 67,38 55,16 
2006  72,16 26,92 43,25 32,26 43,35 48,44 67,95 64,91 
2008 60,23 41,63 53,97 32,12 32,25 50,31 67,08 58,07 
Average % reduction in the Gini coefficient- SA recipients 
2003   7,50       
2004  26,65 14,93 5,14 5,46 18,40 7,49 17,89 24,05 
2005 27,85 16,44 3,89 3,36 8,54 10,34 15,17 21,24 
2006  32,04 9,88 3,63 3,67 9,47 11,72 16,98 22,97 
2007 25,57 5,77 8,69 2,38 7,19 10,77 16,74 23,35 
Note: Figures are computed at the individual level using personal weights; figures refer to the 
year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007. 
Source: own calculations based on EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-SILC 
2008 cross-sectional database; 
 
 A clear test of how successful social assistance schemes are in reaching their ultimate goal 
is their ability to bring the poor over the poverty line. Table 4.6 presents the results of precisely 
this type of test, even if a coarse one. It gives information on the relative reduction of both the 
headcount rate and the poverty gap achieved through means-tested social transfers. As usual, the 
reduction is computed assuming first a higher 60% median equivalised income line and then the 
lower half median equivalised income one. Additionally, since previous analysis has shown 
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coverage levels to be very low, the proportional reduction has been computed both for the entire 
population and separately for program clients only. 
 Looking at the overall ability of means-tested transfers to lift the poor over the poverty 
line, the performance of all eight social assistance schemes is indeed unsatisfactory. When the 
poor population is defined in a broader way, only the Czech Republic  and Slovenia between 
2004 and 2006 are successful in pulling 10% or more of the individuals in need above the 
poverty threshold. The Slovak Republic and Hungary achieve around 4-7% reduction scores, 
whereas the performance of the remaining countries is indeed dismal. Less than 5% (and 
sometimes less than 1%) of those defined as poor before transfer receive sufficiently high means 
tested transfers to bring their disposable income above the poverty line.  
 To some degree, the inability of means-tested transfers to achieve significant poverty 
reduction is unsurprising, given the relatively high chosen poverty line. In fact, since, as a rule, 
national official poverty definitions are well below the EUROSTAT at-risk-of-poverty boundary, 
more illuminating results might be obtained by drawing on a more stringent poverty definition. 
Indeed, when a narrower view of poverty is taken, the ability of social assistance transfers 
improves significantly, but only the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic where the 
achieved poverty reduction increase from about one tenth to about one fifth in the first two 
countries, and from about 5% to 15% in the third. In the remaining five countries, decreases in 
the poverty rate attributable to social assistance remain very low, on average below 5-6%. Yet, 
even in the three better performing countries, the capacity of social assistance transfers to reduce 
the poverty headcount index diminishes severely, reflecting decreased coverage and total outlays. 
For example, the effectiveness of the Czech program declines from about 10% in 2004 to 4% in 
2007, effectively bringing it in line with the effectiveness of the Hungarian and Polish programs. 
The effectiveness decline is steeper though when gauged using the higher poverty threshold, 
again suggesting that the near-poor are being pushed off-support. 
Another measure looks at a scheme‟s poverty reducing effectiveness, independently of its 
being able to minimize exclusion errors. If social assistance schemes would be able to reach all of 
the needy, how big would their impact be? The answer is that “perfect” targeting (in the sense of 
no exclusion errors) would make the impact of social assistance considerably heftier compared to 
the actual situation, but the results would still be very weak. Using the higher poverty line, the 
best performance is registered in Slovenia where a fifth to a third of the client population is 
brought above the poverty line by social assistance transfers. Relatively good results are attained 
by the Czech Hungarian, and Slovak social assistance programs. Average poverty reduction rates 
among the recipients reach 5-15%, depending on year in the remaining countries. 
Redoing the analysis based on the lower poverty definition yields similar country 
rankings. The best results are achieved in the Czech Republic and Slovenia where about 30-35% 
of the poor clients manage to climb out of poverty due to the transfers. Slightly less effective, the 
Slovak program pulls around 25% of its poor clients out of poverty. The lowest likelihood of 
exiting poverty through means-tested social assistance is registered in Estonia and Latvia during 
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2003-2004. In the remaining country-years, poverty reduction rates among the client population 
hover close to 20%. Notably, in contrast to declining poverty reduction effectiveness in the total 
population, program ability to bring participants over the poverty threshold remains relatively 
stable (exceptions are Estonia and Poland where the headcount index reduction among social 
assistance clients increased significantly from 2003 to 2007).  
Thus, the targeting system can only partly explain the poor showing of Central European 
social assistance systems in terms of reducing poverty. Another explanation might be that the 
sums awarded are simply too small to lift recipients over the poverty line118. To investigate this 
possibility further, I take a closer look at the poverty gap. 
 Similarly to the headcount index measure, I compute the mean poverty gap separately for 
two groups, i.e. the total population and benefit recipients and separately for the two poverty 
lines. The underlying reasons are the same as in the case of the headcount index, namely to 
evaluate impact of social assistance allowance independently of targeting efficiency. The figures 
for the reduction of the mean poverty gap computed for the total population closely parallel 
those for the reduction of headcount index. Put differently, systems that manage to lift a higher 
number of the poor above the poverty line are also more successful in closing a higher portion 
of the mean poverty gap. Slovenia and the Czech Republic achieve the highest average poverty 
gap reduction rates, around 25-30% when the higher poverty line is used and between 50 and 
60% when the gap is computed based on the lower line. The worst performing schemes are to 
be found in Estonia and Latvia, irrespective of how poverty is defined. Finally, the downward 
trend in program anti-poverty effectiveness in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic pinpointed by trends in the headcount index reduction rates is confirmed. 
Poverty gap reduction (at the 60% median equivalised income) in the total population is almost 
halved in the Czech Republic and Estonia, whereas in the other two countries it decreases by 
about 30%. Although occasionally improvements in the ability of programs to alleviate poverty 
do occur, performance increases are usually small and seldom sustained during subsequent years. 
When looking at poverty gap reduction, computed only for benefit recipients, the 
Slovenian, Slovak and Czech social assistance schemes emerge as the best performers. On 
average they close around 30-70%, depending on the year and on the definition of the poverty 
line. The remaining five countries succeed in eliminating around 5-50% of their recipient 
population‟s poverty gap. More interestingly, although all social assistance programs are more 
effective in reducing the poverty gap of their poorer clients (compare figures based on the lower 
and higher poverty lines), the difference is relatively small especially in Hungary and Latvia, but 
also in Poland and Lithuania. This patterns suggests that in these countries, transfers tend to go 
as much to the near-poor as to the very poor. On the contrary, in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
and the Slovak Republic, the indicators suggest a heavier focus of transfers on the very poor. 
                                                          
118 This explanation is all the more plausible if one considers that some of the countries have considerable lower 
thresholds that the one used here to define poverty; hence these countries would consider ineligible for aid some of 
the individuals labeled as “poor” by my definition and would award much smaller benefits to the rest;  
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Mirroring trends reflected by the corresponding headcount reduction indicators, the percentage 
decrease in the poverty gap achieved by means-tested transfer is relatively constant in time.  
Cross-national differences in effectiveness are much larger when referring to the total 
population than when computed for participants only, both in the case of the headcount index 
and in that of the poverty gap. Targeting effectiveness is thus a major fault line differentiating 
among countries. Interestingly, countries with lower targeting performance (as measured by the 
differences in indicators computed for the entire population and for program clients only), are 
also less able to achieve significant poverty reduction among the poor that they do reach. Thus, 
poor targeting and meagre benefits seem to be associated. One possible explanation is targeting 
mechanisms. By setting benefits at a very low level, some countries are effectively relying on self-
targeting to allocate resources. Such a mechanism though seems to be highly ineffectual in 
combating income poverty. 
By and large, countries that have been able to more effectively reduce the poverty rate, 
also managed to fill a larger portion of the poverty gap. Nonetheless, the parallelism is not 
perfect. In particular, the Slovak Republic and Estonia during the first two years have 
discrepancies between the reduction in the headcount index and the mean gap that strongly 
favour the latter. This would seem to suggest that they direct the bulk of the resources towards 
the very poor, thus closing a considerable portion of the mean gap while failing to bring 
recipients over the poverty line. The reverse situation is present in particular in Latvia, but also 
Hungary. Here it seems that social assistance schemes might be plagued by a possible 
“creaming” effect, i.e. resources are directed towards those immediately under the poverty line, 
bringing them above it but failing to reach the very poor.  
To better investigate this last characteristic, namely the propensity of a social assistance 
to “cream” (i.e. to concentrate on the clients that are more easily handled and ignore those with 
more “expensive” needs), the last effectiveness indicator checks whether the program disburses 
larger amounts of financial support to the very poor. Arguably, “creaming” would be best 
exposed by a qualitative study.  However, a rough approximation may be obtained by looking at 
the progressivity of social assistance transfers.  As such, the last effectiveness indicator illustrates 
by how much social assistance transfers have reduced inequality (as measured by the Gini 
coefficient) among recipients. Two countries stand out. The Hungarian and Latvian systems are 
visibly less progressive than in the remaining countries. The Gini reduction in these countries is 
kept well within a one-digit range. Conversely, the Czech and Slovak means-tested transfer 
schemes are most pro-poor focused, reducing income inequality among program participants by 
about a fifth.  
Summing up, social assistance program in the eight Central European countries under 
investigation are clearly not very successful in dealing with poverty. Their effectiveness is vastly 
hampered by (very) low coverage, but inability to reach the poor is obviously not the only 
problem. The low amount of resources countries actually make available to the poor, as well as 
potential “creaming” also contribute to reduced performance.  
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4.4.3 EFFICIENCY 
 
Last but not least, social assistance schemes achieve their results at very different costs to 
the public budget. To assess how efficient the various systems are, four indicators have been 
constructed. The first one, leakage, looks at the extensiveness of inclusion errors, i.e. how many 
of the recipients are non income poor before receiving the benefit. Table 4.7 shows that 
inclusion errors are indeed common throughout all of the eight Central European countries 
included in the study. Precise country rankings depend on whether individuals in households 
with equivalised income between 50% and 60% of the median are considered to be poor or not. 
The most efficient program, the Estonian scheme in 2003, still directs around a 30-40% 
(depending on which poverty line is chosen) of its transfers to the non-poor. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the Estonian scheme gradually becomes less successful at keeping the non-poor out 
of the program, at the same time as coverage, receipt rates and relative benefit generosity decline 
as well. The least efficient programs are the Hungarian, Slovenian and Latvian ones.  Even when 
using the higher poverty threshold, these three countries consistently award 60% or more of 
their transfers to the clients that are not poor. If the lower poverty line is used, social assistance 
programs in almost every country leak half of the disbursements to non-poor recipients. 
 
Table 4.7 Efficiency of social assistance programs in Central and Eastern Europe 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Leakage=% non-poor recipients-(poor defined  based on the 60% median equivalised income 
line) 
2003   33,97       
2004  45,27 36,79 74,48 67,46 54,76 47,48 62,83 53,85 
2005 42,35 33,00 59,56 62,68 44,48 44,99 64,57 43,93 
2006  38,77 34,03 62,78 60,94 48,59 42,65 63,77 48,98 
2007 37,53 48,89 66,22 54,47 30,18 44,37 61,96 37,29 
Leakage=% non-poor recipients- poor defined  based on the 50% median equivalised income 
line) 
2003   40,91       
2004  58,45 45,74 84,16 80,23 62,60 61,14 75,11 59,68 
2005 60,17 46,46 70,84 72,62 62,56 59,96 76,44 50,98 
2006  52,60 51,03 74,77 70,00 64,02 58,14 74,16 56,10 
2007 50,51 61,44 79,26 63,58 46,41 59,75 71,31 50,61 
Total well targeted SA† spending- as % of total SA spending†- poor defined  based on the 60% 
median equivalised income line) 
2003   54,07       
2004  70,18 75,59 17,12 33,64 64,43 52,09 48,36 71,31 
2005 70,36 80,17 38,16 35,57 62,45 56,25 48,98 59,98 
2006  77,00 68,19 34,82 41,61 58,71 58,01 53,01 67,60 
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2007 78,50 43,49 46,43 39,46 65,76 60,51 58,31 70,77 
Total well targeted SA† spending- as % of total SA spending†  poor defined  based on the 50% 
median equivalised income line) 
2003   49,07       
2004  57,78 62,22 12,12 23,19 53,07 40,33 37,45 64,24 
2005 56,11 70,83 26,68 22,58 40,80 43,21 38,34 53,91 
2006  66,50 59,24 23,66 30,39 47,45 43,35 41,57 54,85 
2007 66,88 33,94 33,38 31,98 53,10 46,38 44,72 57,63 
Note: Leakage is computed at the individual level, using personal weights; percent well targeted 
social assistance is computed using household data and household weights; figures refer to the 
year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-
SILC 2008 cross-sectional database;  
  
The very high leakage figures are indeed surprising, especially if one considers them in 
conjunction with the low coverage performance (see figures in Table 4.4 and Table 4.7). 
Therefore, the low number of poor covered by social assistance is not only an artificial result of 
setting a poverty line that is rather high and probably well-above national measures. Yet, it might 
be that all the non-poor served by these programs receive tiny amounts, and thus the bulk of the 
resources go to those in a disadvantaged economic situation. However, the next indicator, which 
computes the percentage of the total social assistance expenditure that goes to the poor119, shows 
that this is not the case. Again, the Latvian, Hungarian social assistance schemes emerge as highly 
wasteful. They channel well below half (and in some years as little as 17%) of the program 
transfer resources on payments that do contribute to filling the poverty gap, even when allowing 
for poverty to be defined in the more liberal way. Naturally, when a stricter definition of poverty 
is adopted, efficiency declines. The Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Estonia before 
2007 “waste” the least on the non-poor and overflow. Efficiency increased in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and to a lesser extent in Latvia. The share of the disbursed sums funnelled 
towards addressing the income shortfall the genuinely income poor rose by between 8 and 20 
percentage points in these countries, although in the latter two from a very low base.  
Unsurprisingly, countries with high leakage in terms of clients served also have high leakage in 
terms of the amounts spent. Slovenia is somewhat of an exception, as its program is much closer 
in performance to the more efficient countries when the percent well targeted transfers rather 
than leakage is used as an indicator of performance.  
 Along with being ineffective, European social assistance schemes are not very efficient 
either. In particular, the programs serve more non-poor than poor and often direct their funding 
towards households that are not in material distress. Inefficiency characterizes both the richest 
                                                          
119 In fact, well targeted expenditure is considered to be only expenditure filling the poverty gap; thus non-targeted 
expenditure is composed by benefits paid out to the non-poor as well as benefits paid out to the poor that are in 
excess of bringing them above the poverty line;  
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(Slovenia) and the poorest countries in the sample (Lithuania). Similarly, inefficiency does not 
seem to be related to effectiveness. For instance, Estonia had in 2003 and 2004 a comparatively 
efficient social assistance program, spending less on the non-poor while at the same time 
achieving very low poverty reduction scores. Yet, its efficiency scores deteriorated at the same 
time as the program became even less effective in shrinking poverty. Contrarily, Slovenia is 
relatively effective in reducing poverty through its means-tested transfers while simultaneously 
spending the bulk of its transfers on those already above the poverty line. Some countries, such 
as Latvia, are both ineffective and inefficient. 
 
 
4.5 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PERFORMANCE ACROSS FAMILY TYPES 
 
The previous analyses and discussions have been directed at the general population, 
without differentiating according to household characteristics. Nevertheless, eligibility rules 
encompassed in means-tested benefits, almost without exception take into account some 
household circumstances, such as the age of its members, the number of persons in the 
household (by establishing more or less generous equivalence scales), or the combination of 
adults and children (for example, single parent and families with 3 or more children may benefit 
from a more generous treatment). Programs that can be stingy and/or demanding with some 
types of clients may be generous and liberal with others. To illuminate this point, some of the 
indicators presented above have been computed separately for six family types. These types have 
been chosen both to incorporate household characteristics that are known to be correlates of an 
increased poverty risk (such as, for example, increased dependency ratios), and to be relatively 
common in the wider population. However, despite the second criterion, in some instances (i.e. 
country-year-family type groups), the number of cases on which the figures are computed are 
indeed very small. This problem becomes particularly acute when social assistance receipt rates 
are low within a certain family type. That being said, the six household types are: couple with two 
children, single person aged under 65, single person aged 65 and over, couple with three or more 
children, single parent family living alone, and single parent family living together with other 
adults. So as to keep the discussion simple, only one definition of poverty will be used, namely 
having a disposable equivalised household income below half of the median. 
 
4.5.1  HOW DOES VULNERABILITY VARY ACROSS FAMILY TYPES? 
 
Table 4.8 below presents poverty rates for the six family types across countries and 
across time. Not surprisingly, countries rank similarly irrespective of family type, i.e. countries 
where poverty levels are low are so across the board and conversely, where poverty is high, it is 
so for all household types. Couples with two children are the least vulnerable to the risk of 
poverty in every country. Moreover, with the exception of Latvia and Slovenia, poverty rates 
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declined for this group in every country. However, important cross-national differences remain. 
For example, couples with two children are more than twice as likely to be poor in Poland 
compared to the Czech Republic, Estonia or Slovenia. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, with the exception of Poland and the Slovak Republic, poverty 
rates are very high (and in some cases, the highest) for working age adults living alone (see Table 
4.8).  The three Baltic States together with Slovenia exhibit the highest poverty rates for this type 
of household. 
 
Table 4.8 Poverty rates across different types of families in Central and Eastern Europe 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004   8,13       
2005  5,22 5,41 6,63 8,45 13,04 16,03 4,38 13,63 
2006  5,75 5,83 10,21 13,35 10,2 14,46 4,62 7,76 
2007  3,13 6,03 9,81 6,42 9,94 12,63 3,93 7,47 
2008  4,7 5,1 8,8 12,93 9,5 11,31 4,41 5,67 
Single person aged <65 
2004   24,31       
2005  13,37 21,67 18,37 24,4 26,58 19 34,94 12,69 
2006  12,79 20,68 16,83 32,28 22,71 17,3 31,87 9,87 
2007  8,91 22,64 19,1 35,69 27,91 16,4 26,78 10,39 
2008  12,08 22,45 15,42 32,65 29 17,99 24,64 10,59 
Single person aged >=65 
2004   7,89       
2005  2,35 11,07 4,61 6,27 11,64 3,08 30,53 2,54 
2006  3,15 16,12 5,99 35,13 12,38 2,57 24,03 4,67 
2007  3,13 19,24 4,78 55,5 25,93 2,68 26,9 5,05 
2008  3,24 35,71 3,01 72,72 34,48 6,56 22,68 5,65 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   19,63       
2005  6,2 17,27 19,03 18,87 29,41 34,28 9,36 16,22 
2006  20,74 14,43 20,73 33,5 24,06 28,76 11,7 19,17 
2007  15,29 9,63 21,69 28,55 18,96 25,74 11,52 15,37 
2008  9,93 10,2 13,59 24,44 38,8 21,6 6,26 20,1 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   28,88       
2005  25,09 27,98 19,54 28,4 32,45 33,17 18,05 13,44 
2006  24,74 29,13 27,78 25,47 25,29 22,74 15,97 27,22 
2007  24,78 27,63 19,79 28,69 22,93 25,9 13,35 24,79 
2008  26,13 28,25 18,9 26,35 36,39 22,16 14,24 15,04 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004   13,18       
2005 9,94 11,1 9,96 14,19 21,87 21,11 5,19 12,72 
2006  7,87 13,52 9,96 17,15 17,83 20,4 4,82 10,98 
2007  9,71 12,44 10,43 14,84 16,44 18,31 4,68 9,23 
2008  8,64 12,59 9,26 17,71 19,55 16,92 4,02 9,25 
124 
 
Note 1: single parenthood is based on cohabitation and not on formal marriage; figures refer to 
the year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007. 
Note2: figures are computed at the individual level, using personal weights. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-
SILC cross-sectional databases. 
 
Older persons are probably one of the best deprivation insulated groups in Western 
Europe, largely thanks to generous pension provisions. In Central Europe as well, pension 
systems are a well-developed component of the social protection system, not least as a result of 
social program construction during the communist era (see chapter 2). However, pensioners 
living alone are often women who were less likely to accumulate full pension rights and were 
likely to retire from less well-paid jobs. As a result, single person pensioner households may be 
prone to a higher than average poverty risk. This hypothesis is however rejected by the data in 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Poland, where single person pensioner 
households have very low poverty risks in every year for which data is available. Much higher 
poverty rates are registered for this group Slovenia and Latvia120, as well as Lithuania and Estonia 
during 2007.  
The unfavourable dependency ratio, as well as potential child-care costs makes large 
families with many children vulnerable to the risk of material deprivation. Indeed, poverty rates 
for this family type are above average in all countries and for all years. Despite an extensive and 
complex web of family benefits121, around one fifth of large families fall into poverty in Hungary. 
Poverty risks for this group are even higher in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, where between 20 
and 30% of individuals living in this type of household experience income poverty. Another 
family type potentially plagued by dependency and child-care concerns is the lone parent 
household. To be sure, despite special support made available in some countries, poverty rates 
are very high for single parents living by themselves, even higher than for large families. In the 
three Baltic States and in Poland, no less than a third of adults in this group find themselves with 
an equivalised income below half median in almost every year observed. The situation is not 
much better in the remaining countries either. Even in the country with the lowest risk, Slovenia, 
between 13 and 18% of lone parents fall into poverty. However, single parents stand a much 
higher chance of escaping poverty when they share a household with other adults122, albeit 
poverty rates remain slightly above average. Again, households containing single parents and 
other adults are most vulnerable to material deprivation in Lithuania and Poland. Quite the 
                                                          
120 A very steep yearly increase in the risk of poverty for single persons aged 65 or over is observable in Latvia; it is 
not clear what drives this trend; the yearly differences are so high that almost indubitably they are at least partly a 
statistical artifact; however, the rising poverty risk trend is probably true to reality. 
121 See European Commission, D. E., Social Affaires and Equal Opportunities (2010). Mutual Information System 
on Social Protection Database, European Commission; 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do?lang=en. 
122 Since I explicitly excluded cohabiting partners, the other adults are probably members of the extended family. 
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contrary, they are relatively well protected particularly in Slovenia, but also in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics.  
 Not only the extent of poverty, but also its severity varies across family types both within 
and across countries. Poverty is deep in all households containing children, a worrisome finding. 
With the exception of couples with two children in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the average 
income shortfall surpasses 20%. Countries experiencing extensive poverty are also the ones 
where poverty is more severe. Couples with two children experience particularly high poverty 
gaps in the three Baltic States, Poland, but also in Slovakia. In fact, relative to other household 
types couples with two children are in a particularly disadvantaged situation in the Slovak 
Republic. Incomes are most inadequate for large families and single parents living alone. The one 
exception to this pattern is Hungary, where both groups find themselves significantly closer to 
the poverty threshold. It is possible that the extensive Hungarian family benefit system while not 
being able to push them above the poverty line, nonetheless is successful in preventing the worst 
forms of economic deprivation among these two family types. 
 
Table 4.9 Poverty gap levels across different family types 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004   41,17       
2005  18,16 73,29 19,82 27,18 24,55 33,39 15,01 35,28 
2006  12,83 28,83 31,42 32,79 32 32,98 18,38 24,84 
2007  9,67 25,03 14,01 33,81 35,56 34,43 26,12 27,47 
2008  19,96 36,12 21,81 28,92 32,32 37,23 19,6 42,56 
Single person aged <65 
2004  62,45       
2005 29,24 50,57 25,29 52,62 50,79 53,22 32,11 34,64 
2006 26,45 44,5 38,97 45,63 46,25 38,4 34,67 34,6 
2007 28,11 41,31 41,51 46,21 45,22 31,07 34,69 34,37 
2008 30,13 45,18 35,47 45,93 51,06 41,49 34,08 41,28 
Single person aged >=65 
2004  27,14       
2005 11,25 14,2 12,77 15,96 13,35 54,95 20,77 11,21 
2006 9,31 16,16 20,67 8,16 17,82 23,63 20,48 13,2 
2007 9 13,25 18,71 14,15 16,14 15,63 19,46 14,96 
2008  11,28 10,08 23,82 23,98 12,54 12,47 17,36 13,17 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   33,65       
2005 20,06 24,79 16,52 49,29 32,36 38,56 21,51 39,15 
2006  25,57 26,55 22,56 32,26 28,9 30,72 14,22 20,39 
2007 27,19 34,04 17,82 36,97 30,37 28,35 19,5 24,4 
2008 21,33 17,92 16,71 36,99 33,16 31,14 12,86 29,64 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   36,53       
2005  25,28 34,57 22,59 32,37 32,07 39,9 30,83 25,52 
2006  24,67 36,74 29,83 37,94 45 36,86 28,1 25,55 
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2007 25,89 30,22 24,38 38,52 34,73 26,59 22,49 35,89 
2008  36,68 23,61 27,09 33,55 36,41 29,99 28,67 29,92 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004   31,19       
2005 19,79 33,08 18,49 27,9 32,36 32,23 20,2 20,05 
2006 22,29 32,72 31,65 34,38 27,69 28,37 20,29 25,86 
2007 23,09 24,49 22,26 32,61 31,28 27,78 23,18 28,17 
2008 23,33 28,63 22,08 27,91 26,35 25,05 19 28,82 
Note1: Single parenthood based on cohabitation and not on formal marriage;  
Note2: Figures computed at the individual level, using personal weights; figures refer to the year 
prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007 
Source: own calculations using the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and the EU-SILC 2008 
cross-sectional database; 
 
Deep poverty is especially prevalent among single working age adults. In some cases, 
their average poverty gap may exceed 60% and is never and nowhere less than 20%.  Conversely, 
with the exception of Poland in 2004, single person pensioner households are the household 
type most likely to be exposed to shallow rather than deep poverty. Finally, although sharing 
living arrangements with other adults improves somewhat the economic resources of poor lone 
parents, poverty gaps for the two groups are remarkably similar.  
 
4.5.2 RECEIPT AND SIZE OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS ACCORDING TO FAMILY 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 Next, Table 4.10 illustrates the prevalence of social assistance receipt across the six family 
types. Notwithstanding Latvia and Lithuania, single person pensioner households are least likely 
to be in receipt of means-tested benefits. The low participation rates of this group correspond to 
the lower than average poverty rates and poverty gaps, suggesting that other social programs, 
notably the national pension schemes are relatively successful in preventing material deprivation 
among the elderly. To the contrary, in Latvia and Lithuania, single person pensioner households 
are, among the six household types, most likely to receive means-tested transfers. In addition to 
the potential inadequacy of pensions, this pattern also points to possible divides between the 
deserving and the non-deserving poor in these two countries. 
Unsurprisingly, among families with children, couples with two children are least likely to 
obtain means-tested income support. Only in the Czech Republic and Poland do these 
households have a slightly higher than average probability of receiving social assistance 
payments. Conversely, both large families and single parent families living without other adults 
have a much higher likelihood of income support receipt. Despite facing an only somewhat 
lower poverty risk, households containing single parents and other adults are much less likely to 
be social assistance clients in all countries, with the possible exception of Latvia where receipt 
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rates are low for both groups. The discrepancy raises issues of deservingness and subsidiarity in 
the operation of social assistance programs in the central region of Europe. 
 
Table 4.10 Social assistance receipt rates across different family types in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004   1,43       
2005  16,12 1,22 13,19 9,21 5,29 11,57 10,06 8,92 
2006 14,59 0,53 10,94 5,14 2,44 12,75 9,21 5,86 
2007 8,25 0,54 10,22 7,95 3,03 10,5 7,16 6,22 
2008 6,12 1,01 18,76 10,02 3,38 8,22 3,85 2,29 
Single person aged <65 
2004  13,53       
2005 8,94 3,4 11,78 9,81 9,14 10,99 16,34 15,07 
2006 8,94 5,47 14,47 8,5 8,97 11,31 17,41 9,85 
2007  8,17 2,42 7,77 7,35 7,75 12,32 13,06 7,99 
2008 6,11 2,76 12,44 10,56 8,38 10,49 12,44 5,72 
Single person aged >=65 
2004  0,6       
2005 2,98 0,9 14,36 25,65 20,24 4,08 2,45 4,67 
2006 3,83 3,13 14,11 22,13 17,91 5,04 6,8 3,42 
2007 2,74 1,78 9,15 19,38 18,06 5,82 6,97 3,13 
2008 1,97 3,06 14,33 27,51 20,06 4,5 4,12 2,84 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   12,84       
2005  36,76 16,43 24,46 34,82 8,66 26,85 22,78 26,01 
2006  42,7 2,51 26,45 17,3 4,98 27,53 18,61 9,72 
2007 31,62 0,6 31,62 16,56 18,63 23,93 16,41 7,81 
2008  12,17 4,43 36,01 15,85 22,71 21,37 15,06 5,38 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   19,46       
2005  38,2 15,83 35,57 12,65 16,35 24,61 27,1 50,89 
2006  38,06 11,04 18,98 10,82 17,67 29,99 19,21 19,2 
2007  40,91 8,99 25,7 14,59 14,01 24,76 22,49 10,11 
2008  31,63 7,52 33,49 14,92 14,78 24,88 23,91 6,77 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004  4,22       
2005  23,77 5,13 22,94 10,34 7,94 16,77 23,91 21,44 
2006  21,01 4,42 19,18 5,64 8,61 16,8 21,47 10,95 
2007 17,58 2,14 16,48 7,46 7,26 16,37 22,39 13,03 
2008  7,94 5,17 27,67 10,17 7,5 14,5 17,13 9,91 
Note 1: single parenthood based on cohabitation and not on formal marriage; 
Note 2: figures computed at the individual level, using personal weights; figures refer to the year 
prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007 
Source: own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-SILC 
2008 cross-sectional database; 
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 The embedded nature of deservingness and dependency concerns becomes most visible 
in the case of single working-age adults. The previous tables (Table 4.8 and 4.9) have shown that 
working-age adults living alone are exposed to an elevated risk of poverty (and especially deep 
poverty) in all of the eight CEE countries. Nevertheless, despite their higher than average 
vulnerability, receipt of means-tested transfers is narrow among this group, not exceeding the 
average for the entire population. 
 Whereas considerable cross-national convergence can be observed when examining 
average disbursed benefits in the general population, the same is not true for every type of 
family. In fact, there are striking differences in the average received benefit (equivalised for 
household size) among the six family types within the same country. In the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, the social assistance system is most generous towards single working age adults, and 
least generous towards single person pensioner households123. Single parents, especially when 
living alone, together with couples with two children, also receive relatively high average benefits. 
The Slovenian income support program also pays out relatively large amounts to couples with 
three or more children.  
 
 
Table 4.11 Average yearly social assistance payments (equivalised for household size; in Euros) 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004   44,59       
2005  328,473 86,11 195,507 62,709 153,404 145,909 761,139 435,851 
2006  370,959 298,584 130,841 68,901 281,952 158,98 833,138 632,342 
2007  409,651 131,292 106,547 181,722 53,595 215,701 677,472 420,301 
2008 498,438 684,703 169,405 144,955 123,963 201,079 750,356 800,243 
Single person aged <65 
2004   314,17       
2005  928,058 310,682 273,878 152,356 87,445 277,529 1248,071 598,985 
2006  969,769 331,707 147,574 175,141 106,123 467,802 1554,786 734,888 
2007  924,276 343,106 168,129 189,711 135,603 435,508 1367,815 765,229 
2008  1101,954 512,457 270,9 415,132 138,48 583,14 1354,94 922,138 
Single person aged >=65 
2004   379,4       
2005  152,494 31,96 214,825 82,16 62,054 215,675 151,479 275,792 
2006  137,477 64,75 122,667 91,038 83,843 251,089 270,216 582,014 
2007 183,401 88,129 110,223 127,168 95,484 320,25 116,176 313,365 
2008  329,244 498,01 136,336 208,318 27,677 326,34 200,58 545,714 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   226,641       
2005  207,473 194,131 176,791 59,565 188,333 99,594 1085,425 615,492 
                                                          
123 In all likelihood, this is due to other programs kicking in to tackle old-age poverty before social assistance does;  
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2006  520,826 82,601 112,2 86,522 189,593 153,98 1536,397 307,514 
2007  456,327 353,986 102,694 103,536 125,786 182,205 1777,333 607,979 
2008  392,979 134,264 163,594 154,657 121,251 179,332 1118,187 960,601 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   190,823       
2005  428,508 240,335 479,059 112,338 231,051 133,92 888,648 128,121 
2006  555,805 192,17 110,474 149,124 143,893 232,573 1118,727 436,161 
2007  753,924 164,016 210,253 127,78 234,99 266,465 1018,299 344,024 
2008  517,759 244,727 250,821 199,693 235,112 284,269 1621,493 206,98 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004   175,819       
2005  361,742 179,832 362,595 136,574 167,999 89,428 611,105 295,975 
2006  491,944 199,31 108,564 66,22 122,852 137,749 646,568 373,704 
2007  469,801 178,476 100,391 84,052 95,406 164,496 638,756 359,259 
2008  533,528 201,316 143,592 109,318 216,196 172,993 674,21 431,542 
Note: benefits levels are computed at the household level and „equivaised‟ for household size 
using the modified OECD scale; figures refer to the year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-
SILC 2008 cross-sectional database. 
 
 In the three Baltic States, average amounts are much smaller across the board, although 
substantial rises have been registered especially in Estonia. Average payments are particularly low 
in all countries (except Estonia in 2007) for couples, both those with two and those with three or 
more children. The most vulnerable family type, single parents living alone, receives in the Baltic 
countries about an eighth to a half of the transfers it obtains in the other countries. Indeed, 
Latvia has the lowest average benefits for single parents living alone. Albeit their benefits are 
very low in absolute terms, single person pensioner households outrank couples with children 
and in some cases single working age adults.  
 Average equivalised social assistance benefits are fairly constant across family types in 
Hungary. Single parents living alone receive, on average, somewhat higher transfers, but in the 
remaining household categories received benefits amount to between 100 and 200 Euros per 
year per equivalent person. In Poland, the best protected category is that of single person 
pensioner households. Couples with three or more children and single parents living with other 
adults are least protected. This finding is not surprising given that the Polish social assistance 
program has a very low family cap, thereby effectively putting larger households at a 
disadvantage. Finally, the Slovak program probably shows the largest variations in generosity 
across family types. Couples with three or more children, single working age adults and couples 
with two children receive relatively large transfers, comparable to those in the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia. Single person pensioner households also benefit from larger than average transfers. 
In fact, of all eight countries, the Slovak income support scheme disburses the largest amounts 
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(in absolute terms) received by single person pensioner households in the region. Contrarily, 
average benefits are low for single parents living with other adults and very low for single parents 
living alone. 
 Whereas average paid out benefits increased constantly across time for single person 
households, both pensioner and working age, substantial fluctuations occurred in the case of the 
other four family types in virtually every country. Both increases and decreases have been 
registered. It is unclear what triggers these oscillations as they do not follow trends in the poverty 
gap (for example, poverty gaps fall for single person pensioner households while average 
disbursed benefits increase; for some years, the reverse is true for single parents living alone. 
 A different perspective on benefit generosity is offered in Table 4.12. It presents the 
average share of a poor household‟s budget made up by social assistance disbursements. For 
most family types, it becomes quickly apparent that means-tested income support largely tops-up 
income from other sources. Means-tested income support is least important for single person 
pensioner households. In almost every country and year, the benefit rarely comprises more than 
a fifth of a poor household in this category. There is a clear outlier however, namely Poland 
during the entire period, but especially during the first three years. There, single person 
pensioner households have to rely for between a third and half of their income on means-tested 
benefits. 
 
Table 4.12 Average yearly benefit as % of poor households‟ budget 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004   34,74       
2005  31,8 8,63 10,12 5,15 23,95 18,89 34,91 64,05 
2006  38,59 18,3 9,64 4,47 52,52 17,59 31,09 32,8 
2007  39,47 1,06 5,07 20,24 6,38 17,63 25,06 37,68 
2008 ( 31,67 29,58 14,61 6,84 20,77 15,48 28,8 65,58 
Single person aged <65 
2004   62,79       
2005  64,9 81,4 22,58 41,53 22,98 51,44 60,09 68,17 
2006  57,77 51,48 21,02 31,64 30,07 53,21 64,1 75,33 
2007 58,93 64,83 13,56 22,01 15,26 43,79 55,6 64,21 
2008  69,73 30,19 25,61 17,26 25,72 50,71 56,81 64,23 
Single person aged >=65 
2004   44,23       
2005  8,72  3,46 6,36 8,61 49,99 5,12 2,95 
2006  9,86  12,57 7,03 10,95 33,94 10,87 23,46 
2007  12,27  10,1 7,9 7,67 43,05 3,07 16,09 
2008  23,28 4,38 20,01 9,67 1,75 25,26 4,16 27,59 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   29,91       
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2005  20,63 16,31 3,59 17,25 23,3 10,85 39,09 78,26 
2006 41,99 7,02 5,31 8,22 45,63 13,06 46,92 29,87 
2007  29,93 26,57 7,62 3,99 13,08 11,95 51,41 54,87 
2008  17,71 8,32 14,3 12,66 6,26 12,61 31,39 59,98 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   26,3       
2005  24,7 27,36 28,45 21,16 47,25 14,83 33,97 26,18 
2006  27,29 16,63 6,26 17,15 42,95 30,36 34,68 36,67 
2007  34,8 17,88 10,88 10,6 54,83 25,74 35,8 15,08 
2008  26,88 10,85 17,36 9,78 19,98 25,34 37,63 12,02 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004   30,38       
2005  31,6 28,01 15,64 9,29 25,41 10,62 24,97 50,8 
2006  32,28 29,73 7,4 12,26 14,58 14,24 31,47 36,57 
2007  34,44 10,55 5,44 7,53 12,95 15,57 32,43 42,01 
2008 28,69 29,72 13,24 6,44 14,37 13,87 27,05 34,19 
Note 1: figures computed at the household level, using household weights; figures refer to the 
year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007 
Note 2: missing values denote too low a number of cases in the respective cell; 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the 2008 
cross-sectional database. 
 
 In every country, single poor working-age adults are most reliant on social assistance 
transfers. The finding most likely reflects the lack of other income sources available for this 
group rather than a high level of transfers.  
 Single parents derive between 10 and 50% of their income from social assistance, 
depending on country and year. The strongest reliance is registered in Lithuania and Slovenia, 
while the lowest is found in Hungary and Poland. Throughout the four year period, apart from 
the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Poland where the size of the transfer relative to the 
household‟s budget is stable or slightly increasing, social assistance benefits become less 
important for single parents living alone. If cross-country differences are limited in the case of 
single parents living alone, the opposite is true in the case of single parents living with other 
adults. Two patterns are clearly noticeable. On the one hand, the Czech, Slovak, Estonian and 
the Slovenian social assistance programs contribute about 25 to 40% to their poor clients that 
live in households with single parents and other adults. On the other hand, in Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland and Lithuania, social assistance disbursements make up only 5 to 15% of this type of 
household‟s resources. Poor couples, whether with two or more children, receive around 20-30% 
of their income from their respective social assistance program. Finally, social assistance is much 
more important for every type of recipient (with the partial exception of single pensioner 
households) in the Slovak Republic compared to the other countries. 
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4.5.3 TARGETING MECHANISMS‟ RESULTS ACROSS FAMILY TYPES 
 
 By their very nature, social assistance programs are highly selective. In principle, they 
screen their clients through the program‟s entitlement rules. These rules often do not refer solely 
to income, but incorporate asset limits and, perhaps more importantly, work tests that represent 
barriers to entry. Moreover, since all programs encompass varying amounts of discretion at the 
local level, the strict implementation of formal rules cannot be taken for granted. As a result, 
poor households may be sometime refused support (exclusion errors)124 while better off ones 
may nonetheless receive extra resources from the program. As eligibility rules and their 
implementation, likely depend on household size and composition, Table 4.13 illustrates the 
extent to which the poor in various family types are reached by the social assistance program in 
their country. 
 The importance of family characteristics in determining the extent of exclusion errors is 
particularly striking in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. In these 
four countries, poor families are much more likely to receive social assistance payments if they 
contain children. In fact, coverage levels for all four family types that do contain children are 
very high, sometimes exceeding 80%125. They fall to 30-50% for those household types that do 
not contain children. The best covered households are single parent (both with and without 
other adults) and large families in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. High coverage rates (above 
50%) are present in Hungary as well, albeit mainly for couples with children. Conversely, the 
poor single elderly are much less likely to receive any means-tested transfers126. 
 
Table 4.13 Coverage (exclusion errors) levels in Central European social assistance programs 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004   2,2       
2005  73,18 2,08 50,44 5,41 18,34 30,67 75,74 33,26 
2006  60,17 9,22 27,95 2,24 13,85 37,34 63,21 47,54 
2007  59,58 4,78 28 14,42 15,04 26,61 53,02 42,74 
2008  50,64 11,51 52,14 18,81 20,3 22,81 27,91 23,41 
Single person aged <65 
2004   44,56       
2005  49,4 13,56 16,61 19,18 13,93 32 38,83 58,66 
2006  52,79 20,82 34,72 11,14 16,59 42,52 43,98 64,02 
                                                          
124 Figures presented in Table 13 refer to poor receiving benefit; the data does not allow for a distinction to be made 
between benefit refusal and non-take up among the poor who do not receive any transfers; moreover, coverage 
levels may be artificially low due to underreporting of means-tested income. 
125 The Slovakian system is however much less successful in reaching poor coupled with two children; 
126 It is possible that members of this group have incomes close to the poverty line and as a result, may be 
potentially ineligible for benefits; 
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2007  62,4 8,04 26,89 15,14 17,96 46,89 46,58 52,64 
2008  42,54 11,01 27,68 23,8 12,71 36,73 42,23 46,64 
Single person aged >=65 
2004   3,97       
2005  12,74 0 25,4 26,99 13,2 24,04 5,04 27,23 
2006  14,46 0 37,55 26,08 12,53 29,6 12,02 15,47 
2007  10,91 2,89 26,86 21,99 22,34 29,8 13,87 18,05 
2008  18,96 3,43 32,56 32,06 27,92 16,91 13,11 20,66 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   37,43       
2005  82,17 55,41 21,73 56,11 9,39 36,18 72,53 71,4 
2006  87,61 13,42 50,27 30,54 10,87 46,32 67,28 45,48 
2007  75,56 6,14 47 33,04 13,62 39,91 70,57 34,24 
2008  59,62 13,11 62,69 26,06 32,68 38,9 71,8 23,13 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   50,81       
2005  72,52 37,83 32,43 21,82 32,14 50,12 74,53 85,67 
2006  72,12 24,98 36,45 17,52 30,01 69,18 59,54 53,31 
2007  72,01 26,19 41,69 22,09 23,1 49,54 77,29 26,57 
2008  68,74 18,65 64,15 25 29,71 45,39 69,78 31 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004   19,08       
2005  77,69 22,38 30,48 11,06 13,06 29,95 71,17 58,62 
2006  80,61 14,62 39,46 7,83 27,19 36,21 57,19 46,26 
2007  77,24 7,42 49,13 12,08 12,17 36 66,81 57,82 
2008  44,03 13,52 65,95 14,98 27,81 32,81 63,73 40,31 
Note: figures are computed at the individual level, using personal weights; figures refer to the 
year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal and on the EU-SILC 2008 
cross-sectional databases. 
 
 Coverage rates are more uniform across household types in Poland, and the three Baltic 
States, although poor single parents living alone are clearly more likely to be social assistance 
clients. Coverage levels are also lower in the latter four countries for virtually every type of 
household, with the exception of single person pensioner households127. Coverage rates for this 
group, albeit still low, are approximately twice as large as those encountered in the first group of 
countries. Finally, only the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and the Slovak Republic have 
coverage rates of the poor single working age adults that exceed 30%. Both the Czech and 
Slovak Republic exhibit falling coverage rates for almost every type of household. 
                                                          
127 In Estonia, during two years there are no poor single person pensioners receiving benefit; all the recipients in this 
category are non-poor; 
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 The opposite of exclusion errors are inclusion errors. Leakage rates (i.e. share of the total 
client population that is not income poor before the transfer) are shown in Table 4.14 for each 
country and each year in the dataset. Single person working age adults are least likely to receive 
means-tested cash transfers if they are not poor. The rate of inclusion errors for this category is 
particularly low in the Czech Republic and Slovenia (under 20%). Only in Hungary, do very large 
sections of the working age adult client population receive transfers while being non-poor. 
However, Hungary has very high leakage rates, irrespective of the household type for which they 
are computed. 
 
Table 4.14 Leakage (inclusion error) levels in Central European social assistance programs 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004   87,55       
2005  66,49 90,82 70,93 95,03 54,82 55,51 53,68 46,89 
2006  71,07  73,16 94,18 39,59 54,36 62,31 32,69 
2007  73,18 47,35 70,61 88,36 50,75 64,06 66 40,24 
2008  57,05 42,06 72,3 75,73 43,04 65,76 55,64 39,87 
Single person aged <65 
2004   20,49       
2005  19,03 14,29 73,61 51 59,71 42,55 14,79 39,61 
2006  18,45 17,54 57,62 56,82 56,76 27,55 15,16 30,96 
2007  15,31 24,81 31,02 23,63 34,51 29,42 4,52 17,52 
2008  14,69 8,4 64,22 25,15 56,03 32,31 15,31 8,99 
Single person aged >=65 
2004   45,63       
2005  89,52 100 91,55 93,21 92,07 79,22 37,32 85,15 
2006  87,55 100 82,76 51,8 91,03 84,45 56,13 77,11 
2007  87,56 68,74 84,64 33,6 65,81 84,48 45,44 67,55 
2008  66,83 59,58 92,71 12,69 51,85 73,52 25,99 52 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   40,65       
2005  72,91 40,24 82,63 69,58 66,03 51,34 65,46 44,46 
2006  46,21 22,88 59 40,88 45,59 48,59 41,96 10,35 
2007  40,14  65,78 43,02 86,13 52,92 37,81 32,6 
2008  50,73 65,88 71,7 56,53 44,15 59,08 53,97 10,86 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   24,96       
2005  38,34 27,06 79,45 50,61 35,39 29 38,82 64,39 
2006  34,16 31,93 45,68 57,18 57,05 36,51 35,45 20,77 
2007  43,39 19,48 63,09 55,98 60,86 38,62 27,27 34,87 
2008  34,02 27,01 60,88 54,38 26,85 56,59 29,27 25,86 
Single parent living with other adults 
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2004   38,52       
2005  59,31 51,6 84,5 84,74 62,17 61,34 76,96 56,41 
2006  55,22 55,28 77,95 75,63 43 53,81 83,14 52,21 
2007  48,83 56,92 67,19 75,97 72,09 57,66 79,5 53,08 
2008  44,57 66,89 74 73,26 21,19 59,83 76,96 58,4 
Note1: Figures computed at the individual level, using personal weights; figures refer to the year 
prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007 
Note 2: Blank cells indicate a too small number of cases on which the indicator should be 
computed; 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-
SILC 2008 cross-sectional database. 
 
 Apparently, low coverage levels are not indicative of unavailability of income support 
among single person pensioner households.  With few exceptions, leakage rates within this 
family type are well in excess of 50%, and sometimes reach 90%. The least prone to award 
benefits to non-poor single pensioners are Slovenia during 2004 and 2007 and Latvia during 
2006 and 2007. 
 Leakage rates are generally lower for single parents living alone than for other types of 
households with children. The lower leakage rates point to fact that single parents without the 
support of other adults are extremely vulnerable to income poverty in every country. As a result 
of being more likely to be poor, the social assistance program is less likely to make an inclusion 
error when selecting a household of this type.  
 Last, a clear decreasing trend in the likelihood of making inclusion errors is observable in 
the Czech and Slovak Republics. This tendency manifests itself across the board, for all family 
types. In the other countries, leakage rates fluctuate but cannot be shown to follow a clear 
increasing or decreasing trajectory.  
 Thus, both inclusion and exclusion errors are relatively widespread in Central European 
social assistance programs, irrespective on which family type the focus is directed at. However, 
some interesting differentiations do emerge. Single person working age adults have the second 
lowest coverage rates and the lowest leakage rates indicating that income support schemes tend 
to shun this type of poor household. On the contrary, families with children have both relatively 
high coverage and leakage rates reflecting potential concerns with avoiding child poverty. Single 
parents living alone are somewhat of an exception. Due to their particularly high poverty risk, 
they are less likely to be non-poor while in receipt of means tested benefits.  
 Cross-national distinctions are apparent both regarding inclusion and exclusion errors. 
The Czech, Hungarian Slovenian and Slovak programs are much more effective in reaching 
families with children than other poor households. In the remaining four countries, coverage 
levels for the various family types cluster closer together. Interestingly, this latter group is also 
characterized by very low benefits. Meagre support is often thought to deter participation of the 
non-poor population and to restrict payments to the truly needy. This is obviously not the case. 
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All four countries waste large portions of their transfers on the non-poor. Indeed, for most 
household types, recipients are more likely to be non-poor than poor prior to the transfer. Again, 
this finding underscores the failure of self-targeting to weed out the better off and thus, to 
maximize efficiency. 
 
4.5.4 ANTI-POVERTY EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ACROSS FAMILY 
TYPES 
 
 The previous sections have accounted for program variation in outreach, generosity, and 
capacity to correctly identify the poor across six family types in eight Central and European 
countries between 2003 and 2007. However, for an income support program, the bottom line is 
its ability to effectively reduce poverty. Consequently, the four poverty reduction indicators 
presented in section VI for the general population, have been computed separately for each of 
the six family models. As previously, poverty is defined as having an equivalised household 
disposable income below half of the median. Partly due to the low incidence of poverty 
(according to this stricter definition), partly due to the low incidence of social assistance receipt 
within some family groups, absolute numbers in some country/year/family types cells are very 
low. Correspondingly, standard errors are high. Figures are missing when standard errors could 
not be computed (too little or no variation and a very small N). 
 Given the very limited ability of social assistance schemes to reduce the number of poor 
in the general population (Table 4.6), the decline in the poverty headcount index attributable to 
social assistance transfers is, unsurprisingly, generally low for all family types and all country-
years. In line with program generosity patterns, headcount reduction is much more vigorous 
among families with children compared with childless households in the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and, to a lesser extent in the Slovak Republic. In fact, in the former two countries up to 
30-40% of families with children are brought above the poverty line by the social assistance 
payments. Perhaps due to their shallower poverty and overall smaller likelihood to experience 
material deprivation, couples with children are least likely to be pulled from poverty by social 
assistance disbursements. In the Czech Republic however, program effectiveness declines 
sharply in 2007 for all family types, but especially for families with children. In Poland and 
Hungary, and the Baltic States, headcount reduction among families with children is much lower, 
usually within a one digit range.  
 
Table 4.15 Social assistance effectiveness-average poverty headcount reduction (all) I 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004          
2005  29,21  12,68   4,49 28,75 4,31 
2006  17,94  2,73  4,28 7,18 15,75 6,54 
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2007  15,63  8,49   10,86 14,33 14,15 
2008  9,35  11,7   8,33 11,54 3,79 
Single person aged <65 
2004   0,28       
2005  8,78 0,23 1,83 2,6  3,73 2,57 18,21 
2006  7,36 4,94 4,63 2,01 2,85 10,17 5,11 7 
2007  19,64  4,21 3,78 1,16 11,54  17,01 
2008  1,44 2,28 4,05 1,68  6,97 1,25 5,14 
Single person aged >=65 
2004   3,97       
2005  3,4  3,27 2,68 4,12 12,46   
2006  4,46  7,39 14,09 3,39 2,76 3,09 7,66 
2007    8,51 5,17 6,15 11,59 1,93 10,44 
2008  5,81 0,83 5,9 2,92 0,33 6,92 2,54 14,43 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   3,57       
2005  48,82 2,56 2,65  6,11 5,05 13,72 19,82 
2006 20,88  3,9  3,44 5,86 27,08  
2007  38,97  5,72   8,81 20,3  
2008  1,26 11,51 16,51 7,53  3,9 35,06 3,13 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   2,58       
2005  22,72 8,33 13,19 0,85 1,25 4,86 18,87 36,44 
2006  28,78 3,58 1,75 3,73  17,35 23,32 4,62 
2007  22,94  12,99 1,31 3,37 15,55 36,91  
2008  13,92 3,96 7,42  2 6,85 41,26 7,07 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004   3,16       
2005  20,15  14,51 0,48 4,91 2,45 32,89 20,2 
2006  32,54 0,56 7,03 2,35 1,2 4,77 23,73 2,97 
2007  32,92  5,25  1,18 4,91 31,75 12,73 
2008  13,61 0,27 15,03 2,42 8,06 4,66 34,96 9,57 
Note: Figures are computed at the individual level, using personal weights; figures refer to the 
year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-
SILC 2008 cross-sectional database. 
 Average percent reduction is very low in all countries for single working-age adults and 
also, except Poland, for single person pensioner households. The least effective programs, 
irrespective of family type are the Baltic ones. 
 As shown in Table 4.13, some family types are more likely to be recognized as poor, and 
thus, be awarded benefits. In effect, the ability to correctly identify the poor constitutes a large 
first step in tackling poverty. Once a household has been identified as poor, the next challenge is 
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to lift it above the poverty line. To better understand how programs treat the various types of 
families, the next set of figures quantifies effectiveness in reducing the poverty headcount index 
after targeting, by looking at program clients only. 
 Reiterating the pattern found using both clients and non-clients, the four family types 
that contain children show higher percentage reductions compared to other household types in 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia but not in the Slovak Republic. It seems that in the Slovak 
Republic, families with children are more likely to be recognized as poor but not more likely to 
receive comparatively much higher benefits. On the contrary, in the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, households with children are both more likely to be accepted as program clients and to 
receive more generous protection against material deprivation compared to other family types.  
 
Table 4.16 Social assistance effectiveness-poverty headcount reduction (recipient population) II 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004          
2005  39,91  25,15   14,64 37,95 12,97 
2006  29,82  9,79   19,22 24,92 13,77 
2007  26,23  30,34   40,8 27,03 33,11 
2008  18,45  22,45   36,54 41,35 16,19 
Single person aged <65 
2004   0,64       
2005  17,78 1,71 11,03 13,56 0 11,65 6,63 31,04 
2006  13,94 23,75 13,34 18,04 17,2 23,93 11,62 10,94 
2007  31,47 0 15,65 25,01 6,48 24,62 0 32,32 
2008  3,39 20,78 14,63 7,06 0 18,98 2,97 11,02 
Single person aged >=65 
2004          
2005  26,75  12,9 9,95 31,22 51,83   
2006  30,89  19,69 54,03 27,08 9,34 25,73 49,54 
2007    31,69 23,52 27,55 38,88 13,97 57,87 
2008  30,64 24,29 18,14 9,12 1,18 40,92 19,38 69,83 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   9,53       
2005  59,41 4,62 12,19  65,11 13,97 18,92 27,75 
2006  23,83  7,76  31,7 12,64 40,24  
2007  51,57  12,17   22,08 28,77  
2008  2,11 87,74 26,38 28,89  10,04 48,83 13,55 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   5,08       
2005  31,33 22,02 40,66 3,91 3,9 9,69 25,33 42,54 
2006  39,9 14,36 4,82 21,3  25,08 39,16 8,66 
2007  31,85  31,15 5,96 14,62 31,39 47,75  
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2008  20,25 21,24 11,57 12,96  15,1 59,13 22,83 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004   16,55       
2005  25,94  47,61 4,33 37,63 8,18 46,22 34,45 
2006 40,37 3,86 17,83 29,98 4,42 13,17 41,5 6,43 
2007  21,5  10,69  9,71 13,64 47,53 22,01 
2008  30,9 2,05 22,79 16,17 28,98 14,21 54,85 23,73 
Note 1: figures are computed at the individual level, using personal weights; figures refer to the 
year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007. 
Note 2: in some cases, the figure is missing due to a too low N in the respective cell; 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-
SILC 2008 cross-sectional database. 
 
 The likelihood of the social assistance program pulling single working-age adults above 
the poverty line is greatly increased when ignoring targeting issues. In some years, the reduction 
surpasses 30% in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Even in the Baltic States, it usually exceeds 
10%. The strongest divergence between the achieved reduction among the program clients and 
the one achieved for the total population is undoubtedly registered in the case of single person 
pensioner households. For every country and year, the conditional likelihood of escaping poverty 
given that one is a program client is much higher than the unconditional probability. This 
suggests that single person pensioner households are unlikely to receive social assistance 
payments, but when they do, the transfers tend to be substantial relative to the household‟s 
income shortfall. Assuming poor identification has been successful, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic are most likely to lift a single person pensioner household out of poverty. 
 Headcount reduction effectiveness is obviously always higher when computed among 
program clients only rather than the entire corresponding sub-population. However, the size of 
the discrepancy varies. It is greater for single person households, whether pensioner or working 
age, than for the other households and in Poland and the three Baltic countries compared to the 
rest. Thus, exclusion errors appear to be much more prevalent in Poland and the Baltic States for 
all family types and among single person working age and pensioner households compared to 
family types that contain children. Not surprisingly, countries/categories with high exclusion 
errors are also the ones where overall poverty headcount reduction is smallest, indicating that 
inadequate targeting mechanisms play a major role in diminishing program effectiveness. 
 Social assistance plays a role not only in poverty reduction, but also in poverty alleviation. 
Thus, while not providing for enough resources to bring the poor over the poverty line, transfers 
may make up for a substantial portion of income shortfall, thereby dampening significantly the 
severity of poverty. Table 4.17 shows how the extent to which the poverty gap is filled by social 
assistance benefits varies across family types, countries and years. A review of the table quickly 
points out that the Baltic social assistance programs fill, on average, very small amounts of a 
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poor household‟s income gap. In particular, the programs‟ contribution to poverty alleviation is 
almost nonexistent in the case of coupled with two children.  
 
Table 4.17Social assistance effectiveness-poverty gap reduction (all) I 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004   0,29       
2005  53,29 0,65 27,2 1,11 6,34 13,21 57,37 20,82 
2006  43,3 3,9 9,42 0,29 7,15 16,13 39,13 17,22 
2007  44,18 0,27 15,51 3,36 1,83 15,88 30,25 26,03 
2008  30,2 2,85 26,25 4,37 3,11 11,52 18,3 13,06 
Single person aged <65 
2004   11,67       
2005  35,57 3,13 7,55 6,75 3,51 13,62 17,07 36,59 
2006  33,11 9,27 10,64 3,88 5,82 22,6 26,14 36,6 
2007  41,98 1,84 8,46 6,86 4,92 25,45 18,92 36,83 
2008  23,64 4,9 10,3 6,11 2,24 22,32 16,56 27,77 
Single person aged >=65 
2004   3,97       
2005  6,92  7,8 8,3 8,15 19,41 1,71 4,92 
2006  9,8  15,83 19,62 7,2 13,87 6,1 12,56 
2007  5,68 1 14,57 10,82 11,85 22,19 3,32 15,23 
2008  12,29 1,67 13,4 11,22 3,41 11,82 3,89 19,35 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   15,4       
2005  62,71 27,1 7,18 6,9 6,62 12,22 57,35 48,38 
2006  57,89 1,5 16,05 9,32 5,04 17,24 59,56 17,75 
2007  55,37 2,23 16,24 1,22 4,72 17,79 58,47 19,1 
2008  23,08 12,09 35,14 9,87 6,63 15,44 65,09 12,36 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   18,74       
2005  45,97 14,36 23,11 10,59 17,34 15,02 43,88 47,72 
2006  50,31 12,92 7,03 6,33 10,54 34,27 35,06 24 
2007  49,06 4,44 18,42 7,07 14,35 30,29 55,95 11,9 
2008  32,03 7,73 27,49 8,9 6,68 25,87 60,76 10,66 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004   9,06       
2005  52,03 10,08 21,01 2,73 7,1 7,4 51,43 38,63 
2006  59,4 5,01 14,83 3,78 10,46 13,19 40,39 21,06 
2007  49,15 2,74 16,91 2,34 4,85 13,35 49,63 30,18 
2008  24,68 2,84 31,9 4,74 11,84 13,54 50,48 21,54 
Note: figures are computed at the individual level, using personal weights; figures refer to the 
year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007. 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the EU-
SILC 2008 cross-sectional database. 
 
 The Czech and Slovenian schemes are the most successful in eliminating a substantial 
(over 30%) portion of the poverty gap for all family types, with the exception of single person 
pensioner households. Small poverty gap reductions (between 1 and 20%) for this family type are 
typical for all countries in the analysis. Hungary, Poland, Latvia and the Slovak Republic achieve 
the greatest poverty gap decline for single person pensioner households. 
 The highest drop in poverty gap attributable to social assistance schemes is found among 
families with children in the Czech and Slovenian systems. Thus, once again, the superior 
protection that households with children enjoy in these two countries is confirmed. However, 
just as in the case of the headcount index, the share of the poverty gap filled by social assistance 
transfers plummets in the Czech Republic during 2007, from 50-60% to barely over 20%. 
Families with children, except couples with two children, also have a substantial portion of their 
poverty gap filled in the Slovak Republic. At the opposite end, the three Baltic States, and to a 
certain extent also Poland, do not fill more than 15% of the average poverty gap of a household 
which has children. Single parents living alone are somewhat of an exception. Their poverty gap 
is decreased by about a third in Poland. 
 Compared to the headcount reduction index, the average gap decline shows a somewhat 
different picture in the case of single working age adults. Thus, in the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic their pre-transfer income shortfall shrinks by between 20 and 
40% after receipt of means tested benefits. This constitutes a sizeable cutback. Much smaller 
decreases are registered in the remaining four countries. 
Although the exact country ranking changes depending on the year and family type, 
cross-national patterns in poverty gap reduction effectiveness are visible. The Czech and the 
Slovenian social assistance programs contribute most to improved economic conditions among 
the poor, followed closely by the Slovak Republic. Hungary and Poland achieve much weaker 
results, while still bringing about noteworthy gap declines, in the range of 10-25%. Finally, in all 
Baltic States, but particularly in Estonia, achieved poverty reduction is very low. In these 
countries, single parents living alone are the group with the highest share of the gap closed by 
means-tested transfers. 
 The last table, Table 4.18, shows average poverty gap reduction for the various family 
types, but computed using only program clients. The rationale, as in the case of the headcount 
index, is to provide for a measure of program effectiveness that in some way factors out 
targeting performance. Indeed, the portion of the gap that would be filled by social assistance 
transfers is much higher when ignoring exclusion errors. However, almost nowhere and never is 
the poverty gap fully closed for a family type. Slovenia comes closest to filling the entire poverty 
gap for couples with three or more children in 2007. 
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 Program participants have almost three quarters of their poverty gap closed by means-
tested income support if they belong to a household that has children and live in the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia or the Slovak Republic. Single working age adults also receive generous 
assistance compared to their income shortfall, albeit this is much less true in Slovenia where only 
about half of single working-age adults‟ poverty gap is filled by social assistance transfers. On the 
other hand, single person pensioner households receive much less generous resources compared 
to need, especially in Slovenia but also in the Slovak Republic in 2004. 
 In Hungary, couples with two children and single parent households (whether living 
alone or with other adults) have most (between 30 and 70%) of their poverty gap filled by the 
social assistance program. In Poland, single person pensioner households stand out. Whereas 
average poverty gap reduction fluctuates between 30 and 60% for the other types of households, 
in the case of single person pensioner households, it occasionally surpassed 80%. In fact, Poland 
achieves the highest gap reduction rates for this group of households. 
 
Table 4.18 Social assistance effectiveness-poverty gap reduction (recipient population) II 
Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
Couple with two children 
2004  13,41       
2005  72,82 31,5 53,92 20,5 34,61 43,07 74,35 75,73 
2006  71,96 42,3 33,7 13,07 51,62 43,21 61,9 36,23 
2007  79,19 5,73 55,41 22,58 12,19 59,68 57,07 60,9 
2008  59,64 24,76 50,34 23,24 15,32 50,51 65,56 55,8 
Single person aged <65 
2004   26,19       
2005  71,99 23,13 45,49 35,23 25,2 42,57 43,96 62,37 
2006  62,71 44,54 30,65 34,85 35,07 53,14 59,44 57,17 
2007  67,27 22,93 31,46 45,31 27,42 54,29 40,61 69,97 
2008  55,58 44,49 37,24 25,66 17,67 60,78 39,22 59,51 
Single person aged >=65 
2004          
2005  54,36  30,7 30,76 61,78 80,76 33,9 18,08 
2006  67,76  42,17 75,22 57,5 46,88 50,78 81,21 
2007  52,05 31,15 54,26 49,22 53,06 74,45 23,93 84,37 
2008  64,82 48,66 41,15 35 12,21 69,9 29,69 93,67 
Couple with 3 or more children 
2004   41,13       
2005  76,31 48,91 33,04 12,29 70,53 33,78 79,07 67,75 
2006  66,07 11,22 31,93 30,53 46,41 37,21 88,52 39,03 
2007  73,28 36,42 34,56 3,7 34,71 44,58 82,86 55,79 
2008  38,71 92,16 56,14 37,87 20,28 39,69 90,65 53,41 
Single parent family living alone 
2004   36,88       
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Indicator CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
2005  63,39 37,96 71,26 48,55 53,94 29,97 58,87 55,7 
2006  69,76 51,73 19,28 36,15 35,14 49,54 58,88 45,02 
2007  68,13 16,97 44,19 32,04 62,11 61,14 72,39 44,78 
2008  46,59 41,43 42,85 35,59 22,5 56,99 87,07 34,4 
Single parent living with other adults 
2004   47,48       
2005  66,97 45,04 68,92 24,7 54,37 24,72 72,26 65,89 
2006  73,68 34,29 37,6 48,28 38,49 36,44 70,63 45,53 
2007  63,62 37,04 34,42 19,36 39,89 37,07 74,29 52,19 
2008  56,04 20,98 48,36 31,67 42,57 41,26 79,21 53,43 
Note: figures are computed at the individual level, using personal weights; figures refer to the 
year prior to the survey, i.e. 2003-2007. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database and on the 2008 
cross-sectional database. 
 
 In the three Baltic countries, gap reduction rates are lowest for couples with two 
children. Apparently, this type of participating households receives much less resources relative 
to need compared to the other household types. Reduction rates are also relatively low for single 
working age adults, whereas they are highest for single person pensioner households. 
 Although precise country rankings are not entirely consistent across family types and 
year, a clear distinction emerges between the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic 
on the one hand and the remaining countries on the other. Social assistance transfers in the 
former three states are successful in closing, on average, much larger portions of the various 
households‟ income shortfalls, despite a visible downward trend in the Czech Republic and 
substantial yearly fluctuations in the Slovak Republic. In the other countries, in spite of 
substantial variation, the share of the poverty gap that is closed suggests that received transfers 
are probably too small relative to the income needs of the recipient household128. 
 
 
4.6 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND POVERTY OUTCOMES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE  
 
First of all, it should be noted that, generally speaking, social assistance schemes are a 
marginal element of the welfare state in Central Europe. Benefits are directed towards a small 
number of recipients, while benefit levels are relatively meagre. Nonetheless, a clear demarcation 
may be drawn between Slovenia and the Czech and Slovak Republics on the one hand and the 
three Baltic States on the other hand. The first group of countries clearly possess more 
developed means-tested programs compared to the second. In particular, resources devoted to 
social assistance in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are tiny in comparison with existing needs. The 
                                                          
128 Another possible explanation is that benefit receipt triggers directly or indirectly the loss of other incomes; 
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remaining two countries, Hungary and Poland, are situated somewhere in between the other two 
groups. While it is true that the three small Baltic States are somewhat poorer than the CEE 
average, a clear positive correlation between country wealth (as determined by the national 
poverty line) and resources made available to social assistance is not confirmed. For instance, 
while Estonia, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic enjoy similar levels of economic growth but 
have widely diverging levels of social assistance spending and size of the client population. 
Furthermore, the countries that have the highest receipt rates also offer the highest benefits. 
Unlike West European patterns (Obinger 1999; Sainsbury and Morissens 2002), extensiveness 
and generosity seem to be positively associated in Central Europe. 
There is a region wide downward trend in the resources committed to this type of 
programs, as well as to the share of the population serviced. The pattern is most visible during 
the last year of the observation period, i.e. 2007. Only Poland seems to have slightly increased 
total spending relative to needs, but neither average benefits nor coverage rates exhibit 
corresponding increases. Hungary also seems to devote more resources to means-tested income 
support in 2007, although this result is observed solely during the last year of observation, and 
thus, potentially unreliable. Most troublesome, the strongest decline is found in the most 
developed systems, namely the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In these two countries, the drop in 
spending seems to be reflected mostly in a smaller number of clients rather than in diminished 
transfers. Estonia‟s decline in overall funding has registered both in declining average benefits 
and in lower receipt rates, whereas Lithuania and Latvia have simply maintained both low levels 
of spending and low benefits. Thus, means-tested income support schemes are less extensive 
throughout the region in 2007 compared to 2004, a development consistent with the restriction 
of program rules and toughening of sanctions described in Chapter 3. While a detailed analysis of 
the political economy of means-tested income support is beyond the scope of this work, the 
cutbacks suffered by social assistance schemes in the recent years can be interpreted as a lack of 
political sustainability for this type of protection program. In spite of relatively superior 
performance, both the Czech and the Slovenian programs have been slashed or made more 
stringent. 
Given their relatively small size and lack of overall resources, it is unsurprising that social 
assistance programs in Central Europe do not have a major impact on poverty outcomes. 
Particularly in the Baltic States, but also in Poland and Hungary, the level of resources devoted to 
income support/ means-tested housing is abysmally low and hence, unlikely to effectively 
combat poverty levels or poverty severity. In addition to the overall resource level, the ability of 
social assistance programs to cut poverty is severely hampered by their inability to reach the 
poor. Even when the poor are defined in a moderately restricted fashion, three out of eight 
countries fail to disburse any payments to four fifths of the poor. In the best case scenario, a 
poor person has roughly a 70% probability of receiving income support. The existing data does 
not allow for the disentangling of the mechanisms behind the low coverage levels. More 
specifically, it is not clear whether voluntary non-take-up or the program administration rejecting 
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claims129 are responsible for low coverage figures. However, in countries where entitlement rules 
are comparatively stringent, such as the Baltic States, the thin coverage is at least in part due to 
the too low level of the income support threshold.  
Looking at the two most important indicators, namely reduction of the headcount index 
and of the poverty gap among the total population, the achieved results are strikingly poor, albeit 
somewhat better in the latter case. Notably, the country ranking in performance, albeit somewhat 
dependent on the exact indicators and year, is largely consistent. Thus, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic consistently outperform the other five countries, irrespective 
of which measure of effectiveness is used. Conversely, the three Baltic States constantly rank at 
the bottom. Consequently, countries that operate more extensive and liberal income support 
schemes do appear to be better able to effectively reduce poverty. This correlation is also verified 
in a cross-temporal perspective. More specifically, the stricter entitlement rules and, in some 
cases, lower benefits that have come about in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic have been accompanied by a drop in program performance. Programs have become 
simultaneously less able to reach the poor, less likely to pull them out of poverty and less 
successful in alleviating deep poverty. 
The lack of effectiveness of Central and Eastern European income support schemes goes 
along with low efficiency. Quite strikingly, given the relatively strict entitlement tests used for 
separating the poor form the non poor, a large section of the client population has a disposable 
income that is above the poverty threshold before benefit receipt. The leakage and well-targeted 
spending criteria yield somewhat different country rankings. Yet, Estonia, the Slovak Republic 
and the Czech Republic are relatively more efficient, whereas Hungary, Slovenia and Latvia run 
the most wasteful programs. Unlike effectiveness, efficiency does not seem to be correlated with 
the scheme‟s generosity. To illustrate, the Slovak and Czech income support programs are 
ranked high in terms of extensiveness and benefit generosity but also in terms of program 
efficiency. At the opposite end, the Latvian social assistance is both small and meagre and 
inefficient. Nor does there emerge a trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency, as indicated 
by previous studies (Hölsch and Kraus 2006). The largest reductions in the poverty rate and 
poverty gap are brought about both by relatively efficient means-tested transfer programs (as in 
the Czech Republic) and by relatively inefficient ones (as in Slovenia). One pattern is supported 
though by the data. Less efficient countries “wasting” more of their resources, are also more 
likely to “cream”, in this case have social assistance transfers that are less progressive and that 
fare poorly in cutting the poverty gap relative to the headcount index reduction.  
Means-tested benefits are often argued for based on the merits of targeting (Ringold and 
Andrews 1999; Fox 2003; Sipos and Ringold 2005; Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007). In particular, they 
are advocated as the most efficient method of achieving income redistribution. By making 
                                                          
129 It is also possible that respondents underreport received payments or informal income that is known to social 
workers; coverage levels may also be artificially inflated due to coverage being constructed exclusively on income 
information, whereas eligibility most often contains an asset and a work test; 
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benefits available only upon passing a resources test, targeting is supposed to save public money 
while still preventing material hardship and redistributing towards the bottom. Yet, one the most 
striking findings emerging from the analyses carried out in this chapter consists in the very poor 
targeting performance, with low coverage and high leakage, in all eight countries. Interestingly 
enough, there does not seem to be an inverse relationship between leakage and coverage. Thus, 
systems that cover less of the poor do not necessarily leak less to the non-poor. For example, 
Latvia has one of the lowest coverage but they also rank high in terms of leakage. On the 
contrary, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic have, relatively speaking, both higher 
coverage and lower leakage. This would seem to indicate that the efficiency of means testing 
depends primarily on its implementation and has little to do with the stringency of the means test 
itself. Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish a clear correspondence between targeting efficiency 
and the quality of the administration. The Slovenian civil service is probably among the more 
developed and dependable in the region, yet the Slovenian social assistance is highly inefficient.  
To achieve their goal, i.e. reduce poverty and material deprivation with a minimum of 
resources, all means-tested programs face the challenging problem of restricting transfer receipt 
to the genuinely poor. Closely intertwined with this aspect are targeting rules and program 
complexity. Arguably, more refined program rules regarding eligibility, award of benefits and 
conditions of entitlement maintenance may better capture individual needs. They can also help 
weed out “apparently” poor applicants, i.e. those that have an apparently low income but have 
access to other resources. However, they can also very quickly become cumbersome, difficult or 
impossible to implement and require extra administrative resources that may not be available. 
The opposite approach, keeping rules simple, may be more advantageous from an 
implementation perspective, but may treat inadequately many clients. In between, discretion at 
the street level has been advocated as a way to both contain resources and offer an individualized 
service. 
There are clear distinctions among countries regarding program complexity. Slovenia, the 
Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, especially before 2007, have relatively complex 
programs with multiple rules and benefit types. On the contrary, rules are much more 
straightforward and simple in the Baltic countries and in Poland. Benefits are set per capita 
instead of varying depending on the age and position of the household members. There are 
virtually no income disregards and little individual counselling and few national programs to help 
push recipients into the labour market. It may be said that the very low benefits offered by 
means-tested income support in these four countries also act as a self-targeting mechanism. 
Instead of complex rules, these systems rely on the very low amount of the benefit to keep out 
the non-poor. In addition, all these countries employ local discretion as a de facto rationing 
device when resources are limited. Yet, this combination-simple rules, self-targeting through low 
benefits and local discretion as a rationing device, is proven both ineffective and inefficient. Both 
exclusion and inclusion errors are very widespread and the programs‟ effectiveness in reaching 
the poor and disbursing them enough support to make a difference in their living standard are 
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severely hampered. Moreover, although local discretion has successfully been used by some 
countries such as Sweden, it has yielded very poor results on Central and Eastern Europe. In 
combination with few resources and in the absence of an experienced and professional body of 
social workers, it is equivalent to arbitrary spending and very poor targeting results. Recognizing 
the fact that discretion is unworkable, Latvia partly centralized its social assistance program in 
2002. Hungary, which has a large number of discretion-bound benefits, registered significant 
oscillations in the effectiveness of its safety net to reduce poverty. It also has one of the most 
inefficient programs. 
 The three countries that achieve the best effectiveness scores not only have higher 
benefits but also a regular indexation mechanism in place. Another feature that they share is 
having a relatively centralized administration running the income support program and delivering 
benefits. In addition, spending levels on this type of program is higher, at around 0.4-0.5% of 
GDP. Only Slovenia makes use of a large number of income disregards when establishing 
eligibility. The weakest effectiveness of means-tested benefits is registered in the Baltic States. 
These countries tend to be somewhat poorer, to spend little on their social assistance schemes 
(on average, around 0.1% of GDP), and to entrust the delivery of transfers to the local 
municipalities, while also relying, to a larger extent, on local finances to pay for benefits.  
 Efficiency indicators are not clearly linked with program characteristics, with perhaps one 
exception. Local administration of the program is more likely to lead to high leakage rates, as 
well as more “creaming”, i.e. benefits are being channelled towards the near-poor instead of the 
very poor. This finding contradicts (at least for the CEE context) previous assumptions (Sipos 
1994; The World Bank 2001; The World Bank 2003; Sipos and Ringold 2005; Ringold, Kasek et 
al. 2007; The World Bank 2007) that a local administration of targeted benefits is better able to 
separate the poor from the non-poor due to improved information.  
 To sum up, despite the variation in program performance, it is relatively clear that 
means-tested transfer programs are rather ineffectual and inefficient in dealing with poverty in all 
eight CEE countries. More resources spent on income support, as well as higher benefits are 
however visibly associated with increased effectiveness. The relationship between other program 
characteristics and effectiveness is more ambiguous. Targeting based on a means-test however 
does not live up to expectations regarding efficiency. A substantial number of non income-poor 
benefit from program participation whereas a large number of the poor are excluded from 
transfer receipt. Overall, the results mirror similar findings emerging from research on West 
European countries (Nelson 2004; de Neubourg, Castonguay et al. 2007). Just as in the Western 
part of the continent, social assistance schemes in Central Europe are residual in nature and play 
a relatively minor role in poverty prevention and alleviation. Programs might also be vulnerable 
to budgetary cutbacks even when they achieve results that are, comparatively, superior. Both 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic reduced funding for these schemes, a fact that negatively 
affected performance. 
 
148 
 
149 
 
5 SOCIAL ASSITANCE PARTICIPATION AND FUTURE INCOME  
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: MEASUREMENT OF TRANSFER EFFECTS 
 
The pre post transfer comparison method of evaluating outcomes of social programs 
constitutes a widely used research strategy in (especially European) social policy research. It 
offers a straightforward, relatively easy to understand, less technically demanding approach to 
outcome measurement.  As such, it represents a very useful tool to be employed in welfare state 
studies. Nonetheless, it also suffers from a range of important limitations. First of all, despite 
extensions and refinements, it retains an essentially macro perspective. In assessing transfer 
outcomes, little consideration is given to the micro-level mechanisms that might generate one 
result or another. Even when this topic it touched upon (such as for example when considering 
benefit generosity), a comprehensive theory that included individual behavioural responses is 
missing. Consequently, one is often left with the impression that the causal mechanisms behind 
program outcomes are shrouded in a black box. Little is understood about why some programs 
achieve some effects while others fail do so. Therefore, existing research relying on the pre post 
transfer contrast strategy has been limited to constructing country rankings, league tables and 
country clusters.  
Second, pre post transfer comparisons are plagued by a methodologically more 
important drawback, namely the ignoring of behavioural responses to the presence of the 
transfer/ program. In order to be able to validly infer causal effect, the level and distribution of 
income in the presence of the transfer should be compared to those that would have emerged in 
its absence, i.e. the counterfactual. Since a subject cannot experience simultaneously two 
different states, the counterfactual cannot be directly observed. Instead it has to be theoretically 
constructed and approximated using various methods and techniques. The pre post comparison 
strategy assumes that the pre-transfer distribution is independent of the presence of the transfer 
itself. Such an assumption is deficient on several counts. Following the standard welfare 
econometrics, labour supply is dependent on the amount of non-labour income one disposes of 
(Moffitt 2002; Bergh 2005). Hence, in the absence of a non-labour transfer, low-income 
households are more likely to increase their labour supply, and therefore also their earnings. The 
overlooking of the endogenous nature of pre-transfer income effect is likely to lead to the 
overestimation of any program effects on the income of recipients. A similar argument may be 
made in relation to non-labour income. Low-income families may be more susceptible to receive 
transfers from their kin, neighbours and network of friends when public aid is not available, an 
effect termed “crowding out” (Gruber 2000; Bergh 2005). Not accounting for this type of 
behavioural outcome is also more likely to yield an inflated program effect. Finally, it may be 
argued that not only income but also consumption patterns are likely to be influenced by the 
presence of a given benefit transfer. Not being able to rely on public income support, a low-
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income family might save a larger portion of its income or might buy market insurance to stave 
off a too sharp drop in consumption due to future income loss.  
Attempting to measure the effect of public transfer programs is indeed a complex and 
often cumbersome exercise. The endeavour becomes even more demanding when the transfer 
that is being considered is means-tested. This type of income support scheme is frequently 
governed by a complex set of rules establishing entitlement and aid levels. On the one hand, the 
provision of the benefit will likely lower labour supply not only through an income effect but 
also through a substitution one since the benefit imposes a high (usually 100%) tax rate on other 
income. On the other hand, the presence of mandatory work requirements has the potential to 
mitigate some of the labour disincentives inherent in the program design. The existence of 
maximal asset thresholds is another complicating factor that will be taken up in the next chapter. 
Ideally, the evaluation of means-tested transfer outcomes would benefit from an 
experimental design (Moffitt and Ver Ploeg 1999; Barnow, Kaplan et al. 2000). Since undergoing 
the treatment (i.e. participation in the program) is theoretically open to manipulation, the 
counterfactual can be based on a randomized control group of eligible claimants that are treated 
differently (for example, they not awarded the benefit or are required to fulfil supplementary 
entitlement conditions). This strategy has been employed with great success in the evaluation of 
state alternative programs to the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the 
late 1980‟s and the early 1990‟s (Moffitt and Ver Ploeg 1999; Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001; 
Blank 2002; Blank 2009). If properly executed, the experimental design is particularly strong in 
ensuring unbiased causal inference, although its external validity is somewhat weak. The use of 
an experimental design has other downsides as well. Experiments are ill-suited to address impact 
evaluations when the policy to be assessed is ill-defined, bundling many measures affecting 
several life areas, fluid or aiming at changing broader context characteristics that might also 
affect the control group (such as for example norms and expectations) (Barnow, Kaplan et al. 
2000). Additionally, experiments cannot pick up any program effects on entry rates or spill-over 
impacts on the low-wage labour market (Moffitt and Ver Ploeg 1999; Barnow, Kaplan et al. 
2000).  
Despite these weaknesses, experimental evaluation is best suited for drawing robust 
conclusions about many types of outcomes of program participation. Unfortunately, experiments 
are expensive, may present ethical concerns, and/or are difficult to carry out. In the case of this 
research, they are simply an unavailable alternative. Consequently, the construction of the 
counterfactual has had to be based on statistical adjustments that are weaker in handling threats 
to causal inference. Not least non-experimental research design is often forced to rely on 
assumptions that cannot be empirically checked, but can only be argued for theoretically. 
Therefore, a theoretical underpinning of program participation impact at the micro level is 
essential. The next section reviews the main findings about how participation in means-tested 
transfer programs is likely to affect a range of outcomes. The precise research strategy employed 
in this chapter will be detailed later on in the Data and Research Design section.  
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5.2 THE FUNCTIONING OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: OF THE MECHANISMS BEHIND SOCIAL 
ASSISTANCE’S IMPACT ON INCOME AND POVERTY 
 
Transfers that are contingent upon passing a means-test have often been regarded as the 
last layer of social protection and, as such, a quintessential measure of social rights (Lodemel and 
Schulte 1992; Behrendt 1999; Kuivalainen 2005). Provision of a minimum of resources to those 
who cannot otherwise provide for themselves may be argued for both in normative and practical 
considerations.  
On the normative side, minimum support is seen, first of all, as a way to prevent the most 
dejected forms of deprivation and human degradation (Guibentif and Bouget 1997; Heikkilä and 
Keskitalo 2001; Saraceno 2002; Standing 2004; Munro 2008). Since family economic resources 
usually have an overwhelming impact on the subsequent cognitive, emotional and behavioural 
development of the offspring, social assistance may also be regarded as a way to ensure equal 
opportunity given the inequality of resources available to children in various families (Moreira 
2008).  
On the practical side, means-tested assistance schemes can be seen as an investment in 
human capital. By providing a modicum of resources, they might prevent a spiralling down of 
individuals who are temporarily unable to integrate in the labour market. They provide a source 
of income while their recipients look for work, increase their skills through education and 
training, or address longstanding problems such as health, housing or domestic violence issues. 
Beyond cash transfers, social assistance programs often have “reintegration” as an explicitly 
stated policy objective. In theory, “reintegration” is taken to have a broad meaning, namely the 
restoration of the individual‟s capacity to function within society. In practice however, 
“reintegration” is likely to focus on successful return to the labour market. In any case, social 
assistance programs are nowadays offering, in addition to income, various support services 
aimed at making recipients self-sufficient. 
Another positive potential role for means-tested income support to play is as de facto 
insurance for low-income families. Changes in the nature of employment, the weakening of the 
breadwinner model, the restriction of access to public insurance schemes triggered by budgetary 
concerns have all contributed to the accumulation of new forms of vulnerability. Single parents, 
immigrants, temporary low wage workers etc. are categories for whom the traditional insurance 
mechanism whereby entitlement is based on a continuous contributory history does not work 
adequately. For them, social assistance might ultimately provide the insurance they cannot 
otherwise gain access to.  
Research carried out in the developing, as well as in the developed countries has pointed 
to the poor experiencing more often income volatility (Danziger 1988; Emory Burton 1992; 
Barrientos, Hulme et al. 2005; Bergh 2005; Barrientos and Hulme 2008). In addition to being 
exposed more frequently to income risks (such as unemployment, illness etc.), the poor dispose 
of fewer buffers to protect themselves against detrimental events. As a result, they might be 
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forced to adopt life strategies that are counterproductive in the long-term, but that offer some 
measure of short-term economic security (for example, by engaging in criminal activities, 
pawning one‟s belongings, resorting to child labour etc.). More importantly, risk and vulnerability 
have been found to strongly correlate with foregoing investment in human capital (Barrientos, 
Hulme et al. 2005), and with asset return levels (Mosley and Verschoor 2005). Both low human 
capital and low asset levels contribute to maintaining income poverty in the long-run(Shapiro 
and Wolff 2001). Given their high income volatility coupled with generally insufficient resources 
to successfully cope with income shocks, the poor would stand to benefit a great deal from 
access to insurance mechanisms. However, in light of the strong moral hazard associated with 
the poor‟s characteristics, as well as the potentially higher transactions costs associated to 
providing insurance to this category130 (Dercon, Bold et al. 2008), the market is unlikely to be 
able to efficiently provide insurance for this category. Similarly, since most insurance programs 
require a long contributory history and a stable work career, with infrequent interruptions of 
earnings, they are unlikely to provide the insurance the poor need. 
In this context, a means-tested safety net can be viewed as an insurance mechanism 
specifically designed to temporarily assist the poor (Barrientos, Hulme et al. 2005; Dercon, Bold 
et al. 2008). One study of the American federal poor relief program before the 1996 reform 
(Gruber 2000) found that Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) played an 
important consumption smoothening role for mothers who became divorced.  
 Means-tested social assistance has also been vehemently criticized, as giving rise to a 
series of perverse side-effects that ultimately defeat its objective of helping the poor. Probably 
the most well-known and certainly the most debated argument is that of social assistance receipt 
leading to welfare dependency (Emory Burton 1992; Handler and Hasenfeld 2007). Traditional 
economic models of labour supply state that generous out of work benefits lower the incentives 
of individuals to seek and retain gainful employment, thereby making recipients “dependent” on 
public aid (Moffitt 2002).  
Undoubtedly, the greatest amount of evidence on the work disincentives of means-tested 
public transfers comes from the American context131. Starting with the late „80s and early „90‟s an 
                                                          
130
 Gaining reliable information about the poor who often work odd and temporary jobs, draw heavily on the 
informal economy for earnings, have fewer valuable assets and more mobile is likely to lead to higher transaction 
costs; enforcement is also likely to be more problematic in the case of the poor;  
131 Similar arguments have been advanced by economists in the CEE context Boeri, T. and S. Edwards (1998). 
"Long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment benefits: The changing nature of non-employment 
subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe." Empirical Economics 23(1-2): 31-54, Ham, J. C., J. Svejnar, et al. (1998). 
"Unemployment and the Social Safety Net during Transitions to a Market Economy: Evidence from the Czech and 
Slovak Republics." The American Economic Review 88(5): 1117-1142, Ringold, D. and E. S. Andrews (1999). Safety 
Nets in Transition Economies: Toward a Reform Strategy. Social Protection Discussion Papers. Washington D.C., 
World Bank, Fox, L. (2003). Safety Nets in Transition Economies. A Primer. Social Protection Discussion Paper 
Series. Washington D.C, Social Protection Unit. The World Bank, Ringold, D., L. Kasek, et al. (2007). Social 
Assistance in Central Europe and the Baltic States. Washington D.C, World Bank.. In particular, the combination of 
low minimum wages and relatively higher assistance benefits was deemed to create a „poverty trap‟; Several authors 
Boeri, T. and S. Edwards (1998). "Long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment benefits: The changing 
nature of non-employment subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe." Empirical Economics 23(1-2): 31-54, Earle, J. 
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increase in AFDC caseloads and corresponding expenditure spikes have brought welfare reform 
to the fore of the policy agenda.  In response, a fairly large number of studies have attempted to 
measure the impact of the various changes made to the major federal means-tested program in 
the US, i.e. AFDC, both prior to the 1995 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) reform (focusing in this case on the programs implemented by 
states receiving a waver) and subsequently (trying to assess the impact of replacing AFDC with 
TANF- Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). Although findings are sometimes 
inconclusive, ambiguous and even contradictory, consensus exists in several respects. 
First, the transition from AFDC to TANF has been unambiguously accompanied by a 
spectacular drop in caseloads, an increase in employment among single mothers (especially 
never-married single mothers, the most likely to be receiving AFDC benefits), together with 
increases in total disposable income and a drop in the poverty rates (Blank 2002; Sawhill, Weaver 
et al. 2002; Blank 2003; Blank 2009; Frogner, Moffit et al. 2009; Frogner, Moffitt et al. 2009; 
Ziliak 2009). Controversies exist though about the extent to which these positive trends are 
explained by the booming economy of the mid 1990-s, the expansion of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC), the raising of the minimum wage or welfare reform itself. Supporting the 
hypothesis that healthy economic growth was crucial to the plunge in caseload levels and the 
boost in low-wage employment, the positive trends came to halt after 2000 (Bollinger, Gonzalez 
et al. 2009; Ziliak 2009). Still, studies investigating welfare reform carried out in the framework of 
state wavers, before 1995 concluded that lowering benefits and introducing stronger work 
mandates is consistently associated with a drop in caseloads and welfare usage, as well as an 
increase in labour market participation and earnings (Hoynes 1992; Bloom and Michalopoulos 
2001; Blank 2002; Moffitt 2002; Blank 2003).  
However, increased employment rates have not been automatically translated into self-
sufficiency. As a rule, individuals leaving the welfare rolls were directed primarily to insecure, 
low-wage jobs, carrying few or no benefits and offering virtually no prospects of a stable career 
(Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001; Blank 2003; Lein and Schexnayder 2007). As a consequence, 
welfare leavers remain at risk of re-entering the welfare program in the future (Sawhill, Weaver et 
al. 2002; Mueser, Stevens et al. 2009). Overall, welfare mothers have been recognized to have a 
low earnings capacity that stems from their own characteristics (Garfinkel, McLanahan et al. 
1988), not from a conscious decision to replace labour with non-labour income. Other studies 
(Ayala and Rodriguez 2007; Blank 2009; Frogner, Moffitt et al. 2009) have confirmed the link 
between the ability to find employment and personal traits that are beyond the immediate 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
S. and C. Păună (1998). "Long-term unemployment, social assistance and labour market policies in Romania." 
Empirical Economics 23(1): 203-235, Ham, J. C., J. Svejnar, et al. (1998). "Unemployment and the Social Safety Net 
during Transitions to a Market Economy: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics." The American 
Economic Review 88(5): 1117-1142. emphasized the 100% effective marginal tax rates over large regions of income, 
especially for one-earner couples with children on minimum wage and the associated labour supply disincentives; 
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control of the recipient herself such as age, household size, household composition, low 
education, presence of health problems, number and age of children, quality of transportation in 
the area etc. Moreover, having more than one “unfavourable” characteristic strongly diminishes 
the probability of finding a job (Sawhill, Weaver et al. 2002; Lein and Schexnayder 2007). 
Harsher sanctions and shorter time limits by themselves have proved ineffective at influencing 
the likelihood of finding gainful employment (Lein and Schexnayder 2007). Conversely, the 
provision of work support services capable of removing some of the employment barriers (such 
as for example child-care) is associated with improved job retention and lower welfare recidivism 
rates (Lein and Schexnayder 2007). These findings question the extent to which the negative 
relationship between employment and benefit receipt is the result of an explicit option in favour 
of leisure over work on the part of the recipients. The accumulated evidence would seem to 
suggest that lack of employment is largely due to personal inability to integrate in the labour 
market rather than a personal preference for leisure. 
If the effects of the American welfare reform on employment and welfare receipt rates 
are relatively straightforward, the impact on income and well-being is much less clear-cut. The 
decrease in poverty rates remained below that of the decline in welfare rolls, and unless some in-
work benefits or earnings disregards were provided, the financial situation of welfare leavers 
often failed to improve (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001; Blank 2002; Blank 2003). Moreover, 
while, as a rule, the disposable income of welfare leavers increased after exit, some non-
employed leavers experienced income declines compared to when receiving benefits (Frogner, 
Moffitt et al. 2009). In particular, growing evidence points to the existence of a group of single 
mothers that are neither working, nor receiving benefits and that are very likely to experience 
extreme forms of poverty (Blank 2009). Harsher requirements for benefit receipt have been 
shown to be more likely to harm single mothers that have to deal with multiple integration issues 
(Sawhill, Weaver et al. 2002). Finally, even when increasing employment, reform failed to raise 
incomes across the board. Especially for the poorest income groups increased earnings have 
been entirely offset by benefit withdrawal, thereby leading to stagnation or even declines for 
households at the bottom of the income distribution (Sawhill, Weaver et al. 2002; Bollinger, 
Gonzalez et al. 2009; Frogner, Moffitt et al. 2009; Mueser, Stevens et al. 2009). More generally, 
the strong emphasis on work expectations, on self-support through employment and moving off 
pubic income support failed to properly address the long-term mobility of the disadvantaged 
(Ziliak 2009). 
Not only income, but other measures of material well-being failed to show signs of 
progress. On the contrary, by some consumption measures, clients leaving welfare rolls 
experienced a deterioration of their situation. For example, studies of welfare leavers in the 
aftermath of the PROWRA reform showed a decline in health insurance coverage triggered by 
declining enrolment in Medicaid not being compensated by corresponding increases in employer 
sponsored private coverage (Lein and Schexnayder 2007; Blank 2009; Ham, Li et al. 2009; Kalil 
and Ziol-Guest 2009). The other major benefit aimed at supporting the poor in the US, Food 
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Stamps, also experienced declining take-up (Allard 2009; Blank 2009). Though welfare leavers 
often remained eligible for both Food Stamps and Medicaid, claims on these two types of 
benefits decreased considerably. 
In an attempt to thwart work disincentives arising from public provision of income 
support, many developed countries have sought to strengthen the work mandates embedded in 
their social assistance schemes. They have drawn plenty of attention both in the US and in 
Europe (where they are usually referred to as Active Labour Market Policies –ALMP)(Wiseman 
1988; Barr 1995; Geldof 1999; Hvinden 1999; Barnow, Kaplan et al. 2000; Hanesch, Stelzer-
Orthofer et al. 2001; Aho and Virjo 2003; McCord 2008; Moreira 2008). By acting as another 
conditionality layer, work mandates increase the cost of working versus non working and thus, 
theoretically may lessen work disincentives arising from the provision of a means-tested benefit. 
However, such a mechanism is likely to be successful only if the ultimate causes of welfare 
dependency lie with the individual. On the contrary, work mandates are likely to be ineffective in 
the face of a lack of good, well-paying jobs (Wiseman 1988). In addition to the deadweight they 
may create, stringent work mandates may be harmful to recipients themselves since they distract 
from the search of an „ordinary‟ job, while the associated stigma may have de-motivating and de-
moralizing effects. 
Results derived from experimental programs pointed to the best results being associated 
with programs that used a mix of job-search and training, depending on the recipient‟s 
characteristics and circumstances (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001; Blank 2003). More 
importantly, work mandates are likely to be ineffectual if not accompanied by work-support 
services. Contrary to what the heavy emphasis on paid employment might suggest, finding a job 
is seldom equivalent to achieving self-sufficiency. Instead, even after leaving the welfare rolls, 
former client families remain in need of assistance. The provision of services to help them 
maintain a job (such as child-care, transportation, medical insurance etc.) plays an important role 
in securing self-sufficiency (Blank 2003; Lein and Schexnayder 2007).   
Thus, while generating some support for the predictions derived from the standard 
labour supply model, the American welfare reform failed to show that stricter and less generous 
means-tested income support is better suited at combating poverty, especially in the long-run.  
Evidence on the employment and income responses to European means-tested income 
support schemes is much more scant. An extensive body of literature tries to quantify the 
elasticity of labour supply to taxation (for a comprehensive review see (Meghir and Phillips 
2010)). Nevertheless, few studies are geared specifically towards evaluating means-tested 
transfers and, even fewer address the welfare dependency hypothesis directly. Studies carried out 
in the early 1990‟s on lone parents in the UK have concluded that the existence of means-tested 
income support depressed the probability of employment among single women with children 
(Walker 1990; Ermisch and Wright 1991). Studies reviewing the French Revenu Minimum 
d‟Insertion also found positive but moderate labour supply elasticities among welfare clients 
(Gurgand and Margolis 2002; Gurgand and Margolis 2008). 
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Using administrative data on social assistance recipients in Norway, Dahl and Lorentzen 
(2003) reject the welfare dependency hypothesis. Instead, they conclude that exit from social 
assistance to work is driven by labour market characteristics, the economic cycle, and relatively 
exogenous individual characteristics (such as age or household composition). Similarly, Ayala and 
Rodriguez (2007) find that long-term receipt of social assistance in Spain can be largely explained 
by ethnic minority status, health problems and household composition. Results from a study 
examining unemployment and social assistance receipt time series in Sweden point to social 
assistance receipt being determined by the economic cycle rather than clients purposefully 
choosing unemployment (Brännström and Stenberg 2007). Finally, scholarly research has 
documented a process of cycling between low-paid, insecure jobs and unemployment among 
social assistance recipients (Nicaise 2001; van Berkel 2007).  
Summing up, positive labour supply elasticity‟s notwithstanding, there is little evidence to 
suggest European minimum income support schemes foster welfare dependency among their 
existing/ potential clients. Moreover, findings of large labour supply elasticities tend to be 
concentrated among studies examining single parents, a group that is more likely to face multiple 
barriers to employment. 
Social assistance schemes may have harmful effects through mechanisms other than 
generous benefits. For example, since the majority of these programs make support conditional 
on passing an asset test, they might trigger a consumption of accumulated resources to become 
eligible. Such a behaviour would hurt a household‟s long-term economic welfare and potentially 
make it more dependent on state assistance (Shapiro and Wolff 2001). For illustration, many 
American states have a stringent asset test that makes families that own a relatively newer or 
better car ineligible for public aid (Lein and Schexnayder 2007; Allard 2009). Yet, access to a car 
is often vital in order to find or maintain employment, visit welfare offices, make child-care 
arrangements and so on. Thus, a strict asset test forces families to choose between going without 
a cash transfer they clearly need and giving up a valuable resource that is likely to severely 
hamper self-reliance. 
 Last but not least, because it effectively constitutes an income floor, social assistance 
may discourage asset accumulation as a form of income insurance, particularly among the low 
and very low income households. Even before having to face the eligibility test, low-income 
families may withhold from saving if they expect to be reliant on social assistance at some point 
in their lives. In turn, lower asset accumulation increases the probability of needing public aid 
and, at the same time, could limit the long-term income and earnings strategies.  
Despite their contribution to the evaluation of means-tested programs research, studies 
of US welfare reform are not free of shortcomings (Moffitt and Ver Ploeg 1999; Blank 2002). 
Three are particularly relevant. First, so far the tendency has been to place the onus on moving 
from welfare to work and give less importance to income and well-being. Second, the large 
majority of these studies assess the impact of a package of measures in its entirety, rather than 
trying to disentangle the effects of the separate individual components. Last but not least, the 
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impact estimations often differ according to the way economic and programmatic changes 
accompanying welfare reform are modelled (Ziliak 2009). 
 The present research aims at contributing to the debate on the role of means-tested 
income support policies in addressing poverty, by investigating the possible positive or negative 
effects that current participation in a social assistance scheme might have on future outcomes in 
the Central European context. In particular, the focus is on ascertaining whether receipt of social 
assistance benefits lowers or raises income (and thus, the probability of being poor) in the 
subsequent years in eight Central and East European. In addition to replicating findings about 
the negative effect of social assistance on earnings, the present research also aims to take a step 
further by looking at measures of well-being such as disposable income. It also attempts to make 
a first step in investigating whether different program characteristics impact on the positive/ 
negative effects that social assistance programs might bring about for their clients.  
 
 
5.3 DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 The study makes extensive use of the European Union Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC), a four-year rotating panel which provides comparable detailed micro-
level data on income, consumption and other household characteristics in the 27 Member States 
of the Union (see Chapter 4 for more information on EU-SILC). The following analyses rely on 
the second 2007 longitudinal release (UDBl07-2007-2). Three to four years132 of panel data are 
available in the survey for CEE countries, i.e. 2005, 2006, and 2007. All analyses are carried out 
at the household level. 
The MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the Central and 
Eastern European Countries (MISCEEC) 2002; Mutual Information System on Social Protection 
on EU Member States and the EEA (MISSOC) 2004) system of collecting information about 
EU Member States social protection provisions has been used to retrieve information about 
social assistance organization, main rules, financing and eligibility conditions. When needed, 
several other sources ((GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003; Pieters 2003) have been used to 
supplement information on social assistance design133.  
 The main focus of the subsequent analyses consists of, on the one hand, establishing 
whether participation in an income support program has any (positive or negative) effects on 
future income and, on the other hand, looking into cross-national variation in the magnitude and 
direction of any potential impact. To gain a clearer picture of program effects, five types of 
resources are analysed separately, namely earnings, labour income, long-term benefits, non social 
assistance benefits and total disposable income. Traditionally, earnings have constituted the 
                                                          
132 Four waves  (2004-2007) are available for Estonia; 
133 On the design of social assistance in Central and Eastern Europe see Chapter 3; 
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focus of the various social assistance evaluation exercises. Work disincentives hypothesized by 
the standard labour supply models are likely to primarily affect earnings. 
In addition to earnings, labour income includes income derived from self-employment, 
as well as the value of any household production for own consumption. The latter may be 
particularly important in countries with a large agricultural sector, such as Poland. Self-
employment income and household production represent a special test case. Although they are 
usually included in the means-test that screens out the non-eligible claimants, from a practical 
perspective they are harder to observe and quantify. Therefore, the implicit 100% tax rate 
imposed by the means-test might, in effect, be lower for these types of income. 
 Long-term benefits include old-age and early old-age pensions, disability and survivor 
benefits. Generally, these layers of income protection are designed to kick in before social 
assistance. Thus, theoretically, there is no reason to expect social assistance receipt to influence a 
household‟s access to long-term benefits. However, in practice, social workers and social 
assistance administrators do attempt to transfer part of their caseload onto other benefit 
programs (Haney 2002; Jewell 2007).Particularly recipients that are deemed to be unemployable 
may be shifted unto more permanent types of income support, such as disability benefits. On the 
one hand, access to long-term benefits may improve a household‟s well-being by providing 
additional economic resources. On the other hand, a move onto long-term benefits might 
permanently push the recipient out of the labour force and leave her “excluded”. A similar 
exercise has been carried out using a more encompassing measure of social protection benefits, 
i.e. all social protection benefits less social assistance.  
 Finally, to gauge the impact of social assistance receipt on well-being, net household 
disposable income is used. Disposable income includes all market income and social transfers, 
less taxes and social insurance contributions134. 
 Assessing the impact of social assistance receipt on current income is very problematic in 
the absence of an experimental design. Since low income is a precondition to social assistance 
entitlement, the low income of recipients cannot be interpreted as a consequence of program 
participation. To avoid this problem, future income instead of current income is used 
throughout the following analyses. Future income is defined as annual income in the year 
subsequent to the one in which social assistance receipt is observed. Any effects that social 
assistance receipt might have on the five types of income discussed above may take place either 
directly or indirectly, by influencing social assistance receipt in the year income is measured.  
Several models are estimated for each type of income. As a rule, because the original 
income variables are heavily skewed towards the bottom, they are normalized by taking the 
natural logarithm. In the case of earnings and labour income, both the probability of having 
positive income and the amount (in logarithmic form) conditional on positive income are 
modelled. Only the probability of receiving long-term benefits and other non-social assistance 
                                                          
134 In defining net disposable income, I follow the same definitions as those used in EU-SILC. 
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benefits is examined. Finally, because very few households had negative or zero disposable 
income a separate estimation of the probability of having positive disposable income was not 
needed. All disposable income models concern potential program effects on the amount of 
future income (again, in logarithmic form). 
In the absence of an experimental design135, inference about the impact of receiving 
public aid has mainly relied on comparing different recipient groups across time. Comparisons of 
recipients and non-recipients have usually been considered too vulnerable to selection bias, i.e. 
individuals/families partaking in the program tend to differ in fundamental ways from 
individuals/families that do not, to allow for valid inferences. While statistical corrections may be 
applied to account for observable systematic differences, substantial bias may remain if any 
dimensions of variation are omitted. Most researchers agree that, even if recipients and non-
recipients are matched on observable characteristics (relating to their demographic characteristics 
and material circumstances), selection bias remains due to unobserved heterogeneity (Moffitt and 
Ver Ploeg 1999; Barnow, Kaplan et al. 2000). The gist of the argument is the following: since 
receiving means-tested income support presupposes an initial self-driven act of claiming, by 
definition, recipients and eligible non-recipients must vary on some internal non-observable 
characteristics (for example, motivation, work ethic, expectations about the future etc. ) related 
to income and employment.  
While the confounding potential of selection issues is acknowledged, a different view is 
taken here. The absence of major changes in program rules during the period under study 
essentially precludes recipient-recipient comparisons136137. As a result, the majority of results 
presented in this chapter are derived from comparisons between recipients and non-recipients. 
The analyses take advantage of the fact that the targeting of means-tested benefits is not an 
accurate process. To estimate program effects, it is assumed that some random variation exists in 
which households ultimately participate in the program. More specifically, due to administrative 
discretion and other idiosyncratic factors, some households that are eligible will be denied 
benefits138 while some non-eligible households will receive it. If low income is “chosen” by some 
households that wish to “take advantage” of the existing means-tested benefits, explicitly 
modelling eligibility partly addresses this self-selection process. The eligibility variable has been 
                                                          
135 In this case, the experiment would randomly choose to accept some eligible clients and to reject others; 
subsequent observations on the incomes of the two groups should yield an unbiased estimation of program 
participation on future income; however, there are clear ethical problems with this approach since some households 
are denied support extended to others, and thus, made worse off; 
136 Comparisons across times are not problem free; For example, comparing welfare leavers with stayers is 
vulnerable to confounding bias since, by definition, the leavers have experienced an improvement in their material 
situation; families that have been sanctioned off benefits are usually found to be in a worse position compared to 
those that continued to receive benefits (see Wu, C.-F. (2008). "Severity, timing and duration of welfare sanctions 
and the economic well-being of TANF families with children." Children and Youth Services Review 30(1): 26-44.) 
137 One possibility would be to compare recipients in different countries; however, such comparisons would 
obviously be confounded by country-level differences; as the number of country-level units is very small (just eight), 
there is too little variation to allow for more complex models that explicitly incorporate country features. 
138 An important issue that cannot be addressed in the current framework due to unavailability of data is that of non 
take-up. 
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constructed using information about a household‟s income together with information about 
program rules139. If a household‟s total disposable income (before any social assistance receipt) is 
lower than the maximum benefit it would be entitled to given its characteristics, the household is 
deemed as eligible. Separate program effects are modelled for eligible and non-eligible 
households140. In examining potential program effects, both program participation and the 
benefit amounts are assessed.  
Several household characteristics are used as control variables. Depending on the model, 
all or just some are used (for the exact details, see the section on results). A list of all covariates is 
presented below: 
 single parenthood 
 an indicator for having three or more children (large family) 
 the number of children (18 years or younger) present in the household 
 the number of young children  (7 years old or younger) present in the household 
 the maximum education level of a household member 
 the total number of unemployment months experienced during the income reference 
period by all the adult members of the household 
 the total number or inactivity months experienced during the income reference period 
by all the adult members of the household 
 the number of unemployed adults in the household 
 an urban/rural indicator141 
 an asset indicator based on the tenure status (1 if the household owned the house in 
which it lived; 0 otherwise) 
 the number of working-age adults in the household 
 the number of retired persons in the household 
 non-labour market income (in thousands of Euros) 
 social security income (all benefits less social assistance) (in thousands of Euros) 
Lastly, every model is estimated first on the entire sample and subsequently on a “low-
income” sub-sample. The latter is defined as households in the bottom two quintiles of the 
income distribution142 in the year in which income is measured (i.e. the year subsequent to the 
one in which social assistance receipt is observed). On the one hand, restricting the estimation 
sample to households in the two bottom quintiles of the income distribution considerably 
diminishes the number of observations and thus, statistical power. On the other hand, the low 
income non-recipient group is obviously a more appropriate comparison group than the entire 
                                                          
139 To match the income reference period in the survey, policy rules refer to years 2003-2006; program rules cannot 
be fully simulated however; eligibility is modelled based on annual incomes and family characteristics. 
140 By estimating separate effects for eligible and non-eligible households, recipient eligible households are compared 
to eligible non-recipient ones. 
141 This indicator has been excluded in the estimation using the Slovenian data since it is entirely missing; 
142 Income refers to household net disposable income equivalised using the „modified‟ OECD scale. 
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population. Only households that contain at least one working-age (18-64) adult are included in 
models of earnings and labour income. 
Before interpreting the results, a few important caveats must be noted. First, all income 
information derived from surveys is vulnerable to measurement error. The problem is 
particularly relevant for means-tested benefits which often go unreported or underreported due 
to associated stigma. No attempt is made here to correct for measurement error. All information 
on incomes, including means-tested social assistance, is taken directly from the data without any 
corrections143. Second, while information available in the EU-SILC concerns annual income, 
eligibility for means-tested benefits is usually144 assessed on a monthly basis. The arising time 
mismatch affects the constructed eligibility variable. More specifically, eligibility due to short 
spells of (very) low income (followed by periods of higher income) is ignored. Unfortunately, 
information required to reconstruct more accurately spells of social assistance eligibility and/or 
receipt is unavailable. Third, the eligibility variable is based solely on the income criterion. 
Whereas the income test is probably the most important part of means-testing in social 
assistance programs, other types of conditions, notably related to assets and work-related 
behaviour, are present in all eight social assistance schemes. Incorporating these requirements is 
particularly problematic, on the one hand due to lack of data, and on the other hand, due to 
inherent difficulties in observing these household features. Asset tests, when present, are usually 
ill-defined and highly dependent on administrative discretion in their implementation. Likewise, 
work related behaviour, particularly active job search, is plagued by asymmetric information 
problems and can be only imperfectly monitored.  
Finally, the last step consists of trying to answer the question of what program features are 
most successful at boosting/harming the ability of their clients to escape poverty. To address this 
issue and in light of the low number of cases, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and 
Fuzzy Sets are especially suited to carry out such a task. Altogether, four program dimensions on 
which comparable information is available have been included, namely centralization, benefit 
generosity, strictness of the means-test and availability of support services. Each of these 
dimensions represents a summary (expressed through the fuzzy score) of several indicators. 
Thus, the overall centralization score is based on central/local location off benefit setting, 
financing and delivery. The strictness of the means-test is reflects the existence of earnings 
disregards, other income disregards and asset disregards when establishing and renewing 
entitlement for the transfer. The support services dimension sums up the availability of child 
care, health-care benefits and housing benefits for recipients. Finally, the benefit generosity is 
based on benefit amounts for single persons as percentage of average gross earnings. Appendix 1 
summarizes the components of each dimension and details the rules for assigning a fuzzy score. 
                                                          
143 Eurostat does perform a series of checks and adjustments before releasing the data to the public; see guidelines 
and quality assessment reports http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/dsis/eusilc/library.  
144 While initial eligibility is based on previous monthly income in all eight countries, re-application periods vary 
between one month and six months; see chapter 3 on social assistance program rules. 
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5.4 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND ELIGIBILITY: SOME DESCRIPTIVES  
 
Probabilities to receive social assistance, conditional on eligibility are shown in Table 5.1 
below, separately for each country and each wave in the dataset. As expected, eligible households 
have, on average, much higher probabilities of receiving social assistance benefits in every 
country and every wave. Nevertheless, differences in the likelihood of receiving benefits between 
eligible and non-eligible households are heterogeneous across countries and across time. 
Notably, eligible households have larger probabilities of receipt relative to the non-eligible 
household population in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, and lower 
probabilities in Latvia and Lithuania. 
 
 
Table  5.1 Probability of receiving social assistance, conditional on eligibility 
Year  CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI  SK 
2004 Eligible  35.37       
N  82       
Non-
eligible 
 3.69       
N  1895       
2005 Eligible 48.02 35.59 45.45 27.84 20.34 31.19 60.47 56.34 
N 227 59 88 97 118 327 129 213 
Non-
eligible 
5.97 3.12 12.98 11.45 5.92 8.35 14.88 7.46 
N 4124 2306 3851 2550 2094 7794 5343 2398 
2006 Eligible 47.57 34.41 39.94 18.46 21.15 49.42 66.46 56.95 
N 412 93 323 130 104 257 158 223 
Non-
eligible 
6.10 2.23 10.77 8.99 5.39 8.79 14.46 3.81 
N 7071 3806 5851 3392 3545 11052 7082 3516 
2007 Eligible 49.20 33.90 36.74 14.12 13.70 48.95 65.59 54.61 
N 313 59 215 85 73 190 93 152 
Non-
eligible 
4.36 1.91 9.25 9.37 5.89 8.12 13.94 3.41 
N 6622 3561 5360 2808 3326 10175 5590 3193 
Notes: Figures represent % of the reference group receiving benefits; N refers to the number of 
eligible, respectively non-eligible observations in the dataset; the actual time-period concerns the 
year prior to the data collection, i.e. 2003-2006. 
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
 
Over time, the probability of receiving means-tested income support is relatively constant 
both for eligible and non-eligible households in the Czech Republic and Estonia, while dropping 
for both groups (but especially for the eligible) in Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. The gap 
between eligible and non-eligible households increases both in Slovenia and in the Slovak 
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Republic, in the former due to rising probabilities of receipt for the eligible households while in 
the latter due to falling likelihood of receipt among the non-eligible population. 
Next, Table 5.2 illustrates the average yearly social assistance transfers, conditional on 
receipt, for eligible and non-eligible households per country and wave. The first thing to notice is 
that the average annual benefit is much larger for eligible households compared to non-eligible 
ones in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and Lithuania in 2005 and 2007. On 
the contrary, average amounts are very similar for the two types of households in Latvia, as well 
as in Estonia during 2004 and 2005 waves. Finally, a lower albeit clear disparity in favour of 
eligible households is visible in Hungary, Poland, and Estonia during the last two waves. 
 
Table 5.2 Average social assistance benefit (in Euros), conditional on eligibility and receipt 
Year  CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI  SK 
2004 Eligible  414.37       
N  29       
Non-
eligible 
 455.46       
N  70       
2005 Eligible 1057.82 356.32 683.90 292.32 560.25 366.73 3301.23 1235.69 
N 109 21 40 27 24 102 78 120 
Non-
eligible 
454.15 322.33 432.43 143.59 177.77 241.94 1338.26 313.83 
N 246 72 500 292 124 631 795 179 
2006 Eligible 1264.51 583.77 308.23 162.72 397.37 589.86 3352.22 1096.56 
N 196 32 129 24 22 127 105 127 
Non-
eligible 
489.50 290.24 193.14 156.58 143.04 340.55 1388.74 681.93 
N 431 85 630 305 191 971 1024 134 
2007 Eligible 1472.52 549.05 319.78 191.80 524.29 717.86 3367.35 1261.72 
N 154 20 79 12 10 93 61 83 
Non-
eligible 
568.72 306.73 210.14 197.80 174.23 406.91 1296.49 524.74 
N 289 68 496 263 196 826 779 109 
Notes: all figures are conditional on receipt of social assistance benefits; N refers to the number 
of eligible, respectively non-eligible recipients in the dataset; the actual time-period concerns the 
year prior to the data collection, i.e. 2003-2006. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. 
 
 
5.5 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PARTICIPATION AND EARNINGS 
 
Negative effects of social assistance benefits on recipients‟ wellbeing have been 
hypothesized to come about primarily through decreased earnings. Consequently, potential 
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effects of program participation on future earnings are analyzed first. Table 5.3 presents results 
for a very simple model in which the likelihood of having household earnings is predicted based 
on the lagged social assistance receipt, separately for eligible and non-eligible households (full 
results are shown in Table 1 of Appendix 3). Using all households, receipt of social assistance is 
associated with decreased likelihood of positive earnings in the next year among non-eligible 
households in all countries but Slovenia, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. In Slovenia, non 
eligible households that have received means-tested income support are more likely to have 
earnings in the following year. In the latter three, odds ratios for social assistance receipt are 
statistically non-significant and substantively, close to 1. Associations between social assistance 
receipt and the likelihood of positive future earnings vary somewhat in the case of eligible 
households. Thus, in Estonia, and the Slovak Republic, there is a strong negative link between 
social assistance receipt and the probability of having earnings in the following year. In these two 
countries, the correlation with social assistance receipt is stronger in the case of eligible 
households compared to non-eligible ones. In the remaining countries, estimated coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. 
When the estimation sample is restricted to the bottom two quintiles of the income 
distribution, somewhat different results are obtained. The main coefficient for social assistance 
receipt is statistically zero everywhere but in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. In the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, non-eligible households in the bottom two quintiles 
appear to be more likely to have some earnings when they have participated in the social 
assistance program in the previous year. Looking at eligible households, results are substantively 
the same as those obtained using the larger household sample. Thus, social assistance receipt and 
the probability of having positive earnings in the following year appear to be unrelated 
everywhere but in Estonia and the Slovak Republic where a negative relationship is clearly 
visible. 
A more complex model, containing several household characteristics as covariates, yields 
relatively similar results (see Table 5.4 below; full estimation results are presented in Table 2 in 
Appendix 3). When basing the estimation on the entire sample of households, social assistance  
receipt diminishes the odds of having positive earnings in the subsequent year in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Latvia. The strongest negative effects are registered in Estonia 
and Latvia. In Lithuania, Poland, the Czech and the Slovak Republic the probability of having 
earnings is decreased by receipt of social assistance in the previous year but results are statistically 
insignificant. Only in Slovenia is the effect positive but non-significant. 
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Table  5.3 Average marginal effects of social assistance receipt on the probability of having earnings in the following year (Simple model) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non – eligible 
households 
-0,071 
*** 
0,068* -0,104 
*** 
-0,033 -0,068 
*** 
-0,014 -0,075 
*** 
-0,041 -0,095 
*** 
-0,029 -0,008 0,088 
*** 
0,020* 0,088 
*** 
0,001 0,052 
Eligible 
households 
-0,050 -0,049 -0,320 
*** 
-0,244 
*** 
-0,031 -0,009 0,167 0,177 0,033 0,042 0,022 0,043 -0,052 -0,035 -0,228 
*** 
-0,224 
*** 
N 7512 2307 5447 1846 6235 2371 3310 1014 3627 1170 13019 5458 7849 2793 4336 1431 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. 
 
 
Table  5.4 Average marginal effects of social assistance receipt on the probability of having earnings in the following year (Full Model) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households 
-0,033 
* 
0,012 -0,050 
** 
-0,069 -0,039 
** 
-0,013 -0,049 
** 
-0,006 -0,023 0,008 -0,001 0,029 0,007 0,030* -0,010 0,006 
Eligible 
households 
-0,002 -0,054 -0,044 -0,051 -0,010 0,019 0,125 0,144 0,049 0,031 0,100* 0,061 -0,015 -0,059 -0,106 
** 
-0,091 
* 
N 7512 2307 5443 1845 6231 2369 3310 1014 3627 1170 12699 5304 7827 2781 4334 1431 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. 
 
 
Table  5.5 Average marginal effects of social assistance receipt and benefit amount on the probability of having earnings in the following year (Full 
Model) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible -0.029 0.015 -0.053 -0.060 -0.045 -0.021 -0.061 -0.039 -0.025 -0.010 0.023 0.061* 0.002 0.025 -0.038 -0.017 
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households- 
Receipt 
* ** * 
Non-eligible 
households-
amount  
-0.017 -0.025 -0.045 -0.070 0.044 0.063 0.037 0.092 -0.190 -0.138 -0.109 -0.148 0.009 0.007 0.080 -0.109 
Eligible 
households-
receipt 
0.025 -0.024 -0.013 0.022 0.050 0.088 0.027 0.005 0.231 0.289 0.071 0.036 0.030 0.025 0.017 0.096 
Eligible 
households-
amount 
-0.008 -0.001 -0.128 -0.249 -0.237 -0.268 0.545 0.790 -0.920 - 0.101 0.110 -0.016 -0.025 -0.136 
** 
-0.185 
*** 
N 7512 2307 5443 1845 6231 2369 3310 1014 3627 1170 12699 5304 7827 2781 4334 1431 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; social assistance amounts are in thousands of Euros; social assistance amounts are entered centred around the 
country-wave mean; both receipt and amounts are lagged one period (i.e. year); a missing number indicated group size too small for reliable estimation 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. 
 
 
Table  5.6 Impact of social assistance participation on total amount of household earnings (conditional on positive earnings)-Full Model 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households-
receipt 
-
0,352
*** 
-
0,150
*** 
-
0,404
*** 
-
0,275
*** 
-
0,312
*** 
-
0,171
*** 
-
0,359
*** 
-
0,356
** 
-
0,330
*** 
-
0,097 
-
0,385
*** 
-
0,226
** 
-
0,143
*** 
-
0,095
* 
-
0,164
** 
-
0,075 
Eligible 
households-
receipt 
0.039 -
0.107 
-
0.132 
-
0.006 
-
0.233 
-
0.235 
-
0.367 
-
0.342 
0.069 0.167 -
0.243 
-
0.214 
0.129 0.041 -
0.095 
-
0.245 
N 5971 1406 4768 1231 4984 1604 2850 638 2999 723 9291 3146 7120 2260 3668 999 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; social assistance receipt refers to the previous year. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
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These findings refer to non-eligible households. In the case of eligible households, 
patterns vary slightly. Average marginal effects are different from zero only in Poland (where 
they are positive) and the Slovak Republic (where they are negative). However, it should be 
remembered that, generally, the low number of eligible households translates into low statistical 
power when estimating any effects for this subgroup. 
Using the more restricted low-income subsample, the likelihood of having positive 
earnings among non-eligible households is unaffected145 by social assistance receipt except in the 
Slovak Republic. In this case, households that have received means-tested public assistance 
benefits have-on average a 0.091 lower probability of having positive earnings as non-
participating households.  
 The other household covariates generally have the expected signs. Thus, having been 
eligible to receive social assistance in the year prior, having three or more children, experiencing 
longer spells of unemployment or inactivity and the availability of increased social protection or 
non-labour, market income, all decrease the likelihood of having positive earnings. On the 
contrary, a higher educational level, the presence of more working age adults, the presence of 
children146 and living in an urban area increase the chance of positive household earnings. 
Households where several adults have experienced short unemployment spells are more likely to 
have earnings compared to households where fewer adults have been unemployed for longer 
periods. Only in Poland is homeownership related to the likelihood of having earnings. 
Households that own their home are half as likely to have earnings compared to non-owners.  
 Finally, the last set of models having the likelihood of positive earnings as the dependent 
variable includes both program participation and the amount of received benefits. To account 
for the presence of any nonlinearities, both a linear and a squared term for benefit amount are 
included147 (the full set of coefficients is found in Table 3 in Appendix 3). The term for social 
assistance receipt indicates the estimated effect at the mean of benefit amounts. Examining 
results for non-eligible households, receipt of average social assistance benefits significantly 
impacts on the likelihood of having earnings in Hungary, Latvia and Estonia (see Table 5.5). 
Depending on country, recipient households are between 55 and 35% less likely to have earnings 
in the following year. Average marginal effects for benefit amounts are non-significant in all 
countries. However, relatively large negative effects are registered in Poland and Lithuania. I half 
of the countries the registered impact is actually positive suggesting that increased amounts 
increase the subsequent average probability of positive earnings. 
 . 
                                                          
145 Again, odds ratios are relatively close to 1. 
146 This finding might be somewhat surprising on the surface. However, the number of children can be considered 
an indication of household „age‟. Very young families that are also more likely to not be integrated into the labor 
market will have no or fewer children. Remember that this effect is on top of having a large family, i.e. three or 
more children. 
147
 The social assistance amount variable has been centred around the country-wave mean. 
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Table 5.7 Impact of social assistance participation and benefit amounts on total household earnings in the following year (conditional on positive 
earnings)-Full Model 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households-receipt 
-
0.280
*** 
-
0.153
** 
-
0.425
*** 
-
0.315
*** 
-
0.319
*** 
-
0.161
** 
-
0.356
*** 
-
0.324
** 
-
0.281
*** 
-
0.049 
-
0.389
*** 
-
0.241
*** 
-
0.135
*** 
-
0.093
* 
0.006 -
0.031 
Non-eligible 
households-amount  
0.182
** 
-
0.017 
0.145 -
0.283 
-
0.123 
-
0.004 
-
0.630 
-
1.304
* 
-
0.134 
-
0.613 
-
0.114 
-
0.206 
-
0.013 
-
0.035 
0.170 0.164 
Non-eligible 
households-
amount^2 
0.000
** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** 
0.000 
Eligible 
households-receipt 
0.073 -
0.056 
0.108 0.306 -
0.220
* 
-
0.206
* 
-
0.338 
-
0.319 
-
0.024 
0.084 -
0.267
* 
-
0.186 
0.204 0.154 -
0.006 
-
0.142 
Eligible 
households-amount 
-
0.416
*** 
-
0.434
*** 
1.563
** 
0.600 -
0.085 
-
0.234 
-
1.272 
-
0.017 
0.571 0.465 -
0.907
* 
-
0.838
* 
-
0.063 
0.002 0.002 -
0.133 
Eligible 
households-
amount^2 
0.000
*** 
0.000
* 
-
0.002
*** 
-
0.002
*** 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* 
0.000 
N                 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; social assistance amounts are in thousands of Euros; social assistance amounts are entered centred around the 
country-wave mean; both receipt and amounts are lagged one period (i.e. year). 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. 
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Results for eligible households do not indicate a statistically different from zero effect in 
any of the countries. However, very large (though insignificant) effects may be observed in 
Lithuania. This results though is unreliable to the very small number of eligible households in the 
model. Similarly to non-eligible households, coefficients for the benefit amount rarely pass the 
threshold of statistical significance. They do so only in the case of the Slovak Republic. 
Restricting the estimation sample to low-income households seriously reduces statistical power. 
In fact, no results are statistically significant in the case of non-eligible households. Yet, some 
indication of a negative association between social assistance and earnings in the following year 
can be found based on coefficient size in Estonia (both receipt and amount coefficients), Latvia 
(receipt of average benefits), Poland and Lithuania (benefit amounts). In the case of eligible 
households, higher benefits are negatively associated with the likelihood of positive earnings in 
the Slovak Republic. Insignificant, but large negative effects are also registered in Hungary and 
Estonia. On the contrary, in Poland and Latvia, findings (based both on receipt and benefit 
amounts) suggest potential positive effects 
The other household characteristics included in the models have very similar effects to 
those presented in Table 5.4. Thus, previous eligibility, having a large family, longer 
unemployment and inactivity spells, as well as higher non-labour income (either market 
generated or social protection income) reduce the likelihood of having positive earnings. 
Conversely, higher educational qualifications, more children, more working age adults present in 
the household and urban residence raise the expected probability of having some earnings. 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 above (the full set of results may be found in Tables 4 and 5 in 
Appendix 3) present results from OLS models in which the amount of earnings (conditional on 
positive earnings) is modelled first using program participation only (Table 5.6) and subsequently 
adding the amount of received benefits (Table 5.7). Since only households with positive earnings 
are included in  
the estimation, sample sizes are somewhat lower. Both sets of models control for the full set of 
household characteristics. 
 Among non-eligible households, receipt of means-tested assistance benefits is negatively 
associated with earnings in the following year in all countries (using the total sample of available 
households). The impact is strongest in Estonia, where earnings of recipient households are, on 
average, 33% lower compared to non-recipient households. At the opposite end, earnings of 
recipient households are „only‟ 15% lower in Slovenia. Coefficients for eligible households are 
closer to zero, and due to the small sample sizes, statistically insignificant. Yet, they remain of 
noteworthy size, at least in Hungary, Latvia, Poland and possibly Estonia. 
 Using only low income households in the estimation yields much more moderate results. 
Relative to the previous results and with the exception of Latvia, social assistance receipt has a 
lower impact on predicted household earnings among non-eligible households. However, 
coefficients remain statistically significant everywhere but in Lithuania and the Slovak Republic. 
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Similar patterns are present in the case of eligible households. Substantively large negative effects 
(albeit statistically insignificant) remain in Hungary, Latvia, Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
 Substantively similar results emerge when using both receipt and the amount of earnings 
to predict future household earnings (Table 5.7). Receipt of average social assistance benefits by 
non-eligible households is negatively related to the amount of household earnings in the 
following year everywhere but in the Slovak Republic, using the first sample and everywhere but 
in Lithuania and the Slovak Republic using the second. The largest negative effects (in both 
samples) occur in Estonia, Latvia and Poland. When looking specifically at benefit amounts, 
significant results are visible only in the Czech Republic, using the first sample and Latvia, using 
the second. More generally, coefficients are negatively signed in both estimation samples in 
Hungary, Lithuania and Poland, while being positive in the Slovak Republic. Just as in the 
previous model, estimated coefficients for eligible households are much closer to zero. Some 
results are nonetheless worth noting. Thus, program participation is diminishing future 
household earnings in Hungary, Latvia, Poland (both samples), and possibly the Slovak Republic 
(second sample only).Only in Hungary and Poland are the coefficients statistically different from 
zero. A clear indication that eligible households receiving larger benefits exhibit worse future 
earnings is found in the Czech Republic and Poland (coefficients large and statistically significant 
in both samples). Conversely, relatively large positive effects are noticeable in Estonia and 
Lithuania (albeit only one out of four coefficients is statistically larger than zero). 
 Other household covariates have the expected signs (see the full set of results in 
Appendix 3) and generally confirm patterns found when modelling the likelihood (rather than 
the total amount) of earnings.  
First, it should be noted that social assistance effects are much less likely to be found 
when using only low-income households in the estimation. This is not simply due to the lower 
number of observations in the sample and the consequent diminished statistical power. 
Estimated coefficients are much closer to zero suggesting that selection might be partially driving 
results in the larger sample. Focusing on results obtained based on only low-income household 
comparisons, a negative effect of social assistance on participation in employment is far from 
universal. In fact, the only country where persistent negative effects for both eligible and non-
eligible households emerge across models is Estonia. Furthermore, there are few instances where 
the predicted detrimental impact of more generous benefits is confirmed. Findings vary 
somewhat across eligible and non-eligible households. Compared to non-eligible households, 
lower rates of employment participation after social assistance receipt of eligible households are 
registered in more countries. Moreover, there is noticeably more agreement between receipt and 
benefit amounts coefficients.  
If the employment participation of social assistance programs is more visible in the case 
of eligible households, the opposite is true of the total earnings. Thus, receipt of means-tested 
income support impacts negatively future earnings of non-eligible households in all countries 
(the estimated effects are lower though in Lithuania, Latvia and the Slovak Republic). 
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Conversely, eligible households are negatively affected in only 3 to 4 countries. An additional 
negative effect of benefit amounts is does appear in about half of the countries.  
 
 
5.6 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND LABOUR INCOME 
 
Earnings represent only part of income generated through work. To gain a better 
understanding of the way social assistance affects work incentives, the analysis above is repeated, 
using a more encompassing measure of labour income. In addition to earnings, it includes net 
profits from self-employment, as well as the value of a household‟s non-market production. The 
latter components may be particularly important for countries where an important share of the 
population relies on agricultural incomes. Similarly to earnings, the provision of minimum 
income support might discourage work both thorough an income and a substitution effect. 
However, since self-employment income and production for own consumption are more 
difficult to assess by program administrators, the substitution effect should be milder. 
A simple model where the difference in the probability of having positive labour income 
between households that have been program clients during the previous year and households 
that have not participated is presented in Table 5.8 below (estimated coefficients can be found in 
Table 1 of Appendix 4). Using the larger household sample, non-eligible households have a 
lower probability of positive labour income in the subsequent year when they have received 
social assistance benefits. The strongest negative effects are registered in the three Baltic States, 
Hungary and Poland while the mildest (and statistically insignificant) are registered in Slovenia 
and the Slovak Republic. Eligible households experience lower probabilities of positive labour 
income in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and to a lesser extent in 
Lithuania and Slovenia. 
  When restricting the estimation sample to lower income households, social assistance 
receipt negatively impacts non-eligible households only in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In the 
remaining countries, average marginal effects are statistically non-significant and in the case of 
the Czech Republic and Estonia much closer to zero. Eligible households on the other hand 
display a reduced likelihood of having labour income when having been program clients in all 
countries but Hungary and Latvia. In all cases, predicted effects are large, between -0.096 to -
0.246. 
Holding constant other household characteristics does not change the substantive results 
(see Table 5.9 below and Table 2 in Appendix 4 for the full set of results). In the total household 
sample, non-eligible recipient households remain less likely to have positive labour income 
compared to non-recipients. The exception to this pattern is again the Slovak Republic where the 
effect is zero. Eligible households no longer appear to be influenced by social assistance 
participation in Poland (although the size of the coefficient is still relatively large), but they 
remain negatively affected in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic.  
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 Basing the estimation on the smaller low-income sample produces significant effects 
among non-eligible households only in Hungary, Slovenia and Lithuania. In all countries, social 
assistance clients are less likely to have positive labour income in the following year. However, 
with the exception of the Slovak Republic, the other countries have negative estimated average 
marginal effects. Lastly, negative effects are detectable in a large majority of countries in the case 
of eligible households as well. In the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania, 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic the estimated coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant. The average probability of positive labour income drops by between 0.058 and 0.146 
when the household has received social assistance benefit the year prior. Only in Hungary and 
Latvia, no indication of a negative effect exists. 
 The last set of models estimating the likelihood of positive labour income uses both 
program participation and benefit amounts. Results for eligible and non-eligible households are 
shown in Table 5.10 above (for a full list of coefficients, see Table 3 in Appendix 4). Average 
marginal effects point towards large negative effects for non-eligible households in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia. Estimated effects are somewhat smaller when using the 
low-income subsample. The amount of the benefit itself appears not to matter with the 
exception of Estonia and possibly the Slovak Republic. In Estonia, larger benefit amounts clearly 
diminish the average marginal probability of having positive labour income. In Hungary, Latvia 
and Slovenia the coefficient of benefit amounts is positive (albeit non-significant). 
 Similarly, eligible households appear to be negatively affected by social assistance receipt 
only in Hungary (benefit amounts in both samples), Lithuania (benefit amounts in the larger 
sample) and the Slovak Republic (benefit amounts in the smaller sample). However, it should be 
kept in mind that in many cases the number of eligible households is small and thus statistical 
power is reduced. 
Both models containing social assistance receipt only and those including benefit 
amounts yield similar conclusions with regard to the influence of household characteristics. 
Moreover, while the magnitude of the effects varies somewhat across countries, substantive 
findings are akin. Thus, single parenthood and having more than three children present generally 
depress the probability of positive labour income. On the contrary, the presence of older 
children increases it, a pattern consistent with the one found when examining earnings. Not 
surprisingly, higher educational levels, as well as the presence of more working age adults raise 
the chance of positive labour income, while longer spells of unemployment and/ or inactivity 
diminish it. Again, the household is more likely to have some labour income if more adult 
experience shorter unemployment spells, rather than one adult experiencing longer ones. All 
things equal, urban residents are less likely to have labour income, whereas homeowners are 
generally more likely to do so. 
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Table 5.8 Average marginal effects of social assistance receipt on the probability of having labour income in the following year (Simple model) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households 
-0,047 
*** 
0,018 -0,060 
*** 
-0,020 -0,081 
*** 
-0,040 -0,067 
*** 
-0,101 
* 
-0,092 
*** 
-0,107 
* 
-0,063 
*** 
-0,042 
** 
-0,006 -0,003 -0,018 0,016 
Eligible 
households 
-0,119 
* 
-0,117 
* 
-0,227 
*** 
-0,246 
*** 
-0,051 -0,036 0,097 0,10 -0,138 
* 
-0,159 
* 
-0,215 
 *** 
-0,229 
*** 
-0,088 
* 
-0,096 
* 
-0,134 
*** 
-0,167 
** 
N 7512 2307 5447 1846 6235 2371 3310 1014 3627 1170 13019 5458 7849 2793 4336 1431 
Notes:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
 
 
Table 5.9 Average marginal effects of social assistance receipt on the probability of having labour income in the following year (Full model) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households 
-0.035 
** 
-0.040 -0.025 
* 
-0.137 -0.053 
*** 
-0.036 
* 
-0.038 
** 
-0.038 -0.038 
** 
-0.064 
* 
-0.032 
*** 
-0.013 -0.010 
* 
-0,020 
* 
-0.028 0,0003 
Eligible 
households 
-0.042 
* 
-0.090 
** 
-0.058 
** 
-0.124 
** 
-0.015 0.006 0.062 0,113 -0.074 
** 
-0.146 
** 
-0.032 -0.051 
* 
-0.025 -0.058 
* 
-0.094 
*** 
-0,093 
* 
N 7512 2307 5443 1845 6231 2369 3310 1014 3627 1170 12699 5304 7827 2781 4334 1431 
Notes:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
 
 
Table 5.10 Average marginal effects of social assistance receipt and amounts on the probability of having labour income in the following year (Full 
model) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible -0.035 -0.029 -0.006 0.018 -0.061 -0.038 -0.043 -0.068 -0.020 -0.052 -0.012 0.011 -0.112 -0.027 -0.043 -0.030 
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
households-
receipt 
**   *** * * * 
Non-eligible 
households-
amount  
-0.001 -0.047 -0.237 
* 
-0.583 
* 
0,044 0,013 0,112 0,120 -0.357 -0.279 -0.081 -0.088 0,002 0.010 0.035 0.034 
Eligible 
households-
receipt 
-0.009 -0.049 
 
-0.118 -0.029 0.046 0.078 -0.056 -0.084 0.042 0.017 -0.020 -0.040 -0,009 -0.029 -0.053 
 
-0.008 
Eligible 
households-
amount 
-0.022 -0.020 -0.122 -0.275 -0,244 
** 
-0,285 
** 
0,872 - -0.616 
** 
- -0.007 0,018 -0.005 -0.008 -0.073 
* 
-0.109 
* 
N 7512 2307 5443 1845 6231 2369 3310 1014 3627 1170 12699 5304 7827 2781 4334 1431 
Notes:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; social assistance benefit amounts are centred on the country-wave mean and entered as thousands of Euros. A 
missing number indicated subgroup too small to estimation to be accurate. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
 
 
Table 5.11 Impact of social assistance participation on total household labour income in the following year-Full Model 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households 
-
0.364
*** 
-
0.071 
-
0.492
*** 
-
0.350
** 
-
0.384
*** 
-
0.248
*** 
-
0.373
*** 
-
0.323
** 
-
0.290
*** 
-
0.072 
-
0.393
*** 
-
0.207
*** 
-
0.156
*** 
-
0.123
* 
-
0.146
* 
-
0.113 
Eligible households -
0.168 
-
0.354
* 
-
0.370 
-
0.227 
-
0.288
* 
-
0.278
* 
-
0.173 
-
0.082 
0.151 0.067 -
0.262
* 
-
0.215 
-
0.086 
-
0.319 
-
0.352
** 
-
0.544
*** 
N 6799 1797 5067 1497 5251 1714 3034 772 3274 887 10730 4073 7661 2648 3957 1152 
Notes:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
 
 
Table 5.12 Impact of social assistance participation and benefit amounts on total household labour income in the following year-Full Model 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households-receipt 
-
0.326
*** 
-
0.056 
-
0.534
*** 
-
0.400
** 
-
0.318
*** 
-
0.069 
-
0.374
*** 
-
0.294
** 
-
0.283
** 
-
0.050 
-
0.404
*** 
-
0.232
*** 
-
0.143
*** 
-
0.113 
-
0.040 
-
0.083 
Non-eligible 
households-amount  
0.075 0.010 0.042 -
0.475 
0.146 0.581
* 
-
0.584 
-
1.422
** 
0.190 -
0.577 
-
0.199 
-
0.309
* 
-
0.009 
-
0.049 
0.167 0.152 
Non-eligible 
households-
amount^2 
0.000
* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
0.001
*** 
0.000 0.001
* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Eligible 
households-receipt 
-
0.134 
-
0.269 
-
0.304 
-
0.140 
-
0.271
* 
-
0.244
* 
-
0.148 
-
0.065 
0.041 -
0.012 
-
0.285
* 
-
0.198 
0.026 -
0.124 
-
0.258 
-
0.406
* 
Eligible 
households-amount 
-
0.354 
-
0.309 
1.145 0.455 -
0.221 
-
0.267 
-
0.216 
0.694 0.180 0.463 -
0.836 
-
0.803 
-
0.103 
-
0.088 
-
0.072 
-
0.203 
Eligible 
households-
amount^2 
0.000
* 
0.000 -
0.001
* 
-
0.001 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -
0.001 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 6799 1797 5067 1497 5251 1714 3034 772 3274 887 10730 4073 7661 2648 3957 1152 
Notes:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; social assistance benefit amounts are centred on the country-wave mean and entered as thousands of Euros.  
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
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Finally, as expected, social security income is negatively related to the probability of positive 
labour income. To a lesser extent, the same is true of non-labour, market income. However, the 
latter pattern is clearly visible mostly when using the second, low-income household sample. 
 The impact of social assistance receipt on average yearly household labour income148 is 
summarized in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 (for the full set of results see Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix 4). 
Significant negative effects are noticeable among non-eligible households in every country 
included in the analysis in the first set of models. The biggest occur in Estonia, while they are 
much more moderate in Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. Eligible households appear to be less 
at risk of having lower labour income after social assistance participation, at least in the Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. Eligible households that have been program clients 
continue to exhibit substantially lower levels of labour income in Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, and Estonia, although in the latter the coefficient is too imprecisely estimated for a no 
effect hypothesis to be ruled out.  
 Patterns are to some extent reversed when the estimation is carried out using low-income 
households only. A large drop in average labour income levels is associated with social assistance 
receipt by non-eligible households in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and to a lesser extent 
Slovenia, but is no longer present in the Czech and Slovak Republics, as well as Lithuania. On 
the contrary, eligible households are predicted to have significantly lower levels of labour income 
after having been program clients in the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. 
Relatively large but statistically insignificant effects are registered in Estonia, Slovenia and 
Poland. Only in Latvia and Lithuania is the size of the social assistance receipt coefficient close 
to zero.   
 A more complex approach takes into account both program participation and the 
amount of the received benefits (Table 5.12). The receipt coefficient may be interpreted as the 
average change in labour income levels after receipt of average benefits. It points to a sizeable 
fall in average labour income levels of non-eligible households everywhere but in the Slovak 
Republic (results pertaining to the larger sample). Once more, the largest differences are 
observable in Estonia and the smallest in Slovenia. Actual benefit amounts appear to be less 
important than participation into the program itself. In fact, they fail to achieve statistical 
significance in all countries. Based on the estimated size however, higher benefits are potentially 
more detrimental in Latvia and possibly Poland, while higher benefits might be beneficial in 
Hungary, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic.  
 Analyzing results for eligible households (again using the entire sample of households), a 
negative effect of program participation is present in Hungary, Poland and possibly Estonia and 
the Slovak Republic. Standard errors for benefit amounts are again too large to allow for 
statistical significance. Nonetheless, higher social assistance benefits are predicted to substantially 
                                                          
148 Conditional on positive labour income. 
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reduce average labour income levels in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. They 
are predicted to increase average labour income in Estonia.  
 Using only low-income households in the estimation leads to much lower coefficients for 
program participation of non-eligible households in some countries. Considerable negative 
effects are still present though in Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. More generous benefits are 
expected to reduce household labour income in Latvia, Poland and potentially also in Estonia 
and Lithuania (coefficients not significant in the latter two). In Hungary and perhaps also in the 
Slovak Republic, larger benefits are associated with higher future levels of labour income. 
 Eligible households are also predicted to have lower labour incomes after being social 
assistance clients, in Hungary, the Slovak Republic and possibly also in the Czech Republic and 
Poland. Estimated effects for benefit amounts are again nowhere statistically significant. 
However, they are large and negative in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic, while being sizeable and positive in the three Baltic States.  
 Finally, other household characteristics have the same impact as when modelling the 
probability of positive labour income. There are two exceptions, namely the number of 
unemployed adults generally no longer matters for predicting level of labour income149, and 
urban residents have, on average, higher labour income levels.  
Summing up, there are indications that previous receipt of public assistance benefits 
discourages labour market participation. With few exceptions, results are much more consistent 
across samples than in the case of earnings. Furthermore, negative effects are widespread both 
among eligible and non-eligible households. Benefit amounts on the other hand do not conform 
to predictions derived from standard labour supply theory, especially in the case of non-eligible 
households. In fact, only in Estonia is a negative effect registered and in four out of eight 
countries the coefficients are positive. Eligible households however appear to respond to 
increased benefits by reducing labour market participation at least one country and possibly in 
three.  
As regards total labour income, findings are relatively consistent across models. Thus, in 
Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, all results indicate negative effects on non-eligible households of 
both participation and benefit amounts. Similarly, negative effects emerge across the board for 
eligible households in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
 
 
5.7 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND RECEIPT OF LONG-TERM BENEFITS  
 
Having looked into the connections between earnings/labour income and social 
assistance, the next step is to examine links between social assistance benefits and other types of 
income. In principle, public assistance is conceived as a temporary form of support. Although in 
                                                          
149
  The total length of the unemployment spells does. 
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none of the eight CEE countries does a formal time limit on benefit receipt exist, various factors 
may put pressure on social workers and program administrators to reduce caseloads (Jewell 2007; 
van Berkel 2007). One way this objective may be achieved is by transferring recipients, especially 
less employable ones, onto other, more permanent forms of income support. Alternatively, 
social assistance may used as a stopgap measure before qualifying for longer term benefits. To 
investigate these possibilities, a set of models has been estimated using social assistance receipt to 
predict a change in receipt of long-term benefits. Results are summarized in Table5.13 (for a full 
set of results see Table 1 in Appendix 5). Once again, effects have been estimated both for 
eligible and non-eligible households150.  
Only in Hungary is there clear evidence that social assistance is used as an entry gate to 
other benefits. Non-eligible households that have received social assistance benefits are two and 
two and a half as likely to begin receiving long-term benefits in the following year, depending on 
which sample is used. Similar findings are present to some extent in the Slovak Republic (only in 
the lower-income sample is the coefficient statistically different from zero), and Estonia (both 
samples yield positive but insignificant coefficients). Eligible households are more likely to start 
receiving long-term benefits after having been social assistance clients in Hungary, and possibly 
Estonia. They are less likely to start receiving benefits in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and 
Slovenia although in all three countries recipient-non-recipients differences may be attributed to 
random variation. 
Household features do play a role in determining the odds of starting to receive long-
term benefits151. Patterns are relatively similar across countries. Thus, single parent households 
are more likely to collect long-term benefit in Poland and possibly Slovenia. The same holds for 
large families, especially in Estonia, Poland, but also in Hungary and Lithuania. The presence of 
children and higher educational levels diminish the likelihood of obtaining such benefits. Finally, 
not surprisingly, homeowners are more likely to receive long-term benefits, a pattern 
undoubtedly related to older households being more likely to own their home. 
The hypothesis of client shifting from social assistance support onto long-term benefits 
is not confirmed, with the exception of Hungary, and possibly Estonia. In these two countries, 
both samples suggest a higher likelihood of recipients of joining longer-term forms of income 
support, both in the case of non-eligible and that of eligible households. In the remaining 
countries, social assistance receipt is either unrelated or is actually decreasing the likelihood of 
becoming a long-term benefit recipient (in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Slovenia), though 
results are not significant. 
 
                                                          
150
 As before, eligibility refers to social assistance benefits. 
151
 In modelling the odds of starting to receive long-term benefits, the amount of non-labour income and social 
protection have been dropped. 
179 
 
Table  5.13 Odds ratios of receiving long-term benefits when having received social assistance benefits 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households 
1.281 1.103 1.494 1.400 2.673
*** 
2.513
** 
0.827 1.036 1.531 0.733 1.058 1.055 1.101 1.121 1.826 3.364
* 
Eligible 
households 
0.678 0.625 2.174 2.930 1.913 2.273
* 
1.039 1.020 0.695 0.293 1.294 0.923 0.690 0.423 0.945 1.566 
N 4999 1478 3495 993 3684 1350 2102 573 2241 655 7184 2987 4601 1488 2727 782 
Notes:*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC longitudinal database. 
 
 
Table  5.14 Odds ratios of receiving social protection income when having received social assistance benefits 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households 
2.038
** 
1.152 1.877 0.728 1.817
** 
1.551 1.236 1.315 2.176
** 
1.836 1.642
*** 
1.226 0.647
** 
0.530
** 
1.014 0.729 
Eligible 
households 
0.823 0.634 5.783
** 
7.190
** 
0.899 0.697 4.619
* 
5.302
* 
2.480 2.401 0.919 0.795 1.943 1.067 0.588 0.438 
N 1072
3 
2246 7418 3010 9005 3564 4936 1971 5264 1062 1698
7 
6834 9939 3922 5752 1361 
Notes:*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC longitudinal database. 
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Table  5.15 Average annual amount of social protection incomes based on social assistance receipt 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households 
0.127
*** 
0.093
** 
0.105 -
0.013 
0.048
* 
0.045 0.113
*** 
0.041 -
0.038 
-
0.014 
-
0.064
* 
0.089
** 
0.161
*** 
0.060
* 
0.007 -
0.091 
Eligible households 0.004 -
0.046 
0.107 0.050 0.057 0.122 -
0.106 
-
0.298 
-
0.275 
-
0.364 
-
0.227 
-
0.009 
-
0.147 
-
0.198 
-
0.237
* 
-
0.257
* 
N 8415 3932 6232 2728 7770 3283 4051 1701 3790 1736 12949 5740 8479 3586 4944 2098 
Notes:*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC longitudinal database. 
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5.8 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND RECEIPT OF SOCIAL PROTECTION INCOME 
 
A more encompassing measure of social protection income is used in Tables 5.14 and 
5.15. In addition to long-term benefits, it incorporates all types of shorter term benefits (such as 
child benefits and allowances, maternity and child-raising payments, grants, scholarships, housing 
allowances etc.), with the exception of social assistance itself and sickness insurance benefits152. 
Table 5.13 illustrates expected changes in the likelihood of receiving social protection income 
after social assistance receipt for both eligible and non-eligible households (for a full set of 
results see Table 1 in Appendix 6). 
Utilizing the entire sample of households generates large positive effects among non-
eligible households in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Recipient households are 
between 60% (Poland) and 110% (Lithuania) more likely to start receiving social protection 
income after having been social assistance clients. A large but non-significant effect is registered 
in Estonia. Contrarily, in Slovenia, non-eligible recipient households are less likely to start 
receiving social protection income. Eligible households are clearly more likely to start receiving 
social protection income in Estonia, Latvia, and perhaps also in Lithuania and Slovenia. In the 
Slovak Republic on the other hand, they appear about half as likely as non-recipients to start 
receiving social protection income.  
Results obtained using exclusively low-income households in the estimation vary to some 
extent. Non-eligible households are still more likely to begin receiving social protection income 
in the following year in Hungary and Lithuania, but the result is no longer significant statistically. 
On the contrary, the significantly lower likelihood of receiving this type of income remains in 
Slovenia. Eligible households continue to display a strong positive link between social assistance 
participation and receipt of social protection income in the following year in Estonia and Latvia. 
A negative relationship, albeit insignificant, is visible in the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
A different approach consists of focusing on social assistance participation effects on the 
amounts of social protection received rather than on receipt itself. The main findings coming out 
of such an exercise are shown in Table 5.15 (the full set of results is found in Table 2 of 
Appendix 6). All outcomes are conditional on social protection income being positive. In the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia, non-eligible households experience an 
increase in social protection benefits after participating in social assistance programs. However, 
with the exception of Slovenia, predicted increases are modest. Moreover, when limiting the 
estimation sample to low-income households, effects are much lower and above statistical 
significance thresholds only in the Czech Republic and Poland.  
                                                          
152 Sickness insurance benefits are usually tightly linked to employment, they are often paid by employers during the 
first days of the claim and are strictly limited in time; moreover, they have been added up to other types of income 
in some countries (Lithuania); as a result, they have been excluded from the constructed measure of social 
protection income. 
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Eligible households do not appear to profit from social assistance participation by 
increasing their social protection income in the following year. On the contrary, recipient eligible 
households are expected to receive less social protection income compared to eligible non-
recipient ones, particularly in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland (only when basing the estimation on all 
households), Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. Only in the Slovak Republic, is this result not 
attributable to chance. 
Since social protection income comprises benefits that are directed primarily at the young 
and at the old, it is not surprising that both the number of children and the number of retired 
raise the odds of receiving/average amounts of social protection income. Obviously previous 
receipt/amounts of social protection income impact positively on current amounts. Single 
parents are more likely to receive some social protection benefits but the average disbursed 
amounts are lower in the Czech Republic. Lower average amounts for households containing 
single parents also crop up in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and the Slovak Republic.  
 Evidence of social assistance serving as a gateway to other social protection benefit is 
limited. Only in Hungary and the three Baltic States is there indication of increased likelihood of 
social protection income, and in none of the countries are both eligible and non-eligible 
households affected. Support for the hypothesis of social assistance effects is more widespread 
in the case of changes in received social protection income. Non-eligible households appear to 
experience small increases in other social protection income in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovenia. For eligible households however, all notable effects go into the opposite direction. 
 
 
5.9 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND DISPOSABLE INCOME 
 
Ultimately, the focal interest of this chapter lies in assessing the impact of means-tested 
minimum income support on recipients‟ future well-being. To that end, the final analytical 
section looks at social assistance effects on household net equivalised153 disposable income. 
Equivalised net disposable income is the widest measure of economic resources used in analyses 
of poverty, inequality and income distribution, more generally. While far from ideal, net 
disposable income represent an arguably more complete measure of economic resources than 
either earnings or labour income.  
To evaluate whether the partial negative impact of social assistance on earnings and 
labour income spill over onto disposable income, Table 5.16 presents unconditional differences 
in the average disposable income of former recipients and non-recipients, separately for eligible 
and non-eligible households (the full set of coefficient can be found in Table 1 of Appendix 7). 
For non-eligible households, social assistance receipt is associated with lower net equivalised 
disposable income in every country when examining all households, and all countries but Latvia 
                                                          
153 The „modified‟ OECD equivalence scale is used. 
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and Lithuania when examining low-income households only. Average discrepancies between 
recipient and non-recipient households are particularly large in Estonia, Poland and Lithuania (in 
the larger sample).  
In the case of eligible households, average gaps in income between recipient and non-
recipient households are much lower, but they remain significantly negative in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, the Slovak Republic, and Hungary and Poland (larger sample only). In 
Slovenia, eligible households have, on average, higher equivalised disposable incomes if they 
have received social assistance in the previous year. The coefficient is very large and statistically 
significant in both samples. 
In a second step, program participation effects on future equivalsied disposable income 
have been estimated conditional on household characteristics (see Table 2 in Appendix 7 for a 
full set of results). Table 5.17 displays estimated effects for eligible and non-eligible households. 
Adding household features does not change substantively the findings shown in Table 5.16. 
Non-eligible recipient households continue to show evidence of lower average disposable 
incomes in both samples in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the 
Slovak Republic. Estimated coefficients are however smaller compared to those in Table 5.16. 
Likewise, in Lithuania and Latvia, a significant negative difference between the incomes of 
recipient and non-recipient non-eligible households exists only when all households are used in 
the analysis. 
Eligible households that have been social assistance clients have significantly lower 
amounts of disposable income in the following year, a result consistent across samples in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, and the Slovak Republic. In Hungary and Poland, lower average levels 
of disposable income are observed only in the larger sample. Last but not least, receipt of social 
assistance benefits brings about significantly higher levels of disposable income in the following 
year in Slovenia. Again, the result holds in both samples.  
Table 5.18 presents results of OLS regressions containing both program participation 
and benefit amounts among the predictors (the full set of results may be found in Table 3 in 
Appendix 7). As usual, coefficients for receipt may be interpreted as expected impacts when the 
household receives average benefits. Average equivalised disposable income is lower among non-
eligible households that have been program clients the year prior. With two exceptions, the 
differences are large and not attributable to sampling variation. In the Latvian and Lithuanian 
low-income subsamples, no recipient-non-recipient discrepancies emerge. Among the remaining 
countries, the largest negative effects are registered in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland. 
Benefit amounts appear to matter less than program participation itself. With the exception of 
the Slovak Republic however, they remain negative, although statistically different from zero 
only in the Czech low-income subsample. The Czech Republic aside, sizeable negative 
coefficients are also found in the three Baltic States. 
Large negative effects of social assistance participation are visible among eligible 
households as well. In the Czech Republic, Estonia and the Slovak Republic, the lower expected 
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disposable income of former social assistance clients is consistent across samples. In Hungary 
and Poland on the other hand, the disadvantage of recipient households is observable only in the 
larger household sample. In Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, eligible recipient households have, 
on average, higher disposable equivalised incomes in the following year. Nonetheless, in none of 
the countries is the result statistically significant. The size of the social assistance benefits appears 
to play a role in shaping future disposable income levels, except in Hungary and the Slovak 
Republic. Effects are however too imprecisely estimated to reach statistical significance, except 
one of the results in the Czech Republic. More generous social assistance benefits appear to 
trigger detrimental outcomes in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Latvia, especially when the 
estimation is based on all available households. On the contrary, in Poland and Slovenia they are 
associated with increased levels of disposable income (only in Slovenia is the result statistically 
significant).  
 The influence of household characteristics on disposable income is consistent with 
results documented in the literature. Single parent and large family households have lower levels 
of disposable income, all other things equal. A larger number of adults, as well as a larger 
number of retirees raise the expected level of disposable income (note that this is not merely a 
mechanical effect since disposable income is equivalised to account for household size). Urban 
residents and households with superior educational qualifications are also more likely to dispose 
of a larger net equivalised disposable income. Finally, as expected, the disposable income in the 
previous year is a strong predictor of current disposable income levels.  
Overall, findings are consistent in pointing towards small to moderate effects of social 
assistance participation among non-eligible households. Benefit amounts, on the other hand, do 
not appear to play a role. Not only are benefit amounts effects statistically insignificant, they are 
substantively (with the possible exception of Latvia and Lithuania) very close to zero. The 
picture is more mixed in the case of eligible households. Small to moderate negative effects 
deriving from being a program client are detectable in the Czech Republic, Estonia and the 
Slovak Republic. On the other hand, benefit amounts (again with the exception of Lithuania) are 
either zero or positive. Hence, the hypothesised detrimental impact of higher social assistance 
benefits fails to be confirmed.  
 
 
5.10 DISCUSSION 
 
Pulling together the different results into a coherent picture of program effects is not an 
easy task. The first thing to notice is that results are relatively consistent when comparing 
estimated impacts of participation across models, but that they differ depending on the 
household eligibility status. It should be remembered at this point that the number of eligible 
recipient households is fairly small (at least in some countries). Consequently, results derived for  
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Table  5.16 Average equivalsied disposable income differences between recipient and non-recipient households 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households 
-
0.332
*** 
-
0.133
*** 
-
0.493
*** 
-
0.207
*** 
-
0.302
*** 
-
0.095
*** 
-
0.318
*** 
0.010 -
0.432
*** 
-
0.024 
-
0.485
*** 
-
0.118
*** 
-
0.190
*** 
-
0.039
** 
-
0.185
*** 
-
0.093
*** 
Eligible households -
0.151
*** 
-
0.119
** 
-
0.589
*** 
-
0.282
* 
-
0.196
** 
-
0.083 
0.013 0.152 0.119 0.148 -
0.204
** 
0.063 0.310
* 
0.403
** 
-
0.297
*** 
-
0.267
*** 
N 10722 4255 7387 2983 8997 3553 4888 1923 5250 2115 17322 6979 9959 3932 5752 2276 
Notes:*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001; disposable income entered in logarithmic form. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC longitudinal database. 
 
 
Table  5.17 Social assistance participation effects on future equivalised disposable income 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households 
-
0.196
*** 
-
0.084
*** 
-
0.243
*** 
-
0.109
** 
-
0.171
*** 
-
0.077
*** 
-
0.132
*** 
-
0.004 
-
0.145
*** 
-
0.006 
-
0.209
*** 
-
0.067
*** 
-
0.129
*** 
-
0.083
*** 
-
0.183
*** 
-
0.083
*** 
Eligible households -
0.165
*** 
-
0.102
** 
-
0.607
*** 
-
0.293
* 
-
0.164
** 
-
0.077 
0.084 0.141 0.121 0.104 -
0.233
** 
0.012 0.282 0.391
** 
-
0.268
*** 
-
0.249
*** 
N 10722 4255 7358 2974 8993 3552 4888 1923 5248 2114 16964 6816 9935 3919 5748 2274 
Notes:*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001; disposable income entered in logarithmic form. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC longitudinal database. 
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Table  5.18 Social assistance participation and benefit amounts effects on future equivalised disposable income 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Non-eligible 
households-receipt 
-
0.202
*** 
-
0.104
*** 
-
0.229
*** 
-
0.111
** 
-
0.173
*** 
-
0.063
** 
-
0.139
*** 
-
0.008 
-
0.137
*** 
-
0.006 
-
0.208
*** 
-
0.066
*** 
-
0.124
** 
-
0.077
*** 
-
0.180
*** 
-
0.093
** 
Non-eligible 
households-amount  
-
0.043 
-
0.073
* 
-
0.075 
-
0.012 
-
0.003 
0.012 -
0.197 
-
0.120 
-
0.018 
-
0.143 
-
0.021 
0.023 -
0.001 
-
0.001 
0.054 0.061 
Non-eligible 
households-
amount^2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Eligible 
households-receipt 
-
0.169
*** 
-
0.113
** 
-
0.611
*** 
-
0.292
* 
-
0.158
** 
-
0.072 
0.102 0.158 0.107 0.098 -
0.271
*** 
-
0.012 
0.189 0.249 -
0.226
*** 
-
0.234
*** 
Eligible 
households-amount 
-
0.080
* 
-
0.028 
0.564 0.462 -
0.078 
0.004 -
0.706 
-
0.032 
-
0.499 
-
0.198 
0.313 0.262 0.097
* 
0.140
** 
0.081 0.088 
Eligible 
households-
amount^2 
0.000
* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* 
0.000
* 
N 10722 4255 7358 2974 8993 3552 4888 1923 5248 2114 16964 6816 9935 3919 5748 2274 
Notes:*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001; disposable income entered in logarithmic form; social assistance amounts are centred on the country mean and 
entered as thousands of Euros. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC longitudinal database. 
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eligible households may be somewhat unreliable154. These shortcomings notwithstanding, some 
general conclusions are worth pointing out. First, negative effects of social assistance are not 
universal although they do appear in a number of countries. Negative effects are visible not only 
for earnings but also for labour income and disposable equivalised income. Second, being a 
social assistance client, i.e. participation, and the amount of the received benefits clearly must be 
separated. Benefit amounts are generally much less likely to impact on future incomes compared 
to receipt of means-tested support itself. Even when they do have an impact, it is often more 
modest in size or in the opposite direction as to the one hypothesized155. These findings suggest 
that any negative effects that means-tested income support schemes may have on their clients are 
not necessarily derived through the work disincentives hypothesized by standard labour supply 
theory. Scarring due to stigma, the need to comply with intrusive or burdening administrative 
demands, or other restrictions may have a more important role to play than the work 
disincentives generated by the benefits themselves. Third, there is substantive heterogeneity in 
effects between eligible and non-eligible households. In particular, negative effects on 
participation in employment and/or labour market are more likely to be detected among eligible 
households. If this discrepancy is due to household characteristics, these have to be over and 
above the household features included in the models. Fourth, work disincentives stemming from 
means-tested income support appear to play a larger role on the intensive rather than the 
extensive margin. Both the likelihood of positive earnings and the likelihood of positive labour 
income are less sensitive to benefit receipt compared to earnings and labour income amounts. 
The four points mentioned so far are general in nature. The next section looks more in depth at 
patterns of variation across countries. 
 
 
5.11 LINKING PROGRAM DESIGN TO OUTCOMES 
 
There is considerable variation across countries both regarding their social assistance set-
up and the outcomes these means-tested cash transfers bring about. In principle, such policy 
variation presents the opportunity of isolating and roughly quantifying policy effects. The main 
problem confronting this type of cross-sectional policy impact analysis is the simultaneous 
variation in the economic, social, and policy environments that accompany program 
differentiation. Moreover, as most cross-national research, this study suffers from a problem of 
small N at the country level, thereby reducing the degrees of freedom available for introducing 
country level covariates. 
                                                          
154 The existence of this problem is also highlighted by the very large standard errors associated with coefficients for 
eligible households in some countries.  
155 Variation in benefit amounts is also due to differential length of the participation spell; as such, it is all the more 
surprising that benefit amounts have such a low impact. 
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 A relatively new method particularly suited for medium-size N studies is Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and its extension to continuous variables, Fuzzy Set methods 
(Ragin 1987; Ragin 2000; Ragin 2008). QCA/Fuzzy Sets relies on the principles of necessity and 
sufficiency rather than on co-variation for inference making. As such, it is particularly well suited 
to capture complex patterns and configurations rather than linear or non-linear relationships 
between any two variables. It is also better suited at incorporating more qualitative data in the 
analysis, through the construction of the fuzzy scores. QCA/Fuzzy Set methods, however, 
cannot deal very well with limited diversity (the equivalent of limited degrees of freedom in 
standard quantitative analyses). As a result, the number of case (in this case country) 
characteristics that can be introduced in the analysis remains dependent on the size of N156. 
 In the following paragraphs, the results of a simple fuzzy set analysis are reported. Three 
separate outcomes are examined. More specifically, negative effects of social assistance 
participation on participation in employment, likelihood of positive labour income and on 
equivalised disposable income are examined in conjunction with four program characteristics. 
No analysis is carried out on social assistance impacts on the amount of earnings or labour 
income. As a negative link is clearly visible in all countries, there is not enough variation to 
investigate. Fuzzy scores have been created based on the estimated coefficients for social 
assistance participation in Tables 5.4 and 5.9. The scores for eligible and non-eligible households 
have been combined by constructing a weighted average157 that has subsequently been translated 
into a fuzzy score (see the Appendix 2 for rules of deriving the country fuzzy score).  
In conjunction with program effects, four program dimensions158 are examined, namely 
centralization, benefit generosity, strictness of the means-test and support services. The country 
fuzzy scores for each dimension and the outcomes are given in Table 5.19 (Appendix 2 describes 
the rules that have been used to construct the fuzzy scores for all seven variables). 
 
Table  5.19 Fuzzy scores for social assistance program characteristics and outcomes 
Count
ry 
Centralizat
ion score 
Benefit 
generosity 
score 
Means-test 
score 
Support 
services 
score 
Earnings>
0 
Labour 
income>0  
Eq. 
Disposable 
income 
CZ 0.951 0.836 0.487 0.6 0.276 0.989 0.910 
EE 0.759 0.191 0.326 0.18 0.948 0.858 0.954 
HU 0.686 0.309 0.745 0.55 0.474 0.892 0.796 
LV 0.146 0.191 0.900 0.55 0.194 0.514 0.107 
LT 0.759 0.197 0.852 0.55 0.241 1 0.120 
                                                          
156 More specifically, QCA is vulnerable to „missing configurations‟, i.e. combinations of characteristics for which no 
case exists; the introduction of M characteristics results in 2M possible configurations that have to be covered; as a 
result N>=2M. 
157 The weights are the number of eligible and non-eligible households which are in the respective estimation 
samples; fuzzy scores are built based on results estimated on the bottom 40%. 
158 A thorough discussion of program characteristics can be found in Chapter 3. 
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PL 0.146 0.354 0.878 0.3 0.103 0.544 0.682 
SK 0.951 0.530 0.745 0.6 0.136 0.732 0.653 
SI 0.951 0.891 0.216 0.8 0.225 0.621 0.926 
Source: based on MISSOC 2004, MISCEEC, ((GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003; (GVG) 2003; Pieters 
2003), and Tables 5. 4 and 5.9 above (results obtained using the bottom 40% of the sample); 
 
 The eight countries in the dataset represent six out of the sixteen possible configurations. 
Therefore, limited diversity is severe and likely to influence results. Only sufficient conditions 
analysis is performed, as the isolation of necessary conditions is biased when limited diversity is 
present. The minimized solutions for the three outcomes discussed above, as well as their 
consistency and coverage, are displayed in Table 5.20. Two models are shown for each outcome. 
In the first set of models (i.e. models 1, 3 and 5), the outcome score has been constructed in 
such a way as to represent a negative effect of social assistance participation. In the second set of 
models, the fuzzy set scores are used in their negated form, i.e. solutions relate to the lack of a 
negative effect.  
 
Table  5.20  Results of Fuzzy Set Analysis 
Model/depe
ndent 
variable  
Treatm
ent of 
Logical 
remaind
ers 
Point of 
consisten
cy break-
off 
Solution Consiste
ncy 
Coverag
e 
Likelihood 
of positive 
earnings-M1 
Set to 0 0.924 CENTRALIZATION*benefit*mean
s-test*support  
0.924 0.649 
Likelihood 
of positive 
earnings-M2 
Set to 0 0.925 benefit*MEANS-TEST*SUPPORT 
+CENTRALIZATION*BENEFIT 
* SUPPORT 
0.761 0.701 
Likelihood 
of positive 
labour 
income-M3 
Set to 0 1.000 CENTRALIZATION*MEANS-
TEST *SUPPORT+ 
CENTRALIZATION* 
benefit*means-test* support 
1.000 0.548 
Likelihood 
of positive 
labour 
income-M4 
Set to 0 0.621 centralization*benefit*MEANS-
TEST 
0.542 0.703 
Disposable 
income-M5 
Set to 0 0.947 CENTRALIZATION*BENEFIT*S
UPPORT+ CENTRALIZATION * 
benefit*means-test* support 
0.965 0.615 
Disposable 
income-M6 
Set to 0 0.858 centralization*benefit*MEANS-
TEST* SUPPORT 
0.858 0.521 
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Note1: majuscule letters indicate belonging to the set as it is, while minuscule letters denote 
belonging to the set negated; 
Note2:  * indicates logical and; + indicates logical or; 
Source: own calculations based on Table 5.19 scores; 
 
 A few caveats are in order before interpreting the results. First, the number of cases to be 
analyzed is very small. Consequently, solutions or parts of them are often based on a single case. 
Second, although every attempt has been made to derive fuzzy scores in a transparent and 
relatively straightforward manner, measurement/ calibration errors are possible. In combination 
with the small number of cases, measurement/calibration errors are likely to weigh heavily on 
any results. Third, fuzzy set scores for the three outcomes have been derived based on a single 
set of coefficients. However, it should be borne in mind that, although regression results are 
generally consistent across specifications, some variation does exist and it may potentially affect 
findings. 
 The first two models pertain to the likelihood of having positive earnings. 
Unsurprisingly, patterns of association are far from being clear-cut. A negative effect of social 
assistance programs is associated with centralization, low benefits, lax means-testing, and lack of 
support services. Lack of a negative effect on the other hand, is more likely to be found in a 
country with a decentralized, low benefit, strong means-test system or in one with a centralized, 
high benefit program with strong support services. Thus, low benefits and centralization may be 
found in conjunction with both harmful program effects and with lack of them. The availability 
of support services is more clearly associated with lack of negative effects. A similar picture 
emerges in the case of means-testing.  
Two points should be noted. First, there is no indication of more generous benefits being 
detrimental for recipients‟ future chances of employment. On the contrary, it is low rather than 
generous benefits that seem to be associated with poorer program results. Second, decentralized, 
low benefit, low support programs are also the ones that are least able to reach the poor and 
most likely to „leak‟ benefits to the non-poor (See chapter 4). As such, their association with lack 
of a negative program effect is more likely attributable to their irrelevance, rather than to any 
beneficial program design. 
 In the case of the likelihood of positive labour income, there is much less cross-national 
variation to be analyzed. Regardless of the specific features of the social assistance scheme they 
participate in, recipients are generally less likely to have labour income in the following year 
compared to non-recipients. In fact, all combinations of program characteristics showed the 
presence of the outcome with a very high consistency. To generate results, a consistency 
threshold of 1 was applied. Conversely, a low consistency threshold had to be used when 
minimizing the solution for the negated outcome (i.e. lack of a negative effect). Overall findings 
mimic those derived from the analysis of earnings. Once more, generous benefits do not appear 
to be associated with harmful program effects, albeit low benefits do appear in the solution of 
model 4. Centralization appears more consistently linked with negative outcomes. However, the 
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most important conclusion to emerge from the analysis of labour income regression coefficients 
is that all social assistance schemes, regardless of their features appear to depress the likelihood 
of having positive labour income in the future.  
 Lastly, the final set of models (5 and 6) refers to equivalised disposable income. Lower 
disposable incomes for social assistance clients may be observed in both high and low benefit 
programs. Likewise, negative outcomes appear both in countries where support services are 
underdeveloped and in countries where these services are well established. Lack of negative 
program outcomes is linked to decentralized, low benefit, strict means-test programs. However, 
these programs are also the ones least likely to effectively target social assistance disbursements. 
It is possible that, in this case, lack of negative effects is not due to program effectiveness but 
rather to program irrelevance. Centralized systems appear to be linked more consistently with 
poorer recipient outcomes. 
 
 
5.12 SUMMARY AND PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
Partly due to their relative novelty, social assistance programs in Central and Eastern 
Europe have been, so far, understudied. Standard economic welfare theory predicts that 
availability of a guaranteed income floor will have deleterious effects in terms of both the labour 
supply and the earnings of welfare recipients. However, empirical proof for the previous claim 
has been derived almost entirely from the American experiment with AFDC and TANF. Little is 
known about how social assistance operates in the European context in general, and the Central 
and East European one in particular. The dearth of evidence aside, a few studies in economics 
have taken a closer look at the provision of income support, unemployment benefits and labour 
market outcomes especially during the 1990-s (Boeri and Sziraczki 1993; Fretwell and Jackman 
1994; Boeri and Edwards 1998; Ham, Svejnar et al. 1998; Rutkowski 1998). Albeit informative, 
these studies stop well short of actually empirically testing for program impact. Instead, program 
effects are inferred from marginal tax rates and standard welfare economics theory. 
 The examination of income and prior benefit receipt in eight CEE countries both 
supports and contradicts the predictions derived from the standard labour supply model. 
Overall, findings are far from being conclusive. In a number of countries, participants in social 
assistance schemes tend to have, other characteristics controlled for, lower odds of having 
positive earnings and/or positive labour income. More consistent negative effects are registered 
in the case of conditional earnings/ labour income amounts. Similarly, lower disposable incomes 
for social assistance recipients are registered in some countries. However, results are sensitive to 
the estimation sample, as well as household characteristics. Moreover, there is little indication 
that more generous social assistance benefits negatively impact on future recipients‟ outcomes. 
On the contrary, more generous social assistance benefits appear to counteract negative effects 
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of program participation in some countries. Finally, very little evidence was found to support the 
assertion that social assistance programs act as gateways for other social protection benefits. 
 In principle, cross-national variation in effect sizes presents the opportunity to examine 
program outcomes in conjunction with program design. However, a modelling of country level 
variance through fuzzy set analysis failed to yield clear-cut results. The availability of support 
services tends to be associated with diminished negative impact, a finding is consistent with 
previous work on this programmatic dimension (Hölsch and Kraus 2004; Lein and Schexnayder 
2007). Contrary to welfare and labour supply theory but confirming findings in sections VI, VII 
and X, more generous benefits did not appear to be linked with detrimental program outcomes. 
Additionally, the association of lack of negative effects and stingy, decentralized, strict means-
tested benefits appears to be attributable to program irrelevance rather than program 
effectiveness.  
 At this point, several caveats must be mentioned. First, the QCA analysis suffers from a 
severe limited diversity problem. On the one hand, this makes the obtained results more 
tenuous. On the other hand, the small number of countries prevented the incorporation of other 
indicators of the national economic, social and programmatic159 environment so as not to 
compound the problem. This has the potential to bias the results. Second, the relatively small 
number of countries means that some configurations are only based on one case making 
measurement error and poor fuzzy score translation serious threats. Third, fuzzy set methods are 
relatively young in social science. As such, there are fewer agreed upon conventions on how to 
carry out the analysis and interpret the results. Finally, in light of the above, the results presented 
in this paper are not meant to support causality but rather to probe into existing associations and 
patterns and to hint at hypotheses for additional testing. Adding more European countries, as 
well as careful reviewing of program characteristics, together with incorporating national 
economic and policy aspects into the analysis should further enhance our understanding of how 
means-tested minimum schemes operate and to what effects. 
 
                                                          
159 For example, this analysis has not included variation in active labor market policies; 
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6 EFFECTS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PARTICIPATION ON PATTERNS OF 
ASSET ACCUMMULATION AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
 
 Income, labour market position and status attainment have long formed the core of 
inequality and stratification research. Likewise, redistributive policies have sought to equalize first 
and foremost income resources. Despite its potential for securing consumption and living 
standards, relatively little attention has been paid to wealth and asset accumulation (Keister 2000; 
Keister and Moller 2000; Spilerman 2000; Shapiro 2001; Kurz and Blossfeld 2004). Not only had 
asset accumulation not figured prominently in scholarly research, social policies traditionally 
associated with the welfare state have paid little attention to the distribution of assets and the 
lack of access to them among low-income households (Beverly and Sherraden 1999; Sherraden 
2001)160.  
 Wealth distribution is heavily skewed not only in developing but also in developed 
countries. Given its allocation, large sections of the population possess either no or only a (fairly) 
small amount of wealth. As such, for a long time, assets as a resource  were considered rather 
irrelevant for the well-being of the majority161 (Keister and Moller 2000). Yet, assets and wealth 
may play a substantial role in shaping life chances and opportunities. As a result, policies that 
have an impact on the accumulation of assets among different groups, and thus influence 
stratification merit further investigation.  
Traditionally, redistributive policies have focused on increasing or guaranteeing income 
(and indirectly, consumption) levels. Support for low-income households is usually structured in 
the form of cash transfers/ in-kind provision to boost consumption or in-kind provision of 
services in order to secure integration into the labour market. Policy proposals to foster asset 
accumulation (as an alternative to income based policies) among the poor have been put forward 
only recently and only on a limited basis (Beverly and Sherraden 1999; Carney and Gale 2001; 
Denton 2001; Sherraden 2001; Duflo, Gale et al. 2006). Yet, income support for the neediest is 
not neutral towards asset ownership. Far from promoting wealth accumulation, it might actually 
encourage dissaving, either through the transfers it provides or, more importantly, through an 
asset-test based eligibility. By supplying cash when other income is too low, the program 
                                                          
160 However, a great deal of policies have fostered asset accumulation among the middle income classes, usually 
through tax incentives, but such fiscal welfare, in comparison with traditional spending measures has remained 
much more invisible. 
161 For a description of trends and levels of wealth inequality in the United States, see Keister, L. A. and S. Moller 
(2000). "Wealth Inequality in the United States." Annual Review of Sociology 26: 63-81, Carney, S. and W. G. Gale 
(2001). Asset Accumulation Among Low-Income Households. Assets for the Poor: The Benefits of Spreading Asset 
Ownership. T. M. Shapiro and E. N. Wolff. New York, Russell Sage Foundation: 165-205, Wolff, E. N., A. 
Zacharias, et al. (2005). "Household wealth, public consumption and economic well-being in the United States." 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 29(6): 1073-1090.; wealth inequality is, as a rule, much more severe than income 
inequality. 
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effectively sets an income floor that may discourage saving for self-insurance purposes162. By 
making entitlement dependent on wealth possession, further disincentives to accumulate may be 
built in the program. 
This chapter sets out to investigate the role of minimum income schemes in the patterns 
of asset accumulation among the poor in eight Central and West European countries. The 
chapter is organized as follows. The following section discusses the role of assets in boosting life 
chances and opportunities, and thereby in shaping inequality and poverty. The third part outlines 
some of the specificities of Central Europe regarding savings and wealth accrual. The fourth part 
reviews the existing evidence, as well as its theoretical underpinnings concerning asset stocks and 
accumulation processes among low-income families. The fifth part examines potential links 
between the design of minimum income schemes and asset ownership patterns among 
recipients. The sixth part discusses data, research design as well as detailing hypotheses related to 
the income floor guarantee provided by minimum income programs, as well as asset tests 
contained by those programs and four asset variables present in the database. The seventh part 
presents the preliminary results for the income floor effect, followed by a discussion of asset test 
in section eight. Finally, the ninth section concludes 
 
 
6.1 WHY ARE ASSETS IMPORTANT? 
 
 Albeit ignored, especially in social policy research163, assets undoubtedly constitute an 
important part of economic, social and political resources. First of all, assets can be pictured as 
the present value of a capitalised income flow. Put differently, assets can be sold to generate an 
income stream. As such, wealth can be used to smoothen consumption164 during periods of 
negative income shocks (Shapiro and Wolff 2001; Ziliak 2003; Wolff, Zacharias et al. 2005; 
Carter and Barrett 2006; Hurst and Ziliak 2006; Morillas 2007). Possessing wealth can also 
reduce the need for savings in order to insure against adverse risks, thereby freeing up more 
income to increase consumption levels (Spilerman 2000).  
However, wealth cannot be reduced to an income stream. Its benefits encompass several 
advantages that are not available through income alone (Keister and Moller 2000; Edin 2001; 
Shapiro 2001; Stern 2001; Morillas 2007). First, wealth usually can be invested to generate more 
wealth, usually by making use of the capital markets. In addition, it can be used as collateral in 
order to secure access to credit needed to invest.  
                                                          
162 The mechanism through which the presence income floor depresses precautionary saving is further explained in 
section V. 
163 The American public benefits literature constitutes somewhat of an exception, although, studies looking into the 
impact of public programs on asset accumulation are far fewer than for example the ones investigating labour supply 
and earnings.  
164 For a discussion of the potential interdependencies between homeownership rates and national social insurance 
policies see Conley, D. and B. Gifford (2006). "Home Ownership, Social Insurance, and the Welfare State." 
Sociological Forum 21(1): 55-82. 
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Second, productive assets are directly used in income/wealth generating activities, such 
as self-employment. Even less liquid assets such as housing can contribute positively to the 
development of entrepreneurial activities (especially among those in the lower part of the income 
distribution), by providing a base around which to organize a business.  
Third, it offers its owner status, prestige and easier access to power. Campbell and 
Henretta envisage a status model in which status attainment is underlined by several status 
claims, all related directly or indirectly to consumption levels (Campbell and Henretta 1980). 
Since wealth represents a guarantee of the consumption level in the long-run, they conclude that 
asset accumulation constitutes another basis for claiming status, separate from income.  
Fourth, wealth can enhance household stability and improve future orientation and 
planning, and promote risk-taking165. A review of the recently introduced Individual 
Development Accounts (IDA-s) shows that accumulated assets can offer a sense of security and 
can lessen the perceived economic strain among low-income families, even after income is 
controlled for (Shobe and Boyd 2005). Likewise, homeowners may be less likely to experience 
overwhelming emotional stress during times of economic hardship (Grinstein-Weiss, Williams 
Shanks et al. 2010). 
Fifth, some forms of wealth can be enjoyed/used without consuming them (such as a 
house that is simultaneously being used for living and kept as an asset the value of which 
appreciated over time), are not exposed to labour market risks and often benefit from a more 
favourable tax regime compared to earnings.  
Last but not least, wealth can be equated to improved opportunities. Wealth can be used 
to acquire other forms of desirable capital, such as human or social, thereby further boosting life 
chances.  Morillas (2007) finds that wealth differentials are positively correlated to the inequality 
in the earnings potential, even when education is controlled for. Parental wealth has also been 
found to impact on the children‟s educational outcomes (Haurin, Parcel et al. 2000; Conley 2001; 
Boyle 2002; Huang, Guo et al. 2010). Huang, Guo et. al (2010) find that assets play a more 
important role than income in overcoming short-term borrowing constraints to finance an 
offspring‟s college education. Furthermore, their results suggest a long-term effect of wealth on 
the likelihood of entering college that parallels that of income. Especially early-childhood wealth 
is closely linked to higher academic ability166, as well as family expectations regarding educational 
attainment. In a similar vein, Conley‟s results (2001) suggest that wealth has an analytically 
distinct effect from income on both years of education, and on the transition to post-secondary 
education. 
                                                          
165 Since wealth can be seen as a form of insurance against unsuccessful investment or entrepreneurial activities, it 
theoretically promotes higher risk activities, since higher risk is usually associated with higher return. 
166 The authors hypothesize that assets constitute a resource that can be invested in child development (creating a 
better home environment, attending a better school, financing extra-curricular activities etc.) Huang, J., B. Guo, et al. 
(2010). "Parental income, assets, borrowing constraints and children's post-secondary education." Children and 
Youth Services Review 32(4): 585-594. 
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Homeownership has been linked with significantly improved quality of the home 
environment, both from a cognitive and an emotional perspective, and with raised achievement 
both in reading and mathematics (Haurin, Parcel et al. 2000). Additionally, children of home 
owners have been found to display fewer behavioural problems  (Haurin, Parcel et al. 2000; 
Boyle 2002), to be more often engaged in extracurricular activities and to spend less time in front 
of the TV or playing video games (Grinstein-Weiss, Williams Shanks et al. 2010) compared to 
children of renters. 
 Thus, wealth brings about a series of advantages that cannot be subsumed to a labour 
market position, however exhaustively described. Ownership matters greatly for one‟s economic 
and social welfare and economic security, independently of the current flow of income. In fact, 
the desirable properties of wealth as a measure of well-being and resources have prompted 
suggestions to use it as an alternative to income. Income-based measures of well-being have 
strongly been criticised as arbitrary and not grounded in behavioural/ empirical facts (Birdsall 
and Londoño 1997; Keister 2000; Carter and Barrett 2006). Indeed, income is a flow measure 
and, as a result, is subjected to transitional and random fluctuations. Permanent or life-time 
income is virtually impossible to observe and thorny to estimate. In contrast, wealth represents a 
stock measure and accordingly captures the history of resource accumulation and previous 
income flows for a given individual or household. Given it is more stable over time, wealth could 
replace income as the basis for poverty measurements , as well as serve as a means to 
distinguishing transient from permanent or chronic poverty forms (Carter and Barrett 2006)167.  
 
 
6.2 SAVING AND ASSET ACCUMULATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 
Little work has been carried out to assess the size and distribution of assets in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding this dearth if data, a few facts are relatively 
uncontroversial, although sometimes they have been deduced on theoretical grounds rather than 
documented empirically.  
 First, national accounts data in the 1980‟s and 1990‟s indicates that former socialist 
countries experienced comparatively very high gross domestic saving rates (around 30% of 
GDP) during the 1980‟s, followed by a steep decline during the 1990s when the saving rates 
hovered around 10%. Many researchers have attributed part of this collapse to the elimination of 
involuntary or “forced” savings prevalent during the socialist era (Denizer and Wolf 1998; 
Denizer and Wolf 2000; Schrooten and Stephan 2001; Vadas 2009). Since consumers in a 
command economy are faced with pervasive shortages in a context of fixed prices, 
disequilibrium exists between demand and supply. Thus, consumers are not able to satisfy their 
entire demand at the official price and are left with a monetary overhang. If this excess money 
                                                          
167 The method proposed by the authors assumes that the function converting underlying assets into income streams 
is known. 
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cannot find an outlet on the black market, it is transformed into “forced” or involuntary saving 
(Denizer and Wolf 2000). Price liberalization, one of the first macroeconomic measures taken 
during transition, would have eliminated the savings surplus by inflating prices to the point 
where demand and supply are in equilibrium. However, the existence of “forced” saving could 
not always be documented empirically168. For example, an analysis based on data generated by 
the World Bank‟s “Savings across the World” project, while confirming the presence of 
involuntary saving in the three Baltic States, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, could not find any 
evidence of this phenomenon in Hungary or in the Czech and the Slovak Republics (Denizer 
and Wolf 2000). It is important to remember though that the decline figures relate to aggregate 
and not to private or to household savings. 
Second, although not directly addressing the issue of household savings and assets, 
studies of privatization policies in Central and Eastern Europe have assumed that the level of 
private wealth and accumulation during early transition was very low (Bolton, Roland et al. 1992; 
Walder 2003). The rationale underlying this assumption is based on the official socialist 
proscription of (excessive) private wealth and the relatively equalitarian distribution of income. 
However, private ownership has never completely disappeared in any country of the communist 
bloc. State seizures of property have focused mostly on business and land (i.e. production 
means), and have been less concerned with residential property (Hanley and Treiman 2004). 
Moreover, residential property continued to be bought and sold privately. Land has constituted 
another important form of private wealth, especially for rural residents. In Poland, 
collectivization has never really taken off so a large share of available agricultural land has 
remained in private hands. Even in countries where collectivization has been carried out 
successfully, households were allowed to keep small plots of land for private use (Szelenyi 1988). 
Private property accumulation has been further advanced by economic liberalization. In 
Hungary, reforms carried out in the 1970‟s have further extended the limits of allowable private 
land, and instituted contracts between private individuals and the state for lease and purchase 
purposes (Szelenyi 1988). Thus, especially in more liberalized communist regimes, households 
were likely to privately possess their homes, to accumulate some consumer durables, or even to 
have a business in the secondary economy. Accumulated private property could be passed on to 
the next generation. In fact, inheritance laws, particularly after the Stalinist period, resembled to a 
large extent Romanic law169.  
                                                          
168
 The existence of “forced” savings during socialism is usually demonstrated by comparing the observed savings 
rate with the presumed rate under market economy conditions; the latter is computed by assuming that determinants 
of saving are the same in market and command economies at a certain level of development, determining savings 
elasticities based on a sample of market economies and substituting the socialist countries‟ corresponding values of 
the savings‟ determinants ; see Denizer, C. and H. C. Wolf (2000). "The Saving Collapse During the Transition." 
The World Bank Economic Review 14(3). 
169 Albeit Marxism proclaimed the abolishment of the inheritance of private property, the institution of inheritance 
has been firmly maintained both in the Soviet Union and in its satellites; with the exception of agricultural land in 
joint ownership, there were little restrictions on inheritance; furthermore, initially stricter dispositions have been 
gradually relaxed. For a description of Soviet and CEE inheritance law see Gsovski, V. (1947). "Soviet Law of 
Inheritance: I." Michigan Law Review 45(3): 291-320, Brown, L. N. (1963). "Inheritance and the Communist Legal 
198 
 
In addition to private property carried over directly from the socialist period, two other 
processes have additionally contributed to the formation of private assets stocks. On the one 
hand, restitution laws passed in the aftermath of the regime collapse have reconstituted partially 
or totally pre-communist property rights170(Hanley and Treiman 2004). On the other hand, some 
state property has been acquired, more or less onerously, by managers and insiders of state 
enterprises taking advantage of the de facto decentralization of economic decision-making in the 
early 1990s (Bolton, Roland et al. 1992; Hanley 1999). Yet, the absence of micro-data on 
household savings and possessions during the period makes it hard to gain a clear picture about 
patterns of asset accumulation and distribution in the years after the regime change.  
Despite the data limitations, a few studies have looked into the determinants of private 
and household saving during transition (Denizer and Wolf 1998; Denizer, Holger et al. 2000; 
Denizer and Wolf 2000; Schrooten and Stephan 2001)171. Findings indicate that a higher saving 
rate is associated with having a higher relative income, being middle-aged and facing more 
uncertainty about the future (proxied by the level of liberalization172). The labour market position 
(sector of employment and type of employment) is found to have no impact on the propensity 
to save. One exception is unemployment significantly reducing the savings rate (Denizer and 
Wolf 1998). Lack of consumer durables is also positively correlated with increased saving rates, 
most probably a consequence of constrained consumer credit during the 1990‟s. No clear 
patterns emerged regarding the impact of either inflation or economic growth on the savings 
rate. While informative, these studies are far from providing a clear picture of Central and East 
European specificities in the area of savings and assets. Moreover, confusing patterns might have 
emerged due to the widespread use of proxies in the absence if adequate data. For example, 
economic growth has been found to have both a positive and a negative effect on the saving 
rate. In the first case, it has been interpreted as a proxy for income (Schrooten and Stephan 
2001), whereas in the second it has been seen as a sign of consumption smoothening in the face 
of a J growth curve (Denizer and Wolf 2000). The quality of data represents a serious issue even 
when access to household level data is available. Because savings are generated residually based 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Order." Soviet Studies 14(3): 295-313, Tay, E.-S. A. (1968). "The Law of Inheritance in the New Russion Civil Code 
of 1964." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 17(2): 472-500, Foster-Simons, F. (1985). "The 
Development of Inheritance Law in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China." The American Journal 
of Comparative Law 33(1): 33-62, Malik, S. (1986). "Inheritance Law in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 
of China: An Unfriendly Comment." The American Journal of Comparative Law 34(1): 137-144. However, there 
were limits on what could be held privately, as well as on the uses of private property (for example, the ban on profit 
seeking); it is not clear though to what extent these restrictions were actually enforced. 
170 Especially land and real estate property has been restituted to previous owners or their heirs; to a lesser extent, 
business property owners have also been compensated for their loss.  
171 Only Denizer, C. and H. C. Wolf (1998). "Household Savings in Transition Economies." NBER Working Papers 
Series 6457, Denizer, C., W. C. Holger, et al. (2000). Household Savings in Transition Economies. Policy Research 
Working Paper No 2299. Washington D.C., World Bank. use micro-data in their study. 
172 A higher liberalization index is used to stand for more certainty about the future institutional outlook; its negative 
impact on the saving rate is interpreted as more certainty about the future driving down the need for precautionary 
saving. 
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on income and expenditure, both of which are known to suffer from underreporting173, their 
level is probably underestimated.  
Macroeconomic policies, as well as structural reforms have had an impact on wealth 
levels and distribution in Central East European countries during the first transition years. While 
no comprehensive study on the topic is known to the author, at least two facts are worth noting. 
First, the value of whatever savings households might have accumulated in liquid form 
(voluntarily or involuntarily) has been seriously reduced by bouts of inflation and, in some cases, 
hyperinflation during the first years after price liberalization. Inflation had a levelling effect by 
triggering greater losses for those with higher savings. Second, a rapid privatization of the 
publicly rented housing stock resulted in large home ownership rates across the region 
(Buckleyand and Tsenkova 2001; Pichler-Milanovich 2001). While each country adopted its own 
version of a privatization strategy, the housing stock has usually been sold at price levels well 
below market value, and often disregarding desirability features such as location (Pichler-
Milanovich 2001). While the (very) low asking prices might have enabled some low-income 
households to become home-owners, they also reinforced existing inequalities in access to 
housing since tenants in more desirable housing units were comparatively advantaged. The low 
selling price of the publicly rented housing stock, together with the elimination of direct 
producer subsidies, is thought to have depressed supply and, as a result, increased housing prices, 
making home ownership much less likely for younger generations (Buckleyand and Tsenkova 
2001; Pichler-Milanovich 2001). Some governments (such as the Hungarian one in 2001) have 
subsequently introduced indirect housing subsidies (directed at the consumer rather than at the 
producer), in an attempt to solve the housing issues. However, the subsidies seem to have 
further increased prices rather than eased demand (Vadas 2009).  
 
 
6.3 ASSET ACCUMULATION PROCESSES AMONG LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Although wealth and income are often found to be only weakly correlated (Keister 2000), 
those who posses few income resources are usually found to also lack wealth and assets. To 
some extent, this finding is not wholly surprising. By definition, the poor possess too little 
liquidities to ensure an adequate consumption level. As such, they are presumed to have virtually 
no leeway left to build up savings or to invest in asset accumulation (Keister and Moller 2000; 
Carney and Gale 2001; Sherraden 2001). Furthermore, low income families often have more 
irregular work histories, with more frequent unemployment spells, and less access to secure and 
stable jobs in the primary labour market. Both unemployment (Gruber 2001) and temporary 
employment (McGrath and Keister 2008) have been found to reduce asset levels, independently 
from income, education or occupation. However, the low income levels in themselves are not 
                                                          
173 See for example Denizer, C., W. C. Holger, et al. (2000). Household Savings in Transition Economies. Policy 
Research Working Paper No 2299. Washington D.C., World Bank.. 
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enough to account for the observed levels of asset ownerships, at least in developed countries 
such as the United States. In particular, the standard economic model used to explain saving 
patterns, i.e. the life-cycle accumulation model174, is reasonably accurate in accounting for 
observed wealth accumulation among middle and higher income households but seriously over-
predicts asset-to-income ratios among low income families (Hubbard, Skinner et al. 1995; 
Browning and Lusardi 1996; Ziliak 2003; Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger 2004). 
As a result, other reasons have been put forward to explain why the income poor might 
end up with little or no wealth (Beverly and Sherraden 1999; Carney and Gale 2001; Sherraden 
2001). If income poverty is related to some unobserved psychological or behavioural 
characteristics (such as lack of motivation, lack of discipline and willpower, a preference for 
leisure and present rather than future utility etc), these features, in turn, might be responsible for 
wealth poverty as well. A shortage of both income and assets would in this case be a result of 
“deficient” choices stemming either from personal preferences or from socially shaped “deviant” 
behaviour. In fact, behavioural models of wealth accumulation (Browning and Lusardi 1996; 
Beverly, McBride et al. 2003) maintain that saving in itself requires active psychological or 
behavioural strategies to contain spending and to save. If such is the case, unobserved 
psychological traits that hamper “mental tricks” needed to restrain consumption (such as very 
high time discount rates), as well as lack of access to instruments facilitating savings (such as for 
example, transforming liquid wealth in less liquid forms like stocks or bonds) have the effect of 
lowering wealth accumulation relative to a given income level. Thus, the observed gap in wealth-
to-income ratios between high and low income households could be accounted for if low 
income is correlated with an inability to implement psychological and/or behavioural saving 
strategies.  
Finally, an often overlooked factor that can alter both the distribution of income and 
assets, as well as asset portfolios consists of existing economic and social institutions. These can 
facilitate, or on the contrary impede asset accumulation among the various income groups. 
Traditionally, policies supporting asset accumulation have relied on the tax system. The 
favourable tax treatment of mortgages has long been a well established means through which the 
state can encourage home ownership among the middle classes (Kurz and Blossfeld 2004; Shobe 
and Boyd 2005; Conley and Gifford 2006). In general, favourable tax treatment of capital gains 
and asset holdings has the potential to encourage asset building among the middle and upper 
income strata. Conversely, low and lower middle income households have usually not been able 
take full advantage of these tax incentives since their income was seldom high enough.  
Other institutional barriers have hampered asset accumulation among the poor. Among 
them, lack of access to affordable credit has probably received the most attention, most often in 
connection to access to homeownership (Stern 2001; Karger 2004). Middle-income families have 
                                                          
174 For a comprehensive review of the various theoretical models used to explain patterns of saving, see Browning, 
M. and A. Lusardi (1996). "Household Saving: Micro Theories and Micro Facts." Journal of Economic Literature 
34(4): 1797-1855. 
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traditionally resorted to credit in order to purchase a home. Since homeownership is the single 
most important item in an average family‟s asset portfolio, and since buying a home has been a 
relatively safe and high-return investment, lack of access to affordable mortgage markets can be 
expected to directly limit wealth among poorer households. Moreover, a lack of access to credit 
may impede wealth build-up in more indirect but nonetheless important ways. Both 
entrepreneurial activities and human capital investment are credited with potentially very high 
rates of return, in terms of future income and ultimately asset accumulation (Sykes 2005). Credit 
is an important financing strategy both for launching one‟s own business and for investing in 
education. Finally, even short-term consumption credit may directly impact on asset accrual. 
Ethnographic studies (Karger 2004) have documented that, in the absence of a link to 
mainstream financial institutions, many poor families resort to fringe establishments such as 
pawnshops, rent-to-own stores, check cashers etc. that charge loan sharking fees and repossess 
collaterals, depleting the assets of the poor in the process. 
Low-income groups have traditionally been targeted for state support not through the tax 
system175, but through direct provision of cash and services. More generally, the provision of 
cash transfers and of basic services forms the core of classic welfare state, whose effects on 
assets are much less known176. The next section is dedicated to reviewing the asset implications 
of one type of policy that is especially salient for the poor, means-tested social assistance. 
 
 
6.4 MEANS-TESTED PROGRAMS AND ASSET ACCUMULATION 
 
 Welfare state variation among industrialized countries, both in quantitative and 
qualitative terms, is a well established fact (Esping-Andersen 1990). Although much less rich 
than their neighbours, Central and East European countries have established social insurance 
and assistance programs that largely resemble those established in the West (Collier, Roggeman 
et al. 1999; Barr 2002; Inglot 2008). Social assistance programs are no exception177. Albeit 
differing in a number of important respects, the policy designs of this type of program share 
several important characteristics. Firstly, although support for the poor has been made available 
under various forms, ranging from cash transfers, to subsidized housing, to in-kind provision of 
goods and especially services, the onus is generally put on two dimensions, i.e. enhancing 
consumption and the future labour market position. Nowhere does asset accumulation figure as 
an explicit policy goal. Secondly, programs are, at core, designed as a minimum income scheme, 
meaning that both eligibility and the amount of the disbursed benefit are tied to an income 
                                                          
175 An important exception to this general pattern is the Earned Negative Income Tax in  the US; another 
institutional barrier to asset accumulation among low-income households has been pinpointed in the lack of access 
to affordable credit. 
176 An exception is the relatively well-developed economic literature on the impact of public pension benefits on 
savings. 
177 By social assistance, I mean means-tested cash transfers and associated benefits that are made available based on 
need. 
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threshold. More specifically, the benefit tops up the current income of a recipient up to a certain 
threshold. As such, this type of program effectively establishes a consumption floor, thereby 
possibly reducing incentives for precautionary saving, especially for families with lifetime 
incomes close to the established floor. Thirdly, with few exceptions, means-tested programs take 
into account a claimant‟s assets when establishing eligibility. Asset-test can be justified on at least 
two accounts. On the one hand, as income is a flow measure, it is often very difficult to measure 
it precisely, especially when income sources are erratic as it is often the case with the poor. An 
asset-test can be presumably used to correct for any underestimation of the available income 
sources. On the other hand, since assets are a resource in themselves and as a rule, can be 
converted into an income stream, those possessing them cannot be considered “truly” in need.  
These three features common to social assistance programs throughout Europe, albeit 
not necessarily intended to impact on ownership patterns, have the potential to depress asset 
accumulation among the low income population in general, and their clients in particular. By 
providing an income guarantee, the existence of a means-tested safety net can lower the 
motivation to save in order to insure against future risks (the income effect). Since the level of 
the benefit is set usually very low, most often below relative poverty lines, the strongest 
disincentives are experienced by those with low and very low incomes. In this case, the saving 
disincentive arises from the existence of the transfer itself. Moreover, a more generous income 
support would, in this view, worsen the saving disincentives. 
A very low benefit can discourage asset accumulation in other ways. Often, the build-up 
of assets, especially that of home ownership, life insurance and pension plans, requires a long-
term and steady ability to pay in (premiums, contributions, mortgage rates etc.), before any profit 
can be reaped. Yet, low income households are much more likely to experience variability in 
their income flows. A very low income guarantee would not allow the continuation of such 
payment while in receipt of the benefit and thus could, a priori, discourage any attempts to save 
through long-term (higher return) instruments (security effect). Note that according to this line 
of reasoning, the problem is not the existence of the benefit itself, but its level. Contrarily to the 
income effect, a higher income floor guarantee would be expected effectively enhance asset 
accumulation. 
The effects described above are indirect, but means-tested programs for the poor can 
have a direct negative impact on asset accumulation among low-income households through 
their asset-test. Because entitlement is partly based on lack of access to wealth, the programs give 
rise to two adverse178 effects. On the one hand, households that lack income could be forced to 
                                                          
178 Note that the first effect is actually an intended one if the purpose is to force households to use up all their 
resources before public support kicks in and to thus conserve public resources. However, in light of the importance 
of assets for economic security, as well as their non-linear accumulation, drawing down on assets is potentially 
harmful for the household‟s long-term economic perspectives.  
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spend down their assets in order to become eligible for the benefit179. This outcome would 
artificially lower assets among clients of the program. On the other hand, low-income 
households, knowing that their eligibility for the income safety net is conditional on not 
possessing any wealth, could be induced to forgo any asset accumulation so as to maintain 
entitlement in the case of adverse income shocks. Similarly to the income and security effects, 
this result would affect the entire low-income population, independently of whether it received 
any means-tested benefits or not. 
To sum up, receipt or mere awareness of means-tested income support is possibly 
harmful for the prospects of asset ownership among the low-income strata. Not only is this 
effect undesirable, but it renders assistance to the needy self-defeating. As discussed in the first 
section, assets constitute an invaluable resource. Making them inaccessible to the poor seriously 
undermines their abilities to become self-sufficient and could increase dependence on benefit 
receipt. Studies in the field of development economics have found that the poor can weather 
successfully adverse shocks to their material situation if their (productive) assets have not 
dropped below a critical threshold (Barrett and Carter 2005; Barrett and Swallow 2006; Carter 
and Barrett 2006). In contrast, severe asset losses have been found to usually result in chronic 
poverty lock-ins.  
Notwithstanding a few very brief theoretical discussions (Beverly and Sherraden 1999; 
Sherraden 2001), empirical explorations of the negative effects of social assistance programs on 
asset ownership among the poor have remained scarce. In addition, they are, by and large, 
confined to the American public assistance system, where quantitative evaluation of public 
policies is a well-entrenched tradition and where programs specifically targeting the poor have 
received more scholarly attention. 
An early influential study (Hubbard, Skinner et al. 1995) attempted to reconcile the 
standard life-cycle accumulation model with the observed low wealth to income ratio among 
households with low lifetime earnings (proxied by education), by incorporating the impact of 
means-tested transfers on inter-temporal utility maximization. Two types of effects have been 
integrated in the model. First, since means-tested benefits provide a consumption floor in the 
case of negative income shocks, they reduce the need for precautionary saving. Second, since 
eligibility is asset-based, these programs usually entail an implicit 100% tax on wealth above 
certain thresholds. Both mechanisms should depress asset accrual among households that are 
current or potential clients of the programs. Using simulations of their proposed extended 
model, the authors have been able to reproduce the observed differences in the wealth to income 
ratios of high and low permanent income households. As a result, they conclude that public 
policies in the form of means-tested public assistance can account for the puzzle of very low 
wealth levels among lower-income households.  
                                                          
179 Spending down assets may be particularly problematic in the case of the elderly who would like to bequest 
something to their heirs. Possessing assets may not only disqualify them from public aid but may hurt their 
children/ grandchildren if asset tests are used in conjunction with an extended family assessment unit. 
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 Albeit providing interesting insights, the study does not amount to a formal empirical test 
of either benefit levels or asset limits on wealth accrual among the economically vulnerable 
families. However, several changes in the eligibility rules governing the American public 
assistance system have allowed some authors to directly test for the presence of dissaving 
incentives in the design of means-tested benefits. Taking advantage of the changes introduced in 
AFDC in 1981 through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)180, Powers (1998) 
estimated a relatively large negative effect of asset tests. More specifically, her results indicate that 
a one dollar increase in the exempted assets limit induced a 25 cents increase in savings among 
poor female headed households with children.  
Nevertheless, this finding remains controversial. More recent research centring on the 
transformation of asset eligibility rules brought about by the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act (PRWORA) in 1995181 has failed to find conclusive evidence of a significant 
negative impact of asset tests on wealth accumulation among low income households eligible for 
public assistance. For example, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) find that both the target group 
(potentially eligible households) and the comparison group (low-income households without 
children)  failed to increase their wealth stock in response to more generous asset limits. In 
addition, states implementing more generous asset limits did not experience greater wealth 
accrual among the target group compared to states making smaller adjustments. The authors 
conclude that asset limits present in means-tested public assistance programs are likely not 
binding182, and therefore of no consequence for wealth accrual among low-income households 
(vehicle ownership is an exception). Instead, means-tested transfers may reduce wealth levels 
among economically vulnerable households by providing a consumption floor and thus, reducing 
the need for precautionary saving. In another study, Ziliak (2003) uses a correlated random-
effects generalized method of moments estimator to search for evidence of precautionary saving 
among the poor, the near-poor and the rich183. He finds that the poor show lower (especially 
financial) wealth to income ratios (compared to the near-poor and the rich) in states with higher 
AFDC/Food Stamps transfers. Apparently, the presence of a consumption floor depressed 
accumulation among the poor but not among the near-poor or the rich. Furthermore, his results 
indicate that asset tested benefits reduce wealth-to income ratios among the poor to a greater 
extent than non asset tested transfers. He attributes 42% of the gap in liquid holdings to income 
ratios to the presence of asset tested transfer income.  
                                                          
180 Overall, the law reduced the limit of allowable assets for AFDC recipients, with the exception of the primary 
home which became exempted; since previously the various states has different limits, sharper decreases in more 
generous states could be compared to smaller decreases in states with more stringent rules before the Act. 
181 The federal law allowed the states to implement their own asset limits in the new Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) program; the majority of the states took advantage to raise the limits of allowable assets for 
program clients; however, some states implemented more generous allowances than others. 
182 Low income households save too little anyway for the asset test to be relevant. 
183 The sample is split based on an average of predicted probabilities to be on welfare across several years, Ziliak, J. 
P. (2003). "Income Transfers and Assets of the Poor." The Review of Economics and Statistics 85(1): 63-76. 
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In a similar fashion,  Nam (2008) analyzes the consequences of public assistance asset 
tests on financial savings. Using a somewhat larger target group (female headed households with 
children and less than 16 years of education), the author replicates previous findings of a 
statistically insignificant coefficient of the amount of asset limits on financial savings. However, 
replacing the amount of the asset limit with the length of time a relaxed asset limit has been in 
place does yield statistically significant results. More specifically, the longer a liberalized asset 
limit had been in effect, the greater the likelihood that the target group accumulated more 
financial assets relative to the comparison groups. Additionally, conditional on savings being 
larger than zero, both the value of the asset limit and the time length of implementation mattered 
in raising financial savings, suggesting that there may be a time lag before low-income families 
start saving in response the higher asset limits. A similar time effect has been found in relation to 
the probability of owning a bank account. 
Consumer durables have been shown to constitute a very important component of the 
wealth portfolio of low-income households (Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger 2004; Sullivan 
2006). Since they may also constitute important consumption goods, their potential interaction 
with asset tests present in social assistance programs is of particular interest. Sullivan (2006) 
exploits interstate variation in asset limits related to TANF eligibility, but focuses on vehicle 
ownership and vehicle equity184. His findings indicate that vehicle ownership increased more in 
his target group (single mothers without a high school diploma), both in absolute terms and 
relative to a comparison group, when the state they resided in had higher vehicle limits for 
TANF participation. Vehicle exemptions and higher vehicle limits tended to increase both the 
likelihood of possessing a vehicle and vehicle equity. However, general asset limits had no 
influence on vehicle ownership. Despite the fact that implicit tax rates were lower on vehicles 
than on financial wealth, no evidence of asset reallocation was found. 
Another US public program targeted at the poor is Medicaid. Similar to AFDC/TANF, 
eligibility for Medicaid involves restrictions on asset ownership. One study (Gruber and Yelowitz 
1999) looked at potential effects of Medicaid coverage on the total net worth of low-income 
families, exploiting a differential change in eligibility rules across states to identify program 
effects. Results indicated that each $1000 increase in “eligible Medicaid dollars”185 reduced by 
0.81percent the odds of having positive assets. Correspondingly, each $1000 increase in “eligible 
Medicaid dollars” depressed total net worth holdings by 2.51%, conditional on having positive 
assets. Nonetheless, the effects were relatively small in absolute terms, due to the very low levels 
of total net worth among the Medicaid eligible population.  
Finally, several studies have investigated asset accumulation processes among the 
unemployed (Engen and Gruber 2001; Gruber 2001). Although unemployment insurance has 
                                                          
184 Under TANF, most states implemented a more favourable treatment of vehicles than of financial assets when 
establishing eligibility. 
185 This is a measure computed by the authors to account for variation in eligibility depending on income, family size 
and composition and other household characteristics; see Gruber, J. and A. Yelowitz (1999). "Public Health 
Insurance and Private Savings." Journal of Political Economy 107(6): 1249-1274. 
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different objectives and potentially addresses different needs than means-tested public assistance, 
the client populations of the two programs tend to share important similarities (such as lower 
education, lower life-time income and so on). Using state variation in unemployment insurance 
replacement rates as a proxy for future income uncertainty, Engen and Gruber (2001) test for the 
existence of precautionary saving. Their results indicate that higher replacement rates reduce 
wealth to income ratios, especially for younger workers. The magnitude of the effect they find is 
sizeable in percentage terms (2.8% drop in the financial wealth to income ratio for each 10% 
increase in the replacement rate), but small in absolute terms (around 241$ at the median). In this 
case, the presence of a consumption floor implicit in the unemployment insurance benefits 
depresses saving. Nevertheless, findings in a different study (Gruber 2001) suggest that the 
unemployment insurance may play a positive role in wealth accumulation. In particular, 
individuals benefiting from more liberal replacement rates tend to draw down their assets at a 
slower rate. In this case, the presence of a more generous consumption floor mitigates dissaving 
during unemployment spells.  
If studies of the effect of public transfers on asset accumulation are few and far between 
in developed countries, even less attention has been paid to processes taking place in the 
developing world. A study of the Chilean pension reform (Cerda 2008) concludes that the 
previous PAYG social security system had a negative impact on wealth among low educated 
workers, but not on the other categories of workers. The size of the effect was considerable: 
each peso in current future benefits in the PAYG system reduced the predicted wealth among 
low income workers by approximately 0.1 pesos186.  
In the context of Central and Eastern Europe, several studies have addressed the issue of 
savings in connection with proposed reform of the pension systems187 (Fultz and Ruck 2001; 
Hausner 2001). However, the primary interest of these studies has lied with approximating the 
extent of a rise in aggregate savings in the event of switching from a PAYG to a funded pension 
system. What is more, since implementation of pension reform has started only relatively 
recently188, results are estimated based on theoretical models rather than observed empirically189. 
As such, they shed little light either on mechanisms of wealth accumulation or on the actual 
impact of public transfers on observed asset levels specific to Central Europe. What is more, 
virtually no wok has been carried out to examine the impact of an income floor guarantee and of 
                                                          
186 However, it is not very clear why the author fails to find the same effect for the newer funded system; perhaps 
since the system had less time to establish itself, it is less trusted, and thus it depresses precautionary saving less. 
187 More exactly, the propositions of moving from a PAYG to a funded pension system, largely following the 
Chilean example; the World Bank has played an important part in promoting this transition with varying degrees of 
success. 
188 In some cases (for example Hungary), the transition has been temporarily “frozen” in the face of financial 
difficulties. 
189 A Hungarian study has carried out a similar exercise in connection to housing policies during the 2000‟s; Vadas, 
G. (2009). "The Housing Subsidy Scheme and Households' Wealth in Hungary: Urban Legends and Facts." 
International Journal of Housing Policy 9(1): 1-24. 
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asset based eligibility in minimum income schemes on patterns of asset accumulation among 
low-income households either in Western or in Central Eastern Europe.  
 
 
6.5 HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODS 
 
6.5.1 HYPOTHESES 
 
While the used dataset (the European Union-Survey of Income and Living Conditions) 
does not specifically collect detailed data on wealth levels (especially liquid forms of wealth), 
nonetheless, some information on some types of assets is available. More specifically, 
information exists on possession of consumer durables, accumulation of arrears, and capacity to 
face unexpected financial expenses. The last question is of special interest. In the absence of 
precise information on savings, it provides a first approximation of whether the household has 
some sort of short-term financial cushion190. Additionally, information exists on the income 
amounts that the household derives from its assets, i.e. income from interest, dividends, 
unincorporated business and income from rental of property. Asset generated income may be 
used as a proxy, albeit imperfect, of having positive net worth. 
Thus, in the absence of any good measure of overall wealth, four separate asset related 
variables are used: consumer durables, arrears, asset generated income, and savings. It should be 
noted that despite being all related in some way to net worth, the four variables refer to types of 
assets that may be qualitatively different. As a result, they will be analysed separately. 
All four asset proxies may be hypothesised to be affected by means-tested income 
support programs, yet the strength of the effects will probably differ. Consumer durables may 
represent an important form of asset accumulation for low-income households (Fernández-
Villaverde and Krueger 2004; Sullivan 2006). As such, the presence of a state sanctioned income 
floor, by reducing the need for precautionary saving, depresses all asset holdings, including 
consumer durables. To the extent that program asset tests do count consumer durables as assets 
and deny eligibility to owners, they may further reduce the propensity to accumulate consumer 
durables. However, consumer durables are a special form of assets, in that they hold intrinsic 
consumption value. In effect, they are likely to be purchased primarily for their consumption 
value rather than as insurance for a rainy day191. Moreover, most social assistance programs will 
probably disregard basic household appliances when establishing eligibility (the possession of a 
car is probably the most notable exception). Both income floors and asset tests imply a negative 
                                                          
190 Because of the way it is formulated (help from outside the household and medium and long-term loans are 
excluded), a positive response amounts to having some savings or being able to rely on short term (essentially credit 
card loans that must be paid off within a month). Thus, especially for low-income households which lack the extra 
income to cover an amount equal to the poverty threshold per household member from one month‟s income, a 
positive response is a good approximation of having some savings. 
191 Due to their rapid loss of value, consumer durables in effect make a poor saving device. 
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effect on consumer durable accumulation. On the other hand, social assistance programs do 
provide their clients with additional income that may be used to purchase consumer durables (in 
some cases, programs may make special one-off benefits available precisely for this type of 
purchase). Thus, the programs‟ effect on the accumulation of consumer durables is ambiguous. 
Arrears in existing payment schedules are not technically part of assets. Yet, debts do 
contribute to a household‟s net worth. It is not always clear how to interpret household debt. 
Often, debt is simply a sign of a household‟s access to the credit market, rather than a sign of 
financial vulnerability. What is more, debt in the form of credit is often used to build up assets, 
such as in the case of home mortgages or business loans. Arrears however paint a much clearer 
picture. Since they represent missed payments that often lead to penalties, stain credit histories 
and are directly endangering a household‟s existing possessions, they clearly indicate financial 
vulnerability. Means tested income support programs do not take into account negative wealth 
(i.e. debt) when determining entitlement. Consequently, asset tests are unlikely to be in any way 
related to the built-up of debt arrears. Conversely, the income floor guarantee present in a floor 
could add to arrear build-ups. The rationale is similar to precautionary saving. Households with 
lifetime low incomes might be more likely to resort to risky credit if they can count on an income 
source at all times. A higher income floor should therefore be associated with more arrears. 
Income provided by social assistance could also minimize arrears. Households that lose other 
income sources may still rely on this type of benefit to pay off existing debts, and thus avoid 
arrears. In this case, higher benefits should be associated with fewer arrears. 
Financial assets are most likely to be negatively affected by the existence of means-tested 
programs. This form of savings lacks direct consumption value and is by its nature liquid and 
thus very easily convertible into income. It is thus perhaps best suited to insure against short and 
medium term income shocks. At the same time, financial assets are both easiest to detect and 
highly expected to be run down before public support kicks in. To sum up, both the income 
floor effect and the asset test effect are likely to depress financial assets. Theoretically, social 
assistance income could be saved and thus, it could (up to the asset limit) contribute to increased 
savings. However, this is a highly unlikely outcome given that in all countries social assistance is 
set so as to cover only minimum consumption needs. 
Finally, means-tested income support programs are expected to also depress asset 
generated income. First, any type of assets underlying this type of income is both very likely to 
preclude participation in social assistance schemes and to be liable to depressed precautionary 
saving generated by the existence of a guaranteed income floor. Moreover, asset generated 
income is also part of the income test the household has to undergo in order to establish 
entitlement. Thus, it is subject to a marginal tax rate of 100%. Low-income households may be 
unwilling to invest in income generating assets under these conditions. 
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6.5.2 DATA AND METHODS 
 
 All the analyses are based on the 2007 European Union Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions longitudinal database (second version, released in March 2010192). Data regarding 
maximum benefits to which a family is entitled as well as the existence of asset test has been 
retrieved from the Mutual Information System on Social Protection Database (European 
Commission 2010).  
 Four separate sets of models have been constructed corresponding to the four types of 
asset variables. Both consumer durables and arrears are represented by an index constructed 
based on item response theory (ITR). An ITR model has been estimated using five indicators in 
the case of consumer durables (possession of a phone, a colour TV, a computer, a washing 
machine and a car) and three indicators in the case of arrears (existence of mortgage arrears, 
utility payment arrears and other purchase arrears). Indexes have been computed by predicting a 
single latent factor. A separate ITR model has been estimated for each country and each year in 
the dataset, thereby allowing the impact of the indicators on the latent factor to differ across 
countries and years.  
Two program variables have been constructed, corresponding to the income floor and 
asset tests present in a country‟s social assistance program. Information on program rules193 for 
eligibility has been used to compute the maximum benefit a family may have been awarded194 
during the income reference period, based on the age and number of its members. This is 
referred to as the income floor guaranteed by the program for the respective household. The 
income floor is the theoretical amount of social assistance a household would be entitled to 
should it lose all its income sources195. To maximize comparability, the maximum family benefit 
is expressed in consumption-based purchasing power parities196, as well as adjusted for 
inflation197. Both adjustments have been made using the EUROSTAT compiled indicators on 
consumer price indexes and purchasing power parities (see 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database)  
Regrettably, the information provided by the MISSOC database on asset tests is much 
vaguer than that on benefits. Only a few countries explicitly detail the contents of their asset test, 
a majority just stating its existence198. As a consequence, just a crude asset test indicator could be 
constructed. It contains information on the existence or absence of an asset test199, and in the 
                                                          
192Further information and accompanying documentation of EU-SILC can be found at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/eu_silc.  
193 Rules may differ both across countries and across years. 
194 Zero income is assumed. 
195 It is thus entirely different from received social assistance. 
196 The EU 27 mean is taken as 1. 
197 The CPI for 2005 is taken to represent 100. 
198 To some extent, the lack of clarity is due to ambiguities in the national legislation itself. Furthermore, local or 
regional authorities may be given discretion in establishing entitlement, and therefore in the interpretation of asset 
limits provisions present in legislation. 
199 When an asset test is not mentioned anywhere among eligibility conditions, it is assumed to be absent. 
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case of its existence whether any significant (larger or equal to 1000 Euros) disregards are 
allowed200. 
To identify the impact of the income floor effect, variation across households, countries 
and time is used. To account for the clustering of the data, two and three level hierarchical 
models have been used. Household observations are nested within households and, in turn, these 
are nested within countries. This strategy not only adjusts standard errors due to non-
independence of observations, but also implicitly introduces controls for household and country 
time-invariant characteristics.  
 All the hypotheses that have been discussed so far refer to the low long-term income 
population. Long term or lifetime income is, of course, unobservable. Current income is often 
too variable to be reliably used as a proxy for long-term income. As a result, two alternative 
definitions have been used to delimitate the low-income population. Firstly, because lack of 
education often acts as a barrier to upward mobility, the maximum level of education attained by 
a household member is used as a criterion. Low-income households are defined as households in 
which no member received post-secondary education. Secondly, use is made of the panel nature 
of the data. Since household income is observed in three and sometimes four consecutive years, 
low income households are defined as those households that are consistently found in the 
bottom two income201 quintiles of the population. Applying the second criterion yields a much 
more reduced sample compared to the first one. For every dependent variable, two sets of 
models are presented. Each set corresponds to a different estimation sample defined using the 
education and the income criteria, respectively. 
All sets of models contain several different specifications as the list of control variables is 
gradually expanded. Two types of control variables have been included: single parent family, no 
of children (<18); no of young children (<7), no of retired persons (>64), at the household level, 
and GDP per capita and the national unemployment rate during the previous year, at the country 
level. The selection of controls has been based on potential confounders of the relationship 
between the program characteristics faced by a given household and its assets. All are time-
varying covariates that have the potential to influence both asset accumulation and benefits and 
eligibility in the event of participation in a social assistance program. Single parent households 
and households with children are more likely to both be asset poor (as they have not had the 
time or the resources to accumulate them), and more likely to be awarded social assistance 
benefits when claiming. Due to concerns regarding child poverty, often means-tested income 
support incorporates generous equivalence scales for children (in some cases counting them 
more than additional adults)202. Single parents are also, in some cases, awarded additional benefits 
under social assistance programs. Retired persons, on the other hand, are more likely to have 
                                                          
200 In the case the asset test is just mentioned, no disregards are assumed. 
201 Income refers to household equivalised income. 
202 See European Commission, D. E., Social Affaires and Equal Opportunities (2010). Mutual Information System 
on Social Protection Database, European Commission; 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do?lang=en. 
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accumulated assets and less likely to be social assistance clients due to minimum pension 
provisions. At the country level, benefits are likely to be cut in a recession and raised in times of 
economic boom especially in small Central European countries which have little leeway for anti-
cyclical policies and are very vulnerable to high budget deficits. These same underlying economic 
trends however may also be responsible for asset depletion. 
One consistent finding of the savings literature is that saving behaviour is intimately 
linked to the life cycle (Browning and Lusardi 1996). Hence, the impact of disincentives from 
public assistance is also likely to vary with the life cycle. Since young families are 
disproportionately more likely to rely on social assistance (see Chapter 4) and since they also face 
significant barriers to saving, they might respond more rapidly to the income floor and asset test 
in a public income support program.  In an attempt to capture potential differential effects of the 
income floor, interaction variables have been constructed for single parent, number if young 
children, and number of retired persons in the household. Additionally, the program impact is 
likely to become stronger as the household income decreases. Thus, average program effects in a 
larger sample, where a significant proportion of households have incomes that are substantially 
above the guaranteed income threshold, may be undetectable. As a result, an interaction term 
between household income floors and household net equivalised disposable income has been 
introduced in the model specifications relating to the education-based low-income household 
sample. Finally, since income floor effects may vary according to other context features such as 
the economic background or the larger institutional framework, random slope effects for income 
floor have been estimated. 
It should be noted at this point that results pertaining to asset test effects should be 
regarded only as indicative, and not definitive. Unlike the income floor, asset tests vary only 
across countries, and are constant both across households and across time. As a result, there is 
too little variation to identify effects and too many confounding factors at the country level. 
Nevertheless, the analysis still allows for a prima facie test of asset based eligibility effects on 
asset accumulation among the low-income household population. 
 
 
6.6 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INCOME FLOOR EFFECTS 
 
6.6.1 SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVES 
 
Mean values for the four dependent variables, as well as all household explanatory 
variables included in the models are shown in Table 1 below, separately for the two estimation 
samples and for the entire sample of households. It clearly becomes apparent that the income 
based definition of the low-income household population produces a much more restricted 
sample, containing a higher share of single parents, a higher average number of children (but not 
of young children), and a lower average number of working age adults. The average number of 
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retired persons is very similar in the two subsamples and close to the figure for the total sample. 
From a demographic point of view, the education based subsample resembles the total, whereas 
in the income based subsample households with fewer adults and more children are 
overrepresented.  
As expected, the average disposable income is smaller in both samples compared to the 
average for all households, but substantially smaller in the second sub-sample. Education levels 
though are comparable in the two low income subsamples, but of course, well below the average 
educational level for the entire household population. 
The disadvantaged nature of households in both samples is apparent from the asset 
variables as well. Both samples contain households that have, on average, fewer consumer 
durables compared to the total. Accumulation of arrears is also higher, whereas asset generated 
income and capacity to face unexpected financial expenses decrease. Lack of assets is more 
prevalent in the second estimation sample, as households register, on average, lower scores on 
the consumer durables index, on asset generated income (which is only about a sixth compared 
to that in the total sample) and on the capacity to handle unexpected expenses. The arrears 
index, on the other hand, is higher.  
 
Table  6.1 Descriptive statistics (means) of included variables in the two estimation samples 
 Education based 
definition 
Income based 
definition 
Total 
Durables index  -0.355 -0.959 0.0014 
Arrears Index  0.282 0.613 0.1634 
Asset Income  56.37  13.73  88.80  
Capacity to face 
financial expenses 
(%)  
40.83 25.70  48.84  
Max entitlement 
(Euros)  
340  297.50 335.76  
Single parents (%)  10.74  14.22 10.95  
Average no of 
children  
0.55 0.66 0.56 
Average no of young 
children(<7)  
0.16  0.18 0.17 
Number of retired  0.48  0.49 0.43  
Number of adults  1.68 1.46  1.81  
HH annual 
disposable income  
4228.46  2596.05 4875  
Maximum education 
of a household 
member (ISCED)  
3.67  3.69  4.32  
N  84375  20403  122525 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2007 EU-SILC longitudinal database 
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Last but not least, maximum family entitlements are relatively similar in the total sample 
and the one constructed using the education criterion. Maximum family entitlement is somewhat 
lower though in the sample constructed using the disposable income criterion. This finding 
suggests that these households are likely to be smaller or contain members awarded 
proportionally smaller benefits (such as children). 
 
6.6.2 INCOME FLOOR EFFECTS ON CONSUMER DURABLES 
 
Estimates of the effect of the household specific income floor on the possession of 
consumer durables are presented in Table 2. The left-hand side of the table shown results 
derived based on the education based subsample, whereas the right-hand side presents estimates 
constructed using the income based subsample. Generally, estimates are consistent both across 
different model specifications and across estimation samples. In all cases the effect of the 
maximum benefit entitlement on the household‟s consumer durables is positive and statistically 
significant at the 99% level. When the full set of household and country controls is introduced 
(Models1-3 and 2-3), each 100 PPP (in 2005 Euros) in the monthly income floor raises the 
household consumer durables index, on average, by 0.06and 0.08 points, respectively. These 
effects are both statistically significant and relatively large in substantive terms, amounting to 6 
and 8% of a standard deviation203.  
The introduction of the three interaction terms (Models 1-4 and 2-4) raises the 
magnitude of the main effect to 0.09 and 0.13 points increase per 100 PPP respectively. In 
addition, both models suggest that the impact of the public assistance income floor diminishes 
for households containing single parents, young children and retired persons. The last model of 
the left-hand side panel also indicates that, as expected, the positive impact of the income floor is 
gradually attenuated as the household income rises. Finally, the last two models specifications (1-
6 & 2-5) allow the effect of the income floor to vary across countries. It immediately becomes 
apparent that the country mean for the effect is much larger than the population average in the 
first estimation sample, but not in the second. However, both random slope models indicate that 
the random variation in county income floor effects is statistically different from zero. 
Unsurprisingly, the variation is much lower when a smaller sample is used. However, the average 
effect across countries is also smaller indicating that un-modelled cross country heterogeneity in 
the larger sample may be, to some extent, driving the findings.  
To gain a clearer picture of how the income floor effects vary across countries, Table 3 
below displays the best unbiased linear predictors (BLUP) estimators for all country random 
effects. The results should be interpreted with caution as there is a very small number of units at 
the country level, and the model may not be very well identified. That caveat aside, the most 
notable finding is that country random effects are relatively small in comparison to the country  
                                                          
203 Keep in mind that the index has (by design) a variance of 1 and mean of 0. 
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Table  6.2 Social assistance income floor effects on possession of durables 
 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Mode1-6 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 Model2-5 
Fixed effects            
            
Maximum Family 
Benefit 0.003 3.3E-04 3.7E-04 7.5E-04 5.9E-04 0.0005 0.003 0.003 5E-04 9E-04 2 E-04 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.517) 
            
Single parent   -0.1343 -0.1341 -0.0668 -0.0623 -0.1330  0.0397 0.0409 0.0421 0.0469 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.058) (0.000)  (0.295) (0.280) (0.531) (0.215) 
            
Number of children  0.3954 0.3899 0.3636 0.3861 0.4037  0.3791 0.3532 0.3268 0.3647 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Number of children   -0.3025 -0.3021 -0.0723 -0.0160 -0.2978  -0.2370 -0.2381 -0.0583 -0.2342 
under 7   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.480) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) (0.000) 
            
Number of working-  0.4994 0.4983 0.4786 0.4730 0.4901  0.4356 0.4357 0.4179 0.4395 
age adults  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Number of retired 
persons (>64)  0.0151 0.0184 0.0749 0.0754 0.0179  0.0927 0.1115 0.1533 0.1105 
  (0.209) (0.126) (0.000) (0.000) (0.141)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Unemployment rate -   0.0264 0.0291 0.0332 0.0309   0.0270 0.0303 0.0298 
Previous year   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
GDP/capita   
 
-1.3E-05 -1.4E-05 -4.0E-05 -3.4E-05   -7E-05 -7.3E-05 -6E-05 
Previous year   (0..003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Max Family Benefit*    -1.1E-04 -1.1E-04     2.8E-05  
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 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Mode1-6 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 Model2-5 
Fixed effects            
Single parent    (0.158) (0.158)     (0.877)  
            
Max Family Benefit*    -4.7E-04 -3.4E-04     -4.1E-04  
No children<7    (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000)  
            
Max Family Benefit*    -5.7E-05 -5.4E-05     -5.6E-05  
No persons>64    (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000)  
            
Household disposable     6.3 E-05 4.8E-05      
income     (0.000)       
            
Max Family Benefit*     -3.0E-05-       
Household income     (0.000)       
            
Random Intercept  0.4246 0.2028 0.2428 0.2524 0.2734 0.2772 0.3870 0.1629 0.3027 0.3231 0.2914 
(SD)-Country Level (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Random Slope-Max 
Family Benefit-      0.0004     0.0006 
Country level      (0.000)     (0.000) 
            
Random Intercept 1.3593 1.2172 1.2174 1.2045 1.1697 1.1836 1.3768 1.2555 1.2567 1.2443 1.2502 
-(SD) HH level (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Residual Variance 0.6843 0.6821 0.66814 0.6825 0.6864 0.6854 0.7199 0.7171 0.7128 0.7133 0.7132 
            
N 84368 84368 84368 83880 83851 84368 20403 20403 20403 20321 20403 
Note: p values in parentheses 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC longitudinal database. 
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average. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of the cases they are statistically equal to zero, 
irrespective of which model specification is used to derive them. In fact, when computing them 
from Model2-5, country effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero everywhere but in 
Slovenia, possibly due to the smaller sample size. In Slovenia, the effect of the maximum family 
benefit is slightly higher than the country average. When computations are based on Model1-6, 
the impact of a higher social assistance income floor is lower in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and the Slovak Republic, while being larger in Latvia and Lithuania. The magnitude of the 
country effects are large enough to cancel the positive main effect in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic and to almost double the main effect in the two Baltic 
countries. 
 
Table  6.3 Income floor impact on consumer durables-country random effects 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database 
 
The control variables largely behave as expected. Furthermore, the estimated effects are 
invariant to model specification. Households with more income are more likely to possess more 
consumer durables. Conversely, households with young children are less likely to own consumer 
durables. On the contrary, having more older children is associated with having, on average, 
more consumer durables. This is not entirely surprising if the child variables are seen as a marker 
of a household‟s “age”. Households that have been started earlier are more likely to contain 
more old children and fewer young children. They are also more likely to have had the time to 
accumulate durables. Single parenthood is detrimental to asset accumulation, albeit the effect is 
not statistically significant in the second estimation sample. However, note that no dependency 
ratio effects, i.e. having fewer adults in the household, are captured by the coefficient for single 
parenthood. Due to the way the variable has been defined204, single parents may live in 
households that contain more than one adult (for example, in an extended family household). 
Not surprisingly, the number of working –age adults has a very large positive effect on owning 
                                                          
204 The dummy takes on the value of one if having underage children in the household and not cohabiting, either 
legally (including marriage) or informally; indeed, the term parent is used loosely to encompass both parents and 
other guardians. 
 Model 1-6 Model2-5 
Country Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95%CI 
CZ -2.15E-05 -5.77E-05 1.78E-04 3.64E-04 -1.49E-04 4.60E-04 
EE 1.99E-04 -1.84E-04 5.68E-04 1.49E-04 -2.96E-04 9.14E-04 
HU -4.71E-04 -7.95E-05 2.45E-04 -3.62E-04 -1.65E-04 5.07E-04 
LV 3.56E-04 -2.16E-04 6.67E-04 -6.17E-04 -4.46E-04 1.38E-03 
LT 5.79E-04 -2.26E-04 6.96E-04 1.45E-04 -3.43E-04 1.06E-03 
PL 1.32E-04 -2.90E-04 8.94E-04 -6.23E-04 -4.70E-04 1.45E-03 
SI -1.99E-04 -6.56E-05 2.02E-04 1.09E-03 -1.54E-04 4.73E-04 
SK -5.76E-04 -9.22E-05 2.84E-04 -1.45E-04 -2.19E-04 6.76E-04 
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durables (the index is raised about half a standard deviation for each extra adult). Possibly 
reflecting life cycle effects, households containing more retired persons are more likely to have a 
higher consumer durables index in the income based sample. 
Lastly, country level features display some puzzling patterns. Contrary to expectation, a 
higher unemployment rate during the previous year raises the expected consumer durables 
index205. The effect is stable and statistically highly significant. On the other hand, an increase in 
the GDP per capita seems to have a negative effect on durables possessions, but only at the 
bottom of the income distribution. 
 
6.6.3 INCOME FLOOR EFFECTS ON THE ACCUMULATION OF ARREARS 
 
Income floor effects on the accumulation of arrears are shown in Table 4. Initially, as 
predicted, a higher income floor raises the score on accumulated arrears. On average, an increase 
of 100 PPPs (in 2005 terms) increases the expected arrears index by 10% of a standard deviation 
in the education based sample and by 30% in the income based one. These are large effects 
indeed. The introduction of household and country level covariates reduces the estimated effect 
in the first sample, but not in the second. When the full set of household and country level 
variables is present (Models 1-3 and 2-3), the index of accumulated arrears is predicted to 
increase with approximately 1% in the larger sample and 20% in the second, smaller sample for 
each 100 PPPs of the income floor. 
The effects are heterogeneous across the income distribution. Notably, a higher income 
floor is associated with an increased likelihood of cumulating arrears only at the bottom of the 
income distribution206. Other household characteristics, such as single parenthood, number of 
young children or number of retired, do not seem to affect the magnitude of the income floor 
effect. Interaction terms are statistically insignificant both in all three models where they are 
included (i.e. Model 1-4, 1-5 and 2-4). 
Finally, the last two models (1-6 & 2-5) allow for the effect of the income floor to vary 
across countries207. In both models, standard errors for the random slope suggest there is 
statistically significant cross-national differentiation in the main effect of the public assistance 
income floor. To gain a clearer picture of the cross-national patterns, Table 5 displays predicted 
country random effects using posterior Bayesian probabilities. Despite being relatively large in 
magnitude, country random slope effects are imprecisely estimated. As a result, only in Estonia 
do they remain statistically significant in both models, while in Lithuania they are statistically 
different from zero only in Model 1-6. Nonetheless, results are consistent across estimation. 
                                                          
205 Similar results are obtained when the current unemployment rate is used instead of the lagged rate. 
206 Notice that the coefficient becomes larger when low income is more accurately modeled, i.e. in Model 1-5 and in 
the Models based on the second, more restricted, sample. 
207 Note that to keep only one random slope, the interaction variables are removed. 
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Table  6.4 Social assistance income floor effects on accumulation of debts (arrears) 
 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Model1-6 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 Model2-5 
Fixed effects            
            
Maximum Family  0.001 0.001 0.001 7.8E-04 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.0027 0.004 
Benefit (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
            
Single parent   0.4874 0.4881 0.1570 0.1370 0.4639  0.3767 0.3880 0.2867 0.3366 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.074) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000) 
            
Number of children  0.1848 0.1889 0.1872 0.1483 0.1381  0.0579 0.0766 0.0656 0.0101 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.144) (0.055) (0.108) (0.807) 
            
Number of children   0.0636 0.0633 -0.0034 -0.0527 0.0667  -0.0934 -0.0941 -0.0693 -0.0728 
under 7  (0.056) (0.057) (0.950) (0.344) (0.044)  (0.194) (0.191) (0.524) (0.307) 
            
Number of working   -0.0559 -0.0540 -0.0452 -0.0174 -0.0502  0.0055 0.0017 0.0012 -0.0339 
-age adults  (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.306) (0.006)  (0.880) (0.963) (0.975) (0.389) 
            
Number of retired   -0.3993 -0.4010 -0.3615 -0.3627 -0.4135  -0.6519 -0.6691 -0.6149 -0.6059 
persons (>64)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Unemployment rate    -0.0103 -0.0091 -0.0133 -0.0126   -0.0073 -0.0067 -0.0258 
Previous year   (0.440) (0.495) (0.315) (0.288)   (0.799) (0.814) (0.308) 
            
GDP/capita   5E-05 5E-05 9E-05 7E-05   2E-04 2E-04 2.6E-04 
Previous year   (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Max Family Benefit*    0.001 0.001     4E-04  
Single parent    (0.000) (0.000)     (0.418)  
            
Max Family Benefit*    1.3E-04 -3.1E-05     -5.4E-04  
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 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Model1-6 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 Model2-5 
Fixed effects            
No children<7    (0.128) (0.725)     (0.767)  
            
Max Family Benefit*    -2.5E-05 -3.1E-05     -4.3E-05  
No persons>64    (0.000) (0.000)     (0.023)  
            
Household 
disposable     -9.1E-05 -7E-05     -3.5E-04 
income     (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) 
            
Max Family Benefit*     3.3E-05       
Household income     (0.000)       
            
Random Intercept 0.3175 0.2536 0.3488 0.3342 0.3127 0.1722 0.5144 0.4227 0.8643 0.8455 0.3774 
(SD) -Country Level (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) 
            
Random Slope- 
Max Family Benefit-      0.0015     0.0030 
Country level      (0.000)     (0.000) 
            
Random Intercept  1.945 1.9016 1.9015 1.9006 1.8798 1.8800 2.0733 2.0142 2.0152 2.0150 1.9719 
(SD) -HH level (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
            
Residual Variance 2.444 2.447 2.447 2.450 2.453 2.448 2.804 2.807 2.802 2.806 2.796 
            
N 83295 83295 83295 82817 82788 83266 20076 20076 20076 19994 20075 
Note: p-values in parentheses 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2007 EU-SILC longitudinal database. 
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samples for all countries suggesting a lower impact of the income floor on the accumulation of 
arrears in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, while and a larger one in 
Estonia, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Combined with the main effect, results suggest a 
positive impact of the income floor on the arrears index everywhere but in Lithuania, Slovenia 
and possibly Latvia. 
It is not clear what program characteristics drive the cross-national heterogeneity in 
impact, if any. Examples of strong income floor effects on debt accumulation can be found both 
among countries with relatively more generous social assistance programs (for example, the 
Slovak Republic) and among countries with more restrictive assistance benefits (for example, 
Estonia). Overall, there is some indication that social assistance might be playing a negative 
effect on indebtedness, possibly by encouraging households to take on debt208. 
 
Table  6.5  Income floor effects on arrears accumulation-country random effect 
 Model 1-6 Model2-5 
Country Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95%CI 
CZ -1.97E-04 -4.30E-04 3.60E-05 -7.96E-04 -1.42E-03 -1.68E-04 
EE 3.57E-03 2.70E-03 4.43E-03 6.42E-03 4.80E-03 8.03E-03 
HU -6.37E-04 -9.75E-04 -2.98E-04 -2.03E-03 -2.77E-03 -1.28E-03 
LV -1.20E-03 -2.18E-03 -2.34E-04 -1.33E-03 -3.82E-03 1.16E-03 
LT -1.17E-03 -2.15E-03 -1.83E-04 -3.11E-03 -4.76E-03 -1.46E-03 
PL 4.63E-04 -8.94E-04 1.82E-03 1.62E-03 -1.30E-03 4.55E-03 
SI -7.76E-04 -1.04E-03 -5.09E-04 -2.41E-03 -3.07E-03 -1.74E-03 
SK -4.82E-05 -4.35E-04 3.39E-04 1.63E-03 6.36E-04 2.62E-03 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database 
 
Coefficients of control variables for the most part have the expected sings. Households 
containing single parents are more likely to accumulate debt arrears. The effect is particularly 
large, at around a third of a standard deviation. A larger number of children present in the 
household is also linked to increased arrears. Having more children also raises the expected 
arrears index, particularly in the first estimation sample. Partly reflecting much lower debt levels, 
households composed of retired persons are much less likely to have amassed arrears. On the 
other hand, the arrears index drops as the number of working age adults in the household rises, 
albeit the effect is detectable only in the education based subsample.  
 Finally, the lagged unemployment rate seems to play no role in the arrears accumulation 
process209 , while the GDP/capita indicator is positive and significant. Thus, a higher 
                                                          
208 A selection effect may also be responsible for this result if social assistance administrators are more likely to grant 
benefits to indebted households and low-income households are aware of this fact; in this case, it is not the income 
floor itself but the screening process embedded in social assistance that is driving the negative effects. 
209 It should be kept in mind though that the analyzed period (2003-2006) is a period of economic growth and falling 
unemployment in all the countries under review. 
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GDP/capita in the previous year is likely to raise the index of accumulated arrears. This impact is 
particularly large at the bottom of the income distribution210, suggesting the low income families 
may be more likely to take on excessive debt in times economic boom. 
 
6.6.4 INCOME FLOOR EFFECTS ON THE POSSESSION OF INCOME GENERATING ASSETS 
 
 Ideally, social assistance income floor effects would be tested directly against the size of 
income generating assets a household possesses. Since the EU-SILC does not contain 
information on assets themselves, asset generated income is used as a proxy. The analysis is 
carried out in two steps. First, a two-level logistic regression estimates income floor effects on 
the likelihood of having positive asset income. Because a three level model has been found to 
have convergence problems, countries are introduced as dummies. Admittedly, this is only a 
rough proxy that underestimates the percentage of the population holding assets, if no income 
has been derived from them during the income reference period. In a second step, the amount 
of the income generated from assets is used as a proxy of the size of the assets themselves. 
Whereas in principle the amount of the income stream and the value of the assets behind it 
should closely correlate, there are two caveats to be mentioned. Saving and investment behaviour 
are known to be dependent on the stage of the life course (see the discussion in section IV). As a 
consequence, the relationship between asset income and the underlying assets will differ across 
households. For example, younger households may be willing to rely on riskier asset investment 
strategies that usually yield a higher rate of return. Relying on asset income to impute their assets 
will lead to overestimation. Conversely, the assets of older households that are usually prone to 
pursue safer asset investment strategies will be underestimated. Other household characteristics 
might similarly influence the relationship between asset income and assets. Similarly, if broader 
economic, social or cultural factors at the national level affect the propensity to invest in 
different types of assets, the relationship between asset income and assets will vary not only 
across households but across countries211. Despite these limitations, asset income is the best 
available proxy for the amount of assets themselves. Therefore, the analysis proceeds by 
estimating social assistance income floor effects on asset income (in logarithmic form), 
conditional on having such assets (i.e. asset income is positive).  
 Table 6 below shows results of program effects on the presence or absence of asset 
generated income. In the simplest models in which only countries and household random 
intercepts are controlled for (Models 1-1 and 2-1), a higher income floor actually increases the 
likelihood of owning income generating assets. The effect is highly statistically significant and 
large in magnitude: an increase of 100 PPP (in 2005 Euros) triggers an increase in the  
                                                          
210 Notice the difference in magnitude between Models 1-3/1-5 and Models 1-6 &2-3/2-5. 
211 This is partly solved by using a three level hierarchical model that implicitly controls for time-invariant country 
characteristics. 
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Table 6.6 Social assistance income floor effects on the likelihood of having positive asset generated income 
 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 
Fixed effects          
          
Maximum Family  1,0016 1,0018 1,0011 1,0015 1,0009 1,0011 1,0011 1,0004 1,0002 
Benefit (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,003) (0,118) (0,536) (0,815) 
          
Single parent   0,7081 0,7049 0,8180 0,7864  0,7974 0,7923 0,6927 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,334) (0,000)  (0,282) (0,287) (0,391) 
          
Number of children  0,8191 0,8641 0,8631 0,9859  0,8577 0,9658 0,9851 
  (0,000) (0,003) (0,003) (0,762)  (0,135) (0,743) (0,890) 
          
Number of children   0,8390 0,8238 0,8748 0,8331  0,8581 0,8514 0,7200 
under 7  (0,024) (0,015) (0,380) (0,020)  (0,378) (0,371) (0,305) 
          
Number of working   1,0996 1,3964 1,1326 1,0896  1,2352 1,2529 1,2694 
-age adults  (0,045) (0,008) (0,011) (0,046)  (0,035) (0,028) (0,024) 
          
Number of retired   1,0648 1,0608 1,0419 1,1483  1,7007 1,6648 1,5649 
persons (>64)  (0,338) (0,377) (0,562) (0,028)  (0,000) (0,001) (0,005) 
          
Unemployment rate    0,6069 0,6078 0,6125   0,5829 0,6601 
Previous year   (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)   (0,000) (0,000) 
          
GDP/capita   1,0001 1,0001 1,00005   1,0002 1,0002 
Previous year   (0,000) (0,000) (0.003)   (0,000) (0,000) 
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Max Family Benefit*    0,9996     1,0003 
Single parent    (0,385)     (0,748) 
          
Max Family Benefit*    0,9999     1,0003 
No children<7    (0,684)     (0,483) 
          
Max Family Benefit*    1,00001     1,0000 
No persons>64    (0,393)     (0,209) 
          
Household disposable     1,0002     
income     (0,000)     
          
          
Random Intercept 
(SD) -HH level 10,792 10,775 11,413 11,383 10,650 9,544 9,719 10,595 10,617 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0.000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
          
N 84370 84370 84370 83882 84341 20403 20403 20403 20321 
Note: coefficients represent odds ratios; p-values in parentheses 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2007 EU-SILC longitudinal database 
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odds ratio of owning versus not owning of about 17 percentage points. Adding more household 
level characteristics does not affect the size of the coefficient in the first estimation sample (with 
the exception of income) but it does reduce it slightly in the second. In the second sample, 
introducing household and country level covariates wipes out the statistical significance of the 
income floor coefficient. It also reduces the size of the coefficient to about a tenth of its initial 
value. Controlling for disposable income also reduces the size of the coefficient in the first 
estimation sample, albeit it remains well above the statistical significance threshold.  
 Household and country level variables generally have the expected effects. Families 
having more children, and especially more young children are less likely to have income from 
assets. This is to be expected since households with young children are themselves “young” so 
they have had fewer opportunities to amass income generating assets. On the contrary, families 
where there are more working age adults or more retired persons are more likely to report some 
asset generated income. This pattern is much more visible in the second, lower income 
estimation sample. The coefficient for single parenthood has the expected sign and is highly 
statistically significant. As expected, a higher unemployment rate in the previous year depressed 
the likelihood of having positive asset income, while a higher GDP/capita increases it. Generally, 
both estimation samples yield coefficients that are very similar in magnitude, although due to its 
lower size, coefficients for the second sample are less often statistically significant. Adding in 
country level controls does not change the impact of the household features. 
 All six specifications point to substantial and significant variance to be explained at the 
household level, i.e. by household “fixed” characteristics. Country level coefficients (not shown) 
are relatively large and statistically significant. Countries with the largest share of low income 
households deriving income from assets are Estonia, Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
 Social assistance income floor effects on asset income212, conditional on having positive 
asset income are described in Table 7. Note that both sample sizes shrink considerably due to 
the discarding of all household-years for which asset income is zero. The maximum family social 
assistance benefit is negative and statistically significant in most specification. However, in 
substantive terms, its size is relatively small in the first sample. Estimated coefficients are notably 
larger in the second, poorer estimation sample. Increasing the maximum annual benefit a 
household may be entitled to by 100 PPP (in 2005 Euros) decreases the predicted asset incomes 
by approximately 15 percentage points. This is quite a large effect. Moreover, the coefficient is 
relatively stable regardless of the presence or absence of other controls. Models 1-6 and 2-5 
contain, on top of household and country features, interaction terms for countries. The impact 
of the income floor on income derived from assets appears to be absent in Estonia.  
 Household characteristics have coefficients that conform to the predicted pattern. Single 
parenthood tends to lower asset income, albeit in the second sample the coefficient is 
insignificant. Analyses undertaken using the first larger sample point towards single 
                                                          
212 For all countries, asset income is expressed in Euros and then it is transformed in logarithmic form. Using the 
logarithmic form necessitates the exclusion of cases with zero asset income. 
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Table  6.7 Social Assistance Income Floor Effects on Ln(Asset Income), conditional on having positive asset income 
 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Model1-6 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 Model2-5 
Fixed effects            
            
Maximum Family  8,7E-05 -3,6E-04 -3.4E-04 -4.6E-04 -7,9E-04 -3E-04 7,3E-05 -0,001 -0,0015 -0,0015 -0,0015 
Benefit (0,429) (0,118) (0,119) (0.056) (0,001) (0,266) (0,762) (0,003) (0,003) (0,005) (0,012) 
            
Single parent   -0,3424 -0,3434 -0.6077 -0,4865 -0,3579  -0,1284 -0,1256 -0,4598 -0,15461 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,003) (0,000)  (0,389) (0,401) (0,126) (0,302) 
            
Number of children  0,0242 0,0257 0,0353 0,1120 -0,0309  0,1534 0,1575 0,1583 0,0421 
  (0,512) (0,488) (0,344) (0,002) (0,461)  (0,042) (0,038) (0,040) (0,640) 
            
Number of children   -0,1668 -0,1685 -0.1800 -0.0917 -0,1648  -0,1739 -0,1749 0,0945 -0,1455 
under 7  (0,004) (0,003) (0,156) (0,471) (0,004)  (0,154) (0,152) (0,731) (0,234) 
            
Number of working   0,1281 0,1259 0,1295 0,1183 0,0472  0,3204 0,3119 0,3068 0,1615 
-age adults  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,322)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,098) 
            
Number of retired   0,1512 0,1459 0,1087 1,577 0,0628  0,3493 0,3341 0,3251 0,1640 
persons (>64)  (0,004) (0,005) (0,046) (0.003) (0,290)  (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,193) 
            
Unemployment rate    -0,0400 -0,0398 -0,0456 -0,0405   0,0128 0,0140 0,0190 
Previous year   (0,162) (0,166) (0,057) (0,159)   (0,105) (0,796) (0,725) 
            
GDP/capita   2,7E-05 2,8E-05 -4.4E-05 2.7E-05   8E-05 8E-05 8E-05 
Previous year   (0,244) (0,235) (0,057) (0,257)   (0,096) (0,091) (0,079) 
            
Max Family Benefit*    4,8E-04 3.2E-04     7.3E-04  
Single parent    (0,125) (0,286)     (0,222)  
            
Max Family Benefit*    1,3E-05 2.2E-04     -4.1E-04  
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 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Model1-6 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 Model2-5 
Fixed effects            
No children<7    (0,937) (0,178)     (0,270)  
            
Max Family Benefit*    2E-05 2.5E-05     3.8E-06  
No persons>64    (0,021) (0,002)     (0,862)  
            
Household 
disposable     1,2E-04       
income     (0,000)       
            
Max Family Benefit*     -3,5E-05       
Household income     (0,000)       
Maximum Family       0,0023     0,0029 
Benefit-EE      (0,003)     (0,028) 
Maximum Family       0,0013     -1.6E-04 
Benefit-HU      (0.096)     (0,958) 
Maximum Family       1E-04     0,0023 
Benefit-LV      (0,945)     (0,309) 
Maximum Family       0,0023     0,0056 
Benefit-LT      (0,336)     (0,209) 
Maximum Family       0,0002     0,0101 
Benefit-PL      (0,973)     (0,503) 
Maximum Family       4,5E-04     0,0011 
Benefit-SI      (0,077)     (0,055) 
Maximum Family       6E-04     0,0017 
Benefit-SK      (0,199)     (0,127) 
            
Random Intercept  2,119 2,098 2,107 2,1024 1,9071 2,099 1,3985 1,3581 1,3750 1,3818 1,418 
(SD) -HH level (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
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 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Model1-6 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 Model2-5 
Fixed effects            
Residual Variance 1,152 1,1503 1,1450 1,1454 1,1351 1,1458 0,9128 0,9100 0,8997 0,896 0,9009 
            
N 9376 9376 9367 9362 9360 9376 1581 1581 1581 1578 1581 
Note: dependent variable is asset income in logarithmic form; p-values in parentheses; 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
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parenthood diminishing log income by 30 percentage points, a large effect. Having more young 
children also reduces the expected asset income- on average by 17 ppt. for each child (the effect 
is not significant in the second sample). Conversely, the presence of more working-age adults or 
retired persons is associated with higher asset income. The magnitude of the impact is a 
noteworthy 13 ppt. per adult (again the effect is not statistically significant in the second sample). 
Both country level covariates have the expected signs, but are statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. One possible explanation consists of economic growth being particularly beneficial for 
asset accumulation among the poorest. 
 A significant portion of the variation in asset income (between 37 and 47% depending on 
the chosen sample) is explained by unmeasured “fixed” household characteristics, as shown by 
the large random intercept variation at the household level.  
 
6.6.5 INCOME FLOOR EFFECTS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF HAVING SAVINGS 
 
Finally, Table 8 presents the results of six regressions modelling the effect of social 
assistance income floors on the capacity to face unexpected expenses. As mentioned, this 
variable is taken as a proxy for the existence of savings in low-income households. Following the 
template of previous analyses, two sets of regression coefficients are shown, one for each 
estimation sample discussed in section VII.1. In the simplest models (1-1 and 2-1), only the 
maximum benefit a family may be entitled to in the absence of income is included together with 
random intercepts at the household level and country dummies. In these models, a higher social 
assistance income floor increases the odds of having savings by around 12 percentage points in 
the education based estimation sample and about 2 ppt. for every 1000 PPP 2005 Euros in the 
income based ones. However, the introduction of additional controls changes the direction of 
the effect in the estimations carried out on the income based sample. A higher income floor 
slightly reduces the chance of having savings by around 10 ppt. for every 100 PPP 2005 Euros in 
the most complex specification. The results in the two samples are thus contradictory. 
Unfortunately, a model in which household disposable income is controlled for in the first 
sample could not be estimated due to convergence problems. It is thus very possible that income 
is confounding results at least in the first estimation sample. Results should thus be interpreted 
with caution. The hypothesis that the availability of an income floor depresses savings can 
neither be confirmed nor rejected by this analysis. 
 Household and country characteristics behave as expected. Thus, being a single parent is 
associated with a strong negative effect on the probability of having savings. Other things equal, 
single parent households are 60-65% less likely to have savings. Likewise, the presence of each 
child under seven in a household decreases the likelihood of having savings, albeit the effect is 
not statistically significant in the second sample. Contradictory results are obtained regarding the 
impact of older children. In the set of regressions carried out on the education-based sample, 
having more older children is associated with a lower likelihood of reporting ability to handle .  
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Table  6.8Social Assistance Income Floor Effects on Having Savings (proxied by the capacity to face unexpected expenses) 
 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 
Fixed effects          
          
Maximum Family  1,0012 1,0003 1,0003 1,0008 - 1,0002 0,9985 0,9986 0,9990 
Benefit (0,000) (0,028) (0,070) (0,000) - (0,401) (0,000) (0,000) (0,015) 
     -     
Single parent   0,3460 0,3426 0,4051 -  0,3979 0,3952 0,4841 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) -  (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) 
     -     
Number of children  0,8736 0,8829 0,8531 -  1,2138 1,2064 1,1881 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) -  (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) 
     -     
Number of children   0,9100 0,9064 1,3484 -  0,9757 0,9734 1,2421 
under 7  (0,035) (0,029) (0,000) -  (0,776) (0,756) (0,123) 
     -     
Number of working   1,4432 1,4465 1,3996 -  1,4698 1,4598 1,4296 
-age adults  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) -  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
     -     
Number of retired   1,6461 1,6380 1,6997 -  2,4815 2,4893 2,4705 
persons (>64)  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) -  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
     -     
Unemployment rate    0,7590 0,7617 -   0,8268 0,8296 
Previous year   (0,000) (0,000) -   (0,000) (0,000) 
     -     
GDP/capita   0,9999 0,9999 -   0,9998 0,9998 
Previous year   (0,097) (0,091) -   (0,000) (0,000) 
     -     
Max Family Benefit*    0,9999 -    0,9993 
Single parent    (0,137) -    (0,275) 
     -     
Max Family Benefit*    0,9992 -    0,9994 
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 Model1-1 Model1-2 Model1-3 Model1-4 Model1-5 Model2-1 Model2-2 Model2-3 Model2-4 
Fixed effects          
No children<7    (0,000) -    (0,029) 
     -     
Max Family Benefit*    0,9999 -    0,9999 
No persons>64    (0,000) -    (0,794) 
     -     
Household 
disposable     -     
income     -     
     -     
Max Family Benefit*     -     
Household income     -     
     -     
Random Intercept  7,261 6,893 7,048 6,9832 - 5,831 5,323 5,376 5,332 
(SD) -HH level (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) - (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
     -     
N 84264 84264 84264 83776 - 20384 20384 20384 20302 
Note: coefficients represent odds ratios; p-values in parentheses 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2007 EU-SILC longitudinal database 
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unexpected expenses. On the contrary, in the income based sample, having more older children 
is associated with a statistically significant higher probability of having savings. Presumably, the 
discrepancy is due to the much more disadvantaged nature of the second sample. Among the 
poor, households with older children are somewhat better positioned. Both the number of 
working-age adults and the number of retired persons is positively related to the odds of having 
savings. The magnitude of the coefficients is large and above the significance threshold in both 
samples. Each additional working-age adults boosts the likelihood of having savings by between 
30 and 50% depending on specification. The effect of retired adults is even higher, i.e. an 
increase by between 65 and 140% depending on the model.  
The coefficients of the two country level covariates behave in conflicting ways. The 
lagged unemployment rate has the predicted sign and a very large and statistically different from 
zero magnitude. A 1 percentage point increase in the lagged unemployment rate depresses the 
odds of having savings by between 25 and 18 percentage points depending on specification and 
estimation sample. On the contrary, the coefficient of the GDP per capita has the wrong sign 
and passes the threshold for statistical significance only in the second sample. Other things equal, 
a 1 percentage point increase in the GDP/capita reduces the likelihood of having savings by, on 
average, 0.02 ppt. 213. Lastly, countries differ in their share of the population declaring ability to 
meet financial expenses. Slovenia and Estonia are the countries with the highest proportions of 
households declaring savings whereas Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia are the countries where 
these proportions are lowest.  
 
6.6.6 DISCUSSION 
 
The impact of the income floor implicit in social assistance programs has been estimated 
for four types of assets, namely consumer durables, arrears, income generating assets and 
savings. In the latter two cases, lack of adequate data has compelled the use of proxies. Where 
the dependent variable has taken a binary rather than continuous form, computational 
complexities have prevented the estimation of more intricate models. Findings have generally 
been consistent across samples and model specifications. 
An overview of the results points to both similarities and discrepancies in the impact of 
income floors across the four types of assets. Generally, compared to previous findings based on 
the American public assistance program, evidence of a negative income floor effect on asset-
accumulation in the present in means-tested social assistance is more mixed. Only the 
accumulation of arrears could be shown to be adversely impacted by the presence of an income 
floor in means-tested social assistance. It is possible that the insurance mechanism implicit in an 
income floor promotes riskier behaviour among the very poor, thus ultimately increasing the 
chance of accumulating arrears. In the case of consumer durables, evidence points towards a 
                                                          
213 It is not clear what is causing this effect. It is possible that very poor families are more likely to switch to 
consumption instead of savings in countries/ periods where/when the economic development level is higher. 
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small positive impact of higher guaranteed benefits, with a somewhat weaker effect for 
households containing young children and/or retired persons. The result is consistent with 
treating consumer durables as consumption items rather than assets. Finally, the effects of the 
social assistance income floor on income generating assets or savings are ambiguous. Only in the 
case of the amount of asset incomes did all specifications show the predicted negative effect. 
Even in this case, coefficients in some of the estimations while statistically significant were 
relatively small in magnitude.  
Overall, the depressing effect of income floors on asset accumulation appears to be 
rather limited in Central and East European countries. Several explanations are possible. First, 
the level of the income floor in the region may be too low to depress asset accumulation. Indeed, 
many countries make only paltry support available well below what would be needed to 
overcome poverty (see Chapters 3 and 4). Second, specificities of the region may be partially 
responsible for the findings. Indeed, CEE countries have only recently built the capital and 
insurance markets that are typically used in asset accumulation processes in developed countries. 
Additionally, the period considered in the analysis has been one of rapid economic growth across 
the region, possibly facilitating asset accumulation and investment. Third, given the relative 
novelty of means-tested assistance in the region, as well as possible lack of trust in state 
institutions (Mishler and Rose 2001; Sissenich 2007), it is possible that social assistance programs 
are not trusted to provide an income floor when needed. Low-income households may either 
fear program cutbacks/elimination in the future or not trust the program administration to 
provide them with a benefit when they become eligible. Fourth, general non-monetary costs of 
program participation, such as stigma, may deter from relying on social assistance for insurance 
purposes. Finally, results may be partly explained by shortcomings of the data. Measures of 
wealth possessions are crude and cross-temporal variation in the income floor minimal. As such, 
policy effects may not be well identified, due to measurement issues, low power and possible 
confounding factors, especially at the country level.  
 
 
6.7 ASSET TESTS AND THE ACCUMULATION OF ASSETS 
 
The previous section has focused on whether and how asset accumulation processes 
among low-income households are affected by cash benefits made available by the existence of a 
guaranteed minimum income. Another modality through which means-tested programs may 
discourage asset ownership and saving among the poor and the near-poor is by directly 
prohibiting program participation when a claimant‟s assets surpass a given threshold214. The 
presence of asset tests would both force future recipients to run down their assets in case of 
                                                          
214 The threshold may be effectively set to zero. In this case, no assets may be allowed for program clients. 
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adverse economic circumstances, and more importantly, would discourage accumulation of 
assets in the first place among all low-income households. 
The following subsections discuss the association between asset test and three types of 
assets, namely consumer durables, income generating assets and savings215. Before presenting any 
results, it should be noted that serious data limitations prevent the drawing of any firm 
conclusions. First, the data on asset tests is sparse and relative. To some extent, this is due to the 
program design itself. National legislation is either very vague about how an asset test should be 
implemented (i.e. which assets should be included and which disregarded, how are assets to be 
valued if disregards are permitted etc.), or leaves asset test implementation to the discretion of 
local authorities and/or street-level social workers. The situation is unsurprising given the 
complexities that an asset test may entail. Second, there is precious little differentiation in asset 
tests due to the fact that they only vary across countries. As such, there is very little variation 
from which to identify asset test effects. Third, there is little information about how asset tests 
are being implemented. Even if national legislation prohibits the possession of assets for 
program participants or allows for certain disregards, local discretion may override or modify 
those provisions. 
 Notwithstanding these shortcomings, an initial assessment of the relationship between 
asset tests and assets is possible. Two asset test variables have been used, namely the existence of 
an asset test and when such an asset exists whether any disregards larger than 1000 Euros are 
allowed. Both are coded 0/1. The two variables are however highly correlated since most 
countries that do have an asset test, also allow for a disregard. In the case of Hungary, local 
authorities have ample leeway to decide whether and what types of disregards they allow. 
Initially, Hungary has been coded 1 on the asset disregard variable. Subsequently, the coding has 
been change to zero and the analyses repeated. As findings did not change substantially, only the 
initial results are presented. The estimation strategy follows a sequence of steps. Initially, simple 
correlations adjusted for clustering in the data are presented (Model 1-1 and 2-1). Subsequently, 
additional variables are added using a simple regression framework (but always adjusting for 
clustering in the data). In principle, asset tests apply in the same manner for all households, and 
are therefore invariant to household characteristics. However, as the national demographic 
composition might affect program design and the level and distribution of asset holdings, three 
household characteristics are also added as controls (single parenthood, number of children, and 
number of retired persons). The approach has the advantage that it implicitly controls for 
variations in street-level implementation of the asset test eligibility that depends on whether the 
household is perceived to be needier or more „deserving‟. On top, the maximum family 
entitlement, the lagged unemployment rate and the lagged GDP/capita have been added as 
covariates. Finally, results pertaining to a three level hierarchical model similar to the ones 
introduced in the previous section are presented (Models 1-5 and 2-5). As previously, estimations 
                                                          
215 Arrears have not been modeled since asset test do not take into account debt.  
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have been carried out on two separate samples of low-income households, defined based on 
education and income respectively. 
 
6.7.1 ASSET TESTS AND THE POSSESSION OF CONSUMER DURABLES 
 
Results of the analysis of asset tests‟ influence on the possession of consumer durables 
are detailed in Table 9 below. All specifications show a negative effect that is relatively large 
(around a third of a standard deviation) but that fails to achieve statistical significance. Contrary 
to expectations, the existence of an asset disregard would appear to further lower consumer 
durable accumulation. However, the coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
Comparing the results across samples, the size of the effect is somewhat lower in the poorer 
sample. The finding is consistent with the idea of asset tests being less binding for the very poor. 
However, in all four models, both asset test variables show up as statistically not different from 
zero. Consistent with the results presented in the previous section, the coefficient of the 
maximum family benefit variable is positive and statistically different from zero. 
 
6.7.2 ASSET TESTS AND THE POSSESSION OF INCOME GENERATING ASSETS 
 
The relationship between the existence of an asset test and having non-zero asset income is 
spelled out in Table 10. The unconditional correlation between the two is negative but 
statistically indistinguishable from zero in both samples. Nonetheless, as the specification 
gradually becomes more complex, incorporating additional controls and better modelling, the 
association becomes more negative and passes the significance threshold. Thus, when the full set 
of control variables is present, both the simple logit and the multilevel models (Models 1-4, 2-4, 
1-5 & 2-5) show a large and significant negative coefficient. The presence of an asset test reduces 
the odds of having asset generated income by between 35 and 95%, depending on sample and 
specification. Admittedly, the magnitude of the effect is surprisingly large, suggesting potential 
bias. 
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Table  6.9 Asset test and the accumulation of consumer durables 
 Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model1-3 Model 1-4 Model 1-5 Model 2-1 Model 2-2 Model 2-3 Model 2-4 Model 2-5 
Asset test (0/1) -0,1085 -0,0382 -0,2407 -0,1222 -0,1205 0,1354 0,3783 -0,1822 -0,1118 -0,0632 
 (0,330) (0,647) (0,166) (0,299) (0,477) (0,343) (0,000) (0,240) (0,294) (0,771) 
Asset disregard (0/1)  -0,1160     -0,407    
  (0,303)     (0,012)    
Single parent   -0,2456 -0,2673 -0,1267   -0,1001 -0,1148 0,0473 
   (0,004) (0,001) (0,000)   (0,129) (0,101) (0,212) 
No children   0,3181 0,2786 0,3000   0,3457 0,3044 0,2866 
   (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)   (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
No adult   0,5316 0,4831 0,4828   0,4913 0,4480 0,4184 
   (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)   (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
No retired   -0,0181 -0,0604 0,0055   0,0757 0,0374 0,0970 
   (0,745) (0,287) (0,645)   (0,464) (0,707) (0,000) 
Max Family Benefit    7E-04 4E-04    7,5E-04 5,4E-04 
    (0,029) (0,000)    (0,065) (0,000) 
Unemployment rate     -0,0173 0,0266    -0,0084 0,0265 
    (0,159) (0,000)    (0,523) (0,000) 
GDP/capita    -6E-05 -1,3 E-05    -4E-05 -7E-05 
    (0,008) (0,004)    (0,161) (0,000) 
Random Intercept     0,2307     0,2927 
Country level     (0,000)     (0,000) 
Random Intercept     1,225     1,2632 
HH level     (0,000)     (0,000) 
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N 84380 84380 84380 84368 84368 20403 20403 20403 20403 20403 
Note: p-values in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
 
 
 
 
Table  6.10 Asset tests and possession of income generating assets 
 Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model1-3 Model 1-4 Model 1-5 Model 2-1 Model 2-2 Model 2-3 Model 2-4 Model 2-5 
Asset test (0/1) 0,6183 0,0956 0,5684 0,2621 0,3154 0,5826 0,0784 0,5459 0,2556 0,0643 
 (0,572) (0,000) (0,488) (0,002) (0,000) (0,521) (0,001) (0,455) (0,002) (0,031) 
Asset disregard (0/1)  10,561     12,225    
  (0,002)     (0,000)    
Single parent   0,7174 0,8563 0,7063   0,8488 0,9840 0,7963 
   (0,000) (0,018) (0,001)   (0,275) (0,838) (0,298) 
No children   0,9109 1,0398 0,8136   0,9270 1,0844 0,9280 
   (0,026) (0,574) (0,000)   (0,099) (0,213) (0,431) 
No adult   1,3303 1,3223 1,1282   1,2369 1,3103 1,2659 
   (0,000) (0,004) (0,011)   (0,001) (0,000) (0,022) 
No retired   1,2785 1,3028 1,0537   1,6116 1,5427 1,6825 
   (0,026) (0,065) (0,432)   (0,001) (0,007) (0,000) 
Max Family Benefit    0,9992 1,0015    0,9991 1,0004 
    (0,302) (0,000)    (0,121) (0,599) 
Unemployment rate     0,9681 0,6210    0,9483 0,6242 
    (0,407) (0,000)    (0,231) (0,000) 
GDP/capita    1,0003 1,0002    1,0004 1,0003 
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    (0,000) (0,000)    (0,000) (0,000) 
Random Intercept     3,096     2,953 
Country level     (0,000)     (0,000) 
Random Intercept     11,436     10,706 
HH level     (0,000)     (0,000) 
N 84382 84382 84382 84370 84370 20403 20403 20403 20403 20403 
Note: coefficients are odds ratios; p-values in parentheses 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
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 Introducing both asset test dummies yields the expected pattern whereby asset test have 
a negative impact while disregards reduce that effect. However, strong collinearity makes results 
unusable as pointed out by the unrealistically large coefficients. Confirming findings in section 
VII.4, the program income floor exerts a significant positive influence, raising the likelihood of 
possessing income generating assets. 
 
6.7.3 ASSET TESTS AND SAVINGS 
 
 The last set of models investigates the links between asset test and the likelihood of 
having savings (proxied by the capacity to face unexpected expenses). Findings are shown in 
Table 11. Simple correlations, logit regressions and three-level logit analyses add up to a 
consistent picture. The presence of an asset test is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
having liquid assets. The asset test coefficient is always large and statistically significant. On 
average, living in a country with a social assistance program that implements an asset test reduces 
the likelihood of having savings by around 50-65%. The two samples produce relatively similar 
sets of coefficients. 
 Models 1-2 & 2-2 that contain both the asset test and the asset disregard dummies show 
the predicted pattern. However, the asset test disregard coefficient, albeit large, is statistically 
zero. Again, serious colinearity issues prevent a firm interpretation of results. Finally, while 
significant only in the models using the smaller income based samples, the program income floor 
has a negative impact on the likelihood of having savings. 
 
6.7.4  DISCUSSION 
 
 While lack of variation prevents a proper identification of asset tests effects, a prima facie 
inspection of the relationship between asset tests and asset accumulation yields some interesting 
results. Generally, both samples yield similar results despite being of very different sizes216. The  
presence of asset tests is negatively related with two asset variables, namely the probability of 
having asset generated income, and the probability of having financial savings. The asset test 
coefficients are statistically insignificant in all specifications modelling possession of consumer 
durables. An insignificant effect is to be expected given that consumer durables usually lie 
outside the scope of social assistance asset tests.  
 
                                                          
216 However, the magnitude of the coefficients differs somewhat across samples. 
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Table  6.11 Asset tests and the likelihood of having savings 
 Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model1-3 Model 1-4 Model 1-5217 Model 2-1 Model 2-2 Model 2-3 Model 2-4 Model 2-5 
Asset test (0/1) 0,4707 0,4107 0,4335 0,3952 - 0,3909 0,2900 0,3582 0,3091 0,02570 
 (0,003) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) - (0,015) (0,000) (0,008) (0,000) (0,042) 
Asset disregard (0/1)  1,2489   -  1,6060    
  (0,409)   -  (0,177)    
Single parent   0,5195 0,5394 -   0,5522 0,5682 0,3941 
   (0,000) (0,000) -   (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
No children   0,9200 0,9750 -   1,0416 1,1951 1,1947 
   (0,007) (0,624) -   (0,238) (0,000) (0,000) 
No adult   1,2791 1,3230 -   1,2313 1,4072 1,4532 
   (0,000) (0,005) -   (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
No retired   1,3821 1,4321 -   1,7768 1,9192 2,4762 
   (0,000) (0,000) -   (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Max Family Benefit    0,9993 -    0,9982 0,9987 
    (0,256) -    (0,000) (0,000) 
Unemployment rate     0,9887 -    0,9609 0,8370 
    (0,620) -    (0,085) (0,000) 
GDP/capita    1,0001 -    1,0001 0,9998 
    (0,001) -    (0,001) (0,000) 
Random Intercept     -     1,5746 
Country level     -     (0,000) 
Random Intercept     -     5,3891 
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 Model could not be estimated due to lack of convergence. 
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HH level     -     (0,000) 
N 84276 84276 84276 84264 - 20384 20384 20384 20384 20384 
Note: Coefficients represent odds ratios; p-values in parentheses. 
The model corresponding to 2-5 using the first sample could not be estimated due to lack of convergence. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
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Summing up, findings are overall consistent with the hypothesis that asset tests tend to 
depress asset accumulation among low-income households. In particular, there is strong 
preliminary evidence that asset tests may discourage the build-up of savings and the build-up of 
income generating assets among potentially eligible households. This is exactly what standard 
welfare economics predicts. Due to their liquid and visible nature, savings should be most 
affected by the presence of asset tests in the eligibility conditions of social assistance transfers. 
Obviously, a proper test relying on enough variation to reliably identify policy effects is needed 
before any firm conclusions can be drawn. 
 
 
6.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has set out to examine the possible interrelations between the design of 
social assistance programs and asset accumulation among low income households. To carry out 
the analyses, use has been made of the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. To separate the low-
income population from the rest, two criteria have been used, i.e. education and income across a 
three year period. Mirroring the structure of the data, three level modes have been constructed. 
The relatively complex estimation strategy has allowed for some advantages but has also led to 
lack of convergence for some specifications (chiefly models containing a binary dependent 
variable, as well as more complex features such as interactions or random slopes). As a result, 
not all models could be estimated. 
Two distinct but interrelated features of social assistance programs have been analyzed, 
the generosity of the income floor implicit in the program on the one hand, and the presence of 
asset-tested entitlement on the other hand. Since a good measure of net worth was not available 
in the data, several types of assets have been analyzed separately, namely consumer durables, 
accumulated arrears, income generating assets and savings (proxied by the capacity to face 
unexpected expenses). 
The hypothesised negative effect of a higher income floor on asset accumulation could 
only be corroborated for debt accumulation and the amount of asset income. On the contrary, 
the availability of a more generous guaranteed minimum income is likely to facilitate the 
accumulation of consumer durables. As for the likelihood of owning income generating assets 
and savings, results were inconclusive. 
Albeit data deficiencies allowed only for very tentative results, the hypotheses regarding 
the effect of asset tests have largely been confirmed. Especially in the case of savings and income 
generating assets, there are clear indications that an asset test may have a depressing effect. 
Unfortunately, only a very raw indicator of asset testing could be constructed. Ideally, a more 
refined measure of asset testing (incorporating asset disregards) should be used to gain insights 
into the process through which asset tested eligibility affects asset accumulation among low-
income households. 
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To the author‟s knowledge no other study has attempted to measure the effects of social 
assistance design on asset accumulation among the poor and near poor in Central and Eastern 
Europe. As such, no previous results to serve as a point of reference exist. However, a 
comparison is possible with findings related to the American federal public assistance program 
(AFDC, and later TANF). This study‟s findings are partly convergent and partly divergent with 
the evidence on AFDC/TANF. On the one hand, the negative effect of asset tests on asset 
accumulation in general and savings in particular is consistent with the negative effect of asset 
limits found in both AFDC and TANF (Powers 1998; Sullivan 2006; Nam 2008). On the other 
hand, evidence that a more generous income floor depresses asset accumulation is more limited. 
Moreover, a higher income floor was found to be beneficial, at least for some types of assets. In 
interpreting these results, several things should be kept in mind. Differences in data (the asset 
measure) and identification methods may be responsible for the different results. However, the 
discrepancy may also be attributable to substantive differences between the CEE region and the 
US. First of all, the overall design of the two social assistance programs is very different218, and 
other program features may interact with the benefit level to determine the impact on asset 
accumulation processes. Second, there may be nonlinearities in the relationship between the level 
of the income floor and asset accumulation. More specifically, the level of guaranteed income 
provided by social assistance in Central and Eastern Europe may too low to discourage asset 
building. It may be argued that any harmful effects on precautionary saving kick-in only after a 
certain standard of living is assured by the program. Third, the population served by the CEE 
and the US programs is only partially overlapping219 Differences in the characteristics of potential 
clients are likely to play a role in determining the impact of the program. Fourth, the fact that 
Central East European countries are (in the period under study) both less affluent and more 
likely to experience steeper economic growth may counteract saving disincentives stemming 
from the social assistance program.  
To conclude, albeit there is some support for the hypothesis that social assistance 
programs in Central and Eastern Europe are detrimental to asset accumulation among the poor 
and the near-poor, results are far from conclusive and much weaker than those obtained using 
US data. Rather than depress precautionary saving, higher transfers may help recipient 
households to amass consumer durables, albeit it may also encourage them to take on 
unsustainable levels of debt and reduce their asset income. The inclusion of asset tests in 
program eligibility conditions may adversely affect saving behaviour in low income households. 
                                                          
218 For example, TANF is not a guaranteed entitlement. 
219 For example the US program is largely restricted to single mothers. 
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7  SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: SOME 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
7.1 ISSUES AND SCOPE  
 
  Set up in the early 1990‟s, means-tested public support programs in Central and Eastern 
Europe represent an interesting case of institutional development. On the one hand, the use of 
targeting in general and that of income-testing in particular in social transfer programs, has been 
widely encouraged by the World Bank and other international actors giving advice or „technical 
assistance‟(Wedel 1998) to Central and East European governments (Sipos 1994; The World 
Bank 2001; The World Bank 2002; Fox 2003; The World Bank 2004; Ringold, Kasek et al. 2007). 
Income testing and means-testing were supported as the best way to channel scarce resources to 
the „truly‟ poor while dismantling an „overdeveloped‟ welfare state that was said to be a drag on 
economic growth. On the other hand, social assistance transfers are complex and 
administratively demanding programs that may bring about unwanted side-effects, a fact readily 
acknowledged even by supporters of means-testing. The challenges of running a successful social 
assistance transfer program were all the more striking given the peculiarities of the Central and 
East European context. With the exception of Hungary, no previous experience with 
income/means testing was available to build on. Given the particularities of the command 
economy and the official work-centred ideology, poor relief was deemed unnecessary (see 
Chapter 2). Program implementation was likely to be further hampered by a weak state 
administrative capacity (compared to Western standards), as well as by significant levels of 
informal economic activity(Johnson, Kaufmann et al. 1997). Beyond implementation issues, 
means-tested benefits are controversial for the potential work disincentives they may induce 
among low-income earners. Once more, the particularities of the region during the 1990s were 
expected to aggravate the work disincentive problem. More specifically, a relatively compressed 
distribution of wages and earnings together with relatively low living standards prevented the 
establishing of a benefit large enough to protect against poverty without simultaneously affecting 
the cost of working for a significant share of the population. Thus, paradoxically, means-tested 
programs were hailed as the solution to reconciling cuts in social protection with protecting the 
poor, while their viability in Central and Eastern Europe was questioned. Despite the 
controversy, very little is known about how means-tested income support programs in Central 
and Eastern Europe work, or what are the outcomes they bring about. The previous chapters 
have aimed at contributing to filling this gap.  
 On a theoretical level, the interest of this study has been more general, namely to 
examine the way means-tested income support transfers affect the distribution of economic 
resources at the bottom of the income distribution , as well as to investigate linkages between 
244 
 
program design and outcomes, using Central and Eastern Europe as a case study. Evaluations of 
social assistance programs have tended to be both holistic (the program as a whole is evaluated) 
and narrow (a single program/ country is assessed). In the regime typology tradition, some 
studies have looked at whether social assistance or other transfer policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe amount to a different regime (Bahle 2005; Kogan, Gebel et al. 2008; Cerami 2009)This 
study has taken a different approach in that it used cross-national variation in program 
characteristics to identify patterns of association with various program outcomes. To that end, 
two interrelated questions have been addressed. On the one hand, an effort has been made to 
describe means-tested income support programs in a thorough and systematic way, so as to 
capture meaningful dimensions of variation and to allow for comparability. On the other hand, 
several analyses have been carried out so as to look into „program performance‟, from several 
perspectives.  
 The main data source used throughout the study is the 2007 longitudinal component of 
the European Union-Survey of Income and Living Condition (EU-SILC). In addition to the EU-
SILC, several other sources have been drawn upon, especially in order to gather information 
about program characteristics. Of these, the most important one is the Mutual Information 
System on Social Protection (MISSOC). Other data sources are documented in the chapters 
where they have been used. The selection of countries included in the study has been based 
partly on theoretical, partly on data availability considerations. On the theoretical side, a variant 
of „most similar case‟ design was followed. To ensure enough commonalities between the cases, 
the geographical scope of the study has been restricted so as to include countries that fulfilled 
simultaneously two conditions, i.e. they had been a member of the former communist bloc, and 
they have since 1990‟s experienced a process of “(re)westernization” leading up to EU 
membership. The application of these two criteria ensured that the social and economic 
structures both before and after 1990 were sufficiently similar to make comparisons feasible. On 
the data side, only countries that had been included in the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal 
component could be retained220. Overall, eight countries are included in the study, i.e. Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic221.  
 Several programs aimed at providing transfers to the low-income population may exist in 
any one of the eight countries mentioned above. In defining social assistance222 for the purposes 
of this research, only one type of program is taken into account, namely income-tested benefits 
                                                          
220
 Romania and Bulgaria had to be dropped due to data availability issues. 
221 At the same time, it should be noted that substantial differentiations do exist among these countries in terms of 
living standards, inequality and relative poverty, demographic characteristics and economic and social institutions. 
222 Social assistance, public assistance, means-tested income support, and minimum guaranteed income have been 
used interchangeably. 
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aimed at the general population. Thus, any special safety nets provided to special categories, such 
as for example the elderly or the disabled, are excluded223.  
 
 
 
 
7.2  MAIN FINDINGS 
 
 Chapter 2 sets the background for the remaining ones by giving an account of the 
inherited patterns of inequality from the communist era and of economic vulnerability both 
before and after the regime change. It highlights the fact that, contrary to official ideology and to 
conventional wisdom, communist societies were much less equalitarian than claimed. The 
evolution of wage inequality followed a cyclical pattern whereby previous equalization trends 
were reversed so as to accommodate labour allocation targets. The presence of considerable 
inequalities was even more striking when looking beyond wages, at consumption patterns. Unlike 
the Western welfare state, public, non-market channels of allocation worked to reinforce rather 
than diminish wage inequalities. In fact, preferential access to desirable goods and services (such 
as housing, subsidized holidays, cars, access to special shops etc) was often used as a wage 
supplement. Collective farmers, unskilled workers, workers in services and other „non-
productive‟ sectors, the disabled, and the Roma had lower economic resources than the general 
population.  
Communist patterns of disadvantage continued after the regime change albeit in slightly 
different forms. Farmers, rural resident, the Roma, the low educated, large families experienced a 
higher risk of unemployment, underemployment, irregular employment, or low-paid 
employment, and thus a higher risk of poverty. These categories remained economically 
vulnerable after the economy had returned to growth in the late 1990s. As such, they were the 
most likely to necessitate public support in the form of means-tested benefits. Interestingly 
enough, despite the communist past and despite the period of economic turmoil termed 
„economic transition‟, the characteristics of the poor in Central and Eastern Europe are currently 
remarkably similar to those in the Western half of the continent.  
 The history of social assistance programs in Central and Eastern Europe is reviewed in 
chapter 3. A peculiarity of Central and Eastern Europe is the lack of experience with poverty 
relief. During the five decades of communist rule, social protection was achieved through 
integration into production, not outside it. As a result, no comprehensive public program to 
address economic hardship existed. Instead, whatever public support was made available for the 
                                                          
223 The data format prevents a more encompassing definition of social assistance; means-tested benefits for the 
disabled, elderly, families with children etc. are aggregated under old-age, disability, family etc. benefits rather than 
with social exclusion. 
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poor was highly discretionary, centred on social work and stigmatizing. More importantly, 
benefits were highly fragmented, duplicative, and opaque. After some policy experimentation, all 
of the eight countries included in this study have established classic general guaranteed minimum 
income schemes. However, the legacy of fragmentation and duplication has endured in the form 
of special categorical programs being maintained alongside the universal one.  
 The bulk of the chapter is devoted to a detailed description of program features in the 
first half of the 2000s. Five program characteristics are examined, i.e. expenditure, entitlement 
rules, benefit levels, centralization of administration, and the provision of additional services. 
Aggregate expenditure on general means-tested benefits has been low throughout the region, 
both in absolute and in relative terms, although somewhat higher in Slovenia and the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. In addition, expenditure levels have fallen between 2003 and 2007. The 
downward trend is particularly visible in the higher spending countries.  
Mirroring expenditure levels, benefits are equally low. Amounts are often based on 
budgetary considerations rather than on actual needs, while inflation has often been used as a 
mechanism to „de facto‟ cut benefit levels. Nevertheless, benefits for large families can exceed 
the statutory minimum wage. In some cases, more generous support is made available for 
„deserving‟ categories such as the disabled or lone parents. 
Access to the benefits is granted after passing two or three tests. The „stingier‟ programs 
such as the Polish or Latvian impose, in addition to an income and a work test, an asset test. All 
countries require able bodied unemployed to seek work. However, the strictness with which 
these work tests are implemented probably varies. Finally, countries differ in the way they define 
the most important screening device governing access to the benefits, i.e. the income tests. By 
disregarding certain types of incomes partially or totally, the effective marginal tax rates224 are 
changed. However, most countries focus disregards225 on certain social protection benefits such 
as disability or child allowances. Only the Slovak Republic and to a lesser extent Latvia have 
effective marginal taxes on earnings below 100%.  
None of the eight countries has a social assistance program that is completely 
decentralized. At a minimum, a general benefit level is set nationally, albeit its payment is not 
fully guaranteed everywhere. Having noted that, the most centralized scheme is found in 
Slovenia. The Czech and the Slovak Republics also have relatively more centralized programs. 
Lastly, receipt of social assistance benefits automatically grants access to health benefits where 
these benefits are not already universal. Some countries explicitly take into account housing 
when establishing benefits. Yet, nowhere are these benefit components large enough to fully 
cover housing costs.  
                                                          
224
 The effective marginal tax rate is defined as the percentage of an increase in earnings that the earner keeps 
after all applicable taxes are deducted and declines in benefit entitlements are accounted for.   
225
 An income disregard is present when income from a given source is not taken into account (wholly or 
partially) for purposes of the means-test. See Chapters 3 and 5 for details on what income disregards exist in the 
social assistance schemes of the eight countries included in the study. 
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Important cross-national differentiation exists on all five dimensions. The number of 
countries is too small to allow for a thorough investigation of variation in program dimensions. 
However, a few patterns are worth noting. Countries having larger benefits also have more 
permissive entitlement rules, make available additional services such as health-care or housing, 
and spend larger fractions of their GDP on this type of programs226. These are also the countries 
with the lower relative poverty rates suggesting that generous income support for the poor might 
be unfeasible if poverty is too widespread. Social assistance design may also be influenced by the 
size of the state‟s redistributive effort. Thus, countries with more inclusive social insurance 
schemes (Inglot 2007) also tend to have more generous universal poverty relief and fewer 
categorical means-tested benefits. On a different note, previous poor relief experiences may 
impact on the blueprint of the current social assistance program. Building on the case of 
Hungary, it may be hypothesized that a tradition of local charities favours the development of a 
decentralized support for the poor.  
 The first analytic chapter is Chapter 4. Using pre post transfer comparisons, it examines 
program extensiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency. On extensiveness, social assistance 
programs are a marginal component of the social protection system in all eight countries. They 
serve small populations, spend relatively little compared to needs and the benefits they award are 
largely a top-up for their clients. Beyond this general pattern, considerable cross-country 
variation exists. Two clusters of countries are visible, i.e. countries where both the number of 
recipients and average benefits tended to be higher (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and the 
Slovak Republic) and countries where both were severely restricted (the three Baltic States). On 
effectiveness, the contribution of social assistance programs to poverty reduction/alleviation is 
severely circumscribed. Both the ability of the programs to reach the poor and, the ability to 
provide them with sufficient resources to bring them above the relative poverty threshold are 
found lacking. Even the most successful programs fail to lift out of poverty more than a fifth of 
the poor227. The general low effectiveness notwithstanding, substantive cross-national 
differentiation does emerge. Using pre-post transfer comparisons, the more extensive and 
accessible programs achieved higher effectiveness in reducing poverty, a result that held both 
cross-nationally and over time. Moreover, more extensive and liberal programs directed a greater 
share of their resources to the very poor. On efficiency, all countries have been found to „waste‟ 
a large share of their program resources mainly by directing payments to the non-poor but also 
by awarding benefits to the poor in excess of their shortfall from the poverty line. 
 Two issues are worth noting from a theoretical perspective. First, contrary to some 
theoretical expectations, no negative link was found between generosity and efficiency. Quite the 
opposite, programs that made available only very low benefits, transferred a larger share of these 
benefits to households that were not poor before transfer. This finding calls into question the 
utility and viability of using low benefits in combination with program application costs as a self-
                                                          
226
 This pattern remains true even after the more the spending cuts implemented between 2003 & 2007.  
227 The poor being defined using the more conservative 50% median equivalised income line. 
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targeting mechanism. More generally, the assumption that the opportunity cost of claiming the 
benefit is smaller for the poor than for the non-poor appears misguided. In fact, the non-poor 
may have more resources, such as time, available to invest in claiming a benefit228. Thus, using 
low benefits as a self-targeting mechanism is both failing to provide support for those 
households that are vulnerable and relatively wasteful. At a more general level, findings suggest 
that shortcuts taken to diminish the administrative burden of measuring a household‟s economic 
resources may turn out to be counterproductive to the program‟s goals and that there are no easy 
solutions to the administrative costliness of means-testing. 
 Second, there is something to be said about decentralization and discretion. In a study of 
the social assistance administration in the US, Germany and Sweden, Jewell (2007) finds that 
German and Swedish front-line workers use their discretionary authority to provide extra 
support for some households who would not receive it under ordinary circumstances. A 
different pattern is observed in Central and Eastern Europe. Decentralization and discretion are 
often used to ration insufficient resources. Moreover, discretion is linked to very poor targeting 
performance, suggesting arbitrariness in entitlement and spending decisions. The contrasting 
patterns of Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand and Germany/Sweden on the other 
hand may be explained by lack of administrative capacity in the former. More specifically, in a 
context where a tradition of professionalization/ civil service to draw on when making decisions 
is lacking, discretion is likely to lead to inconsistencies in the application of the program rules, as 
well as a general incapacity to channel resources to the most needy. 
 Finally, pre- post- transfer comparisons have been carried out not only for the entire 
population, but also separately for six family types. Results were generally aligned with those 
obtained for the general population. Nonetheless, slight differences across family types did 
emerge. Social assistance programs were more likely to shelter against income deprivation when 
households contained children or pensioners. In contrast, they were less likely to offer 
(generous) support to single working-age adults. These findings are consistent with programs 
differentiating, explicitly or implicitly, between various groups and treating those seen as more 
„deserving‟ on more favourable terms. Households with children are particularly likely to be 
better protected in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, i.e. the countries with 
the most effective social assistance programs.  
 Social assistance outcomes are examined from a different perspective in chapter 5. Using 
dynamic panel modelling, the chapter focuses on the longer-term program impact on recipient 
households‟ income. Although social assistance programs are meant to provide only temporary 
support and to improve their clients‟ long term economic self-sufficiency, work disincentives are 
a well known problem associated with means-testing. By potentially discouraging recipients to 
                                                          
228 This argument has been made in a different form about using work requirements to screen-out the non-poor, in 
developing countries; in fact, often poor households were more time constrained than non-poor households and 
thus less able to take advantage of work-tested programs Ravallion, M. and G. Datt (1995). Is Targeting through a 
Work Requirement Efficient? Some Evidence for Rural India. Public Spending and the Poor. Theory and Evidence. 
D. Van de Walle and K. Nead. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press: 413-444. 
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increase their earnings, social assistance programs may be in fact self-defeating229. To assess the 
extent to which social assistance schemes in Central and Eastern Europe discourage economic 
self-sufficiency, the analyses in chapter 5 compare the income changes of recipients and non-
recipients through time. To partly account for self-selection into the program mechanisms, 
eligibility to receive benefits is modelled. Finally, earnings, labour income, other social protection 
income, and total household disposable incomes are analyzed separately.  
 Confirming patterns found in Chapter 4, social assistance programs in the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic were more able to identify and reach eligible 
households compared to Latvia, Hungary, and Poland.  
 No clear evidence of a negative effect of social assistance programs on future earnings 
could be discerned. Albeit social assistance clients tended to have lower earnings growth 
compared to non-recipient low-income households in some countries, the result was far from 
universal. Moreover, even where a negative effect has been found, it often could not be 
confirmed across households or samples. More importantly, households receiving relatively 
larger benefits could not be shown to experience slower earnings growth compared to 
households receiving less. More consistent results have been obtained for labour income. As a 
general pattern, households that have received social assistance benefits have lower labour 
income in subsequent years. Over and above program participation, only eligible households 
appear to diminish their labour income in response to higher benefits. Partly reflecting a drop in 
labour income, total disposable household income is moderately negatively affected by 
participation in a social assistance program. Nevertheless, results gave no indication that more 
generous social assistance benefits depress future household disposable income. 
 Overall, results proved to be very sensitive to specification details and thus inconclusive. 
However, a few points are worth noting. First, any work disincentives that the programs might 
create could not be linked to the benefits they provide. Instead, lower future incomes appear to 
be related to program participation as such rather than disbursed benefits. Second, while labour 
supply may be negatively affected by program participation both at the extensive and at the 
intensive margins, cross-national variation patterns differ. At the intensive margin, all countries 
exhibit relatively similar small to moderate impacts. On the contrary, more differentiation across 
countries exists on disincentives at the extensive margin. Third, program outcomes could not be 
unambiguously mapped onto program characteristics. In particular, both more liberal and more 
generous programs and stingy, harsh means-testing ones could produce less negative outcomes. 
However, in the latter case, the lack of negative outcomes may be due more to the programs 
being irrelevant rather than beneficial. 
                                                          
229 This argument has had wide currency especially among neo-conservative; see Murray, C. A. (1984). Losing 
gound: American social policy, 1950-1980. New York, Basic Books. for a prominent example; for a rebuttal using 
the American case, see Emory Burton, C. (1992). The Poverty Debate. Politics and the Poor in America. Westport, 
Greenwood Press, Handler, J. F. and Y. Hasenfeld (2007). Blame welfare, ignore poverty and inequality. New York, 
Cambridge University Press. 
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 The last analytic chapter is chapter 6. It turns on a different type of economic resources, 
namely assets. Very little is known about household saving behaviour in Central and Eastern 
Europe beyond a general agreement that the existent level of savings is relatively low and that 
capital markets are only now being developed (Stark and Bruszt 1998; Hanley 1999; Fultz and 
Ruck 2001; Hausner 2001). Even less is known about the possible interactions between saving 
and social transfer programs. Given the scarcity of information, hypotheses have been derived 
based on the American literature on AFDC/TANF. Two possible mechanisms linking means-
tested minimum guaranteed income programs and assets have been examined. First, by design, 
transfer programs of the minimum guaranteed income type create an income floor below which 
nobody should fall. In turn, the existence of an income floor may discourage precautionary 
saving, at least for households that have a long-term income close to the guaranteed income 
floor. Second, the presence of an asset test in the process of determining entitlement potentially 
amounts to an additional disincentive to save for low-income households as any assets that have 
been accumulated will need to be run down before any benefits can be granted.  
 A series of data limitations preclude a proper testing of the second mechanism. More 
specifically, lack of accurate information on the specificities of asset test implementation, as well 
as the lack of variation in the asset-test variable resulting from the (very) small number of 
countries do not allow for a proper identification of asset test effects. Instead, results should be 
interpreted as associations/ correlations. Another data shortcoming comes from absence of 
encompassing asset measures, particularly measures of financial assets and net worth, in the EU-
SILC. Consequently, four partial asset indicators have been constructed using the available data, 
namely a consumer durables index, a debt accumulation index, asset income, and the ability to 
face unexpected expenses (used as a proxy for having savings). 
 A higher income floor has been found to favour rather than hamper the accumulation of 
consumer durables. The effect is heterogeneous across groups. In particular, single parents, 
households with children, households containing retired persons, and higher-income households 
are less affected. Moreover, the link between a higher income floor and the accumulation of 
consumer durables appears to be stronger in the Baltic countries and weaker in the richer 
countries (Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary).  
 Debt accumulation has been shown to be positively related to the level of the income 
floor. The predisposition to build up arrears when facing a more generous income guarantee is 
particularly visible in the case of poorer households. With the exception of Estonia where the 
impact is somewhat larger, countries do not appear to differ widely in the magnitude of the 
effect. 
 The level of the guaranteed income floor has been negatively linked to the conditional 
level of asset income but not to the probability of it being positive. Similarly, the capacity to face 
unexpected expenses could not be demonstrated to be lowered by the presence of a higher 
income floor.  
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Preliminary results indicate that the presence of asset testing in minimum guaranteed 
income transfers may discourage both saving and the accumulation of income generating assets. 
On the other hand, the accumulation of consumer durables appears to be unaffected by the 
presence of asset-testing.  
 Overall, the impact of means-tested programs on asset accumulation among low-income 
households is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, with the exception of debt management, 
there are few indications that the income floor implicitly created by the programs represents a 
disincentive to saving. On the other hand, asset tests present in means-tested programs may play 
a role in depressing asset accumulation among low-income households.  
The various findings brought together paint a picture of similarity rather than of 
differentiation among social assistance schemes in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite much 
touting of means-testing by the World Bank and other international organizations, this type of 
transfer remains a marginal component of the social protection system in the region. In design, 
they very closely mirror features of West European modern social assistance programs, by 
providing a needs-based transfer aimed at guaranteeing a minimum level of resources for all 
residents. Beyond this general blueprint however, programs differ, especially in the level of the 
minimum they set, and in the way they are administered. 
Do social assistance programs work as intended? Evidence from the EU-SILC suggests 
only partly. In particular, all eight schemes experience serious shortcomings in reaching the poor 
and in filtering out the non-poor. The poor targeting performance points to the importance of 
administrative capacity for the workings of means-tested benefits. Furthermore, findings suggest 
that design cannot easily substitute for an efficient administration. First, using low benefits as a 
self-targeting mechanism is unlikely to solve the problem of separating the needy from the 
better-off. Second, discretion used in a context of insufficient resources and lack of a proficient 
administration can be expected to produce arbitrary rationing of transfers rather than improved 
matching of resources to needs.  
Given the limited scope and deficient functioning, it is not surprising that the impact of 
social assistance transfers on poverty is minimal. Nonetheless, programs with more liberal access 
and more generous income support do achieve better results. Behavioural responses to the 
existence of the transfer have been shown to be equally limited. In contrast to some US findings, 
both welfare dependency and non-saving in the face of an income floor received only limited 
support in the data. Instead, results are more in line with some European studies showing limited 
work disincentives arising from the existence of means-tested programs, despite the very high 
implicit marginal tax rates that they impose. There may be several explanations underlying this 
pattern. First, it should be noted that the population served by the American and the CEE (and 
West European) social assistance programs are very different. American federal public assistance 
is reserved, by and large, to poor single mothers with young children, a group that is particularly 
difficult to integrate into the labour market. Work disincentives and employment barriers may 
compound each other in this case. Second, social assistance schemes in CEE are embedded in a 
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larger social protection setup. In all likelihood, some individuals and families who would 
otherwise be forced onto social assistance will be supported by other social transfer programs. 
What is more, the level of social assistance benefits is well below other forms of support, and 
thus, the program is less attractive as a source of income. Third, the sustained economic growth 
and subsequent steep upward trend in wages characterizing the region during the 2004-2007 
period has potentially played a role in encouraging work over welfare receipt230. Summing up, 
there is no indication that social assistance programs in Central and Eastern Europe have much 
of an impact, either positive or negative. On a more theoretical level, the lack of program impact 
questions the hypothesis that generous means-tested benefits are self-defeating. At least up to a 
certain level, larger transfers appear to better support the living standards of their recipients 
without causing serious work disincentives. 
7.3 IS THERE A ROLE FOR SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE? 
 
Do social assistance programs in Central and Eastern Europe amount to sound public 
policy? A recent study has claimed they have been a crucial tool for keeping poverty in check and 
ensuring the legitimacy of the new institutional order (Cerami 2009). Such a view is at odds with 
findings presented throughout this work. Far from being a critical component of the social 
protection system, social assistance programs are marginal and lack impact. However, despite of 
their shortcomings, social assistance transfers are hardly irrelevant. First, even the most 
developed welfare state needs a safety net of last resort for those failing to qualify for other types 
of social support (Leisering 2008). As such, means-tested social assistance remains a necessary 
component of any modern social protection system. Second, means-tested benefits may provide 
a much needed buffer against destitution for vulnerable groups such as children especially when 
they are more generous and access is not exceedingly onerous (see Chapter 4). Yet, social 
assistance programs should not be counted on to solve the problem of poverty. Paradoxically, 
they may work best when their scope remains limited231 (Korpi and Palme 1998; Nelson 2004). 
They may be necessary but are not sufficient as an anti-poverty instrument. Ultimately, patterns 
of social stratification depend primarily on processes taking place in the labour market (Hill 
2006) and in the capital markets. While undoubtedly important, the impact of public 
redistribution is mainly at the margins. As such, the role of social assistance cannot but remain 
limited. 
 
                                                          
230 The role of a strong economy has been found crucial in moving welfare clients into work in the US as well (see 
Chapter 5). 
231
Large means-tested benefit programs clearly directed at the poor tend to lose political support, and so their 
terms tend to be less generous or become less generous in time. 
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APPENDIX 1: Poverty and Inequality measures in CEE during the 1990s and early 2000s  
 
Indicator Year BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
Headcount 
% (Pov 
line=2.15 $ 
PPP/day) 
1981 0.27 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.12 0.00 0.02 0.00 
1984 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.52 1.22 0.00 0.02 0.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.52 1.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 
1990 0.00 0.00 2.61 0.06 0.00 18.09 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1993 1.31 0.03 7.46 0.76 5.00 44.12 11.76 14.22 0.00 0.00 
1996 19.98 0.00 6.90 2.15 8.39 7.79 0.67 13.62 2.88 0.04 
1999 11.20 0.00 5.88 1.77 11.52 7.21 1.16 16.60 2.16 0.00 
2002 9.70 0.00 7.54 0.71 4.14 8.86 1.48 15.62 1.78 0.00 
2004 6.41 0.00 6.72 0.48 4.38 7.53 1.08 12.63 1.67 0.00 
Poverty 
gap-%;Pov 
line=2.15 $ 
PPP/day 
1981 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.33 0.00 0.01 0.00 
1984 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.01 0.00 
1987 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.00 
1990 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.02 0.00 5.28 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1993 0.45 0.01 1.93 0.28 0.49 12.92 4.60 3.65 0.00 0.00 
1996 3.74 0.00 1.35 0.51 2.22 2.04 0.17 3.07 0.84 0.02 
1999 2.64 0.00 1.24 0.46 2.63 1.55 0.23 3.96 0.58 0.00 
2002 2.58 0.00 1.73 0.18 1.17 1.99 0.28 3.92 0.45 0.00 
1004 1.02 0.00 1.87 0.14 1.03 1.69 0.22 2.90 0.41 0.00 
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Headcount 
% ;Poverty 
line= 
4.40$PPP/ 
day 
1981 4.72 0.04 2.32 2.47 0.64 17.94 18.11 3.48 0.41 0.87 
1984 2.59 0.04 2.48 1.73 0.57 13.69 19.57 4.66 0.41 0.87 
1987 1.84 0.02 2.66 1.23 0.49 13.67 19.25 5.81 0.26 0.58 
1990 1.56 0.23 19.13 1.72 0.36 46.23 5.76 5.48 0.10 0.72 
1993 19.53 0.51 36.81 12.18 48.25 87.63 38.21 45.31 2.01 0.90 
1996 78.84 0.96 38.69 28.91 37.59 43.17 13.76 61.56 11.44 0.91 
1999 52.80 0.89 33.46 26.92 45.38 41.79 19.32 63.61 8.51 0.64 
2002 41.44 0.70 35.60 15.85 26.37 44.13 20.57 59.29 7.05 0.48 
2004 39.88 0.00 33.15 10.62 26.30 36.04 17.45 54.82 6.69 0.48 
Poverty 
gap-%; 
Poverty 
line=4.40 
$PPP/day 
1981 0.85 0.01 0.45 0.49 0.16 3.39 3.78 0.95 0.06 0.17 
1984 0.50 0.01 0.48 0.38 0.15 2.47 4.13 1.18 0.06 0.17 
1987 0.38 0.00 0.51 0.29 0.13 2.47 4.07 1.41 0.04 0.13 
1990 0.34 0.05 5.23 0.26 0.11 19.00 1.14 1.35 0.02 0.16 
1993 4.06 0.09 11.78 2.37 13.24 42.17 14.18 17.27 0.16 0.20 
1996 28.72 0.36 11.72 6.74 11.76 13.33 2.75 20.67 3.72 0.19 
1999 17.55 0.34 10.11 5.96 15.22 12.72 4.38 22.56 2.78 0.14 
2002 13.44 0.30 11.36 3.08 7.64 14.10 4.90 20.89 2.30 0.11 
2004 11.24 0.00 10.55 1.95 7.83 11.57 3.96 18.48 2.18 0.11 
Gini index 1981 23.43 19.40 22.97 20.96 22.49 22.48 25.16 23.31 19.54 23.60 
1984 23.43 19.40 22.97 20.96 22.49 22.48 25.16 23.31 19.54 23.60 
1987 23.43 19.40 22.97 20.96 22.49 22.48 25.53 23.31 19.54 23.60 
1990 23.43 26.60 39.50 25.05 22.49 26.94 26.89 23.31 19.52 26.39 
1993 24.32 26.60 39.50 27.94 26.99 33.64 32.39 26.83 19.49 29.18 
1996 26.38 25.89 30.06 26.13 31.60 32.36 32.66 28.82 25.81 28.72 
1999 30.36 25.82 37.32 27.78 33.62 30.21 33.08 29.84 25.81 28.41 
2002 31.79 25.82 36.81 26.82 35.91 32.33 34.05 31.46 25.81 28.41 
2004 29.24 25.82 35.78 26.82 37.66 36.01 34.05 31.06 25.81 28.41 
Source: The World Bank PovcalNet tool, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp ; 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: Comparison of social assistance performance in the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania and the Slovak Republic- all households vs. single unit households only 
 
 
Assessment units for evaluating social assistance entitlements have been constructed using 
program rules. For a detailed description of these see the corresponding EUROMOD country 
reports (https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/resources-for-euromod-users/country-reports). 
The same rules have been used in each year. The share of households that contain just one social 
assessment unit differs slightly from country to country and from year to year (see Table 1 
below) but generally hovers around 70%. 
Table 1: Share of 1 social assistance unit households among all households 
 CZ LT SK 
2004 74,56 76,73 73,25 
2005 72,98 74,59 70,22 
2006 71,43 69,63 66,54 
2007 74,00 74,11 67,92 
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Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset and the 2008 cross-
sectional dataset. 
 
 Table 2: Extensiveness/ generosity measures 
 CZ LT SK 
 All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only Average disbursed benefit per person (adjusted based on the equivalence scale  
 
2004 401,79 383,17 156,21 151,51 326,58 369,34 
2005 464,74 427,64 105,98 115,62 416,91 477,08 
2006 588,37 598,01 148,27 146,14 390,32 497,67 
2007 551,88 559,94 166,13 149,25 521,23 655,95 
Spending per poor person (poor defined on the 60% median equivalised income) 
2004 268,26 224,69 28,95 29,34 202,11 184,98 
2005 301,96 246,28 19,09 19,80 174,52 130,88 
2006 328,46 283,31 28,34 30,08 155,33 118,73 
2007 200,81 194,98 29,00 27,19 146,93 104,07 
Spending per poor person (poor defined on the 50% median equivalised income) 
2004 423,01 365,57 41,59 43,14 287,51 265,67 
2005 526,18 436,61 30,04 33,28 289,45 229,00 
2006 528,54 503,55 43,18 48,51 271,64 217,26 
2007 349,55 368,62 41,32 40,31 265,62 201,89 
Sum of social assistance benefit spending as % of the national poverty gap-60% line 
2004 50,54 41,13 9,82 9,73 45,51 39,73 
2005 54,60 42,88 5,82 5,85 43,31 32,69 
2006 49,42 43,49 6,92 7,03 35,02 24,03 
2007 28,74 27,85 5,20 4,66 26,74 19,29 
Sum of social assistance benefit spending as % of the national poverty gap-50% line 
2004 86,18 69,85 16,58 16,34 68,32 58,48 
2005 96,73 75,69 10,11 10,04 73,75 56,66 
2006 81,88 74,95 12,50 12,82 62,88 41,51 
2007 51,94 50,74 9,39 8,33 46,15 33,98 
Average benefit size-as % of poor households‟ budget (poor based on 60% median equivalised 
income) 2004 27,87 27,70 26,80 26,34 48,13 50,51 
2005 28,30 28,35 15,44 16,76 38,31 42,20 
2006 32,19 31,76 15,95 16,78 34,35 46,68 
2007 28,49 29,34 11,79 11,02 33,59 44,27 
 
2004 33,90 33,62 30,74 30,35 53,24 55,72 
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 CZ LT SK 
 All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 2005 36,60 38,21 20,08 24,93 41,78 45,72 
2006 39,07 40,27 21,09 23,01 37,22 49,98 
2007 33,89 35,79 14,72 14,66 39,26 47,54 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset and the 2008 cross-
sectional dataset. 
 
Table 3: Effectiveness measures 
 CZ LT SK 
 All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
Coverage=% poor receiving SA benefits- (poor based on the 60% median 
equivalised income line)  
 
2004 56,81 50,87 13,36 15,70 45,75 43,81 
2005 59,22 51,36 14,89 14,71 36,72 26,72 
2006 55,36 46,62 14,99 18,84 32,16 22,56 
2007 34,32 33,55 20,46 21,14 28,17 16,51 
Coverage=% poor receiving SA benefits- (poor based on the 50% median equivalised income 
line) 
2004 68,02 64,19 15,86 18,85 56,86 55,45 
2005 71,28 62,20 15,80 14,61 53,25 42,17 
2006 68,97 61,30 15,99 20,36 48,38 37,91 
2007 47,33 49,52 22,37 22,24 40,11 29,20 
Sum of well targeted social assistance benefit spending as % of the national poverty gap-based on 
the 60% median equivalent income line 
2004 35,47 32,55 6,33 7,02 32,46 30,87 
2005 38,42 33,97 3,63 4,00 25,98 21,12 
2006 38,05 34,96 4,06 5,09 23,67 20,49 
2007 22,56 23,14 3,42 3,15 18,93 15,88 
Sum of well targeted social assistance benefit spending as % of the national poverty gap-based on 
the 50% median equivalent income line 
2004 49,79 46,99 8,80 9,93 43,89 41,41 
2005 54,27 50,15 4,13 4,20 39,76 34,95 
2006 54,45 51,91 5,93 7,39 34,49 31,19 
2007 34,74 36,73 4,99 4,84 26,59 24,49 
Average % reduction in the poverty rate-total population- (poor defined on the 60% median 
equivalised income line) 
2004 11,44 6,61 1,31 1,73 5,73 3,74 
2005 14,97 9,40 2,14 2,79 5,15 1,72 
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 CZ LT SK 
 All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
2006 10,20 7,45 0,67 0,97 6,76 3,42 
2007 4,56 3,97 1,05 1,36 5,73 1,81 
Average % reduction in the poverty rate-total population-(poor defined on the 50% median 
equivalised income line) 
2004 26,35 23,92 3,29 2,74 13,95 12,12 
2005 25,62 19,51 3,17 4,68 8,74 3,29 
2006 25,39 21,36 1,93 2,44 15,78 10,08 
2007 13,55 12,27 3,08 1,68 9,94 6,56 
Average % reduction in the poverty rate-SA recipients- (poor defined on the 60% median 
equivalised income line) 
2004 20,13 12,99 9,83 11,24 12,52 8,53 
2005 25,28 18,29 14,37 12,68 14,03 6,45 
2006 18,42 15,98 4,47 15,76 21,04 15,15 
2007 13,29 11,83 5,15 14,53 20,34 10,99 
Average % reduction in the poverty rate-SA recipients- (poor defined on the 50% median 
equivalised income line) 
2004 38,74 37,27 20,73 14,53 24,54 21,85 
2005 35,94 31,38 20,07 32,00 16,41 7,80 
2006 36,81 34,85 12,06 11,99 32,61 26,59 
2007 28,62 24,77 13,76 7,57 24,78 22,46 
Average % reduction in the poverty gap- total population- (poor defined on the 60% median 
equivalised income line) 
2004 31,44 26,46 6,02 6,76 23,64 21,33 
2005 33,43 26,36 5,30 5,92 17,62 10,15 
2006 31,42 26,16 10,14 5,60 17,40 11,29 
2007 16,03 15,66 4,37 4,04 14,67 7,85 
Average % reduction in the poverty gap- total population- (poor defined on the 50% median 
equivalised income line) 
2004 48,82 44,76 8,32 9,71 35,17 32,67 
2005 49,90 41,45 6,43 15,60 29,37 18,67 
2006 49,77 43,75 6,93 16,81 54,12 23,08 
2007 28,51 30,88 7,21 15,06 31,40 16,98 
Average % reduction in the poverty gap- SA recipients- (poor defined on the 60% median 
equivalised income line) 
2004 55,35 52,01 45,08 43,08 51,68 48,69 
2005 56,44 51,32 35,61 40,22 47,97 38,00 
2006 56,75 56,11 28,45 29,72 54,12 50,03 
2007 46,69 46,66 21,38 19,11 52,09 47,55 
Average % reduction in the poverty gap- SA recipients- (poor defined on the 50% median 
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 CZ LT SK 
 All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
equivalised income line) 
2004 71,78 69,72 52,47 49,43 61,86 58,92 
2005 70,00 66,64 40,69 46,26 55,16 44,28 
2006 72,16 71,38 43,35 42,89 64,91 60,89 
2007 60,23 62,35 32,25 27,50 58,07 58,15 
Average % reduction in the Gini coefficient- SA recipients 
2004 26,65 29,29 18,40 23,41 24,05 25,76 
2005 27,85 30,48 8,54 12,11 21,24 25,80 
2006 32,04 35,06 9,47 14,36 22,97 30,99 
2007 25,57 29,70 7,19 7,41 23,35 31,65 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset and the 2008 cross-
sectional dataset. 
 
Table 4: Efficiency measures 
 CZ LT SK 
 All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
Leakage=% non-poor recipients-(poor defined based on the 60% median 
equivalised income line)  
 
2004 45,27 42,80 54,76 46,76 53,85 43,74 
2005 42,35 41,82 44,48 38,18 43,93 31,41 
2006 38,77 35,43 48,59 38,76 48,98 34,95 
2007 37,53 33,99 30,18 29,34 37,29 29,05 
Leakage=% non-poor recipients- poor defined based on the 50% median equivalised income 
line) 
2004 58,45 55,64 62,60 56,53 59,68 50,41 
2005 60,17 60,26 62,56 63,48 50,98 38,12 
2006 52,60 52,23 64,02 58,96 56,10 40,27 
2007 50,51 48,47 46,41 49,87 50,61 35,32 
Sum of well targeted benefits as a % of the sum of all benefits (poor defined based on the 60% 
median equivalised income line) 
2004 70,18 79,13 64,43 72,13 71,31 77,69 
2005 70,36 79,23 62,45 68,32 59,98 64,61 
2006 77,00 80,40 58,71 72,42 67,60 85,26 
2007 78,50 83,10 65,76 67,46 70,77 82,32 
Sum of well targeted benefits as a % of the sum of all benefits (poor defined based on the 50% 
median equivalised income line) 
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 CZ LT SK 
 All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
All hh 1 unit hh 
only 
2004 57,78 67,27 53,07 60,79 64,24 70,82 
2005 56,11 66,26 40,80 41,88 53,91 61,68 
2006 66,50 69,25 47,45 57,63 54,85 75,14 
2007 66,88 72,39 53,10 58,04 57,63 72,06 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset and the 2008 cross-
sectional dataset. 
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APPENDIX 3: Construction of the social assistance program feature scores 
 
With the exception of support services, all fuzzy scores have been derived from an 
interval variable. The derivation involved the indirect method described by Ragin (Ragin 2000; 
Ragin 2008). In a first step, the eight countries have been grouped based on their score on the 
interval level variable and assigned a first „raw‟ fuzzy score. In a second step, the „raw score‟ has 
been refined using a fractional logit model.  
 
Table 1: Rules for the derivation of fuzzy score 
Dimension Components Indicators Interval variable  
Centralization Based on location 
(central vs. local) of 
benefit setting, 
financing and 
delivery of benefits 
A score of 1 has been assigned to 
benefit setting/ delivery if these are 
centralized; 0 is assigned if carried 
out at the local level; the financing 
indicator is based on the proportion 
of financing coming from the 
central government. Where this is 
not known, an estimation is entered.  
Since a minimum benefit is set 
centrally in all countries, the 
centralization score is based on 
the remaining two indicators; 
financing has been assigned 
twice the weight of benefit 
delivery. 
Benefit generosity  Maximum benefit for single person 
as % of average gross earnings 
Maximum benefit for single 
person as % of average gross 
earnings 
Strictness of the 
means-test 
Based on the 
existence of 
earnings disregards, 
of other income 
disregards and of 
asset disregards 
when establishing 
and maintaining 
eligibility 
Earnings-1- the percentage of 
disregarded earnings; Other income-
A score of 1 indicated no income 
disregards; 0.8 only special 
circumstances allowances 
disregarded; 0.6-at least one sizable 
income disregarded (ex: family 
allowance); 0.4-2-3 important 
income sources disregarded; 0.2-
more than 3-4 income sources 
disregarded 
Assets-1-no disregards; 0-assets not 
considered; lower scores indicate 
less strictness of the test 
A simple average of the three 
indicators 
Support services Based on availability 
of health benefits, a 
housing benefit and 
child care;  
Health care-a score of 1 signals that 
health care benefits are available to 
SA recipients either through the SA 
program or they are free at the point 
of delivery for all citizens; a score of 
0 signals that SA recipients do not 
have access to health benefits, 
except for emergency care or by 
paying out of the pocket 
Greater weight is assigned to 
child-care. The overall 
index=[2*childcare score + 
health score + housing 
score]/4; 
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Dimension Components Indicators Interval variable  
Housing-if a centrally set housing 
benefit exists-0.9; if a benefit exists, 
but is set locally 0.4; if a benefit 
exists but not to cover rent but only 
utilities 0.2; if no benefit exists-0; 
Child care- a composite 
indicator=[2*% of 0-3 cohort in 
formal childcare+ % 3-school age 
cohort in formal childcare]/3; 
Impact on 
employment 
participation 
Magnitude of the 
effect 
Based on the estimated impact of 
SA receipt in the previous year. 
Based on the estimated impact 
of SA receipt in the previous 
year. 
Impact on the 
odds of having 
positive labour 
income 
Magnitude of the 
effect 
Based on the estimated impact of 
SA receipt in the previous year. 
Based on the estimated impact 
of SA receipt in the previous 
year. 
Impact on the 
amount of 
equilvalised 
disposable income 
Magnitude of the 
effect 
Based on the estimated impact of 
SA receipt in the previous year. 
Based on the estimated impact 
of SA receipt in the previous 
year. 
Source: Based on program rules and characteristics. See Chapter 3 for more details. 
 
Table 2: Derivation of fuzzy scores for program centralization 
 Delivery Financing Delivery Interval variable Fuzzy score 
CZ 1 1 1 3 0.951 
EE 0 1 1 2 0.759 
HU 0 0.9 1 1.8 0.686 
LV 0 0.2 1 0.4 0.146 
LT 0 1 1 2 0.759 
PL 0 0.2 1 0.4 0.146 
SI 1 1 1 3 0.951 
SK 1 1 1 3 0.951 
Source: Final fuzzy scores based on fractional logistic regression. 
 
Table 3: Derivation of fuzzy scores for benefit generosity 
 Benefit for single person Average wage Interval variable Fuzzy Score 
CZ 4300 17760 0.242 0.836 
EE 750 8073 0.093 0.191 
HU 19760 159461 0.124 0.309 
LV 21 225.64 0.093 0.191 
LT 121.5 1276 0.095 0.197 
PL 316 230.62 0.134 0.354 
SI 46981 277279 0.169 0.530 
SK 4580 17274 0.265 0.891 
Source: Final fuzzy scores based on fractional logistic regression. 
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Table 4: Derivation of fuzzy scores for strictness of the means-test 
 Earnings test Other income test Asset test Interval variable Fuzzy Score 
CZ 1 0.9 0 1.9 0.487 
EE 1 0.6 0 1.6 0.326 
HU 1 0.6 0.8 2.4 0.745 
LV 1 1 0.9 2.9 0.900 
LT 1 0.8 0.9 2.7 0.852 
PL 1 1 0.8 2.8 0.878 
SI 1 0.6 0.8 2.4 0.745 
SK 0.75 0.4 0 1.35 0.216 
Source: Final fuzzy scores based on fractional logistic regression. 
 
Table 5: Fuzzy score for outcome variables 
 Β (earnings) FS (earnings) B (labour 
income ) 
FS (labour 
income) 
B (disposable 
income) 
FS (disposable 
income) 
CZ 0.785 0.2776 -4.850 0.9891 -0.119 0.9099 
EE -6.733 0.9483 -2.805 0.8580 -0.113 0.9545 
HU -0.876 0.4745 -3.044 0.8922 -0.064 0.7967 
LV 1.693 0.1941 -1.492 0.5141 0.002 0.1071 
LT 1.156 0.2410 -7.669 0.9997 0.001 0.1201 
PL 3.138 0.1028 -1.583 0.5442 -0.063 0.6820 
SI 2.516 0.1363 -2.207 0.7319 0.085 0.6534 
SK -1.325 0.2254 -1.821 0.6207 -0.111 0.9261 
Note: B- original logistic regression coefficients; FS-fuzzy score. 
Source: B-s constructed based on Tables 5, 10 & 18 and the respective estimation sample sizes; fuzzy 
score determined via a fractional logistic regression.  
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APPENDIX 4: Impact of Social Assistance Participation & Benefits on Earnings- Full Models 
 
Table 1: Likelihood of having positive total household earnings (odds ratios) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) 0.625*
** 
1.347* 0.343*
** 
0.854 0.644*
** 
0.934 0.494*
** 
0.835 0.486*
** 
0.882 0.960 1.458*
** 
1.295* 1.877*
** 
1.010 1.313 
SA eligibility (lag 1) 0.216*
** 
0.546*
** 
0.172*
** 
0.414*
** 
0.385*
** 
0.696* 0.148*
** 
0.496*
** 
0.209*
** 
0.590*
* 
0.189*
** 
0.334*
** 
0.156*
** 
0.338*
* 
0.566*
* 
0.939 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 
1.308 0.610* 0.759 0.429* 1.355 1.028 3.995*
* 
2.452* 2.351* 1.342 1.145 0.8307 0.618 0.460* 0.271*
** 
0.265*
** 
N 7512 2307 5447 1846 6235 2371 3310 1014 3627 1170 13019 5458 7849 2793 4336 1431 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. 
 
 
Table 2: Probability of having positive household earnings, full model (odds ratios) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) 
0,732* 1,101 
0,460*
* 0,562* 
0,682*
* 0,902 
0,560*
* 0,958 0,780 1,059 0,990 1,190 1,163 1,444* 0,872 1,063 
SA eligibility (lag 1) 0,366*
** 0,696 
0,164*
** 
0,176*
** 
0,391*
** 
0,373*
** 
0,256*
** 
0,273*
** 
0,305*
** 
0,271*
** 
0,171*
** 
0,202*
** 0,361* 0,502 
0,336*
** 
0,296*
** 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 1,348 0,602 1,465 1,203 1,356 1,269 
4,580*
* 2,533 1,844 1,141 1,778* 1,209 0,700 0,388 0,427* 0,404 
Single parent 
0,880 1,134 0,727 1,200 0,952 0,949 0,848 1,311 0,703 0,835 
0,818*
* 0,889 
1,575* 
 
1,894*
* 1,244 1,229 
Large family (3+ 
children) 1,709* 1,675 
0,264*
** 0,377* 0,549* 0,627 
0,179*
** 0,362 
0,247*
** 
0,253*
** 
0,470*
** 
0,486*
** 
0,404* 
 
0,491 
 
0,274*
* 0,352* 
No children<7 
1,051 1,281 
1,481*
* 1,177 1,187 1,131 1,402 1,324 1,570* 1,516* 1,114 1,123 1,225 0,984 0,910 0,837 
No children (<18) 1,327*
** 
1,541*
** 
2,068*
** 
2,374*
** 
2,080*
** 
2,557*
** 
2,278*
** 
2,314*
** 
1,691*
** 
2,070*
** 
1,328*
** 
1,552*
** 
1,628*
** 
1,783*
** 
2,147*
** 
2,831*
** 
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Max hh education 1,218*
** 0,956 
1,359*
** 1,042 
1,515*
** 1,084 
1,849*
** 
1,426*
** 
1,746*
** 1,117 
1,548*
** 
1,182*
** 
1,987*
** 
1,390*
** 
1,507*
** 1,103 
Total no of months 
unemployed 
0,838*
** 
0,780*
** 
0,827*
** 
0,850*
** 0,937* 0,908* 
0,878*
* 0,889* 
0,857*
** 
0,875*
* 
0,906*
** 
0,924*
** 0,961 0,971 
0,850*
** 
0,790*
** 
Total no of months 
inactive 
0,894*
** 
0,911*
** 
0,851*
** 
0,910*
** 
0,898*
** 
0,928*
** 
0,895*
** 
0,922*
** 
0,893*
** 
0,933*
** 
0,935*
** 
0,975*
** 
0,888*
** 
0,894*
** 
0,893*
** 
0,898*
** 
No persons 
unemployed 2,030* 
4,497*
** 1,690 2,216 1,131 2,085 1,605 2,306 2,288* 
3,210*
* 
1,963*
** 
2,554*
** 0,928 1,034 2,261* 
5,065*
* 
Urban (0/1) 
0,854 0,774* 
1,712*
** 
1,740*
* 1,151 0,785 
1,684*
** 0,859 
2,045*
** 1,297 
1,423*
** 
1,234*
* - - 1,183 0,849 
Owner (0/1) 
0,874 0,857 0,869 0,734 1,149 1,092 0,842 0,698 0,772 0,924 
0,575*
** 
0,608*
** 0,866 0,857 0,979 1,007 
No working age 
adults 
4,774*
** 
6,665*
** 
6,856*
** 
6,627*
** 
4,674*
** 
5,701*
** 
3,781*
** 
3,242*
** 
3,344*
** 
2,712*
** 
2,559*
** 
2,198*
** 
6,518*
** 
8,298*
** 
4,069*
** 
4,805*
** 
Non-labour market 
income (thousands €) 
0,917*
** 
0,555*
** 1,099 
0,625*
* 0,992 
0,517*
** 0,901 
0,309*
* 
0,846*
* 
0,375*
** 
0,798*
** 
0,555*
** 0,998 0,978 0,970 0,532* 
Social protection 
income (excluding 
SA) (thousands €) 
0,618*
** 
0,443*
** 
0,655*
** 
0,408*
** 
0,641*
** 
0,430*
** 
0,673*
** 
0,365*
** 
0,652*
** 
0,400*
** 
0,787*
** 
0,619*
** 
0,826*
** 
0,756*
** 
0,608*
** 
0,390*
** 
N 7512 2307 5443 1845 6231 2369 3310 1014 3627 1170 12699 5304 7827 2781 4334 1431 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. 
 
Table 3: Probability of having positive household earnings, conditional on program participation and benefit amount (odds ratios) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1 
0.759 1.129 0.435* 0.606 
0.642*
* 0.850 0.490* 0.772 0.758 0.931 1.178 1.434 1.034 1.362 0.759 1.129 
SA eligibility (lag 1)  0.363*
** 0.690 
0.162*
** 
0.176*
** 
0.391*
** 
0.371*
** 
0.255*
** 
0.272*
** 
0.311*
** 
0.277*
** 0.171 0.201 0.350 0.484 0.363 0.690 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 1.585 0.735 2.045 1.964 2.286* 2.180 2.509 1.334 7.485* 6.347 1.271 0.863 1.463 0.950 1.585 0.735 
SA receipt (L1)*SA 0.855 0.829 0.568 0.540 1.501 1.720 1.349 1.664 0.141 0.326 0.422 0.365 1.239 1.133 0.855 0.829 
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
amount (L1) 
SA Receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2 (L1) 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.002 1.006 1.007 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 
receipt (L1) * SA 
amount (L1) 1.111 1.290 0.563 0.254 0.086* 0.072* 59.075 93.140 0.000 0.000 4.308 5.582 0.620 0.675 1.111 1.290 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 
receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2(L1) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001* 1.001* 0.997 0.995 1.008 1.007 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Single parent 0.881 1.127 0.749 1.217 0.944 0.939 0.858 1.302 0.732 0.881 0.817 0.886 1.548 1.842 0.881 1.127 
Large family (3+ 
children) 1.768* 1.806 
0.273*
** 0.378* 0.524* 0.581 
0.178*
** 0.352 
0.235*
** 
0.248*
* 0.472 0.488 0.430 0.534 1.768 1.806 
No children<7 
1.033 1.214 
1.491*
* 1.186 1.177 1.107 1.422 1.339 
1.586*
* 1.491 1.112 1.120 1.224 1.033 1.214 1.491 
No children (<18) 1.336*
** 
1.583*
** 
2.038*
** 
2.358*
** 
2.110*
** 
2.630*
** 
2.263*
** 
2.321*
** 
1.663*
** 
2.056*
** 1.330 1.555 1.651 1.829 1.336 1.583 
Max hh education 1.219*
** 0.954 
1.357*
** 1.046 
1.516*
** 1.085 
1.848*
** 
1.419*
** 
1.747*
** 1.121 1.549 1.183 1.984 1.378 1.510 1.219 
Total no of months 
unemployed 
0.846*
** 
0.793*
** 
0.827*
** 
0.846*
** 0.939* 
0.909*
* 
0.878*
* 0.885* 
0.860*
** 
0.878*
* 0.906 0.924 0.968 0.982 0.860 0.846 
Total no of months 
inactive 
0.895*
** 
0.915*
** 
0.851*
** 
0.911*
** 
0.897*
** 
0.928*
** 
0.895*
** 
0.921*
** 
0.893*
** 
0.934*
** 0.935 0.975 0.890 0.897 0.894 0.895 
No persons 
unemployed 1.970* 
4.472*
* 1.701 2.344 1.112 2.069 1.618 2.434 2.186* 3.053* 1.972 2.571 0.889 0.977 2.138 1.970 
Urban (0/1) 
0.862* 0.797 
1.698*
** 
1.734*
* 1.155 0.792 
1.672*
** 0.849 
2.050*
** 1.288 1.424 1.238 1.000 1.000 1.187 0.862 
Owner (0/1) 0.864 0.824 0.876 0.739 1.152 1.100 0.836 0.690* 0.774 0.924 0.572 0.600 0.858 0.847 0.971 0.864 
No working age 
adults 
4.788*
** 
6.738 
*** 
6.855*
** 
6.614*
** 
4.699*
** 
5.755*
** 
3.795*
** 
3.281*
** 
3.286*
** 
2.623*
** 2.563 2.205 6.524 8.389 4.142 4.788 
Non-labour market 
income (thousands €) 
0.916*
** 
0.546*
** 1.085 
0.622*
* 0.991 
0.516*
** 0.903 
0.292*
* 
0.845*
** 
0.371*
** 0.799 0.556 0.998 0.978 0.958 0.916 
Social protection 
income (excluding 
SA) (thousands €) 
0.618*
** 
0.443*
** 
0.650*
** 
0.408*
** 
0.641*
** 
0.429*
** 
0.673*
** 
0.365*
** 
0.650*
** 
0.404*
** 0.787 0.618 0.826 0.755 0.605 0.618 
N 7512 2307 5443 1845 6231 2369 3310 1014 3627 1170 12699 5304 7827 2781 4334 1431 
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Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. 
 
 
Table 4:  Impact of social assistance participation on total amount of household earnings (conditional on positive earnings)-full model 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) -
0,352*
** 
-
0,150*
** 
-
0,404*
** 
-
0,275*
** 
-
0,312*
** 
-
0,171*
** 
-
0,359*
** 
-
0,356*
* 
-
0,330*
** -0,097 
-
0,385*
** 
-
0,226*
* 
-
0,143*
** 
-
0,095* 
-
0,164*
* -0,075 
SA eligibility (lag 1) -
0,764*
** 
-
0,369*
** 
-
0,709*
** 
-
0,605*
** 
-
0,554*
** 
-
0,425*
** 
-
0,576*
** 
-
0,402*
* 
-
0,873*
** 
-
0,741*
** 
-
0,898*
** 
-
0,694*
** 
-
1,313*
** 
-
1,264*
** 
-
0,565*
** 
-
0,403*
** 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 
0,391*
** 0,044 0,272 0,269 0,079 -0,064 -0,008 0,014 0,398* 0,264 0,142 0,012 0,272 0,136 0,068 -0,170 
Single parent -
0,174*
** -0,044 
-
0,233*
** -0,020 
-
0,075* -0,016 
-
0,237*
** 0,018 
-
0,163*
** 0,008 
-
0,184*
** 
-
0,063* 
-
0,119*
** -0,034 
-
0,101*
* 
-
0,143*
* 
Large family (3+ 
children) 
-0,009 -0,070 
-
0,243*
** -0,139 
-
0,123* -0,155 
-
0,566*
** -0,205 
-
0,193*
* -0,230 
-
0,212*
** 
-
0,143*
* 
-
0,143* 
-
0,221* 
  -
,160* -0,094 
No children<7 -
0,060*
* 0,023 
0,132*
** 0,049 0,057* 0,058 0,006 -0,107 0,043 -0,075 0,016 0,013 0,016 0,005 0,017 -0,047 
No children (<18) 0,121*
** 
0,260*
** 
0,145*
** 
0,212*
** 
0,155*
** 
0,303*
** 
0,208*
** 
0,248*
** 
0,095*
** 
0,222*
** 
0,113*
** 
0,194*
** 
0,137*
** 
0,283*
** 
0,098*
** 
0,231*
** 
Max hh education 0,180*
** 0,038 
0,161*
** 0,016 
0,297*
** 
0,104*
** 
0,212*
** 0,064 
0,315*
** 0,046 
0,221*
** 
0,066*
** 
0,277*
** 0,039 
0,103*
** 
-
0,064* 
Total no of months 
unemployed 
-
0,043*
** 
-
0,021* 
-
0,044*
** -0,017 
-
0,054*
** 
-
0,035*
** 
-
0,048*
** -0,025 
-
0,039*
** -0,005 
-
0,022*
** -0,005 
-
0,023*
* 0,001 
-
0,024*
** -0,013 
Total no of months 
inactive 
-
0,014*
** 
-
0,014*
* 
-
0,039*
** 
-
0,024*
** 
-
0,035*
** 
-
0,029*
** 
-
0,033*
** 
-
0,024*
** 
-
0,037*
** 
-
0,020*
** 
-
0,029*
** 
-
0,012*
** 
-
0,032*
** 
-
0,017*
** 
-
0,028*
** -0,010 
No persons -0,048 -0,150 - -0,199 -0,059 -0,070 -0,112 -0,185 -0,055 - - - - - -0,090 -0,085 
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
unemployed 0,163* 0,246* 0,146*
* 
0,151*
* 
0,200*
* 
0,250*
* 
Urban (0/1) 0,057*
** -0,033 
0,095*
** 
0,128*
* 
0,170*
** 0,008 
0,308*
** 0,072 
0,293*
** 
0,203*
** 
0,116*
** 0,028   
0,115*
** -0,005 
Owner (0/1) 
-0,024 0,047 
0,094*
* 0,051 
0,160*
** 0,129* 
0,104*
* -0,005 0,058 -0,003 
-
0,049*
* 
-
0,118*
** 
0,080*
* 0,045 0,028 -0,056 
No working age 
adults 
0,350*
** 
0,374*
** 
0,376*
** 
0,430*
** 
0,371*
** 
0,500*
** 
0,394*
** 
0,385*
** 
0,351*
** 
0,376*
** 
0,260*
** 
0,302*
** 
0,341*
** 
0,402*
** 
0,322*
** 
0,366*
** 
Non-labour market 
income (thousands €) 
-
0,019*
* 
-
0,263*
** 
0,035*
** 
-
0,147*
* 
-
0,017*
* 
-
0,181* -0,025 
-
0,429* 0,017 
-
0,320*
* 
-
0,034*
* 
-
0,297*
** 
0,014*
** 
0,016*
* 0,017 -0,037 
Social protection 
income (excluding 
SA) (thousands €) 
-
0,127*
** 
-
0,202*
** 
-
0,081*
** 
-
0,195*
** 
-
0,099*
** 
-
0,231*
** 
-
0,047*
** 
-
0,278*
** 
-
0,066*
** 
-
0,234*
** 
-
0,078*
** 
-
0,207*
** 
-
0,064*
** 
-
0,109*
** 
-
0,089*
** 
-
0,218*
** 
N 5971 1406 4768 1231 4984 1604 2850 638 2999 723 9291 3146 7120 2260 3668 999 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal dataset. 
 
Table 5: Impact of social assistance participation and benefit amounts on total household earnings in the following year (conditional on positive 
earnings)-Full Model 
 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) (in 
thousands €) 
-
0.280*
** 
-
0.153*
* 
-
0.425*
** 
-
0.315*
** 
-
0.319*
** 
-
0.161*
* 
-
0.356*
** 
-
0.324*
* 
-
0.281*
** -0.049 
-
0.389*
** 
-
0.241*
** 
-
0.135*
** 
-
0.093* 0.006 -0.031 
SA eligibility (lag 1)  -
0.763*
** 
-
0.372*
** 
-
0.709*
** 
-
0.606*
** 
-
0.554*
** 
-
0.429*
** 
-
0.579*
** 
-
0.406*
* 
-
0.876*
** 
-
0.744*
** 
-
0.898*
** 
-
0.692*
** 
-
1.316*
** 
-
1.270*
** 
-
0.571*
** 
-
0.413*
** 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 
0.354*
** 0.097 
0.533*
* 
0.621*
* 0.099 -0.045 0.019 0.005 0.257 0.133 0.122 0.055 0.339 0.247 -0.012 -0.111 
SA receipt (L1)*SA 
amount (L1) 
0.182*
* -0.017 0.145 -0.283 -0.123 -0.004 -0.630 
-
1.304* -0.134 -0.613 -0.114 -0.206 -0.013 -0.035 0.170 0.164 
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA Receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2 (L1) 
0.000*
* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000*
** 0.000 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 
receipt (L1) * SA 
amount (L1) 
-
0.598*
** 
-
0.417*
* 1.418* 0.883 0.038 -0.231 -0.642 1.286 0.705 1.078 -0.793 -0.632 -0.050 0.036 -0.168 -0.297 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 
receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2(L1) 
0.000*
** 0.000* 
-
0.002*
** 
-
0.002*
** 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
Single parent -
0.177*
** -0.047 
-
0.233*
** -0.026 
-
0.075* -0.013 
-
0.238*
** 0.012 
-
0.160*
** 0.014 
-
0.185*
** 
-
0.064* 
-
0.119*
** -0.029 
-
0.095*
* 
-
0.132* 
Large family (3+ 
children) 
-0.008 -0.066 
-
0.236*
** -0.131 
-
0.121* -0.157 
-
0.565*
** -0.246 
-
0.192*
* 
-
0.237* 
-
0.213*
** 
-
0.146*
* 
-
0.136* -0.187 
-
0.164* -0.089 
No children<7 -
0.062*
* 0.019 
0.136*
** 0.049 0.056* 0.056 0.004 -0.119 0.041 -0.073 0.015 0.012 0.015 0.003 0.013 -0.056 
No children (<18) 0.123*
** 
0.260*
** 
0.141*
** 
0.210*
** 
0.155*
** 
0.307*
** 
0.212*
** 
0.269*
** 
0.097*
** 
0.226*
** 
0.114*
** 
0.196*
** 
0.138*
** 
0.283*
** 
0.101*
** 
0.236*
** 
Max hh education 0.180*
** 0.038 
0.160*
** 0.011 
0.297*
** 
0.103*
** 
0.212*
** 0.066 
0.315*
** 0.047 
0.221*
** 
0.067*
** 
0.277*
** 0.036 
0.104*
** 
-
0.059* 
Total no of months 
unemployed 
-
0.043*
** 
-
0.019* 
-
0.039*
** -0.008 
-
0.054*
** 
-
0.035*
** 
-
0.047*
** -0.022 
-
0.040*
** -0.006 
-
0.022*
** -0.005 
-
0.022*
* 0.002 
-
0.022*
* -0.009 
Total no of months 
inactive 
-
0.014*
** 
-
0.013*
* 
-
0.039*
** 
-
0.025*
** 
-
0.035*
** 
-
0.029*
** 
-
0.033*
** 
-
0.023*
* 
-
0.037*
** 
-
0.020*
** 
-
0.029*
** 
-
0.012*
** 
-
0.032*
** 
-
0.016*
** 
-
0.029*
** -0.010 
No persons 
unemployed 
-0.045 -0.161 
-
0.221*
* 
-
0.308*
* -0.061 -0.075 -0.123 -0.212 -0.052 
-
0.236* 
-
0.144*
* 
-
0.148*
* 
-
0.205*
* 
-
0.251*
* -0.096 -0.109 
Urban (0/1) 0.060*
** -0.025 
0.094*
** 
0.127*
* 
0.170*
** 0.008 
0.309*
** 0.083 
0.291*
** 
0.195*
** 
0.117*
** 0.031   
0.118*
** -0.001 
Owner (0/1) 
-0.022 0.047 
0.096*
* 0.051 
0.159*
** 0.124* 
0.106*
* -0.002 0.061 -0.002 
-
0.052*
* 
-
0.129*
** 
0.079*
* 0.039 0.029 -0.061 
No working age 0.349* 0.373* 0.376* 0.435* 0.371* 0.501* 0.392* 0.380* 0.353* 0.383* 0.260* 0.303* 0.342* 0.405* 0.323* 0.366*
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
adults ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Non-labour market 
income (thousands €) 
-
0.019*
* 
-
0.260*
** 
0.035*
** 
-
0.143*
* 
-
0.016* 
-
0.184* -0.027 
-
0.437* 0.017 
-
0.305*
* 
-
0.034*
* 
-
0.295*
** 
0.014*
** 
0.016*
* 0.019 -0.041 
Social protection 
income (excluding 
SA) (thousands €) 
-
0.127*
** 
-
0.202*
** 
-
0.081*
** 
-
0.197*
** 
-
0.099*
** 
-
0.229*
** 
-
0.047*
** 
-
0.277*
** 
-
0.066*
** 
-
0.232*
** 
-
0.078*
** 
-
0.207*
** 
-
0.064*
** 
-
0.109*
** 
-
0.090*
** 
-
0.220*
** 
Eligibles (receipt) 
0.073 -0.056 0.108 0.306 
-
0.220* 
-
0.206* -0.338 -0.319 -0.024 0.084 
-
0.267* -0.186 0.204 0.154 -0.006 -0.142 
Eligibles (amount) -
0.416*
** 
-
0.434*
** 
1.563*
* 0.600 -0.085 -0.234 -1.272 -0.017 0.571 0.465 
-
0.907* 
-
0.838* -0.063 0.002 0.002 -0.133 
N 5971 1406 4768 1231 4984 1604 2850 638 2999 723 9291 3146 7120 2260 3668 999 
Notes:*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001; social assistance receipt and amount are lagged one year; social assistance amounts are entered as thousands of 
Euros; 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database.
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APPENDIX 5: Impact of Social Assistance Participation & Benefits on Labour Income- Full Models 
 
Table 1: Likelihood of having positive labour income, conditional of social assistance receipt (odds ratios) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) 0.528*
** 
1.126 0.356*
** 
0.870 0.520*
** 
0.813 0.372*
** 
0.566* 0.320*
** 
0.551* 0.603*
** 
0.783*
* 
0.693 0.912 0.779 1.113 
SA eligibility (lag 1) 0.212*
** 
0.554*
* 
0.373*
** 
0.931 0.334*
** 
0.634*
* 
0.197*
** 
0.651 0.323*
** 
0.931 0.548*
** 
0.970 0.177*
* 
0.381 0.997 1.826 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 
1.058 0.520* 0.476 0.251*
* 
1.525 1.049 4.456*
* 
3.025 1.415 0.777 0.515*
* 
0.373*
** 
0.569 0.453 0.261*
* 
0.226*
* 
N 7512 2307 5447 1846 6235 2371 3310 1014 3627 1170 13019 5458 7849 2793 4336 1431 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
 
 
Table 2: Likelihood of having positive labour income, conditional of social assistance receipt (odds ratios)-Full Model 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) 0.510*
* 0.665 0.559* 0.694 
0.503*
** 0.705* 
0.487*
* 0.723 
0.437*
* 0.477* 
0.629*
** 0.860 0.532* 0.563 0.709 1.004 
SA eligibility (lag 1) 0.336*
** 
0.545*
* 0.683 0.767 
0.315*
** 
0.289*
** 
0.429*
* 
0.421*
* 0.699 0.474* 0.723 0.795 0.450 0.643 0.998 1.196 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 1.129 0.661 0.598 0.470 1.712 1.497 4.876* 3.150 0.562 0.456 1.032 0.650 0.783 0.563 0.510 0.349 
Single parent 0.440*
* 0.693 0.684 0.933 0.766 0.788 0.624 1.041 0.455* 0.433 
0.531*
** 
0.620*
* 0.723 0.981 0.929 1.338 
Large family (3+ 
children) 0.310* 0.480 
0.230*
* 
0.248*
* 
0.272*
** 
0.331*
* 
0.068*
** 0.178* 0.334 0.351 
0.316*
** 
0.391*
* 0.217* 0.326 
0.131*
** 0.385 
No children<7 0.640* 0.680 1.668* 1.644* 1.046 0.983 0.847 0.768 1.297 0.800 1.203 1.115 0.568 0.584 0.809 0.777 
No children (<18) 3.506*
** 
2.861*
** 
2.064*
** 
2.152*
** 
2.992*
** 
3.800*
** 
4.217*
** 
3.545*
** 
2.487*
** 
3.313*
* 
2.454*
** 
2.543*
** 
3.082*
** 
2.625*
* 
3.424*
** 
2.992*
** 
Max hh education 1.539*
** 1.118 
1.361*
** 1.104 
2.023*
** 
1.322*
* 
2.069*
* 
1.501*
** 
1.740*
** 1.272* 
1.498*
** 1.151* 
1.421*
** 0.939 
1.339*
* 0.938 
Total no of months 0.801* 0.777* 0.818* 0.846* 0.903* 0.868* 0.787* 0.785* 0.683* 0.691* 0.771* 0.767* 0.962 0.938 0.804* 0.781*
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
unemployed ** ** ** * * ** ** * ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Total no of months 
inactive 
0.902*
** 0.936* 
0.850*
** 
0.905*
** 
0.892*
** 
0.915*
** 
0.863*
** 
0.915*
** 
0.807*
** 
0.840*
** 
0.858*
** 
0.867*
** 
0.917*
** 
0.919*
** 
0.899*
** 0.949 
No persons 
unemployed 2.321* 
3.650*
* 1.699 2.029 1.262 2.388* 2.981* 5.855* 
5.505*
* 
7.871*
** 
3.013*
** 
3.796*
** 0.908 1.307 2.525* 3.752* 
Urban (0/1) 0.629*
** 
0.643*
* 0.678* 
0.547*
* 1.078 0.755* 0.723 
0.394*
** 
0.500*
** 
0.283*
** 0.915 0.783*   
0.597*
* 
0.454*
** 
Owner (0/1) 1.496*
* 1.289 1.156 1.199 
1.539*
* 1.497* 1.399* 1.444 1.273 1.889 
1.356*
** 
1.820*
** 
2.095*
* 2.045* 1.169 1.697* 
No working age 
adults 
7.196*
** 
8.292*
** 
8.348*
** 
6.819*
** 
6.000*
** 
8.407*
** 
8.763*
** 
6.151*
** 
12.683
*** 
10.668
*** 
7.998*
** 
8.167*
** 
5.520*
** 
6.386*
** 
4.405*
** 
4.907*
** 
Non-labour market 
income (thousands €) 0.983 0.713* 1.054 0.630* 0.988 
0.406*
** 
0.823*
** 0.374* 
0.749*
** 
0.387*
* 
0.676*
** 
0.368*
** 1.095 0.983* 0.826* 
0.343*
* 
Social protection 
income (excluding 
SA) (thousands €) 
0.564*
** 
0.454*
** 
0.726*
** 
0.569*
** 
0.587*
** 
0.357*
** 
0.618*
** 
0.411*
** 
0.570*
** 
0.296*
** 
0.667*
** 
0.489*
** 
0.872*
** 
0.839*
** 
0.690*
** 
0.467*
** 
N 7512 2307 5443 1845 6231 2369 3310 1014 3627 1170 12699 5304 7827 2781 4334 1431 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
 
Table 3:Likelihood of positive labour income, conditional on program participation and benefit amounts (odd ratios)-Full Model 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) 0.464*
* 0.513* 
0.380*
* 0.488* 
0.507*
** 0.690* 
0.458*
* 0.667 0.433 0.529 
0.571*
** 0.776 0.543* 0.594 1.068 1.715 
SA eligibility (lag 1)  0.330*
** 
0.529*
* 0.670 0.757 
0.314*
** 
0.288*
** 
0.423*
* 
0.417*
* 0.712 0.488* 0.725 0.795 0.431 0.622 0.992 1.119 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 1.517 1.067 0.912 0.683 1.649 1.512 4.157* 2.818 0.322 0.235 1.269 0.846 1.009 0.729 0.343 0.217 
SA receipt (L1)*SA 
amount (L1) 0.750 0.537 5.757 7.215 1.222 0.900 1.632 3.961 4.887 9.332 
0.260*
* 
0.249*
* 1.030 1.108 4.197* 5.710* 
SA Receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2 (L1) 1.000 1.000 1.009 1.010 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.002 1.006 1.002 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 0.925 1.347 0.046 0.028* 0.223 0.403 3204.7 400.65 0.000 0.000 2.626 3.201 0.813 0.763 0.137* 0.067*
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
receipt (L1) * SA 
amount (L1) 
84 5 * * 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 
receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2(L1) 1.000 1.000 0.992 0.991 1.001 1.000 0.996 0.994 1.013 1.014 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Single parent 0.422*
** 0.654 0.692 0.921 0.758 0.787 0.613 1.018 0.489* 0.460 
0.534*
** 
0.626*
* 0.711 0.977 0.925 1.440 
Large family (3+ 
children) 0.327* 0.531 
0.250*
* 0.260 
0.266*
** 
0.325*
* 
0.065*
** 0.161* 0.306 0.311 
0.316*
** 
0.394*
* 0.240* 0.355 
0.125*
* 0.433 
No children<7 0.578*
* 0.591* 1.678* 1.695* 1.043 0.978 0.843 0.773 1.242 0.767 1.210 1.124 0.553 0.562 0.801 0.714 
No children (<18) 3.776*
** 
3.183*
** 
2.030*
** 
2.134*
** 
3.012*
** 
3.824*
** 
4.360*
** 
3.640*
** 
2.481*
** 
3.329*
* 
2.466*
** 
2.559*
** 
3.204*
** 
2.766*
** 
3.461*
** 
3.084*
** 
Max hh education 1.553*
** 1.127 
1.360*
** 1.105 
2.025*
** 
1.324*
* 
2.072*
** 
1.493*
** 
1.742*
** 1.277* 
1.500*
** 1.153* 
1.413*
** 0.919 
1.344*
** 0.941 
Total no of months 
unemployed 
0.822*
** 
0.798*
** 
0.830*
** 
0.860*
* 
0.906*
* 
0.871*
* 
0.790*
** 
0.786*
** 
0.683*
** 
0.692*
** 
0.770*
** 
0.766*
** 0.974 0.955 
0.807*
** 
0.791*
** 
Total no of months 
inactive 
0.903*
** 0.939* 
0.850*
** 
0.905*
** 
0.892*
** 
0.914*
** 
0.863*
** 
0.913*
** 
0.807*
** 
0.840*
** 
0.858*
** 
0.867*
** 
0.920*
** 
0.921*
** 
0.895*
** 0.951 
No persons 
unemployed 2.070 3.544* 1.447 1.682 1.229 2.320* 2.873* 5.801* 
5.455*
** 
7.817*
** 
3.039*
** 
3.827*
** 0.875 1.218 2.405* 3.436* 
Urban (0/1) 0.643*
* 0.670* 0.665* 
0.534*
* 1.080 0.758 0.716 
0.386*
** 
0.497*
** 
0.277*
** 0.920 0.791*   
0.590*
* 
0.426*
** 
Owner (0/1) 1.468*
* 1.232 1.177 1.232 
1.535*
* 1.494* 1.390 1.438 1.279 1.936 
1.337*
* 
1.784*
** 
2.081*
* 2.027* 1.170 1.707* 
No working age 
adults 
7.346*
** 
8.698*
** 
8.375*
** 
6.874*
** 
6.004*
** 
8.418*
** 
8.845*
** 
6.291*
** 
12.401
*** 
10.417
*** 
8.079*
** 
8.345*
** 
5.608*
** 
6.568*
** 
4.444*
** 
4.888*
** 
Non-labour market 
income (thousands €) 0.983 
0.691*
* 1.044 
0.607*
* 0.986 
0.406*
** 0.823* 
0.355*
* 
0.749*
** 
0.395*
* 
0.674*
** 
0.368*
** 1.092 0.983* 0.828 
0.368*
** 
Social protection 
income (excluding 
SA) (thousands €) 
0.564*
** 
0.449*
** 
0.719*
** 
0.565*
** 
0.587*
** 
0.357*
** 
0.618*
** 
0.412*
** 
0.572*
** 
0.301*
** 
0.666*
** 
0.485*
** 
0.872*
** 
0.839*
** 
0.686*
** 
0.462*
** 
N 7512 2307 5443 1845 6231 2369 3310 1014 3627 1170 12699 5304 7827 2781 4334 1431 
Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; social assistance benefit amounts are centered on the country wave mean and entered in thousands of Euros. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
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Table 4: Conditional total household labour income and program participation –Full Model 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) -
0.364*
** -0.071 
-
0.492*
** 
-
0.350*
* 
-
0.384*
** 
-
0.248*
** 
-
0.373*
** 
-
0.323*
* 
-
0.290*
** -0.072 
-
0.393*
** 
-
0.207*
** 
-
0.156*
** 
-
0.123* 
-
0.146* -0.113 
SA eligibility (lag 1) -
0.936*
** 
-
0.345*
** 
-
0.787*
** 
-
0.629*
** 
-
0.515*
** 
-
0.407*
** 
-
0.760*
** 
-
0.561*
** 
-
0.890*
** 
-
0.682*
** 
-
0.802*
** 
-
0.579*
** 
-
1.197*
** 
-
0.998*
** 
-
0.450*
** 
-
0.271*
* 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 0.196 -0.283 0.123 0.123 0.095 -0.029 0.200 0.241 0.441* 0.138 0.131 -0.007 0.070 -0.196 -0.206 
-
0.431* 
Single parent -
0.273*
** 
-
0.177* 
-
0.257*
** -0.016 
-
0.117*
* -0.026 
-
0.238*
** 0.094 
-
0.194*
** -0.006 
-
0.199*
** 
-
0.104*
* 
-
0.100*
** 0.002 
-
0.148*
** -0.052 
Large family (3+ 
children) 
-0.092 -0.162 
-
0.295*
** 
-
0.201* 
-
0.146*
* 
-
0.186* 
-
0.543*
** -0.260 
-
0.197*
* 
-
0.261*
* 
-
0.232*
** 
-
0.199*
** 
-
0.275*
** 
-
0.353*
* 
-
0.440*
** 
-
0.429*
** 
No children<7 
-0.023 0.007 
0.195*
** 0.142* 
0.078*
* 0.070 0.066 -0.017 0.057 0.013 0.013 0.003 0.006 -0.031 0.003 -0.043 
No children (<18) 0.256*
** 
0.479*
** 
0.236*
** 
0.369*
** 
0.175*
** 
0.327*
** 
0.275*
** 
0.301*
** 
0.157*
** 
0.294*
** 
0.153*
** 
0.267*
** 
0.293*
** 
0.468*
** 
0.289*
** 
0.465*
** 
Max hh education 0.229*
** 
0.117*
* 
0.200*
** 0.083* 
0.317*
** 
0.126*
** 
0.249*
** 
0.122*
* 
0.346*
** 
0.107*
* 
0.291*
** 
0.133*
** 
0.327*
** 
0.108*
** 
0.183*
** 0.068 
Total no of months 
unemployed 
-
0.062*
** 
-
0.049*
* 
-
0.055*
** 
-
0.036* 
-
0.054*
** 
-
0.033*
** 
-
0.050*
** 
-
0.040* 
-
0.048*
** -0.021 
-
0.030*
** 
-
0.017*
* 
-
0.034*
** 
-
0.028*
* 
-
0.042*
** 
-
0.045*
* 
Total no of months 
inactive 
-
0.015*
* -0.004 
-
0.051*
** 
-
0.029*
** 
-
0.036*
** 
-
0.030*
** 
-
0.035*
** 
-
0.027*
** 
-
0.041*
** 
-
0.022*
** 
-
0.031*
** 
-
0.017*
** 
-
0.035*
** 
-
0.024*
** 
-
0.036*
** -0.006 
No persons 
unemployed 0.041 0.057 -0.154 -0.105 -0.042 -0.069 -0.074 -0.002 -0.034 -0.129 
-
0.109* -0.089 -0.065 0.037 -0.012 0.145 
Urban (0/1) 0.075*
* -0.071 
0.160*
** 
0.240*
** 
0.200*
** 0.038 
0.328*
** 0.012 
0.298*
** 
0.230*
** 
0.158*
** 0.019   
0.270*
** 0.120* 
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
Owner (0/1) 
0.018 -0.012 0.058 -0.010 
0.151*
** 0.123* 0.098* -0.045 0.013 -0.018 
-
0.094*
** 
-
0.137*
** 
0.090*
* 0.067 -0.008 -0.052 
No working age 
adults 
0.591*
** 
0.791*
** 
0.508*
** 
0.664*
** 
0.398*
** 
0.520*
** 
0.472*
** 
0.543*
** 
0.434*
** 
0.490*
** 
0.351*
** 
0.416*
** 
0.544*
** 
0.702*
** 
0.499*
** 
0.616*
** 
Non-labour market 
income (thousands €) -
0.030* 
-
0.326*
** 
0.047*
** -0.110 -0.004 
-
0.229* 0.014 
-
0.445* 0.018 
-
0.420*
** -0.024 
-
0.219* 
0.020*
** 
0.012*
* 0.060* -0.034 
Social protection 
income (excluding 
SA) (thousands €) 
-
0.280*
** 
-
0.496*
** 
-
0.149*
** 
-
0.392*
** 
-
0.114*
** 
-
0.251*
** 
-
0.073*
** 
-
0.309*
** 
-
0.103*
** 
-
0.335*
** 
-
0.114*
** 
-
0.266*
** 
-
0.086*
** 
-
0.145*
** 
-
0.179*
** 
-
0.452*
** 
N 6799 1797 5067 1497 5251 1714 3034 772 3274 887 10730 4073 7661 2648 3957 1152 
Notes: *p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001; dependent variable is entered in logarithmic form. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
 
 
Table 5: Conditional total household labour income, program participation and benefit amounts –Full Model 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) -
0.326*
** -0.056 
-
0.534*
** 
-
0.400*
* 
-
0.318*
** -0.069 
-
0.374*
** 
-
0.294*
* 
-
0.283*
* -0.050 
-
0.404*
** 
-
0.232*
** 
-
0.143*
** -0.113 -0.040 -0.083 
SA eligibility (lag 1)  -
0.937*
** 
-
0.347*
* 
-
0.788*
** 
-
0.629*
** 
-
0.516*
** 
-
0.410*
** 
-
0.763*
** 
-
0.565*
** 
-
0.888*
** 
-
0.684*
** 
-
0.801*
** 
-
0.576*
** 
-
1.202*
** 
-
1.009*
** 
-
0.455*
** 
-
0.285*
* 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 0.192 -0.213 0.230 0.260 0.047 -0.175 0.225 0.229 0.324 0.037 0.120 0.035 0.169 -0.010 -0.218 -0.322 
SA receipt (L1)*SA 
amount (L1) 
thousands € 0.075 0.010 0.042 -0.475 0.146 0.581* -0.584 
-
1.422*
* 0.190 -0.577 -0.199 
-
0.309* -0.009 -0.049 0.167 0.152 
SA Receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2 (L1) 
thousands € 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-
0.001*
** 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 
receipt (L1) * SA -0.429 -0.320 1.103 0.931 -0.367 -0.848 0.368 2.115 -0.009 1.039 -0.637 -0.494 -0.093 -0.039 -0.239 -0.355 
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amount (L1)  
thousands € 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 
receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2(L1)  
thousands € 
0.000*
* 0.000 
-
0.001* -0.001 0.000 
0.001*
* 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Single parent -
0.275*
** 
-
0.181* 
-
0.254*
** -0.023 
-
0.107*
* -0.027 
-
0.238*
** 0.092 
-
0.194*
** -0.004 
-
0.200*
** 
-
0.106*
* 
-
0.100*
** 0.005 
-
0.143*
** -0.032 
Large family (3+ 
children) 
-0.089 -0.152 
-
0.290*
** 
-
0.202* 
-
0.150*
* 
-
0.220*
* 
-
0.539*
** 
-
0.300* 
-
0.212*
* 
-
0.268*
* 
-
0.233*
** 
-
0.202*
** 
-
0.266*
** 
-
0.311*
* 
-
0.432*
** 
-
0.407*
* 
No children<7 
-0.025 -0.001 
0.198*
** 0.135* 
0.071*
* 0.040 0.064 -0.026 0.060 0.015 0.012 0.002 0.004 -0.036 -0.001 -0.053 
No children (<18) 0.257*
** 
0.480*
** 
0.232*
** 
0.374*
** 
0.179*
** 
0.342*
** 
0.279*
** 
0.323*
** 
0.157*
** 
0.297*
** 
0.154*
** 
0.269*
** 
0.294*
** 
0.470*
** 
0.291*
** 
0.470*
** 
Max hh education 0.230*
** 
0.121*
* 
0.198*
** 0.080* 
0.316*
** 
0.126*
** 
0.249*
** 
0.124*
* 
0.346*
** 
0.108*
* 
0.291*
** 
0.134*
** 
0.327*
** 
0.104*
** 
0.185*
** 0.070 
Total no of months 
unemployed 
-
0.062*
** 
-
0.046*
* 
-
0.053*
** 
-
0.033* 
-
0.054*
** 
-
0.036*
** 
-
0.049*
** 
-
0.038* 
-
0.048*
** -0.021 
-
0.030*
** 
-
0.017*
* 
-
0.033*
** 
-
0.026* 
-
0.040*
** 
-
0.039*
* 
Total no of months 
inactive 
-
0.015*
* -0.004 
-
0.051*
** 
-
0.029*
** 
-
0.036*
** 
-
0.028*
** 
-
0.035*
** 
-
0.026*
** 
-
0.041*
** 
-
0.022*
** 
-
0.031*
** 
-
0.017*
** 
-
0.034*
** 
-
0.022*
** 
-
0.036*
** -0.005 
No persons 
unemployed 0.042 0.045 -0.173 -0.138 -0.039 -0.031 -0.079 -0.018 -0.031 -0.124 
-
0.108* -0.086 -0.072 0.028 -0.022 0.105 
Urban (0/1) 0.076*
* -0.065 
0.159*
** 
0.241*
** 
0.202*
** 0.051 
0.329*
** 0.023 
0.297*
** 
0.225*
** 
0.159*
** 0.023   
0.273*
** 0.123* 
Owner (0/1) 
0.018 -0.016 0.057 -0.014 
0.153*
** 0.137* 0.099* -0.043 0.018 -0.018 
-
0.097*
** 
-
0.150*
** 
0.088*
* 0.057 -0.008 -0.055 
No working age 
adults 
0.591*
** 
0.793*
** 
0.508*
** 
0.667*
** 
0.398*
** 
0.516*
** 
0.471*
** 
0.539*
** 
0.434*
** 
0.496*
** 
0.352*
** 
0.418*
** 
0.545*
** 
0.707*
** 
0.500*
** 
0.620*
** 
Non-labour market 
income (thousands €) -
0.031* 
-
0.327*
** 
0.047*
** -0.106 -0.004 
-
0.234* 0.013 
-
0.456* 0.018 
-
0.410*
* -0.024 
-
0.218* 
0.020*
** 
0.012*
* 0.061* -0.044 
Social protection 
income (excluding 
-
0.280*
-
0.497*
-
0.150*
-
0.391*
-
0.114*
-
0.250*
-
0.074*
-
0.309*
-
0.102*
-
0.335*
-
0.114*
-
0.266*
-
0.086*
-
0.145*
-
0.179*
-
0.454*
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Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; social assistance benefit amounts are centered on the country wave mean and entered in thousands of Euros; dependent 
variable is entered in logarithmic form. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database. 
SA) (thousands €) ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
N 6799 1797 5067 1497 5251 1714 3034 772 3274 887 10730 4073 7661 2648 3957 1152 
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APPENDIX 6:  Impact of Social Assistance Receipt on the Likelihood to Begin Receiving Long-term benefits  
 
Table 1: Odds ratios of starting to receive long-term benefits  
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) 
1.281 1.103 1.494 1.400 
2.673*
** 
2.513*
* 0.827 1.036 1.531 0.733 1.058 1.055 1.101 1.121 1.826 3.364* 
SA eligibility (lag 1) 
1.263 0.917 0.651 0.500 
2.982*
** 
3.304*
* 0.791 1.322 1.218 1.010 0.666 0.887 1.288 1.599 1.114 0.797 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 0.529 0.567 1.455 2.093 0.716 0.904 1.257 0.985 0.454 0.400 1.223 0.875 0.627 0.377 0.518 0.465 
Single parent 
0.901 0.721 1.220 0.992 1.315 1.083 1.164 1.046 1.055 1.201 
1.634*
* 1.100 1.453 1.691 1.522 0.799 
Large family 
1.653 1.638 
3.964*
* 3.447 2.088 2.107 2.618 0.507 2.234 1.833 
2.223*
* 1.500 1.198 1.784 0.729 
Omitt
ed 
No children<7 
0.574 0.483 
0.505*
* 0.591 0.945 0.911 0.806 0.980 0.627 0.604 
0.614*
* 
0.560*
* 1.558* 2.000* 0.475 0.530 
No children (<18) 0.488*
** 
0.511*
* 
0.583*
** 0.603* 
0.522*
** 
0.556*
* 0.693* 0.904 0.656* 0.877 
0.585*
** 0.778 
0.591*
* 
0.466*
* 
0.560*
* 0.995 
Max hh education 0.787*
* 0.987 0.894 1.084 
0.790*
* 0.981 0.834 0.761 0.987 0.781 0.920 0.862 0.931 0.851 0.996 0.723 
Total no of months 
unemployed 1.048 1.070 0.984 0.982 0.996 0.966 0.982 1.201 0.992 0.989 0.987 1.055 1.043 1.048 1.038 1.055 
Total no of months 
inactive 1.079* 1.041 
1.127*
** 
1.151*
** 0.983 0.993 1.031 1.031 
1.107*
** 
1.131*
* 
1.091*
** 
1.086*
** 1.025 1.019 
1.109*
** 
1.132*
* 
No persons 
unemployed 0.806 0.572 1.548 1.578 0.760 1.056 1.142 0.075* 1.191 1.860 0.965 0.512 0.883 0.678 0.764 0.519 
Urban (0/1) 0.990 1.220 0.989 0.824 1.126 1.351 0.972 1.483 1.161 1.493 1.013 0.832   1.025 1.092 
Owner (0/1) 
1.754 1.635 0.974 0.899 
2.198*
* 2.003* 1.671* 1.877 2.103* 0.842 1.122 1.060 
1.306*
* 1.083 
3.781*
* 3.726 
No working age 
adults 1.017 0.916 1.122 1.006 
1.257*
* 1.270* 1.114 1.310 0.847 0.793 1.130* 1.098 1.298 1.209 0.891 0.798 
N 4999 1478 3495 993 3684 1350 2102 573 2241 655 7184 2987 4601 1488 2727 782 
Notes: *p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database.
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APPENDIX 7: Impact of Social Assistance Receipt on Social Protection Income 
 
Table 1: Odds ratios of starting to receiving social protection income 
 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) 2.038*
* 1.152 1.877 0.728 
1.817*
* 1.551 1.236 1.315 
2.176*
* 1.836 
1.642*
** 1.226 
0.647*
* 
0.530*
* 1.014 0.729 
SA eligibility (lag 1) 
0.772 
0.427*
* 0.465* 
0.279*
* 3.021* 2.776 
0.394*
* 0.466* 0.891 0.775 0.791 
0.514*
* 0.375* 0.384* 0.796 0.567 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 0.404* 0.551 3.080 
9.871*
* 0.495 0.450 3.738* 4.031 1.139 1.307 0.560 0.648 3.003 2.014 0.580 0.601 
Single parent 1.486* 2.629* 0.720 1.539 0.944 0.924 0.448* 0.978 1.191 1.023 1.127 1.234 1.434* 1.219 0.994 2.020 
No children<7 4.812*
** 
6.740*
* 0.973 2.384 
3.333*
** 2.262 2.434* 4.328 
12.705
*** 
14.503
*** 
1.239*
* 
1.742*
** 
2.310*
** 3.361 
4.674*
* 3.365 
No children (<18) 1.260*
* 
1.669*
* 
10.024
*** 
4.143*
** 
2.873*
** 
1.866*
* 
7.184*
** 2.744* 0.968 1.222 1.015 
1.209*
* 
1.708*
** 
2.031*
** 
3.102*
** 
2.712*
* 
No working age 
adults 0.965 1.051 
1.415*
** 
1.568*
* 1.061 1.092 
1.254*
* 1.381* 1.152* 1.090 
1.127*
** 1.040 
1.257*
** 1.298* 1.088 1.055 
No retired 154.13
8*** 
Omitt
ed 
462.94
1*** 
182.19
0*** 
53.013
*** 
22.693
*** 
77.984
*** 
34.666
*** 
294.88
8*** 
Omitt
ed 
61.429
*** 
32.134
*** 
47.101
*** 
29.340
*** 
128.43
8*** 
Omitt
ed 
Urban (0/1) 0.817* 1.102 0.802* 0.653 0.811* 0.744 0.879 1.268 0.993 1.108 0.913 0.890   0.931 1.410 
Owner (0/1) 
1.126 1.170 0.954 1.079 
1.626*
** 1.372 0.964 0.885 0.997 0.743 1.044 0.994 1.245 1.188 1.164 1.074 
Receipt of non SA 
social protection 
benefits (lag 1) 
56.111
*** 
44.833
*** 
34.881
*** 
49.553
*** 
25.229
*** 
27.679
*** 
18.496
*** 
27.211
*** 
33.933
*** 
41.550
*** 
45.742
*** 
49.490
*** 
74.507
*** 
114.27
6*** 
47.776
*** 
40.110
*** 
N 10723 2246 7418 3010 9005 3564 4936 1971 5264 1062 16987 6834 9939 3922 5752 1361 
Notes: *p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database 
 
 
Table2: Average amount of social protection income  
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) 0.127* 0.093* 0.105 -0.013 0.048* 0.045 0.113* 0.041 -0.038 -0.014 - 0.089* 0.161* 0.060* 0.007 -0.091 
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
** * ** 0.064* * ** 
SA eligibility (lag 1) 
0.243*
** 
0.175*
** -0.099 -0.146 
0.199*
** 0.122* 0.030 0.161 0.025 -0.028 
-
0.281*
* 
-
0.209* 
0.307*
* 0.166* 0.116 0.025 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 
-
0.123* 
-
0.139* 0.002 0.063 0.008 0.077 -0.219 -0.339 -0.237 -0.350 -0.164 -0.098 
-
0.308* 
-
0.258* 
-
0.244* -0.167 
Single parent -
0.154*
** 
-
0.286*
** 
-
0.098*
* 
-
0.199*
** 
-
0.103*
* 
-
0.113*
* 
-
0.122* 
-
0.278*
** -0.064 -0.037 0.020 0.027 0.033 0.018 -0.058 
-
0.140* 
No children<7 0.315*
** 
0.215*
** 
0.204*
** 0.084* 
0.128*
** 0.061* 
0.179*
** 0.134* -0.085 -0.021 -0.027 -0.036 
0.141*
** 
0.064*
* 
0.308*
** 
0.303*
** 
No children (<18) -
0.244*
** 
-
0.078*
** 
-
0.046*
* 0.018 
-
0.034*
* 
0.043*
* 
-
0.138*
** -0.056 
-
0.069*
* -0.055 
-
0.142*
** 
-
0.058*
** 
-
0.095*
** 
-
0.036*
* 
-
0.214*
** 
-
0.132*
** 
No working age 
adults 
-
0.119*
** 
-
0.182*
** 
-
0.025* 
-
0.047*
* -0.005 0.019 0.006 
-
0.055* 0.001 -0.001 
0.029*
** -0.010 0.018* -0.016 
-
0.077*
** 
-
0.085*
** 
No retired -
0.095*
** 
-
0.122*
** 
0.367*
** 
0.242*
** 
0.233*
** 
0.306*
** 
0.440*
** 
0.186*
** 
0.202*
** 
0.172*
** 
0.208*
** 
0.221*
** 
0.274*
** 
0.161*
** 
0.321*
** 
0.348*
* 
Urban (0/1) 
-0.029 -0.024 
-
0.060*
* 
-
0.071* 0.001 0.002 
-
0.076*
* -0.022 
-
0.049* -0.004 -0.010 
-
0.086*
**   
-
0.080*
* -0.052 
Owner (0/1) 
0.014 -0.002 -0.014 -0.056 0.036 0.016 -0.003 -0.009 
0.230*
** 
0.194*
* 
0.057*
** 
0.071*
* 0.043 0.034 
0.151*
* 0.063 
Non SA social 
protection ben (lag1)-
thousands € 
0.372*
** 
0.385*
** 
0.337*
** 
0.368*
** 
0.231*
** 
0.218*
** 
0.414*
** 
0.620*
** 
0.437*
** 
0.461*
** 
0.256*
** 
0.392*
** 
0.144*
** 
0.155*
** 
0.296*
** 0.251* 
N 8415 3932 6232 2728 7770 3283 4051 1701 3790 1736 12949 5740 8479 3586 4944 2098 
Notes: *p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001; dependent variable entered in logarithmic form. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database 
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APPENDIX 8: Impact of Social Assistance Receipt & Benefits on Future Disposable Income 
 
 
Table 1: Average equivalised disposable income (conditional on positive income) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) -
0.332*
** 
-
0.133*
** 
-
0.493*
** 
-
0.207*
** 
-
0.302*
** 
-
0.095*
** 
-
0.318*
** 
0.010 -
0.432*
** 
-0.024 -
0.485*
** 
-
0.118*
** 
-
0.190*
** 
-
0.039*
* 
-
0.185*
** 
-
0.093*
** 
SA eligibility (lag 1) -
0.609*
** 
-
0.307*
** 
-
0.826*
** 
-
0.656*
** 
-0.660 -
0.342*
** 
-
1.217*
** 
-
0.864*
** 
-
1.347*
** 
-
0.915*
** 
-
0.968*
** 
-
0.731*
** 
-
1.222*
** 
-
0.935*
** 
-
0.501*
** 
-
0.315*
** 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 
0.181*
** 
0.014 -0.096 -0.075 0.107 0.012 0.331 0.142 0.550*
** 
0.172 0.281*
** 
0.182* 0.499*
* 
0.442*
* 
-0.112 -
0.173*
* 
N 10722 4255 7387 2983 8997 3553 4888 1923 5250 2115 17322 6979 9959 3932 5752 2276 
Notes: *p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001; dependent variable entered in logarithmic form. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database 
 
 
Table 2: Social assistance participation effects on average equivalised disposable income (conditional on positive income) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) -
0.196*
** 
-
0.084*
** 
-
0.243*
** 
-
0.109*
* 
-
0.171*
** 
-
0.077*
** 
-
0.132*
** -0.004 
-
0.145*
** -0.006 
-
0.209*
** 
-
0.067*
** 
-
0.129*
** 
-
0.083*
** 
-
0.183*
** 
-
0.083*
** 
SA eligibility (lag 1) -
0.276*
** 
-
0.196*
** 
-
0.262*
* 
-
0.368*
** 
-
0.347*
** 
-
0.277*
** 
-
0.768*
** 
-
0.674*
** 
-
0.795*
** 
-
0.619*
** 
-
0.433*
** 
-
0.505*
** 
-
0.798*
** 
-
0.874*
** 
-
0.413*
** 
-
0.295*
** 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 
0.031 -0.018 
-
0.364*
* -0.184 0.007 0.000 0.216 0.145 0.265 0.110 -0.024 0.079 
0.411*
* 
0.474*
** -0.085 
-
0.166*
* 
Single parent -
0.107*
** 
-
0.063*
** 
-
0.081*
** -0.009 
-
0.074*
** 0.004 
-
0.066*
* 0.009 
-
0.088*
** -0.017 
-
0.076*
** -0.027 
-
0.050*
* 0.013 
-
0.114*
** 
-
0.063* 
Large family (3+ - -0.001 - 0.020 - 0.032 - 0.052 -0.061 0.057 - - - 0.016 - -0.031 
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
children) 0.096*
** 
0.076*
* 
0.095*
** 
0.134*
* 
0.158*
** 
0.048* 0.059* 0.204*
** 
No working age 
adults 0.077*
** 
0.035*
** 
0.078*
** 
0.038*
** 
0.044*
** 
0.037*
** 
0.103*
** 0.006 
0.063*
** 
0.034*
* 0.000 
-
0.004*
* 
0.044*
** 
0.051*
** 
0.054*
** 
0.026*
** 
No retired 0.016*
* 
0.094*
** 
0.057*
** 
0.169*
** 
0.093*
** 
0.170*
** 
0.032*
* 
0.196*
** 
0.055*
** 
0.143*
** 
0.082*
** 
0.112*
** 0.013 
0.060*
** -0.013 
0.100*
** 
Max hh. Education 0.069*
** 0.006 
0.053*
** 0.006 
0.131*
** 
0.021*
* 
0.101*
** 
0.021*
* 
0.066*
** -0.001 
0.075*
** 0.002 
0.135*
** 
0.052*
** 
0.108*
** 0.019* 
Urban (0/1) 0.022*
** -0.005 0.022* 
0.043*
* 
0.112*
** 0.007 
0.148*
** 0.019 
0.093*
** 
0.071*
** 
0.069*
** 0.017   
0.076*
** 0.029* 
Owner (0/1) 
0.005 -0.001 0.028 -0.007 
0.072*
** 0.048 0.049* -0.021 0.019 0.051 
-
0.050*
** 
-
0.052*
** 
0.044*
* 0.008 
0.050*
* 0.026 
Disposable income 
(lag1) 
7.67E-
05*** 
0.0000
54*** 
0.0001
57*** 
0.0001
18*** 
5.17E-
05*** 
1.36E-
05* 
0.0001
43*** 
6.46E-
05* 
0.0001
91*** 
0.0001
78*** 
0.0001
45*** 
0.0001
07*** 
3.33E-
05* 
5.20E-
06 
2.13E-
05*** 
1.85E-
06*** 
N 10722 4255 7358 2974 8993 3552 4888 1923 5248 2114 16964 6816 9935 3919 5748 2274 
Notes: *p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001; dependent variable entered in logarithmic form. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database 
 
 
 
Table 3: Social assistance participation and benefit amounts‟ impact on average disposable equivalised income (conditional on positive income) 
 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (lag 1) -
0.202*
** 
-
0.104*
** 
-
0.229*
** 
-
0.111*
* 
-
0.173*
** 
-
0.063*
* 
-
0.139*
** -0.008 
-
0.137*
** -0.006 
-
0.208*
** 
-
0.066*
** 
-
0.124*
* 
-
0.077*
** 
-
0.180*
** 
-
0.093*
* 
SA eligibility (lag 1) -
0.275*
** 
-
0.195*
** 
-
0.261*
* 
-
0.370*
** 
-
0.347*
** 
-
0.277*
** 
-
0.769*
** 
-
0.676*
** 
-
0.796*
** 
-
0.622*
** 
-
0.433*
** 
-
0.506*
** 
-
0.798*
** 
-
0.875*
** 
-
0.413*
** 
-
0.295*
** 
SA receipt (L1)* SA 
eligibility (L1) 
0.033 -0.009 
-
0.381*
* -0.181 0.015 -0.009 0.241 0.166 0.244 0.104 -0.062 0.054 0.313 0.326* -0.046 
-
0.141* 
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 CZ EE HU LV LT PL SI SK 
 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 All Q1-2 
SA receipt (L1)*SA 
amount (L1) -0.043 
-
0.073* -0.075 -0.012 -0.003 0.012 -0.197 -0.120 -0.018 -0.143 -0.021 0.023 -0.001 -0.001 0.054 0.061 
SA Receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2 (L1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 
receipt (L1) * SA 
amount (L1) -0.037 0.044 0.639 0.474 -0.075 -0.008 -0.509 0.087 -0.480 -0.055 0.334 0.238 0.098* 
0.141*
* 0.027 0.027 
SA eligibility (L1) *SA 
receipt (L1) * SA 
amount ^2(L1) 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 
Single parent -
0.106*
** 
-
0.063*
** 
-
0.083*
** -0.010 
-
0.075*
** 0.006 
-
0.066*
* 0.011 
-
0.085*
** -0.012 
-
0.076*
** 
-
0.027* 
-
0.050*
* 0.013 
-
0.114*
** 
-
0.063* 
Large family (3+ 
children) 
-
0.095*
** -0.002 
-
0.073*
* 0.018 
-
0.095*
** 0.032 
-
0.128*
* 0.058 -0.062 0.061 
-
0.157*
** 
-
0.048*
* 
-
0.060* 0.010 
-
0.205*
** -0.033 
No working age 
adults 
0.077*
** 
0.035*
** 
0.078*
** 
0.038*
** 
0.044*
** 
0.037*
** 
0.103*
** 0.006 
0.064*
** 
0.036*
* 0.000 -0.005 
0.044*
** 
0.050*
** 
0.055*
** 
0.026*
** 
No retired 0.016*
* 
0.095*
** 
0.057*
** 
0.169*
** 
0.093*
** 
0.170*
** 0.031* 
0.195*
** 
0.055*
** 
0.145*
** 
0.082*
** 
0.112*
** 0.013 
0.060*
** -0.012 
0.100*
** 
Max hh. Education 0.069*
** 0.006 
0.052*
** 0.006 
0.131*
** 
0.021*
* 
0.101*
** 
0.021*
* 
0.066*
** -0.001 
0.075*
** 0.003 
0.135*
** 
0.052*
** 
0.107*
** 
0.020*
* 
Urban (0/1) 0.022*
** -0.006 0.023* 
0.044*
* 
0.112*
** 0.007 
0.148*
** 0.020 
0.092*
** 
0.068*
** 
0.069*
** 0.016   
0.078*
** 0.030* 
Owner (0/1) 
0.005 -0.002 0.026 -0.008 
0.072*
** 0.049* 0.049* -0.021 0.021 0.052 
-
0.050*
** 
-
0.051*
** 
0.044*
* 0.009 0.048* 0.025 
Disposable income 
(lag1) 
7.7E-
05*** 
5.4E-
05*** 
1.6E-
04*** 
1.2E-
04*** 
5.2E-
05*** 
1.4E-
05* 
1.4E-
04*** 
6.5E-
05* 
1.9E-
04*** 
1.8E-
04*** 
1.5E-
04*** 
1.1E-
04*** 
3.3E-
05* 
5.1E-
06 
2.1E-
05* 
1.8E-
06* 
N 10722 4255 7358 2974 8993 3552 4888 1923 5248 2114 16964 6816 9935 3919 5748 2274 
Notes: *p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001; dependent variable entered in logarithmic form. 
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SILC 2007 longitudinal database 
